If the US leads, the world will follow

(September 21) - Although the circumstances are quite different, the path chosen by President George W. Bush's administration, following the brutal terror attacks against New York and Washington, is very similar to that of former US president George H. Bush's administration in 1990. Many of the major players are the same, and once again, Washington is preparing military options and moving weapons and troops, while also attempting to develop political support through a broad international coalition.

Now, as in 1990, the umbrella of the coalition is being stretched as widely as possible, creating some strange bedfellows and members of dubious distinction, including Syria, Pakistan, and there is even talk of including Iran. In the last round, in the war against Iraq, Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians embraced Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and paid a significant price for backing the wrong side. In the effort to avoid the same mistake now, Arafat has sought to hide and ban pro-terror celebrations, and declared another pseudo-cease-fire, although the murderous terror attacks against Israelis are continuing.

This pattern of coalition-building is highly problematic, and may incur more costs than benefits in the American effort to confront terrorism in its various forms. The participation of NATO and Russia (another target of Islamic terror) is central, but the role of many other junior partners is certainly questionable.

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the US invested a great deal of diplomatic energy in assembling a large military force in Saudi Arabia. (In retrospect, the size of the US troop buildup in Saudi Arabia was much larger than necessary, resulting from exaggerated estimates of Iraqi capabilities.) The American government needed the cooperation of the Saudi government, which, in turn, wanted to avoid isolation in the Arab world. As a result, other Arab states were brought into the coalition, including Egypt and Syria. The military contribution of both was negligible, and they received major financial and political rewards. Indeed, the Syrian role was always half-hearted, and did not lead to any policy changes, including support for terror in Lebanon and rejection of compromise with Israel.

Following the US victory in that war, and the premature end of the military operations that left Saddam in power, the coalition disintegrated. As the US lost the initiative in keeping Iraq isolated, particularly during the second Clinton administration, other countries in the region got the message. As a result, many of the Arab regimes ignored the UN sanctions and resumed trade with Saddam. Syria and Iraq have established a wide network of cooperative relations, and Egypt is also following this path.

In addition to learning the lessons from 1990, there are other reasons to reconsider the coalition process in the current situation. If ground troops are to be used in Afghanistan as part of the war against terrorism, they are likely to be small commando units that will be introduced and removed quickly. Intelligence cooperation regarding the location of key individuals, such as Osama bin Ladin, and in other areas, is important, particularly from Pakistan, but information sharing takes place quietly and without public discussion. The most important reason for building support from a number of Islamic and Arab states is political, to demonstrate that the war is against terrorists and terrorism and not Islam, as many Islamic and Arab figures are already claiming.

However, this does not require the negotiation of a coalition, which is a very costly and time-consuming process. Indeed, the efforts to build a coalition that includes key sponsors of terrorism and anti-American incitement, such as Iran, Syria and the Palestinian Authority, are counter-productive.

Sensing American weakness and hesitation, these regimes are attempting to establish conditions for their participation in this coalition, as if they were key players whose involvement was necessary and significant. Pakistan wants to exclude India and Israel, while Syria, Iran, and the Palestinians seek to distinguish between anti-Israeli terror and attacks on the US.

Efforts to tie anti-terror coalition-building to Israeli concessions are painful reminders of the costs of the 1990/1 coalition, when Israeli passivity in the face of missile attacks provided the glue that kept the Arab members satisfied. After the war ended, the promises to rid the region of the threats posed by Saddam and his arsenal of missiles and weapons of mass destruction were slowly forgotten.

Instead of time-consuming negotiations and diplomatic coalition building, President Bush, as the leader of the world's only superpower, needs to demonstrate his determination and power through clear action. This does not mean that long-standing allies such as NATO (including Turkey) and partners such as Israel, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India and even Russia and China should be ignored. Consultation and cooperation are important, but the US must also provide an unambiguous lead. Those states that are serious about anti-terrorist policies will follow, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and many other Arab and Islamic countries which are themselves threatened by fundamentalist Islamic terror.

The survival of many of these regimes depends on American power, and if the US hesitates or falters, they will become targets of terror themselves. As a result, there is no reason to give them the power to shape American anti-terrorist policies or to consider demands for concessions or restrictions, whether with respect to Israel or on other key issues.