Since the beginning of the Arab uprisings Turkey’s security environment has changed dramatically. In the beginning Turkey tried to take advantage of the changes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region by supporting change, presenting itself as a source of inspiration for the transition countries and, particularly, strengthening its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood parties, which were expected to gain from the transformations in the region. Yet, especially the Syrian crisis has presented Turkey significant challenges and marked the end of Turkey’s Middle East policy based on “zero problems with neighbors”, use of soft power and mediation, and promotion of economic interdependence. Today, Turkey’s regional influence as well as its popularity has declined and Ankara has lost its image as constructive and stabilizing power. The emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) further contributed to the instability in Syria but also in Iraq that accentuated the already existing problems and created the new ones for Turkey.

The paper will first briefly summarize the main tenets of Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East prior to the Arab uprisings. Then, it will account for the evolution of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the MENA region since the Arab uprisings. There will be an analysis of how the AKP government read the developments in the region and what kind of policies it developed to deal with the new environment. Here there will also be special emphasis on the Syrian crisis especially through its three particular consequences: the refugee crisis, the impact on the Kurdish issue, and the effect on Turkey’s relations with the third parties. Finally, the paper will end with an analysis of possible impact of the recent parliamentary elections on Turkey’s foreign policy in the MENA region.

Turkey and the Middle East Prior to the Uprisings

Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East went through a significant transformation especially after the coming to power of the the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has been ruling as majoritarian governments since 2002. For political, economic and ideological reasons the AKP developed a comprehensive policy towards the region and initiated a new kind of activism. AKP’s foreign policy in the MENA region had both domestic and foreign policy objectives. The government hoped that its activism in the region would increase Turkey’s influence and thus contribute positively to Turkey’s stability and economic well-being. The government also expected that Turkey’s activism in the Middle East would increase Turkey’s importance in the West. Then-advisor to the Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu was frequently using bow-and-arrow anology to make the point: Defining Turkey as an archer, this analogy implied that the more Turkey drew the string of the bow through the East, the farther the arrow would fly to the West.

Turkey’s Middle East policy, however, also contributed to achieving the AKP’s domestic goals. The use of soft power as well as diplomatic and economic tools, and thus the desecuritization of Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East, was linked to one of the AKP’s domestic objectives, mainly to limit the role of the military in politics. Promoting economic relations in the region would similarly serve the AKP’s domestic interests because it would benefit Anatolian businesses, the backbone of the AKP’s successes in electoral politics. Finally, ideologically too, the narrative of Turkey’s “return” to the Middle East was an important element of the AKP’s anti-Kemalist ideology. All at once Turkey’s Middle East policy was allowing the AKP to criticize the republic’s foreign policy, reinventing Ottomanism and promoting an image of a powerful and respected country in the region, something it claimed was missing before.

Thus, the “new Middle East policy” clearly served the AKP’s interests in the region as well as in Turkey. Yet the implementation of the AKP’s vision in the Middle East would still not have been possible without an enabling international and regional environment. Globally, the AKP and its engagement in the Middle East fit perfectly with a post-9/11 era where the main international players were looking for inspirational examples in the Muslim world. Turkey ruled by the “post-Islamist” AKP was thought to provide exactly that both in terms of “compatibility of Islam with democracy” as well as having close ties with the West. Regionally, the post-2003 war Middle East welcomed Turkey for different reasons, including counterbalancing Iran (the Gulf Cooperation Council - GCC), or ending isolation (Syria). Furthermore, Turkey – a member of NATO and in accession negotiations with the EU – was not considered an actor that was ultimately firmly embedded in this region, which made its acceptance easier for other regional states.

For the AKP the MENA region became the most visible example of the implementation of three main pillars of the government’s foreign policy perspective: “zero problems with neighbors”, expanding economic relations, and mediating conflicts. The most notable example of “zero problems with neighbors” policy was the level and the extent of improvement in Turkey’s relations with Syria. Already normalizing their relations after the October 1998 Adana Agreement, the two countries expanded their relations into a close partnership under the AKP. The bilateral relationship acquired new meaning resulting especially from three developments: the establishment of the High Level Cooperation Council, which involved regular ministerial meetings between the two countries; the introduction of a visa-free travel scheme; and the fostering of bourgeoning economic relations. In December 2004 a Free Trade Agreement was signed and was ratified on January 1, 2007. As a result the volume of trade between the two countries reached almost 2.5 billion USD by 2010. The elimination of visa requirements in 2009 contributed to the proliferation of trade as well as of tourism[1]. There was some progress even in one of the problematic areas in bilateral relations: the water issue. The two countries began working on collaborative management of the Euphrates water resources. They also agreed on a dam project on the Asi/Oranthes River, called the “Friendship Dam”, on the Turkish-Syrian border. The protocol signed by the ministers of the two countries a few months before the beginning of the Syrian uprising not only signified deepening relations but also had a political meaning since it meant Syria’s recognition of the Hatay border.

Another major change in relations with Turkey’s neighbors occurred with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Since its establishment Turkey had perceived the KRG as a threat and refused to recognize its existence. The state officials avoided any contacts with its leaders. The KRG was seen as a supporter of PKK as well, a situation, which made any contact with this entity very difficult. The AKP was giving signs of its desire to make shifts in this policy despite continuing resistance particularly from the military. Eventually the government was successful in changing Turkey’s approach towards the KRG and established close political and economic relations through which both sides benefitted. Soon Turkey realized that oil-rich and landlocked KRG would be an attractive market for Turkish business, whereas the KRG perceived Turkey as its opening to the world. In due process KRG even became AKP government’s “partner” in its quest to resolve the Kurdish question in Turkey and in its relations with the PKK.

In addition to these specific cases Turkey’s relations with the Arab world and Iran in general improved significantly during this period. In achieving this objective the AKP government focused on soft power assets; emphasized engagement of all actors; promoted economic interdependence and mediation roles.

Economic relations boomed with the region as a whole. Turkey launched an initiative to set up a free trade zone with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. A policy of visa liberalization with regional countries was aimed at facilitating the free movement of people. Between 2002 and 2010, Turkish trade increased threefold with Syria, nearly fourfold with Maghreb countries, fivefold with the Gulf countries and Yemen, and sevenfold with Egypt. The number of Arab tourists to Turkey increased considerably, from 332,000 in 1991 to nearly 1.9 million in 2010[2].

During those years, in a stark reversal of Turkey’s traditional policy, the AKP government became eager to engage in mediating regional conflicts. Turkey’s involvement in resolving Lebanese domestic crises, its attempts to mediate between Israel and Syria, to achieve Palestinian reconciliation, to facilitate the participation of Iraqi Sunni groups in the 2005 parliamentary elections, and its involvement in the Iranian nuclear issue are just some examples of this policy. Turkey failed to achieve its objectives in resolving the conflicts in most of these cases, but through its involvement was able to brand itself as a benign regional power working to introduce stability and order.

Largely due to these developments the perception of Turkey in the region improved considerably. A survey conducted in the Arab world by Zogby International right at the time of AKP’s coming to power (March-April 2002) found that the respondents’ attitudes toward Turkey were very negative, above only the UK, the US, and Israel in the list. Quite the opposite the surveys conducted by TESEV, a Turkish think tank, in 2009 and 2010 found that Turkey was the most positively regarded foreign country in Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, there was a clear support for its mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (overall 78 per cent) and a belief that Turkey’s impact on peace in the Middle East was positive (overall 76 per cent). In the region as a whole 66 percent saw Turkey could as a “model” for the Middle East. The numbers were even higher in the Palestinian territories (77 per cent), Jordan (76 per cent), Syria (75 per cent) and Lebanon (71 per cent). Finally, Turkey’s was identified as the strongest economy in the Middle East by the respondents in all countries except Iran, where Turkey came behind Iran and Saudi Arabia[3].

Thus, the Arab uprising came at a time when Turkey was an important regional power and was able to establish quite close relations with regional countries. Furthermore, it was popular with the opposition groups in the Arab countries, be they Islamist or liberal, albeit for different reasons.

Turkey and the Arab Uprisings

The AKP government initially perceived the uprisings as an opportunity to strengthen its position in the region. After a brief period of surprise the government developed a policy response towards the uprisings with the aim of protecting and in fact strengthening its regional power status.

The first part of this policy response was the decision to side with the opposition movements against the regimes. This was not an easy decision to implement as AKP government had worked so hard to develop close relations with all these regimes, albeit successful in varying degrees. Furthermore, by doing so in some cases Turkey had to forsake its lucrative economic relations with some of these countries, such as the case in Libya. Yet the falling of existing regimes and the quick spill over of uprisings in the region led AKP government to believe that the tide is on the side of change. This was particularly evident in the words of then-Foreign Minister Davutoğlu who characterized the process of political changes that was unleashed by the uprisings as inevitable and irreversible. Davutoğlu argued that:

in this process, the place of Turkey is with the peoples of the region. Turkey will stand side by side with the peoples, their legitimate aspirations and work tirelessly for the realization of these aspirations and work tirelessly for the realization of these aspirations in a stable and peaceful fashion[4].

Overall, it was decided that change in these countries might in the long run offer even more possibilities for Turkey, and may be more importantly, Turkey was poised to benefit more than any other regional power. Thus, among the regional powers Turkey’s support to the opposition movements was less compartmentalized, although Ankara was more eager to support the uprising in some countries than in others, such as in Libya or Bahrain.

The second part of the new policy was more specific. Among the several opposition movements and groups the AKP government decided to particularly extend its support to Muslim Brotherhood parties. This decision was based on both strategic calculations and ideological reasons. In the early days of the “Arab Spring” the Muslim Brotherhood parties, more organized than other groups, seemed to strategically-located to benefit more from change and thus it pragmatically made sense to “invest” in them. Yet more significantly the AKP leadership also ideologically felt affinity with these movements. Having grown out of Turkey’s own Islamist movement, the AKP leadership historically had ties with Muslim Brotherhood parties. Thus, the AKP government preferred these parties to come to power and supported them in different ways. On their part, the Muslim Brotherhood parties also found making references to the AKP useful, particularly for passing the message of moderation to the West and to domestic groups that were suspicious of their democratic credentials.

The AKP government openly supported the Muslim Brotherhood parties that came to power in Egypt and Tunisia. In Egypt, the AKP provided election advice to the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the party of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially during the presidential elections mainly “to correct the image that the Muslim Brotherhood aimed to monopolize political activity[5].” Once Mohammed Morsi came to power, Turkey committed to provide Egypt with 2 billion USD, both to finance infrastructure projects and to contribute to foreign currency. Turkey also started to push for a new strategic partnership with Egypt. This clearly has been a new element that emerged in response to the changing regional political order in the Middle East with the post-Arab uprisings. Davutoğlu stated that, “For the regional balance of power, we want to have a strong, very strong Egypt. Some people may think Egypt and Turkey are competing. No. This is our strategic decision. We want a strong Egypt now[6].”

After the toppling of Ben Ali, Turkey’s relations with Tunisia have expanded as well and Ankara began to become involved in Tunisia’s political change after the first parliamentary elections. Turkey began to provide aid to Tunisia, particularly for administrative and civil infrastructure, social and educational infrastructure, productive sectors, police and security capacity building, and technical cooperation. In the meantime trade and investment relations between the two countries began to flourish. Finally, in December 2012 Turkey and Tunisia established High Level Strategic Cooperation Council.

Turkey also supported Muslim Brotherhood movement in countries where the movement had more limited power. Thus, in Libya, Yemen and Syria Turkey also pushed for a more extensive role for the Brotherhood. This policy made Turkish policy towards the “Arab Spring” increasingly controversial in the region. Turkey was no longer seen as an actor that was above the regional fragmentations. Other opposition forces in these countries increasingly criticized Turkey’s new position.

In fact, the AKP policy soon faced other challenges. The coup in Egypt in July 2013 and the developments in Libya, Yemen and Tunisia either weakened or completely undermined the Muslim Brotherhood parties in the political scene, which frustrated the AKP policies and led to a deterioration of Turkey’s relations with these countries as well as the anti-Muslim Brotherhood bloc in the region. When President Morsi was toppled by a military coup, Turkey chose to react harshly to this event. Thus, from strategic partnership negotiations, the relations between the two countries have degenerated towards a state of crisis. Turkey’s criticism of the coup has also created a rift in its relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the supporters of the Sisi regime. The eruption of conflict and civil war in Yemen, Libya and Syria further strained Turkey’s position as Ankara’s taking sides in these conflicts dragged Turkey into these conflicts at different levels. Parallel to these developments Turkey’s public image in the region started to decline and, may be more significantly, it became fragmented.

The Syrian Crisis

The real challenge to Turkey’s regional role, in fact, came with the Syrian crisis. Ankara’s relations with Syria that had transformed from enmity to amity were supposed to represent a model strategic partnership. Thus, when the Syrian uprising started the AKP government expected to have an influence there and sought to convince Bashar to initiate reforms. When it became clear that Turkey did not have any leverage over the Syrian regime after all, the AKP government drastically changed its policy. There have been three main elements of this new policy: Calling for a regime change; calling for an outside intervention; organizing and helping the opposition. All these three elements have pointed to an important shift in not only AKP’s previous foreign policy but also in Turkish foreign policy in general.

From the beginning the Syrian crisis has presented several challenges for Turkey; the most important among them have been the refugee crisis; the implications on the Kurdish issue, and the impact on the relations with the third parties.

1. The Refugee Crisis

One of the immediate yet long-lasting consequences of the Syrian crisis has been the wave of refugees that have come to Turkey since the beginning of the civil war. Turkey adopted an “open door policy” and announced that it “would welcome anyone who is escaping the brutality of the Assad regime.” As a result of this policy and the prolongation of the war Turkey now hosts the world’s largest community of Syrians. According to United Nations estimates, Turkey’s Syrian refugee population was more than 1.7 million as of mid-March 2015, and the large unregistered refugee population may mean the true figure is even larger. Until 2013 almost all refugees lived in camps, but now only a small fraction lives in 22 camps[7]. According to the government, by 2015 Turkey has spent 7.6 billion USD hosting Syrian refugees[8].

Turkey has in fact done its best to provide for the refugees in the camps. Yet it is the majority of refugees not residing in the camps but who are instead scattered across the country that are both suffering more and triggering social tensions in Turkey’s cities. Thus, this has been a humanitarian crisis that creates serious social, political, security and economic consequences.

2. The impact on the Kurdish issue

The impact of the crisis on Turkey’s Kurdish issue was evident early on, as Assad regime reiterated its support for the PKK in response to Turkey’s backing of the Syrian opposition. Later in the civil war and when increasingly pressured by the opposition forces, Assad regime withdrew its forces from Kurdish areas in the north of Syria. This development led to the emergence of one of the factions, Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is linked to the PKK, as the most influential actor there solidifying its control in different areas by “benefitting from regime weakening and armed opposition fragmentation[9].” Turkey tried to encounter these developments by cooperating with the KRG President Mesoud Barzani who was also wary about the advances of the PYD. In the meantime a peace process was also initiated with the PKK domestically.

The complexity of the issue became clear when in the Fall of 2014 Kobane, a Syrian Kurdish town on the border with Turkey, came under siege by ISIS, starting a wave of Kurdish refugees into Turkey. The government’s reluctance to help Kobane led to a two-day rampage by the supporters of the PKK in several cities. Thus, the conflict around Kobane put the Kurdish peace process that started in 2012 in danger. In the meantime, the US started to airlift arms, ammunition and medical supplies to Kobane, and together with its allies in anti-ISIS coalition began to bomb ISIS positions. These developments, together with mounting international pressures, led Turkey to allow Peshmerga forces from KRG to cross through Turkey to Kobane.

The PYD’s success in repelling the ISIS, effectively turned it into an ally of the anti-ISIS coalition on the ground. Yet, the advances of the PYD and its elevation to a partner of anti-ISIS coalition increased the hand of the PKK in Turkey and intensified cross-border links. The AKP government started to see this development as the main threat to Turkey’s security. Government officials and especially President Erdoğan began to criticize the PYD frequently. In several of his speeches Erdoğan equated PYD with ISIS and criticized US arms transfers to the PYD, claiming that Turkey would strike if those arms ended up in the hands of the PKK[10]. Turkey also declared that the PYD’s attempt to cross the Euphrates River and link its cantons in northern Syria as a red line and recently attacked PYD forces when they attempted to do so[11]. Therefore, the developments in Kurdish regions of Syria were linked closely with the developments in Turkey’s Kurdish problem.

3. The relations with the third parties

The Syrian civil war had an impact on Turkey’s relations with Iran and Russia, two main supporters of the Assad regime. Although there have been efforts to “compartmentalize” bilateral relations, these efforts have not always been successful. Similarly, Turkey’s relations with the US have been influenced by the developments in Syria. While Turkey has been critical of what it saw as inaction of the Obama administration, the US became critical of Turkey’s relations with some radical opposition groups and its reluctance to be an active member of the anti-ISIS coalition. Overall, Turkey’s Syria policy has led to its international isolation. As other states have changed their policies over the course of the developments in Syrian crisis and have adopted more pragmatic positions, Turkey continued to adamantly call for the overthrown of the Assad regime. This position put Turkey at odds with several states. At times Turkey even had divergent positions as to which opposition groups to support with countries such as Saudi Arabia that otherwise also aimed the toppling of Assad regime. Overall, Turkey was seen increasingly a less effective actor in Syria which led to the demise of its position as one of the leading regional powers.

Turkey’s Foreign Policy After the Elections

The AKP, which has been in power for 13 years, lost its parliamentary majority in the elections held on June 7th, 2015 elections and yet came to power in the re-run elections held on November 1st, 2015 with the highest vote the party has ever gotten (49 percent). The question is whether there will be some changes in AKP’s foreign policy in the MENA region in this new era. Although it would be difficult to make predictions for the coming four years of AKP rule, some arguments can be put forward for the near future:

For the overall direction of foreign policy there are strong reasons for not expecting major changes. The AKP has not made a revision of its foreign policy in the MENA region since the beginning of the Arab uprisings; it has not engaged in any self-reflection on its choices and domestically the voters have not punished it. More significantly, the same leadership, that is President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Davutoğlu, who have become more influential in foreign policy making in the last period and have increasingly become more ideological in their approach will remain at the helm during this period as well.

Yet, it is also true that even before the elections there were already some signs of shifts in Turkey’s policy in the region and they are mainly related to Syria. The developments in Syrian crisis began to force Turkey to initiate some changes in its policy. Russia raised the stakes by its robust military intervention in Syria. Iran, on the other hand, increased its weight after the nuclear deal with P5+1. As the AKP government realized its limitations and Turkey lost its influence in Syria and as pro-regime actors, mainly Russia and Iran, increased their power of setting the terms of Turkey started to change its policy. The new policy, which is expected to continue after the elections, has the following elements:

First, the AKP seems to be more flexible in terms of accepting a political transition period with Bashar Assad. This new position allowed Turkey to take an active part in the Vienna process. Clearly if there is really going to be an agreement on Syria and a beginning of a transition process, Turkey does not want to be left outside.

Second, increasingly isolated Turkey realized that it can no longer afford to continue to have an image of dragging its feet to act against ISIS and that it needed to mend fences with the US on this issue. The result was the agreement with the US in mid-July over the use of İncirlik airbase and Turkish airspace by the US warplanes in the fight against ISIS. Overall, Turkey became more actively involved in the anti-ISIS coalition.

Third, it seems that the AKP government policy towards the PYD will also continue at least in the medium term. This issue links closely with the evolution of Turkey’s Kurdish problem, which the government is saying that it plans to solve this problem without the PKK. This relatively new approach clearly signals the continuation of Turkey’s policy towards the PYD.

Conclusions

During the course of 13 years of AKP rule foreign policy in the MENA region has transformed significantly. Lured by its popularity in the region and its hard and soft power, the AKP government thought that it was well placed to benefit from the Arab uprisings. After all the AKP government had earlier defined Turkey’s role as an order-setter country and believed that it now at the moment of great change could play that role. Particularly in Syria, which then-Prime Minister Erdoğan called as “our internal matter”, the AKP government engaged in brinkmanship. Soon after Assad regime began to crack down on the opposition, the government started to threaten the Assad regime. The AKP, in fact, created the impression that it is willing to, or is actually going to, resort to extreme actions, including war to achieve the objective of toppling Assad regime. Yet, Turkey increasingly found its options limited when it became clear that the US will not intervene in Syria, the opposition continued to be fragmented, and, Russia and Iran increased their military support to Assad regime. The emergence of ISIS further strengthened the hand of Turkey’s two enemies, Assad and the PYD. In the meantime Turkey continued to be accused of at least indirectly supporting the ISIS. Thus, Turkey also became increasingly isolated internationally.

Beyond Syria Turkey’s influence in the region also dwindled. In addition to Syria, Ankara has no ambassadors in Egypt, Israel and Libya. Its relations with Iran as well as Iraqi central government are strained mainly over Syria policy. Even with KRG there are now more problems due to KRG’s rapprochement with PYD in their fight against ISIS and KRG’s concerns about the collapse of the peace process in Turkey. Relations with Saudi Arabia face challenges due to Egypt policy.

Recently, however, Turkey tried to increase its strategic importance for the US and the EU. The AKP government’s decision to join the anti-ISIS coalition and its negotiations with the EU countries on refugee issue aimed to serve this purpose. Yet, ultimately Turkey’s return to its more influential role would require a more significant change. During the election campaign Prime Minister Davutoğlu and AKP officials talked about AKP “resetting to factory settings”, meaning that it will return to its initial policies of political and economic reform. I would argue that Turkey should also return to its factory settings in its foreign policy in the Middle East. Such an approach would require Turkey to remain above regional fragmentation, engage with all actors even if it does not agree with their perspective, and play constructive roles. It is true that the regional and international context have changed significantly since then. Yet even under these new circumstances there is a room for maneuver for Turkey to play these roles. Normalization of relations with Egypt and Israel and refraining from being part of fragmentation in countries like Libya could be a starting point. A more significant development in this regard is clearly Syria. Of course, the evolution of the Syrian crisis towards a political transition is well beyond Turkey’s policy. Yet once that road is taken there are several constructive roles Turkey can play there. The re-launching of a Kurdish peace process would also strengthen Turkey’s hands in this context. Finally, focusing on economic engagement in post-sanctions Iran, in KRG and in Syria that started its process of political transition will be crucial in returning back to mutually beneficial relations. Although all this seem to be far off in the context of deepening crisis in the Middle East, the presence of actors with such a vision will be crucial in its realization.