Iran and the states of Gulf Cooperation Council have been in disagreement and conflict since the 1970s. This tension between the two sides of the Gulf has become a prominent feature in the international relations of the Gulf. However, the two sides have never been in direct confrontations, rather they have been engaging in proxy wars for the past 20 years. The war in Yemen, nonetheless, have taken this into another level of confrontation. The attacks on Saudi oil refineries by Iranian supported group Houthi reflects that this tension is now at its peak. While this is considered a significant development in this region, the small Gulf states appear to have mixed reactions towards the source of the recent attacks. In fact, small states in the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particulate are perceived as being very much peculiar due to the nature of their external behaviour, survival strategies and domestic realties. Regional dynamics in the Middle East over the past twenty years proved that states can produce unexpected behaviour.

Therefore, this paper seeks to examine the strategies and reactions of the small Gulf states towards Iran. These states have different responses towards not only the Iranian question, but also other issues in the Middle East. In particular, it asks Why Qatar, the UAE, Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait have different policies towards Iran? Despite the similarities between these states, why there is no consensus in regard to the relations with Iran? This article makes three key arguments. First, it can be argued that hedging reflects the policies of Qatar and Oman, but it is still difficult to test. Second, bandwagoning appear to be the predominant strategy for the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait, but it has not been consistent, rather based on regional dynamics. Third, the paper argues since the start of the Gulf crisis with Qatar in 2017, it is no longer accurate to refer to the GCC as one entity and therefore, there are great differences in their threat’s perceptions from Iran. The different perceptions of all the GCC states towards issues within the region led to further the fragmentation of this regional organization. Particularly, small states instead of cooperation, they engaged in regional competition, specifically between the UAE and Qatar. While the latter appears to be supported by Oman and Kuwait, the former receives support from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Thus, the division between small states reflects the uncertainty in their position towards Iran and also other issues in the region. It is important to analyse the behaviour of small states in the Gulf as having ‘sudden or unexpected behaviour’, where their political positions, behaviour and relations towards various issues within the region can change without it being explained. For example, the perception toward Iran can change from being real to imaged, or behaviour towards the question of Houthis in Yemen.

Introduction

Tension in the Gulf between Iran and GCC states since the so-called Arab Uprising in 2011 began to draw a new era of further confrontations. In particular, Iran and Saudi Arabia engaged in several proxy wars over the past years. However, Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) appear for the outsiders that they have consensus behaviour towards the threats from Iran. This is due to the fact that until 2017, most of small states have been following and sometimes supporting the Saudi’s foreign policy towards Iran. Nonetheless, the GCC since 2011 when Arab Uprising led to further instabilities in the Middle East, and the Gulf crisis in 2017 the led to the fragmentation of this regional organization.

Before 2011, security of small Gulf states have relied, and continue, on external powers from outside the region such as the US. In Addition, regional cooperation contributed to the stability of small states despite its weakness (the GCC and Arab league). This is due to the fact that regional small states failed to create a genuine collective security system that can support the survival of states. What contributed to this failure is the fragmentation of small states in the Gulf that are part of the GCC. Therefore, the formation of the GCC was established based on threat perceptions and changing regional dynamics in the Middle East. This led to making it weak regional organization. Nonetheless, it helped small Gulf states to increase their deterrence and avoid direct threats.

With regional changes in the Middle East since 2011 and changing small states behaviour, small states such as the UAE and Qatar increased their activities at the regional level to prove their ability to engage and influence in the region as an alternative way to limit security threats coming from various part of the region. This led to increasing military expenditures of almost all small states in the Gulf which include the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait. However, the changing of these states since the Arab Uprising divided these states into three categories, Kuwait and Oman being more neutral in their policies, while Qatar and the UAE choose to new alliances. Consequently, there have been some changes in the existing strategies of hedging, bandwagning and balancing. The self-reliance strategies is near impossible for these states and therefore they tend to use their economic capabilities to deter some of the existing threats, such as exerting power and influence to win further regional support through the use of foreign aid. Therefore, their strategies towards the perceived or real threat from Iran have been different. Therefore, this paper seeks to examine how the small Gulf states adopted new strategies and reaction towards Iran to avoid the continues security threats from the region in general and Iran in particular. The paper will divide into three main parts, first, examine the currant security threats towards the small Gulf states from Iran, second looks into the strategies adopted by Gulf states before 2011, and third examine how the small Gulf states adopted new reactionary behaviour based on the new changing dynamics in the Gulf, particularly with the Gulf crisis and continues instabilities within the Middle East.

The Small Gulf states: regional threats

Most studies on small states focused on the security issues of all states that emerged after the end of cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union. This is due to the fact that small states were inactive with limited capabilities. In the Gulf, however, small states emerged in the regional and international system relatively with economic powers. This allowed them to use oil wealth as a tool in their foreign policies, to reflect their ability to influence in the region, albeit limited before the end of Cold War. Nonetheless, small Gulf states emerged weak and vulnerable, and without oil and international support they would have struggled with survival and received in direct threat since early 1970s.

Nonetheless, despite the development of the small Gulf states military, economic and political powers, they remain fragile and subject to threats. Security threats of the Small Gulf states can be categorized into four; first, state actors such as Iran in the Middle East which has been the main concern for the UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain but limited with Qatar and Oman due to their different external behaviours. Second, during the past forty years, non-state actors played increasing role on posing serious threats towards the small states, such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and some political Islam movements that aspired for political agenda in the region such as Muslim Brotherhood. Third, domestic security due to the demographic imbalance, high unemployment rate, fiscal problems…etc. This domestic dimension can contribute to any future political instabilities in Oman and Bahrain, while Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait might see less pressure from their populations due to larger economic wealth. Fourth, geopolitical dynamics might play a vital role in determining the Gulf small relations with Iran. These states, particularly, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE appreciate the importance of the Straight of Hormouz as a vital access gate for export of oil. The recent attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf reflect that small states could be forced to re-think their relations with Iran to avoid regional political unrest that can harm their economies indirectly.

These threats seem for outsiders as a commonality between small Gulf states. However, it is important to note that there is a problem of perception and misperception. In other words, are these threats from Iran towards the small Gulf states are real or imagined? Do these countries share the same concerns? It is important to put into the perspective that the conflict between small Gulf States and Iran are deeply rooted in the identity dimension, Arabs Vs Persians. According to Fred Halliday “he conflict between Gulf states, and between Arabs and Persians, is a product not so much of imperialist interference, or of long, millennial or atavistic, historical antagonisms, but of two interrelated, modern, processes, state formation and the rise of nationalism.”[1] The latter two factors ‘state formation and nationalism’ contributed significantly to how small Gulf States should perceive Iran. The UAE has received real threats from Iran before and after the formation of this country when Iran occupied three islands that belong to the UAE. Just two days before the establishment of the UAE, Iran occupied Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs islands. This has led to the UAE to perceive threats from Iran as real, and can potentially lead to de-stabilize the Emirates. This Iranian behaviour constructed an idea that Iran is a dangerous regional state actor that threatens the stability of small states. In addition, the Persian nationalism have threatens the identities of Arab in the southern part of Iran and therefore this can be used in other small Gulf states such as in Bahrain through the support of Shia population. Moreover, the Iranian’s desire to influence state in the Gulf especially after the USSR support of Iranian regime led them to focus on southern part of the Gulf. Fred Halladay argues that

“This assertion of Iranian influence in the Gulf was a result, however, of another factor, namely the improved relations with the USSR. If after the 1953 coup relations between Tehran and Moscow had been cool, reaching a critical point in 1959, there was thereafter a significant improvement, such that Iran felt, by the middle 1960s, that it did not face a major threat to the north. This meant, in effect, that Iran could refocus its forces to face a possible challenge in the south, from Iraq, and to promote its presence in the Gulf. On the Iraqi side, the revolution of 1958 also opened the way for increased confrontation with Iran: the assertion of Iraqi nationalist aspirations on the one hand, and the involvement of Iran, real or imagined, in the now fragmented domestic politics of Iraq, made the connection with Iran for the first time a factor in Iraqi politics.”[2]

The desire to influence and be hegemonic in the region created further fear for the small Gulf states which led them to adopt different policies depending on their relations with Iran. However, after the Iranian revolution, tension with Iran continued after the start of the use of religion as a tool in Iran’s foreign policy to protect Shia communities across the region. This was the start of the Iranian intervention in Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Syrian and Lebanon and some other states. Small Gulf states realized the use of sectarian politics than can lead to instability in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia if Iran continue to play interventionist strategies in the Gulf. Therefore, threat perceptions remained predominant in the small stats foreign policy perception of Iran.

In the past 20 years, most Arab states perceived Iran as on the of the main actors that led to the political instabilities in the region, and therefore supporting some of the small states in the Gulf. Sectarianism, proxy wars and interventionist policies of Iran determined the perception of threats from the small Gulf states. However, it is important to note that this perception might be the same with Iran’s view towards the Gulf, where Saudi Arabia plays active role in the region.

The Gulf states strategies towards Iran before 2011

Small Gulf states continued through the new millennia to see Iran as the main actor of political instability in many parts of the Middle East, as well as contribute to creating political unrest in some of the small Gulf states such as in Bahrain and Kuwait. Nonetheless, we have seen continues and sometimes different policies on how to deal with Iranian threats. Security protection policies adopted by the small Gulf state can been divided into three; first, enhancing military capabilities; second seeking external support from Western powers, mainly the US; and third collective security through regional and organizations or coalitions.

Since the formation of the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait, military expenditure have been very clear. Their spending on the military capabilities reflected the continues concern and threats from regional actors mainly Iran. Jarzabek points out that “A significant increase in the military spend- ing of the Arab Gulf states began during the mid-1980s, sparking an upward trend that, despite some periodic fluctuations, continues today. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 prompted not only Kuwait, but also Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., to significantly increase their military spending.”[3] This has continued over the past two decades, and with political instability in the region and Yemen War, Gulf countries are spending more and more on arms.

Furthermore, small Gulf states, since their formation and after the departure of the British from the region, have relied extensively on the US for their security. The US security umbrella continued to be the main guarantor for security in the region. Despite changes in the US administration, it has continued to play a significant role in the security of small states. Even during Obama’s administration and current one, the US remains a major security partner. According to Katzman “U.S. defense ties to the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates [UAE], Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) are extensive and since their inception have evolved in many unintended ways not always attuned to U.S. interests.”[4]
Giving the uncertainties of US external behaviour towards the Gulf, the small Gulf states have taken new path of diversifying their security partners by establishing and strengthening their security relations with some European and Asian partners. This has been the case until 2011, and continued, to some extent after that despite political unrest across the Middle East.

The Gulf collective security under the regional organization, the GCC, was the weakest strategy due to the differences between the small Gulf states. Despite that the share some security agreement, they were unable to agree on the security threats in the region in order to establish strong security policies towards Iran under the umbrella of the GCC. Gulf States lack consensus on their reactions towards Iran. Three strategies have been visible in the external behaviour of these states in response to Iranian threat/influence in the region, as the below table indicates.

	Strategy	With	Reasons
Qatar	strategic hedging	Turkey and the US	To avoid being fully dependent on one power and to allow Qatar engage at the regional level
Oman	Hedging	relies on the US, and maintains good links with all states in the region	This approach allows Oman to diversify its sources of security by playing all sides to its advantage (Binhuwaidan, 2019)
UAE	Mixed between Bandwagoning, hedging and alliance strategies	The US, Saudi Arabia, the UK. Egypt	A tactic to diversify threats, exert power and influence in the region, but rely on the US as the main security umbrella
Bahrain	Bandwagoning	Saudi Arabia, US and the UK	To contain local threat and Iranian influence/threat
Kuwait	Mixed between bandwagoning and hedging	Saudi Arabia and the US	Neutral state, local threats, geographic proximity to Iran and Iraq

The Small Gulf states new reactions and policies towards Iran since 2015

Two main events since 2015 drew a new era of confrontation between the Gulf and Iran. First, in 2015, Saudi Arabia managed to create a regional coalitions to provide military support and engage in military confrontation against Houthi group that is supported by Iran. According to Baron

“In March 2015, the president of Yemen, Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, was forced to flee the country by Houthi rebels. The Zaidi Shia Houthis were supported by elements of Yemen’s military loyal to the country’s former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. In response, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition of a dozen countries to restore Yemen’s internationally recognised government to power. The coalition included the Gulf Cooperation Council states (with the exception of Oman), Egypt, and Sudan, and was backed by the United States and United Kingdom.”[5]

Second, in June 2017, the Gulf states witnessed an unprecedented intra-GCC conflict. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain decided to completely end their diplomatic relations with Qatar and impose sever blockade. According to Tharoor

“The Arab states of the Persian Gulf are in the grip of an unprecedented regional crisis. In Monday's early hours, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt released coordinated statements, announcing a diplomatic break with the tiny-yet-wealthy peninsular nation of Qatar. They cut air, sea and land links and ordered Qatari officials and nationals stationed in their countries to return home.”[6]

These two events have contributed significantly to on-going confrontations between the two sides of the Gulf. Iran and Saudi Arabia engaged in a proxy war that dragged other small states in the GCC to support Saudi Arabia directly or indirectly. The UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait decided to support Saudi role in Yemen. However, Qatar was obliged to be part of the coalitions, while Oman have not joined from the beginning. Qatar was latter expelled from the coalition due to the accusation that Qatar supports extremism and terrorism. In fact, given the Sultanate’s traditionally neutral and non-interventionist foreign policy, Muscat’s decisions to keep Omani forces out of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and not join Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. in severing ties with Qatar are unsurprising.[7] Oman preferred to play a role of mediator that a contributor to the conflict, where it has held various roundtable talks to find a solution for the conflict. On the other hand, after expelling Qatar from the coalition, it began to call for an end to the conflict in Yemen. Therefore, perception the small Gulf states towards the Houthi can be summarized as follow:

•Saudi Arabia perceives Houthis as a terrorist group and poses serious threats towards the Kingdom and it is supported by Iran.
•Oman adopts different strategy despite bordering Yemen and does not see a threat from Houthi. It’s good relation with Iran, Oman determined to avoid being dragged into the war, and maintain its neutral position.
•Qatar joined the regional coalition against the Houthi but asked to leave despite its limited role and capabilities. It’s relations with Iran improved significantly after the sanctions by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt. In other words, it was forced to shift its policies towards Iran due to the sanctions/blockade.
•Kuwait joined the regional coalition against the Houthi but played extremely limited role in the coalition, but this was surprising due to fear of Iran’s role in the region
•UAE’s role has been significant in Yemen, and to some extent, it has played a vital role alongside Saudi Arabia. It sees that Houthi poses serious threat not only towards Saudi arabia but also towards the region. Due to the UAE’s role in the region, its security concern has increased and sees Iran as the mains source of instabilities in various states in the Middle East. Therefore, it has increased its activities in the region to counter the rise of non-state actors both those supported by Iran and other political-Islam movements.
•Bahrain’s role was very much similar to the Saudi and Emirati due to the Shia’s population. Since Arab Uprising, Bahrain has feared the Iran could support the Shia against the monarchy and that could lead to political instability. It stands strongly against the Houthi and has contributed, to some extent, to the coalitions despite its limited military capabilities.

Therefore, it is clear that Oman and Qatar are taking different positions and policies in the region, as well as Kuwait trying not to be part of the Saudi coalition due to its neutral foreign policy. In contrast, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE have been much clearer on their position towards Iran. This division within the GCC towards Iran led to small states, like Qatar and Kuwait to adopt new policies towards Iran by strengthening their relations with Iran, while keeping hopes that the GCC can retain its strength. On other hand, Iran realized that this is an opportunity to strengthening its relations with individual states in the GCC particularly, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait. According to Vakil, “Over the years, instead of dealing with the GCC as a bloc, Tehran has pursued bilateral relations with Oman, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, capitalizing on internal GCC tensions, which have escalated since the 2017 Qatar crisis. These ties have enabled Tehran to protect itself from past US-led isolation and containment efforts, but have not graduated beyond reactionary, pragmatic engagement.”[8]
Therefore, three main changes in Small Gulf states relations with Iran took place after 2015. First, due to Gulf crisis, Qatar restored full relations with Iran. In 2017, Qatar’s Foreign Ministry announced that it was sending its ambassador back to Tehran after a 20-month hiatus that started in January 2016, when Qatar broke off relations after attacks on two Saudi diplomatic facilities in Iran.[9] This was expected behaviour from Qatar due to intra-GCC rift. In addition, Qatar strengthened relations with Oman and Kuwait where it has led to further the division within the GCC. Second, Oman continued to improve its relations with Iran, and preferred to play a mediator role not only between the GCC states, but also between Iran and the Saudi Arabia particularly for the issue of Yemen. Furthermore, Oman perception of the GCC as a Saudi dominated organization and weak continued and preferred to strengthen its role within the GCC. Third, Kuwait continued its strategic hedging policies. Its relations with Iran have fluctuated over time, and it appears that Kuwait does not want to upset neither the Saudis nor the Iranian. Therefore, according to Baabood “Left to their own strategic calculations, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait would not willingly join the anti-Iran coalition. Indeed, they prefer to play a neutral role and, at times, to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These smaller states are likely to maintain this position, carefully watching how the tension between Riyadh and Tehran unfolds – particularly in relation to whether the Trump administration will adopt a more confrontational policy on Iran”[10]

The UAE, however, while maintaining good economic relations with Iran, it has been very rigid about the role of Iran in the region. Since 2011, the UAE’s new policies is to strengthen its relations with Saudi Arabia, as well as exert more power and influence in the region. This new policy of regional engagement is new and prefers always to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia in various issues across the region. Bahrain has not adopted new policies but continued its foreign policy behaviour by aligning itself with Saudi Arabia. The security umbrella for this tiny state is not just the US, but also Saudi Arabia due to various reasons.

Conclusion: Iranian Threat real or Imagined?

The political development in the Gulf over the past ten years can bring back the real question about GCC small state threat perception from Iran; is the Iranian threat real or imagined? It is clear from the above analysis that the six Gulf Cooperation Council have different views in regards to threat perceptions from Iran. In fact, not only the GCC states believe that the Iranian threat is real, rather some believe it is imagined.

Country	Imagined Threat	Real Threat	Reason
Qatar	Imagined		Qatar shares with Iran with of the world largest gas field. In addition, since 2017, Qatar received significant support from Iran during the crisis, mainly strengthening economic relations and restoring full diplomatic relations. The US military base in Qatar gives the small state further security and prevents any other states from posing any kind of threats.
Oman	Imagined		Historically, Oman has always maintained good relations with Iran and never perceived Iran as a real threat within the Gulf. However, it has balanced its relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. According to Baabood, “Oman’s good relations with Iran did not change following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Unlike other Gulf Arab countries, Oman did not fear the revolutionary regime in Iran nor support the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. As a result, Oman was able to mediate a peace deal between the sides – and has mediated on many other issues involving Iran since.”[11]
Bahrain		Real	For a very long time, Bahrain believes that Iran supports Shia opposition and anti-government groups which pose serious domestic threats. The Shia opposition seeks for political change to give them a major role to play in the Bahrain politics. Bahraini government, therefore, sees that some Shia act as a representative for the Iranian to seek further power and influence in Bahrain.
Kuwait		Real	Relations with Iran have not been consistent, rather fluctuated over time. This is based on the Saudi role in the region and regional dynamics that determine the small state behaviour. However, Kuwait has accused Iran of intervening in its politics and supporting groups like Quds Force.
The UAE		Real	Despite the strong economic relations, the UAE has strong argument about its threat perception from Iran. Two days before the formation of the UAE in 1971, Iran occupied three Emirati islands. This has constructed an image about Iran that it poses serious threat towards Arab countries in general and the Gulf in particular. This fear has continued after the Iranian revolution, where Gulf countries agreed on the fact that the Islamic republic have objective to spread particular ideology in the region.

Therefore, the reactions and policies of small Gulf states have been mixed between adopting new strategy of engaging military to fight the non-state actors supported by Iran and being neutral. The role of Iran in Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon forced some of the small states, such as the UAE to contribute fighting proxy wars alongside Saudi Arabia. Other smaller states supported indirectly some of the Saudi policies towards Iran. Nonetheless, with on-going intra GCC crisis. Qatar and Oman maintained good relations with Iran due to their different perception and their economic and political relations with Iran. Qatar found Iran as an economic partner after the sanctions, while Oman historically have always been neutral and adopting an independent foreign policy that contradicts with what the Saudi and Emirati seek. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the GCC small states have consensus behaviour toward Iranu, rather there is an individualistic approach. Each small state base its relationship with Iran on domestic, regional and international dimensions.