Attacks Refocus White House on How to Fight Terrorism
High Stakes, Tension Magnify Differences Among Bush's National Security Officials

By Mike Allen and Alan Sipress
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, September 26, 2001; Page A03

In designing the way his White House and Cabinet would function, President Bush followed a corporate model, with a strict hierarchy, clearly defined responsibilities and a central role for longtime loyalists to shape and communicate an agenda for a time of peace and prosperity.

But the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon refocused that agenda on fighting terrorism, and focused the White House on devising ways to do it.

A "war cabinet" composed of top national security officials from the White House, CIA, State Department and Pentagon has become the main decision-making body considering how the United States will frame its response to the Sept. 11 attacks. And a "domestic consequences" group, chaired by Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten, meets every day to deal with fallout from the attacks on the home front.

The politics of Bush's national security officials sometimes seem as complex as the enemy they are taking on. Most of them have known and competed with one another earlier in their careers, and administration officials say the current stakes and tension are magnifying longtime differences.

In one notable instance, a dispute between Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz over the ultimate objective of the U.S. response became public.

Before Sept. 11, Powell and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld saw Bush a few times a week. Now they both attend a National Security Council meeting every morning with Bush that lasts nearly an hour. Bush sometimes joins his national security team again in late afternoon by secure video teleconference.

The 9:30 a.m. meetings include Vice President Cheney, Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice. Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill and Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta come when needed.

In addition to those principals, a powerful cadre of deputies also sits in at many of the meetings -- Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage and Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Cheney's chief of staff. The frequent presence of Wolfowitz and Libby provides two more conservative voices in a room where Powell often finds himself fighting uphill with his calls for restraint.

A crucial member of the war cabinet is CIA Director George J. Tenet, who briefs Bush each weekday at 8 a.m.. His presentation used to last about 15 minutes but has grown considerably in length and detail since Sept. 11. Cheney and Rice sit in. Almost every morning since the attacks, Tenet has stayed for the NSC meeting.

Tenet was at Bush's right hand in a photo of a national security meeting Saturday at Camp David. Card and Rice were the only other officials with Bush; the others participated through a teleconference.

Even before the attacks, Powell, Rumsfeld and Rice had been holding conference calls at 7:15 each morning. Although Powell often joins the call before setting out for 12-hour days at Foggy Bottom, Rumsfeld and Rice are already in their offices.

The group chaired by Bolten includes several Cabinet members and meets each morning at 10:30. The topics vary but have included the Justice Department's proposed terrorism legislation, Labor Department efforts to help people who are unemployed because of the tragedies, and the Commerce Department's concerns about long tie-ups at border crossings.

A congressional source said Rice, Card and Tenet represent a new generation with whom the president is comfortable, while everyone else on the national security team "was one of his father's buddies." Even before the administration went to war footing, Card and Rice spent more time with Bush than any other administration officials.

Several senior administration officials said they had expected Bush's counselor, Karen P. Hughes, and his senior adviser, Karl C. Rove, to be taken into the national security sessions. But they have not been.

Hughes and Rove are part of the "Iron Triangle" of aides who have been with Bush since his days as governor of Texas. Several key supporters of the administration said their exclusion from the war cabinet had the benefit of demonstrating that military planning is being done without regard to domestic political considerations.

Administration officials said Hughes and Rove have retained their influence with Bush, and the two co-chair a daily "message meeting" designed to communicate the White House's dual message of fighting terrorism and promoting recovery from the attacks. Rove has described his role as that of a "utility infielder" during the crisis, and Hughes is believed to talk frequently with Bush.

The clash between Powell and Wolfowitz surfaced after Wolfowitz argued that the United States should broaden its campaign to targets outside Afghanistan, in particular the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Wolfowitz went so far as to suggest publicly two days after the terrorist attacks that the United States should be "ending states who sponsor terrorism."

Powell, in a response to a reporter's question four days later, dismissed that view. "I think ending terrorism is where I would like to leave it, and let Mr. Wolfowitz speak for himself," Powell said.

Privately, Powell had told Wolfowitz that his plan would "wreck the coalition" of countries Bush has been assembling.

Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld support Powell's position, at least for the time being. Administration officials say any action against other state sponsors of terrorism will wait for later phases of the campaign against terrorism.

A second ongoing debate centers on whether the United States should make overthrowing the Taliban, the regime that rules most of Afghanistan and harbors terrorism suspect Osama bin Laden, an explicit objective of the campaign. Again, Powell and fellow officials at the State Department have counseled that the administration be cautious and focus on bin Laden and his al Qaeda network. Other officials, including some at the Pentagon, want to ensure that the campaign ends with the ouster of the Taliban.

Another possible debate could concern the extent to which the administration coordinates its actions with Iran, which has a long history of antipathy toward the Taliban. Some State Department officials have been looking for an opening toward Iran and, in particular, a way to strengthen the reformists associated with President Mohammad Khatami. But others in the administration are more skeptical of the merits of any overture toward Iran.

Powell's determination to moderate the campaign's objectives springs in large part from his role as chief coalition-builder. If the administration were to turn its sights from bin Laden to Iraq and other targets farther afield, the U.S. effort could be expected to rapidly lose backing. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Middle East, where such crucial U.S. allies as Saudi Arabia and Egypt have told the administration that they would be hard pressed to support a military campaign against another Arab country-- in other words, Iraq.

Since the start of the administration, Powell has been the official most active in seeking multilateral approaches to foreign policy problems. On Iraq, Powell sought to build broad international support for revamping the United Nations sanctions on Baghdad. Other top U.S. officials, such as Rumsfeld and Cheney, have been more enthusiastic about unilateral approaches, in particular stepping up backing for Iraqi opposition groups.

Powell's deputy, Armitage, used to be known for more hawkish, unilateral views. But since signing on at State, he has struck a more collaborative tone. Armitage, a weightlifter and former Navy SEAL, is so close to Powell that they used to speak on a daily basis even before Armitage became his deputy.

Just as Powell and Wolfowitz have clashed, Armitage has a disdainful, even antagonistic relationship with Rumsfeld -- setting the stage for more battles in the war cabinet.

Staff writers Glenn Kessler, Vernon Loeb and Walter Pincus contributed to this report.