Avoiding the rampaging elephant

(September 21) - It's not that difficult to understand why Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat publicly declared a cease-fire. With America on the warpath against terrorism, the major restraint on the use of overwhelming Israeli force in response to Palestinian violence has been weakened, if not altogether eliminated. It is therefore a matter of survival for him to prevent another terrorist attack that would trigger massive Israeli retaliation, or at least to be able to dissociate himself from it and credibly claim that he is struggling against this scourge in order to shelter under the wings of the American anti-terrorism umbrella.

Nor is it that difficult to understand why Prime Minister Ariel Sharon agreed to de-escalate and to authorize Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to meet with Arafat. With America determined to maximize the political foundation of its campaign by stressing that it is aimed at terrorism, not at the Arab world or Islam, Israel has no choice but to minimize the disruptive effect of the Israeli-Palestinian war on American strategy.

It is therefore essential for Israel to try to lower its profile, just as it did during the Gulf War a decade ago, when a similar American policy was formulated by many of the very same individuals who are formulating American policy now.

But even the converging interest of Arafat and Sharon - to get out of the way of an elephant on the rampage - is not enough to guarantee that a real cease-fire will take hold. It was already violated less than 48 hours after it was proclaimed, and the chances that it will survive any 48-hour test are slim. That may be because Arafat can't do what is necessary to enforce it; it may be because he won't.

If there is no cease-fire, the reason why won't really matter because the outcome will be same: no diplomatic contact, the guarantee of continued low-intensity warfare, and the possibility of a dramatic Israeli response in the wake of a particularly ghastly terrorist attack that resonates strongly, not just in Israel, but in the United States, as well.

The more perplexing, though no more hopeful scenario, refers to a situation, however improbable, in which a true cease-fire does take hold. The latest round of international pressure on Israel and the Palestinians, involving the EU, the UN and the Russians along with the Americans, has had the same objective as did every previous effort to halt the violence: to get the parties back to the negotiating table.

What happens if, contrary to expectations, the best-case scenario does develop and Israel and the Palestinians do resume negotiations?

On the Israeli side, two points are critical. The first is that this government will not repeat the offer made by the Barak government at Taba in January, based on the guidelines laid out by president Bill Clinton in December. The second, only slightly less certain, is that no other government will go beyond that offer. In other words, the most that can reasonably be expected is that Israel, after prolonged political turmoil, will validate Barak's prediction when he left office: Sooner or later, we will get back to where we were then. But even that was not enough to close a deal with the Palestinians.

Consequently, any progress in negotiations - without which it is hard to imagine that the hard-to-imagine cease-fire will last - depends on the Palestinians accepting what they rejected, not just at Camp David or at Bolling Air Force Base, but even at Taba. And there is precious little basis on which to predict that outcome.

The Palestinians clearly won't settle for less, but perhaps a different Israeli leader would persuade Arafat not to demand more; according to some instant histories of the negotiations during 2000, it was Barak's condescending attitude that prevented Arafat from recognizing a Jewish connection to the Temple Mount or repudiating the right of return for refugees. Perhaps a different Palestinian leader would be less personally invested in claiming victory and more amenable to conflict resolution as the term is ordinarily understood. It is even possible that American military action of proportions difficult now to predict could serve as a kind of catharsis that would overturn all the beliefs and shatter all the social forces that determined Palestinian policy up until now.

But all of this is speculation bordering on science fiction. It is more likely that accepting what was previously unacceptable would be seen as an admission that all the deaths, all the injuries, all the deprivation, and all the material loss since January had been for nothing. And that is something that no Palestinian leader, whatever his personal beliefs, could easily do. That is no reason not to try. But unless the elephant's rampage somehow produces this result, the glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel will turn out to be nothing but the entrance to another tunnel.