After the election of President Donald Trump, a number of analysts argued that those trying to understand U.S. foreign policies should ignore the tweets and wait to see what President Trump would do. Over a year into the Trump administration some experts continued to argue the tweets matter far less than the actual policy, finding more continuity than change on key foreign policy issues, including in the Middle East.[1] The dilemma is that it is easy to cherry pick examples of continuity, and just as easy to identify policies that mark a serious departure from foreign policy norms of the past.[2]

In many cases, we see sheer confusion about what U.S. policy is on any given issue. During his first fifteen months, before the appointment of John Bolton as National Security Adviser, the gaps between the President and his national security team were often so wide that American foreign policy analysts questioned whether the President’s national security positions, in his tweets and other statements, reflected the administration’s policy positions in practice.[3] Allies and adversaries around the world have been equally mystified as to what or who represents U.S. foreign policy.

American Middle East policy is no exception. The confusion over where the United States stood in the rift among Arab Gulf states during the announced blockade of Qatar in June 2017 is a good example. The President tweeted in support of the Saudi position while then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, taking a relatively neutral stance, attempted unsuccessfully to mediate the dispute. Given the presence of a major U.S. airbase in Qatar, the President’s initial stance siding with the Saudis and Emiratis against Qatar took many in the Department of Defense by surprise as well. The President later distanced himself from the Gulf spat, but the episode reflects the chronic dilemma of mixed signals from different quarters in the administration.

In other policy areas, we have seen confusion but also continuity with previous policies, particularly in active war zones like Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Because the Trump administration has largely delegated authority in these conflicts to the Department of Defense, the continuation of U.S. policies on military interventions is not surprising. As during the Obama administration, the overriding concern has been countering the Islamic State (ISIS), not intervening to overthrow the Assad regime. The Trump administration’s military strike in Syria following a chemical weapons attack in April 2017 appeared to be signaling a shift in policy but was ultimately limited in scope and did not lead to further escalation or greater support for Syrian opposition groups. In fact, the Trump administration has continued policies of seeking to find accommodation with Russia, and then Turkey, on de-escalation zones as U.S. forces continue to focus on defeating ISIS forces in the country.

In Iraq, the United States maintains support for the Iraqi government under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi despite concerns about the entrenchment of Shia militia forces in the country in the aftermath of the fight against ISIS. And in Yemen, the United States continues its support to the Saudi-led campaign against the Houthi rebels amid growing concerns about the humanitarian catastrophe in the country. Indeed, the Trump administration has largely removed human rights and democracy promotion from its regional policies, and largely from its wider foreign policy agenda.[4] Previous administrations also often relegated human rights to the backburner as they pursued other foreign policy priorities, but we have never seen U.S. values dismissed and dictators embraced to the extent as is occurring in the Trump administration. The only exception appears to be Iran, where the administration took an active stance in calling out Iranian human rights violations in the wake of the protests in the winter of 2017-2018.

When it comes to the three core priority areas of the Trump administration in the Middle East—confronting extremism, the Iran nuclear deal and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process—we see notable changes in the direction and articulation of U.S. policy. The most significant shift is a singular focus on Iran, with all three key priorities shaped through the prism of how to confront Iranian regional influence. While containing Iran has arguably been a mainstay of US regional policy since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, U.S. policies over successive administrations have focused on a variety of other areas, from confronting Soviet influence in the 1980’s to containing both Iraq and Iran in the 1990’s to fighting Al Qaeda after 2001 and overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003. Iran has always posed a serious threat to U.S. interests, but it was one among many regional challenges for the United States. The Obama administration arguably went the furthest in trying to downgrade the Iranian threat among competing regional priorities.

But for the Trump administration, Iran is the most significant regional challenge. The other priorities, fighting extremism and striking the ‘ultimate peace deal,’ are framed in the context of confronting Iran, notwithstanding the fact that military campaigns in the region continue to focus on Sunni extremists. The Trump administration views Iran as the primary source of the region’s instability and has doubled down in support of allies who share this perspective, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel. The following assessment of the Trump administration’s approach in these three core priority areas will underscore the overwhelming focus on Iran, but also the difficulty in implementing policies that do not always match the complex realities of the region. It also shows that when it comes to the Middle East, it is wise to take the President’s tweets seriously.

Countering extremism is about confronting Iran

While U.S. military campaigns in the region are still largely focusing on rolling back Sunni extremists, mainly ISIS and Al Qaeda affiliates, the Trump administration’s political approach to countering terrorism in the Middle East has elevated Iran’s role in fostering extremism and relies more significantly on allies like Saudi Arabia as regional pillars of this strategy than the previous administration.

The counter-terrorism center launched in Riyadh in May 2017 and the President’s warm embrace of his Saudi hosts on that visit illustrate the new approach. The President’s visit was intended to demonstrate that the Arab and Islamic world is united in the fight against extremist ideology, but the theatrics and make-up of the summit meeting signaled an effort not to establish unity but to bolster Sunni allies to confront Iran. Notably, no major Shi’a figure attended the gathering (Iraq was represented by its Kurdish Sunni president, Lebanon by its Sunni Prime Minister). The framing of extremism in sectarian terms and conflation of Iran-backed groups with Sunni-based terrorism was another shot against the Islamic Republic.

While the Trump administration has put a stronger emphasis on Iran’s links to terrorism, it is important to point out that concerns about Iran’s influence in the region are not particularly new and escalated significantly following the 2003 Iraq war. The unrest following the Arab uprisings and the rise of ISIS offered additional opportunities for Tehran to exploit, raising fears of Iran controlling four capitals (Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sanaa) and increasing the perceived expansion of a ‘Shi’a crescent’ from Iran to the Mediterranean. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s ability to remain in power with Iranian and Russian support has reinforced these fears.

Leaders in Israel regularly refer to concerns about an Iranian land bridge from Tehran to Lebanon, where Iran’s growing presence in Iraq and Syria allows for the transfer of Iranian personnel and weaponry to Hizballah and other non-state allies threatening Israel. The Saudis are equally concerned about Iranian missile transfers to Houthi forces in Yemen, creating a new cross border threat in the context of the wider Saudi-Iranian political competition for regional influence. In reality, Iran’s ability to expand its soft and hard power throughout the region faces serious limits, and a variety of actors are actively pushing back against Iranian power projection. [5] Iran also faces its own vulnerabilities at home. Nonetheless, the perception of unfettered Iranian influence is widespread in the region and in Washington.

The Trump administration has enthusiastically embraced this narrative of expanded Iranian influence and danger to frame its regional posture on countering extremism. From the earliest days in the Trump administration top advisors like then-national security advisor Michael Flynn spoke about “putting Iran on notice.”[6] Other senior officials like U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, have repeatedly called out Iran’s links to terrorist groups across the region. With Iranian missile fragments behind her at one press conference to underscore Iran’s support for Houthi rebels in Yemen, Haley called Iran the “arsonist” that is “fanning the flames of conflict in the region,” arguing that it is hard to find a terrorist group in the Middle East “that doesn’t have Iran’s fingerprints all over it.”[7] The Trump administration also began highlighting claims connecting Iran with Al Qaeda during the period when the President began challenging the Iran nuclear deal.[8] President Trump even used language in tweets following the winter protests in 2017-2018 that were read as calls for regime change, not just a change of Iranian government behavior.[9] Taken together, the Trump administration’s hostile rhetoric and policies toward Iran is unmistakable and defining theme in its broader regional policy.

As the Riyadh summit demonstrated, the administration has elevated Saudi Arabia’s importance as a key pillar in confronting Iran’s influence. Major arms sales and support for the Saudi campaign in Yemen accelerated. Multi-billion-dollar U.S. arms sales to regional partners is nothing new, with major arms deals to the Saudis taking place in the Obama administration. But the context of elevated Saudi importance in U.S. regional policy gives them more significance in the Trump administration, and they now come with fewer constraints tied to human rights considerations.[10] The Trump administration is even considering an agreement for Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy development that would exceed the standards set for other regional states despite proliferation risks.[11] The shift in leadership in Saudi Arabia to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has expressed staunchly anti-Iranian views and has developed a close relationship with the President’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, further cemented the synergy between Washington and Riyadh in the Trump era.[12]

But the administration’s ambitions to capitalize on fears of Iranian expansion by building a Sunni coalition to confront Iran have bumped against the messy realities of the regional politics. Just over a week after the Riyadh counter-terrorism summit, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates led a blockade against Qatar, a rift within in the Sunni Arab Gulf that continues. Even before the Qatar crisis, the Arab Gulf states did not have unified positions on key issues such as Iran and Islamic political movements like the Muslim Brotherhood.[13] The result is an uncomfortable situation in which Gulf countries ally with the United States while deepening their conflicts among one another.

Turkey is another ally that does not fit neatly into efforts to build a Sunni coalition against terrorism and Iran. Turkey’s primary interest in Syria is countering Kurdish forces to prevent an independent state, but these same forces have been important allies for U.S. forces in the fight against ISIS. Again, we face a situation where U.S. partners are fighting each other. To make matters worse, Turkish concerns about Kurds in Syria have pushed the United States’ Turkish allies closer to Iran. To add to the confusion, Iran-backed militias are also de facto fighting on the U.S. side against ISIS in Iraq and the United States supports the Iraqi government’s position against Kurdish independence, which happens to be the Iranian position as well.

While the Trump administration maintains a Manichaean view of regional politics that seeks to support a Saudi-led alliance to fight extremists, including Iran, the implementation of this policy is proving difficult. Despite the tough rhetoric on Iran and the growing conflation of Iran with other regional terrorism challenges, it is unclear how the administration can operationalize or sustain this approach in key conflict zones. The approach also significantly increases the risks for escalation with Iran, particularly given the severing of key communication channels with Iran that had been developing in the Obama administration.

Undoing the Iran Nuclear Deal

The starkest example of reversing previous policy with a more confrontational approach to Iran is the administration’s position on the Iran nuclear deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Though he never detailed the reasons for his attitude, Mr. Trump made no secret of his disdain for the nuclear deal during the presidential campaign and continued to call the agreement the “worst deal ever” once in office.[14] The administration’s hostile approach to Iran beyond the nuclear agreement contributed to uncertainty about whether the President would scrap the deal.

In the first months in office many analysts thought the President would accept the agreement as long as Iran continued to comply, particularly because his top national security advisors at the time supported staying in the agreement. Even advisors and analysts who did not like the original agreement argued that if Iran was complying an American withdrawal could risk U.S. isolation and the loss of leverage in the future. Defense Secretary James Mattis and the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that Iran was complying with the agreement, echoing multiple IAEA reports certifying Iranian compliance. Indeed, the President twice certified Iranian compliance after assuming office, as required by U.S. law every ninety days.

But in October 2017, the President made the decision to decertify the JCPOA against the advice of his national security team and European allies, and despite no change in Iranian compliance with the agreement. Some argued the decertification decision was only symbolic, offering a compromise that allowed the President to register his disapproval of the agreement without ending it, because only the re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions would violate the deal. But in reality, the decision set in motion a chain of events that began undermining the agreement and raising questions about its future viability. The October decertification decision forced a sixty-day review period in Congress that could have re-imposed nuclear-related sanctions that would have killed the deal. After strong lobbying from Europe, Congress did nothing during the sixty days, moving the fate of the deal back to the White House.

The next major decision point came in mid-January when the administration had to decide whether to continue waiving the nuclear-related sanctions necessary for the deal’s survival. The President waived the sanctions,[15] but gave Europe one last chance to “fix” the agreement within 120 days or the United States would withdraw. In his January address, the President outlined his major areas of concern with the JCPOA, primarily related to Iran’s missile development, inspections of military sites and sunset clauses.[16] The State Department is engaging European partners to work on addressing these areas in an attempt to find a compromise that might save the agreement.[17] While the Europeans have made it clear they are not willing to renegotiate the JCPOA, European leaders have indicated a willingness to discuss supplemental agreements on non-nuclear areas, like missile development. Whether U.S. European partners can propose ideas that will be enough to satisfy President Trump remains to be seen, not to mention whether Iran would accept new measures that might be proposed in any transatlantic bargain.

Indeed, the core bargain of the JCPOA was Iran’s nuclear rollback in exchange for economic relief through the lifting of sanctions. The uncertainty sparked by the Trump administration’s threats has already created a chilling effect on international trade and investment in Iran even without the formal collapse of the JCPOA.[18] Iranians are disappointed the agreement has not brought the economic benefits they were promised, threatening to weaken public support for the JCPOA and the leaders who promoted it. President Rouhani, Iran’s most prominent proponent of the nuclear accord, is facing increased domestic pressure following the widespread protests across the country in the winter of 2017-18. Rouhani has not been able to deliver on high expectations that the JCPOA would bring economic relief to ordinary Iranians. The result would unfortunately be an opportunity for hardliners who never liked the agreement to blame the United States for its unraveling while deflecting attention away from their own failings. Iranian leaders are already signaling that they may leave the agreement if Iran does not receive the economic benefits they expected.[19]

If President Trump pulls out of the agreement, Europe may take steps to preserve the JCPOA without the United States. Some leaders have indicated Europe may consider reinstating blocking sanctions to protect European companies from U.S. secondary sanctions, as occurred during the 1996 crisis over Cuba sanctions. But it is unclear whether Europe will have the same leverage to back the United States off from enforcing extraterritorial sanctions against their companies and whether European business will be willing to risk losing the U.S. market. In any case, such a trade war would create the type of uncertainty that is likely to only further discourage the economic investment the Iranians expected from the agreement, increasing the prospects for the deal’s collapse once the United States pulls out.

If this scenario unfolds, we could be back to a pre-JCPOA situation quickly where Iran resumes nuclear enrichment to levels that its neighbors consider unacceptable by placing Iran too close to a threshold where it could produce nuclear weapons if it chose to do so. A key component of containing Iran is keeping a lid on its nuclear program. President Trump’s policies that have put this agreement into question may be the biggest strategic miscalculation in his Middle East agenda, significantly reversing previous policies and increasing proliferation risks that will be difficult to once again reverse.

The ‘Ultimate Deal’: solving the Arab-Israeli conflict

President Trump is not the first President to want to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. President Bush, Clinton, and Obama all engaged in serious peacemaking efforts, all without success. Likewise, President Trump has elevated solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a top priority for his administration. He assigned Jared Kushner to lead the effort in coordination with Jason Greenblatt, a longtime lawyer for Donald Trump. Kushner and Greenblatt made multiple trips to the region and have reportedly been developing a peace initiative that is nearly complete but has not yet to be made public. By all accounts the plan seeks to bring in Saudi and broader Arab acceptance of Israel to sweeten the deal for Israeli concessions on the Palestinian front, though the types of concessions the administration might demand of Israel is unclear. The willingness of the Trump administration to press for Israeli concessions is also uncertain given its staunchly pro-Israel positions and President Trump’s ambiguous statements about a two-state solution. Reports suggest the Saudis may be backing a peace plan that is far more favorable to Israel than any other plan previously presented by a U.S. administration, and that few believe Palestinians could accept.[20]

The framing of the peace initiative as bringing in the broader Arab world fits with the Trump administration’s attempts to capitalize on hostility toward Iran to forge a region-wide alliance against it; solving the Arab-Israeli conflict could bolster those efforts according to this logic. Many observers believe this is an optimal time for a regional approach to the conflict given the Arab world is preoccupied with other conflicts and increasingly concerned about Iran’s growing influence, putting them de facto on the same side as Israel. Expanding Israeli ties with Arab Gulf nations, albeit largely behind the scenes, reflects these changing priorities. The regional approach is similar to one taken by the Bush administration after the Gulf war in 1991, where the United States hosted a multilateral regional peace conference to underscore the benefits peace could bring to Israel if they resolved their conflict with the Palestinians.[21]

At the same time, President Trump has taken actions that mark a sharp departure from previous U.S. policy on the conflict. Whatever doubts already existed about the Trump administration’s intentions or ability to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace were only compounded with the President’s decision in December of 2017 to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The move was a radical reversal of longstanding U.S. policy to leave Jerusalem’s fate to final status negotiations with the Palestinians, who also claim Jerusalem as their capital. In February 2018 the administration doubled down on this unprecedented step by announcing the opening of a new U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem earlier than expected to coincide with Israel’s 70th anniversary of independence in May 2018.

The Jerusalem decision—opposed by senior national security officials, American military leaders and most global powers—was widely viewed as catering to domestic politics and fulfilling a campaign pledge. There did not seem to be a strategic rationale for the decision or the prospect that the move would improve the prospects for peace. As one analysis summarized it, “The Jerusalem announcement follows other administration moves that undermine the peace drive but help fulfill Trump’s campaign promise to strengthen ties with Israel and get tougher on the Palestinians.”[22]

Even before the Jerusalem move Kushner was associated with policies viewed as hostile to Palestinians, including White House support for legislation that would cut aid to the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, the Trump administration’s Ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, was associated with the Israeli far right before his appointment, supporting and financing Israeli settlements in the West Bank and opposing an independent Palestinian state. Friedman had also expressed derogatory statements against liberal American Jewish groups critical of Israel and even accused President Obama of antisemitism. Five former U.S. Ambassadors to Israeli opposed his appointment, questioning his fitness to serve.[23]

Nonetheless, the favorable regional environment led many analysts to believe a renewed peace effort was possible, and both Palestinians and Israeli leaders engaged President Trump’s peace team on regular visits. Greenblatt in particular received high marks for being willing to listen to all sides. Still, given the Israeli government coalition includes parties opposed to a two-state solution and the weak leadership on the Palestinian side, there is ample reason to doubt a breakthrough under President Trump’s watch. The Jerusalem decision only reinforced the skepticism that a peace settlement was possible with the team Trump had put in place and most importantly because of the negative trend lines on the ground in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza that are not favorable to a two-state compromise.

After the Jerusalem announcement, the Palestinians broke off contact with the U.S. team and declared the United States could no longer be an honest peace broker. Younger Palestinians remain disillusioned with their leadership that has failed to deliver gains on the ground as despair grows. Israelis are similarly disillusioned with the prospects for peace, often arguing they have no viable partner for peace. And in the Israeli government, we see nationalist ministers who believe in annexation of West Bank, not a two-state solution. Finally, we have an American President who has gone to extraordinary steps to register his pro-Israel position, raising questions about whether this administration would be able to exert the type of pressure on the Israelis to exact compromises that would be needed from all sides.

As in other policy areas, the realities on the ground do not bode well for the Trump administration’s aims in the Middle East. Without fundamentals changing on the ground between Palestinians and Israelis, no amount of Arab support for a peace process will make a difference. What may be particularly dangerous this time around is raising expectations of a major conflict-ending agreement but failing again, locking in gains for Israel on issues like Jerusalem but with no peace deal in return. This trajectory could lead to dangerous consequences for all sides, including a potential return to widespread violence.

Conclusion

This overview and assessment of the Trump administration’s core policies in the Middle East to date underscores that the current U.S. approach to the region is not business as usual. While we see some areas of continuity, particularly in areas where the Department of Defense is in the lead, we also see dramatic departures from previous policies. This is particularly true when it comes to core priorities for the Trump administration on issues that President campaigned on, like the Iran nuclear deal and moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem. In these cases, the President’s rhetoric and tweets are becoming official U.S. policy. The removal of more pragmatic officials on the President’s national security team and their replacement by hawkish and ideological leaders like John Bolton only reinforces this trend. While it will take years to assess the full consequences of these steps, the administration’s policies are not likely to achieve the policy objectives of moderating Iran or striking a final settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. At best the policies will not lead to further conflict. But more likely is that the President’s approach to the region may only further inflame tensions and hostility to the United States and increase the prospect for war.