Afghanistan

Saturday, September 15, 2001; Page A26

THE BUSH administration's vow to go after states that harbor terrorists as well as terrorists themselves opens a broad array of potential targets. Iran certainly fits the description. It is impossible to imagine the United States "winning" this war in any meaningful sense while Saddam Hussein remains in power in Iraq. Yemen, Sudan, Syria, North Korea -- the list of countries that have aided terrorists to one degree or another is formidable. Its length and diversity help explain why military might must be only one tool among many in this campaign, and why Americans cannot expect quick victory. At the same time, the daunting array of sponsors of terror cannot become an excuse for inaction.

Of all the candidates, one -- Afghanistan -- currently looks like the most likely first target for armed force. It is the harbor of Osama bin Laden, a prime suspect in Tuesday's assault and an indicted author of previous terrorist attacks against Americans. The Taliban government has defied the United Nations in continuing to shelter Mr. bin Laden and his organization, and planning for a possible military operation against the country appears to be well underway -- rightly, in our view.

If Afghanistan is to be taken on, however, the United States must absorb its complexities and learn the lessons of past failures there -- its own as well as those of others. Afghanistan is more than a terrorist camp overseen by an implacably fundamentalist regime. It is also the site of one of the world's greatest humanitarian crises, with up to 1 million people in danger of starvation this year. Some 300,000 people in the capital, Kabul, survive on U.N. food deliveries, and the United States has spent more than $100 million to subsidize food aid this year alone. After four years of drought and two decades of war, the countryside is an economic wasteland, and cities already have been reduced mostly to rubble. The Taliban's medieval oppressiveness has made it unpopular among many Afghans, but the political alternatives to it are hardly credible. And though it is isolated from almost the entire world, the Taliban still has backing in Pakistan, an unstable neighbor ruled by a military regime that now has nuclear weapons.

Past attempts by outside powers to tame this land have only made the situation worse. The United States fired dozens of cruise missiles at Mr. bin Laden's training camps in 1998; only a few, mostly Pakistani militants, were killed, and there was a political backlash against the United States both in Pakistan and elsewhere. The Soviet Union's attempt to impose its order on the country, beginning with a 1979 invasion, failed utterly, and U.S. support for anti-Soviet warriors helped create Mr. bin Laden and his movement. Today the country is so devastated that resistance to a new foreign invasion might be weaker. Still, no occupier could expect to stay long without suffering the relentless ambushes and booby traps that eventually drove the Soviets out -- and the British a century before.

For now the Bush administration seems to be focusing on a preliminary step: pressuring Pakistan into cutting its ties to the Taliban and cooperating in a U.S. campaign. That is a good place to start -- Pakistan can provide valuable intelligence, overflight airspace and possibly basing for U.S. ground operations. After years of playing both sides, its military finally must be forced to choose between good relations with the West and the Taliban. Yesterday it appeared the pressure might be yielding some results. But any U.S. strategy should include not only Pakistan but a broad alliance of countries that, as in the Persian Gulf War, has common and clear goals. These should be political as well as military; while bombing or commando raids against Mr. bin Laden's headquarters or camps might have an impact, they will not solve the larger problem. A real solution will require finding a formula for stabilizing Afghanistan and rescuing its people while eliminating the terrorists. Such a campaign might best start not with a cruise missile strike against the rubble of Kabul, but with a last ultimatum delivered to the Taliban: Cooperate against the terrorists, or face war with an alliance that spans the world.