Tapping Afghanistan's Peacemakers

By Patricia Gossman

Thursday, September 27, 2001; Page A27

The Bush administration has stated that it is not out to "replace one regime with another" in Afghanistan. But like it or not, it will do exactly that. The only question that remains is: What kind of regime?

The Taliban's hold on Afghanistan is slipping. Sources in the region I have been in touch with through e-mail report that in the west of the country the Taliban have all but disappeared; checkpoints are deserted, and Taliban fighters are desperately trying to make deals with one side or the other. Even before the attacks on the United Staes, there was widespread dissent within the movement, provoked in part by the increasingly centralized and secretive control exerted by Mullah Mohammad Omar, and deep resentment about the hold foreign forces have had over his policies. The anticipated U.S. strike has accelerated this process, and the mood is similar to that which prevailed in 1994-1996, when the Taliban swept into power. If the international community does not act swiftly to take advantage of the moment by supporting Afghans who have initiated a peace process at the ground level, another abusive force could easily come to power. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who has a record of war crimes that rivals the Taliban's and is equally fond of Osama bin Laden, continues to have support within the Pakistani military and intelligence services.

Nor is it enough for the United States to blindly lend its support to the rebel coalition known as the Northern Alliance. Afghans have fled Kabul by the thousands not only out of fear of U.S. airstrikes but out of panic that the group might take power there again. When I was in Kabul last year, I was told time and again that the only thing people there feared more than the Taliban was that the warlords of the Northern Alliance might return to power. Between 1992 and 1995 fighting among the factions of the alliance reduced a third of Kabul to rubble and killed more than 50,000 civilians. The top commanders ordered massacres of rival ethnic groups, and their troops engaged in mass rape. The years of anarchy laid the groundwork for the emergence of the Taliban and everything that followed. If the Northern Alliance succeeds in ousting the Taliban from Kabul before some kind of transitional process is agreed on, it will be 1992 all over again. The world would be left with another "failed" or "rogue" state that would continue to pose a threat to regional and global security.

There is another option: Afghans inside the country -- including moderate Taliban and Northern Alliance commanders who have been disgusted by the abuses of their leaders -- have been quietly urging the United Nations to take a proactive role and not repeat the mistakes of the past that left Afghanistan to political chaos. The United States should support an initiative that has come from inside Afghanistan and is now under consideration in Europe: to achieve fundamental political change in Afghanistan through negotiation with competent local authorities who can begin a transitional process aimed at creating (none exists now) a representative, national administration.

Who are these local authorities pursuing peace inside Afghanistan? They include former civilian administrators from many of the different eras of Afghanistan's recent political past, tribal elders, disaffected members of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, members of local representative councils (shuras) and other groups recognized as traditional leaders in their communities. They represent a range of geographic locales and ethnic constituencies. Their own defense forces are prepared to secure and defend territory. Many have links to exiled Afghans, including economists and other technocrats, who have been active in the "Rome process," an initiative focused on the former king, Mohammad Zahir Shah, and aimed at convening an emergency "loya jirgah" (great council) to agree to a constitution and establish a national administration. This idea has had U.S. support; the process could be greatly strengthened by linking it with local leaders who would be able to facilitate access to members of the loya jirgah to enable them to consult more widely, build popular consensus and bring other Afghans into the process.

What would be the role of the United States and its allies? To give firm diplomatic support to the initiative, to help facilitate coordination among the different groups and to be prepared to provide reconstruction aid to rebuild the country and wean its economy from the drugs and smuggling enterprises that have helped sustain the conflict. What would be the role of the United Nations? To engage the support of member states, provide logistical support to facilitate coordination among the different local authorities in Afghanistan and to assist in a public information campaign, using local language radio to inform local civilians of developments and condemn abuses by the Taliban that directly affect them, including the many recent massacres of Afghan Muslims. As part of this assault, the official Taliban broadcasts of Radio Shariat -- which have long urged violence against those opposed to the Taliban -- should be scrambled. The United Nations and member states should also increase humanitarian support to areas secured by these local authorities to help stem population movements, and undertake training for the local administrators in governance, human rights and international humanitarian law.

To deter former warlords from hijacking the process, the United Nations should establish a war crimes tribunal to try suspects accused of grave abuses in all phases of Afghanistan's wars. The U.N.-sponsored "6-plus-2" contact group on Afghanistan should adopt appropriate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and enlist high-level diplomatic pressure to minimize interference from neighboring states. As several key states that have a record of interference are members of the U.S. coalition to fight terrorism, the United States can play an important role in this regard.

But such a process cannot wait for a military solution. It must be supported now before the collapse of the Taliban leaves a political vacuum that others opposed to peace will rush to fill. Only by allying with Afghans who have local legitimacy can there be a long-lasting solution to the endless cycle of war and terror.

The writer conducted research inside Afghanistan funded by the U.S. Institute of Peace. She is a consultant on human rights in South Asia and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and the Jonhs Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.