Afghanistan's Atmosphere Of Mistrust
U.S. Looks for Partners In a Region of Rivals

By Peter Baker
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, September 27, 2001; Page A01

JABAL SARAJ, Afghanistan, Sept. 26 -- Inside the compound that houses his rebel regiment, Gen. Mohammad Aref readies for what could be the final act of a long civil war with the ruling Taliban. He is prepared for a tough battle. He is prepared to fight alongside the United States. But he is not prepared to trust America's ally over the border.

"To trust Pakistan is difficult," Aref explained today, "because Taliban means Pakistan."

Here in rebel-controlled northeastern Afghanistan, the suspicion and even hatred of Pakistan runs deep because of its role as prime patron of the radical Taliban, which has ruled most of Afghanistan for five years. The feeling is mutual in Islamabad, Pakistan's capital, where the Pakistani foreign minister this week warned the United States not to team up with the Afghan rebels, known as the Northern Alliance.

The enmity is a challenge for the Bush administration as it assembles a coalition to retaliate against the Taliban for harboring Osama bin Laden, the chief suspect in the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The United States wants to use bases in Pakistan for possible strikes against Afghanistan, and it may support the Northern Alliance's ground troops in their fight against the Taliban. But those two most important potential U.S. partners regard each other as blood enemies.

Even if the hostility is finessed in the short term, it promises delicate problems down the road. If the Taliban is dislodged, as President Bush has suggested is a U.S. aim, the formation of any new government in Kabul under the Northern Alliance is bound to foster tension and possibly destabilization in an already troubled region.

Pakistan worries that an unfriendly Afghan government dominated by the rebels would threaten its security as it faces a politically hostile India on its other flank. Some analysts believe that victory by the Northern Alliance could even trigger a backlash among Islamic militants in Pakistan that could threaten the government of Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Because both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons, turmoil in the region could become a global crisis.

Nearly every country in Central Asia claims important stakes in the fortunes of the Northern Alliance. India, which contests the Kashmir region with Pakistan, has provided money and weapons to the northern fighters. Shiite Muslim Iran, which despises the Sunni Muslim Taliban, also has supported the Northern Alliance, providing arms and training.

Russia, fearful of the spread of the Taliban's brand of Islam into former Soviet republics on its border, has provided financial, military and logistical support to the Northern Alliance -- all of whose primary commanders fought Soviet forces that occupied Afghanistan in the 1980s. However, most Central Asian states have been wary of direct support to the rebels. In recent years, several have made diplomatic overtures to the Taliban in efforts to seek a peace settlement.

It is uncertain how closely the United States will work with the Northern Alliance. Abdullah, a top alliance official who like many Afghans uses just one name, said today that contacts with U.S. officials had increased in recent days. He hinted that the rebels had given Washington a list of potential bombing targets that presumably includes air bases and other military installations.

But suggesting that Washington has so far withheld any commitment, Abdullah solicited U.S. assistance: "We deserve this, and we have the right to get this support."

The Northern Alliance represents a coalition of ethnic and political factions that banded together to resist the Taliban, which has imposed its rigid interpretation of Islam on most of the country. A major component of the alliance is the former Afghan government that the Taliban drove from Kabul, the capital, in 1996.

The rebels control 10 percent or less of Afghanistan but say they have 15,000 armed fighters and an intimate knowledge of the territory that could be invaluable for the U.S. military.

By themselves, the guerrillas might never defeat the Taliban. Despite a new push to recapture the strategic northern city of Mazar-e Sharif, and reports today of taking a nearby district, they have failed over five years to seriously threaten Kabul. But the prospect of a U.S. military operation has changed that equation.

The alliance still considers itself the rightful government of Afghanistan -- Abdullah, for instance, holds the title of foreign minister -- but the group has moved in recent days to ease concerns that it expects to simply take over if the Taliban is ousted by the United States.

A rebel delegation was heading to Rome today to meet with former Afghan king Mohammed Zahir Shah and overseas Afghan interest groups to begin discussing a post-Taliban government. Zahir Shah, the last of the Durrani dynasty that ruled Afghanistan for more than 200 years, was on the throne for 40 years. He was deposed in 1973 by his brother-in-law, who established a republic and exiled the monarch to Rome.

If the Taliban is brought down, the rebels said, they plan to establish an interim government that would include various political blocs to establish order, draft a constitution and schedule elections. "We will be a major factor" in this temporary government, said Abdullah. But "all other groups that share these values should participate.

"What we want to see is a moderate Islamic country where democracy would be the rule of the game," he added. "The will of the people should be accepted, and the rights of the people, women and men," protected. "The people should decide who to go with and who not."

His comments came a day after Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar told reporters in Islamabad that the United States should not choose sides between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. "We must not make the blunder of trying to foist a government on the people of Afghanistan," he said. "We fear that any such decision on the part of foreign powers to give assistance to one side or the other in Afghanistan is a recipe for great disaster for the people of Afghanistan."

The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been complicated for years. The United States used Pakistan to manage its proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. After five years of chaos following the Russians' withdrawal, Islamabad intervened on behalf of the Taliban.

In recent years, Pakistan has given the Taliban tens of millions of dollars in aid, from wheat and fuel to funds for the salaries of its government officials; on behalf of the Taliban, Pakistan set up a telephone network, repaired roads, provided electricity, overhauled aircraft and helped establish a national radio station in Afghanistan. In exchange, Pakistan used Afghanistan for its own purposes, such as training militants there for the conflict with India in Kashmir.

But the Taliban resisted subservience and began manipulating its patron. It established a trade scheme that cost Pakistan millions of dollars in customs fees while allegedly enriching Afghan bandits. The Taliban has used Pakistani intelligence and military in the ongoing civil war, according to rebel generals. The rebels say 500 of the 2,500 Taliban defenders on the Kabul front are Pakistanis. Pakistan has refused to cut diplomatic ties to the Taliban, and now it is the only country that still recognizes the Afghan government.

Here in Jabal Saraj, 45 miles north of Kabul, Abdullah scoffed at Sattar's invocation against foreign involvement, noting that Pakistan had interfered in Afghan affairs for years.

He accused Pakistan of deceiving the United States by targeting only enough terrorist elements to satisfy Washington. "My fear is Pakistan will decide which terrorists are its 'good terrorists' and 'bad terrorists' and keep some terrorists for the future. This would be a disaster. Pakistan is trying to keep its influence by keeping a part of the Taliban force in place in Afghanistan."

The close ties make the Taliban and Pakistani governments indistinguishable to many in the Afghan opposition. From regimental commanders to everyday residents, Afghans living in rebel-held territory often volunteer harsher recriminations toward Pakistan than toward the Taliban.

Nasser Bakhshi, a rebel official in the town of Khoja Bahauddin, subscribes to a simple formula for victory in the civil war. "If Pakistan stops helping, we would win," he said.

Mirakhman, a rebel commander at the front lines north of Kabul, offered a similar assessment when asked the prospects for retaking the capital if the United States bombs Afghanistan.

"You have to destroy Pakistan," he said. "Then we'll go to Kabul."