The Pakistan Connection

Wednesday, September 19, 2001; Page A32

THE DIPLOMATIC preparations for action against terrorism are proceeding well. Yesterday the Bush administration secured a promise of cease-fire from Palestinian and Israeli leaders, which in turn may make it easier to draw Arab states into a U.S.-led coalition against terror networks. Even more important, U.S. pressure is inducing Pakistan to reconsider its sympathy for the pro-terrorist government of Afghanistan. Last week the government of Gen. Pervez Musharraf agreed to a list of demands presented by Secretary of State Colin Powell, apparently including permission for U.S. aircraft to attack Afghanistan through Pakistani air space. And a Pakistani negotiating team returned yesterday from talks with the Afghans, having at least tried to persuade them to consider turning over terrorist leader Osama bin Laden.

The Afghans appear unwilling to cooperate, but the progress so far warrants further efforts to improve U.S. relations with Pakistan. Any military operation against terrorist bases in Afghanistan would be greatly assisted by Pakistani cooperation, both because Pakistan's intelligence services know the territory and because a sustained military effort may require some kind of staging ground. Afghanistan's other neighbors -- Iran and the Russian-dominated ex-Soviet countries -- are unlikely allies. The challenge for the administration is to move Pakistan to the point where it can support military action against its erstwhile allies without itself being toppled by a domestic backlash.

Some kind of backlash seems certain: Pakistan's radical Islamic groups have already staged demonstrations to protest cooperation with the United States. The Bush administration needs to consider ways of managing this reaction that go beyond the usual fallback of doling out financial assistance. It should allow Pakistan's government enough time to play out its Afghan diplomacy, so that Pakistanis are convinced that the alternative to military reprisals has at least been tried. It should share as much evidence as is prudent with Pakistan, so that the reasons for naming Mr. bin Laden as the chief suspect behind last week's atrocities become clearer. And the administration should seek as far as possible to target its military action. In the aftermath of slaughter, Pakistanis sympathize with American suffering. But if the United States is perceived to be killing civilians in Afghanistan, Pakistan's cooperation will become more difficult.

Some within the Bush administration have understandable doubts about befriending Pakistan, a military dictatorship. The country's intelligence services have winked at Afghan-sponsored terrorism, and many Pakistani militants have been trained in Mr. bin Laden's Afghan camps before going on to fight the Indian authorities in Kashmir. It is therefore tempting to see Pakistan as an enemy in the war on terrorism rather than as a potential ally. But isolating Pakistan's government while at the same time inflaming Islamic radicalism with an attack on Afghanistan is a recipe for disaster. If a nuclear-armed nation with a population of 140 million fell into the hands of Muslim militants, the war against terrorism would not have started well.