We Must Be Clear

By Bernard Lewis

Sunday, September 16, 2001; Page B07

The attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has been likened many times this week to Pearl Harbor. The resemblance goes further than the simple suddenness and cruelty of the assault. This too, like Pearl Harbor, is not an isolated act; it is the opening salvo of what is intended to be a war leading to victory. The Japanese assumption at the time was that the United States, despite its wealth and strength, was unmilitary and indeed cowardly, and would easily be frightened out of Asia. A similar calculation underlay the action on Tuesday: that the Americans have gone soft, cannot take casualties and will run if attacked. A similar purpose inspired the action -- to expel the Americans, their economic tentacles, their corrupting culture and their local accomplices from all the world of Islam, wherever the frontiers of that world may ultimately lie.

The calculation is not at first sight unreasonable. The abandonment of Vietnam, the flight under attack from Lebanon and Somalia, the recent preemptive withdrawal and evacuation because of a (probably planted) intercept indicating a threat of terrorist action, all seem to point in that direction. So too does the anxious, propitiatory posture adopted by spokesmen in addressing the rulers of other countries, including those regarded as friends.

The words "friend" and "friendship," between states as between individuals, are used to denote two very different things: (1) a deep mutual commitment, based on shared principles and aspirations, or (2) a temporary arrangement, based on a perception of shared interests. The first is likely to be permanent, unaffected by changing circumstances. The second will last only as long as the interests and the perception last.

In political terms, the one means a relationship with a fellow democracy, perhaps differing in some details, but sharing the same basic way of life -- free institutions, liberty under law, elected and responsible government. The second means an understanding with an autocratic ruler, valid only as long as he stays in power and does not change his mind.

Why would he change his mind? Discussions of these matters often make use of such terms as "public opinion," "climate of opinion," "constituency" and the like, all terms and concepts derived from the political life of democratic societies but having little relevance to the politics of an autocratic regime unhampered by such alien concepts as "civil liberties" and "freedom of expression." In a dictatorship the law of political survival is very simple: Jump on the bandwagon. The problem that sometimes arises in the more complex conditions of today is to identify the bandwagon in the traffic jam. A wrong choice may in the most literal sense be fatal.

Attitudes toward the terrorists and the governments that harbor and help them are not too difficult to understand. Saddam Hussein has made war against three of his neighbors and invaded two of them, doing great damage. Clearly, they are neither forgetful of the past nor confident of the future. Their dearest wish is certainly to see him removed and replaced by a less menacing regime. But they are not willing to take the risk of participating in yet another action that would go far enough to annoy him but not far enough to remove him, and would leave them to face his inevitable revenge.

Their primary need is not to evaluate the policies and purposes of dictators and terrorists, which they know well and understand accurately; it is to understand the policies and purposes of the United States -- a much more difficult task. In this task, they have two guides: The first is history, which Middle Easterners read. In this the record is not encouraging. The second is their current dealings with U.S. statesmen, soldiers and diplomats, and the interpretations they put on what is said to them and what is asked of them.

Middle Eastern responses to American appeals for support will be determined by their assessment of America's position. What is needed is clarity in recognizing issues and alignments, firmness and determination in defining and applying policy. Even with these, there is no certainty of success in getting the necessary support from frightened neighbors -- only a possibility. Without them there is a certainty of failure.

The writer is professor emeritus of Near Eastern studies at Princeton University.