Bin Laden's Money Takes Hidden Paths To Agents of
Terror
Records Hint at Complex Financial Web
By Robert O'Harrow Jr., David S. Hilzenrath and Karen
DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writers
Friday, September 21, 2001; Page A13
The legend of Saudi fugitive Osama bin Laden is that of the world's richest terrorist, a business-savvy nomad who has used a vast inheritance and a constellation of companies to finance a global network of violence.
But the details of his finances, as gleaned from court records and government reports in the United States and elsewhere, tell a more complex tale. Although bin Laden commands a personal fortune, his agents have often carried out their most violent attacks on a paltry budget.
In the terrorist attacks of the 1990s, bin Laden's men took rooms in cheap hotels, often used cash, and sometimes turned to petty crimes to raise money for living expenses. They lived frugally in nondescript neighborhoods. Some of his cadres supported themselves with criminal activity, such as identity theft and credit card fraud.
Last week's hijackings and attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon may have involved more money than some earlier actions. U.S. officials said they believe the terrorists maintained middle-class lifestyles, took airline flights around the country and paid thousands of dollars for flight instruction.
But the bin Laden agents covered their tracks. They often distributed cash by hand, or transferred it through underground banking systems that have long eluded regulators and law enforcement authorities. This use of concealed channels will undoubtedly pose a major challenge for investigators scrambling to trace bin Laden's money and find ways to destroy his organization, al Qaeda.
The al Qaeda financial network remains hidden, but some details of bin Laden's business ventures have come to light in recent years in testimony during trials of those charged with carrying out terrorist attacks. In Sudan in the 1990s, bin Laden engaged in construction and agriculture. In recent years, he has helped bankroll the ruling Taliban militia in Afghanistan. A State Department report in 1996 called him "one of the most significant financial sponsors of Islamic extremist activities in the world today." The estimates of his personal fortune vary widely, from a few million dollars to $300 million.
To track bin Laden's money in President Bush's new war on terrorism, U.S. investigators are expected to examine electronic banking systems and known offshore banking havens, while also seeking help from officials in Malaysia, Singapore and other Asian countries bin Laden is believed to use as banking bases.
Investigators also will be examining the ties between al Qaeda and Islamic charities and wealthy individuals in the United States, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and elsewhere. These private donors are believed to give millions of dollars to bin Laden's group every year.
But a wide range of specialists and government sources interviewed for this article agreed that the traditional redoubts of global finance may not offer many clues about the elusive bin Laden network.
Suspected terrorists involved in the attack on the World Trade Center, for example, had several thousand dollars in about nine checking accounts at SunTrust Bank in Florida. Those accounts offered no signs of unusual activity, according to bank officials. The story is much the same in the attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, specialists said.
"When you talk about the money, the money, the money, it just isn't that much," said Jack Blum, former special counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on terrorism, narcotics and international operations.
"In many ways, we think of bin Laden as a one-man financial and operational specter pushing the buttons," said Magnus Ranstorp, deputy director of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews University in Scotland. "But in reality, many of these cells are self-financing through criminal activity which is virtually impossible to track electronically."
Ever since his days as a student of economics and finance at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, bin Laden has shown a special affinity for raising and managing money.
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, bin Laden, son of a construction magnate, spent a decade marshaling funds and other support for the CIA-backed Afghan resistance, organizing a vast network of Islamic donors. Bin Laden has built upon those sources and methods to finance his terrorism.
After the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, bin Laden moved his activities to Sudan, but also spent time in Saudi Arabia, working for the family construction business. Though the firm has been a major contractor for the kingdom, bin Laden supported a militant Islamic opposition, and the Saudi government expelled him in 1991, according to U.S. government accounts. He went to Sudan.
Bin Laden is one of about 20 male heirs to the family fortune. How much of the family wealth he received before his family disavowed him is a subject of guesswork and dispute. Whatever the amount, it is not the sole or even the primary source of al Qaeda funds today, according to a wide variety of sources, including U.S. government reports, Pakistani intelligence sources and the testimony of a former associate.
In testimony this year at the trial of four men accused of participation in the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, witnesses described how Sudan provided a base for bin Laden, through which money and recruits could be managed in a much more organized way than in Afghan camps -- real offices and secretaries and files and bookkeeping.
During the trial, former participants in bin Laden's organization recalled that some of his adherents worked for his legitimate businesses, while others were paid directly by al Qaeda, and some worked for both. The two payrolls were distributed from different offices in the same Khartoum building on McNimr Street. Jamal al Fadl, a Sudanese man who was one of the first to join the organization, later embezzled money from it, and testified as a government witness in the trial. He recalled being given $57,000 and 17,000 Saudi riyals to rent houses for bin Laden's people when they moved to Sudan; later he was given $250,000 to buy a farm north of Khartoum.
Al Qaeda terrorist cells or individuals were funded locally, through their own business enterprises, and by infusions of cash hand-carried to them, the trial showed. According to al Fadl, he was once told to fly to Amman, Jordan. He was given $100,000 in cash in $100 bills.
Such money runs were carried out by couriers who were given documents, tickets and travel visas, arranged by the al Qaeda travel committee, and either were told someone would meet them at the airport or were given an address. Once the money was handed over, often in a sealed envelope, the operative would return to the airport and go home. Most had no idea what was going on beyond their immediate task.
In Sudan, bin Laden invested in a variety of businesses -- including construction, farming and banking. He built bridges, an international airport and a major roadway. He harvested peanuts, fruit, sesame, white corn, sunflowers and wheat. He dealt in imports and exports.
He paid $50 million for part ownership of a Khartoum bank, and he ran Taba Investment Co., which invested in global stock markets. He formed ventures with members of Sudan's ruling National Islamic Front, using his wealth to win favor and protection. Under pressure from the United States and Egypt, Sudan expelled bin Laden in 1996.
Like much of bin Laden's story, the bottom line on his investments in Sudan is murky. Abdel-Bari Atwan, a London-based journalist who interviewed bin Laden in 1996, said bin Laden claimed to have lost "more than $150 million on farming and construction projects during his time in Sudan."
Nonetheless, bin Laden's organization is believed to have enough cash to sustain a worldwide empire. His organization has operated ostrich farms and shrimp boats in Kenya, bought tracts of forest in Turkey, engaged in diamond trading in Africa and acquired agricultural holdings in Tajikistan.
Ejected from Sudan, bin Laden moved to Afghanistan, where he has been financing the Taliban's war against opposition forces in the northern part of the country.
Bin Laden's organization draws large amounts of money from wealthy Islamic donors and charitable groups, according to current and former U.S. officials, Pakistani intelligence sources, Muslim clerics close to bin Laden and others who have studied his organization.
Some of the donors give because they believe in bin Laden's cause. "The global movement [al Qaeda] has hundreds of well-to-do people almost everywhere in the world who are dying to make a financial contribution," said a Muslim cleric in Pakistan.
"The money is forjihad and is separate from charitable contributions," another cleric said, using the Arabic term for holy war.
Other wealthy donors may be contributing to avoid potentially unpleasant consequences. "We believe a lot of guys have paid protection money" to bin Laden, a former senior U.S. official said. Whatever the inspiration, the money "just pours out of" the Persian Gulf, the source said.
Beyond individual donations, some of the $10 billion each year that the Saudi leadership showers on Islamic organizations through the ministry of religious works -- largess designed to appease fundamentalists -- is said to find its way into bin Laden's coffers even though the funds are supposed to be used for social, educational and humanitarian purposes.
The U.S. government believes funds from various international charities that collect money for refugees and other relief works in the Middle East have been diverted to terrorism, in some cases with the knowledge of contributors.
Bin Laden's group is said to have an archipelago of bank accounts stretching from Barclay's Bank in London, where a suspect account was shut down by the British government this week, to Girocredit in Vienna to several banks in the trading port of Dubai of the United Arab Emirates.
"There is a web of private accounts with Islamic interest-free banks in the Muslim world which serve as lifeline to al Qaeda movement," said a former Pakistani military intelligence official.
The UAE is said to be a major hub of bin Laden's banking operation, because it maintains a very liberal banking system with few controls and the government is one of only three (along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) that maintains official relations with the Taliban. Afghanistan's national airline was used to transport cash from banks in Dubai to Afghanistan until late 1999, when the airline's international flights were grounded because of U.N. economic sanctions, a former senior government official said.
Since the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa, the U.S. government has made "a massive effort" to trace and seize the money of bin Laden's group, but "it's proven rather elusive," a former government official said. In 1998, President Bill Clinton issued an executive order freezing any U.S. assets of bin Laden, two associates and al Qaeda, but no such assets have been found.
The government had intelligence that bin Laden was using a bank in Dubai, but it had difficulty getting authorities there to act, another former U.S. official said. "It was enough that the [Clinton] administration took it very seriously and worked very hard with the UAE to try to shut it down," the official said. When authorities in Dubai finally intervened, "there just seemed to be a whole lot less there than was originally expected," possibly because funds had been moved, the official said.
The opportunity "just seemed to slip through our fingers," he added.
Some U.S. officials liken al Qaeda to "a large holding company" with bin Laden at the top -- and independent operators at the bottom. "Nairobi was conducted on a shoestring," said another former U.S. official of the embassy bombing there. "In fact, the local mastermind was constantly complaining . . . about money -- about the fact that he did not have enough."
Instead of wiring money directly to terrorist cells, al Qaeda often provided seed money and then urged them to raise money on their own. It appears they often did that through identity theft and credit card fraud.
For example, Ahmed Ressam, a member of an Algerian group with close ties to bin Laden, was caught in December 1999 at the Canadian border with a trunk full of explosives and said he was heading to Los Angeles International Airport. He had assumed the name Benni Norris, which he used to obtain a passport and open bank accounts. He also got a false birth certificate and a student ID.
A member of the Armed Islamic Group, or GIA, Ressam told authorities that he relied on welfare and petty crime, including credit card fraud and trafficking in identity documents, to support himself in Montreal. He was linked to a theft ring suspected of funneling money to radical Islamic groups around the world. Authorities believe the ring stole more than 5,000 items, including computers, cellular phones, passports and credit cards; the real purpose of the ring was to help finance Muslim extremist groups. This April, Ressam was convicted of terrorism.
"It is very clear that cells live off the land," said Jonathan Winer, a former deputy assistant secretary for enforcement at the State Department. "Once they've gotten seed money, they have to be self-sufficient."
"There are all these varieties of fraud used to raise money. There's no question about it," said Steven Simon, assistant director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. "There is the use of these crimes that don't normally rise to law enforcement attention to raise money."
In doing so, the fraud artists can avoid detection. Moreover, bank and credit card security companies often don't prosecute.
At the same time, al Qaeda operations often bypass traditional money laundering techniques -- such as the use of electronic transfers and offshore accounts -- that might provide clues to sources and methods. Instead, agents deliver cash in suitcases. "Mostly they move it through couriers," just like drug cartels or smugglers, Simon said.
Another way to move money is an underground system known as hawala. Part of the universal Arabic banking terminology, the word refers to a money transfer, regardless of how it is made. The unregulated system, based on trust and relationships, "allows funds to be transferred in secrecy without any electronic trail" and "virtually no paper trail," said William F. Wechsler, who was director for transnational threats at the National Security Council during the Clinton administration.
"For many people in remote areas of the world, the hawala system is faster, cheaper and more reliable than Citibank," Wechsler said. Organized through a series of informal chits and promises, such a system can move huge amounts of cash. None of it crosses borders, and apart from personal notes there's no record of the transactions.
"A good way to look at the financial life support for bin Laden is not just to look at his financial assets," said Ranstorp, "but to realize the fact that the compartmentalized networks . . . generate their own financial support through vast amounts of financial fraud."
Correspondents William Drozdiak in Brussels, T.R. Reid in London, Keith B. Richburg in Paris and John Ward Anderson in Istanbul, special correspondent Kamran Kahn in Karachi, staff writer R. Jeffrey Smith and researcher Robert Thomason contributed to this report.