s the Pentagon draws up plans for possible military action in Afghanistan, it ought to be thinking in terms of bayonets rather than stealth bombers.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his war planners seem to appreciate the challenges of operating in a remote, mountainous nation against an elusive enemy that lacks traditional military targets like command and communication centers, airfields or fuel dumps. But the reality of Afghanistan exceeds even the grimmest expectations.

I saw that reality during several visits in the 1980's when Afghanistan was living under — and resisting — Soviet occupation. I well remember arriving in Khost in January 1988, not long after Soviet and Afghan government forces had broken a prolonged siege of that dusty garrison town in eastern Afghanistan.

This was no ordinary siege. It had lasted, with only brief respites, for more than eight years. Not long after Soviet forces rolled into Afghanistan in 1979, guerrillas had gained control of the only overland route between Khost and the nearest city, Gardez, 60 miles away. Making cunning use of the rough terrain and high mountain passes, the guerrillas had literally stopped the Soviet army in its tracks by ambushing supply convoys and tank columns.

Eager to show the world that they had finally "liberated" Khost, Soviet and Afghan authorities brought foreign journalists to the provincial center for a firsthand look. It was not a great day in the annals of Soviet propaganda. The Khost airfield came under guerrilla rocket fire as the visitors were landing, the road to Gardez was littered with the charred carcasses of Soviet tanks and trucks, and the wreckage of a Soviet Antonov An-26 airplane was scattered across a dry field just outside town.

"The day, like the war itself, proved impossible for the government to control," I wrote in my dispatch to The Times that night,

That is the nature of foreign military interventions in Afghanistan. It is something that President Bush and his administration must understand before committing America to fight there. If anything, Afghanistan could prove to be a more difficult battlefield for the United States than it was for the Soviet Union.

As an environment for military conflict, Afghanistan is virtually impervious to American power. Not only does it lack the "high-value" targets that are commonly attacked in modern warfare, it lacks almost any meaningful targets at all, unless the United States is prepared to bomb government offices and residential neighborhoods, producing many civilian casualties.

The arsenal of advanced weapons that the United States used with some success against Iraq in the Persian Gulf war and against Serbia during the conflict over Kosovo is likely to be neutralized by the backward state of Afghanistan. There is no need for billion-dollar radar-evading airplanes because Afghanistan has only the most feeble air defenses. Laser-guided missiles that can knife down the chimney of a munitions factory are of little use in a nation that lacks an arms industry. Fancy electronic-jamming equipment doesn't mean much against an opponent that has no systems to jam. President Bush summarized the problem pretty well this week when he told Congressional leaders that it makes no sense to use $2 million cruise missiles to attack empty $10 tents.

The administration may be considering using commando units to make lightning raids against terrorist camps at night. But Afghanistan is also ideally suited by terrain to resist those assaults. Terrorists and their followers know the rugged mountains and remote valleys well, and American forces are going to discover that it is very hard to find them if they want to stay hidden. Helicopter gunships, night-vision goggles and other high-tech equipment will not provide a decisive advantage against people who can stay holed up in remote caves.

One of the men who knows this countryside the best is Osama bin Laden. He first came to Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation to support the guerrillas, a cause that was also championed by the United States.

Now, as the primary suspect in last week's terror attacks on New York and Washington, he may well be hiding in the mountains outside Khost. The bin Laden training camp that the United States attacked with cruise missiles in 1998, after the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, was located not far away.

As Americans discovered during the disastrous effort to rescue the American hostages in Iran in 1980, the most advanced hardware and lengthy planning does not guarantee success for military operations in distant lands and hostile climates. That mission failed before a shot was fired because of helicopter mechanical problems. In Afghanistan the terrain and climate will be no less challenging. This time the enemy will know we are coming.