Red Lines on Shifting Sands

1. Introduction

A year before he became the Democratic party's nominee for president in the 2008 election, Illinois Senator and presidential candidate Barack Obama outlined his foreign policy in an article published in Foreign Affairs. Obama emphasized the primacy of Israeli security as both the foundation and the objective of U.S. Middle East policy:

Obama also laid out his blueprint for dealing with Syria and Iran, which he described as "tough-minded diplomacy, backed by the whole range of instruments of American power--political, economic, and military." These, Obama said, could bring success even when dealing with long-standing adversaries, particularly Iran and Syria.

When Obama, as president, gave his first major foreign policy speech abroad in Cairo, Egypt, on June 4, 2009, directing his remarks not to Egypt but rather to the entire Muslim world. Again he asserted the primacy of American support for Israel: "America's strong bonds with Israel are well known. This bond is unbreakable. It is based upon cultural and historical ties, and the recognition that the aspiration for a Jewish homeland is rooted in a tragic history that cannot be denied." [3]

Obama again had harsh words for Iran but also hinted at the opportunity that might lay ahead for rapprochement: "We will pursue this diplomacy with no illusions about the Iranian regime. Instead, we will present a clear choice. If you abandon your dangerous nuclear program, support for terror, and threats to Israel, there will be meaningful incentives--including the lifting of sanctions, and political and economic integration with the international community. If you refuse, we will ratchet up the pressure." [4]

Like all of his presidential predecessors for the last half century, Obama's foreign policy considers U.S. defense of Israel as a non-negotiable strategic objective in its own right--as well as a means to the achievement of other U.S. goals in the region. Nevertheless, Israeli political leaders, as well as his political opponents within the U.S., have depicted Obama as hostile to Israel. In order to understand how this is possible, it is necessary to understand the unique role of Israel in U.S. foreign policy, past and present. How did Israel, a small, albeit strategically located country, come to occupy such a central role in U.S. foreign policy? And how did Iran, with the third or fourth largest petroleum reserves in the world, find itself subject to such crippling sanctions, which cut off other countries access to its gas and oil supplies?

2. National Interests and Foreign Policy Objectives

The main objective of U.S. foreign policy, like that of any state, is to maintain and promote national interests abroad. Foreign policy is an ongoing process of responding global and regional developments in a way that ideally promotes both long term and more immediate national interests. Longstanding U.S. national interests in the Middle East are generally understood to include assuring adequate sources of energy, particularly petroleum, for the U.S. and its allies; access to strategic waterways such as the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf; sites for strategically located military bases and harbors for U.S. warships; and providing for the defense of allies in the region. It is a convention in foreign policy circles that such "hard power" national interests remain fairly constant over time, regardless of who is president or which political party dominates in Congress.

The U.S. also has "soft power" interests on behalf of which it reserves the right to intervene in the affairs of other--the prevention of genocide, human rights violations, and the promotion of democratic ideals such as religious freedom, ethnic harmony and gender equality. For nearly seventy years the US has been in the forefront of creating and fostering multilateral organizations through which to project its hard and soft power and protect its interests, for example, the United Nations; the World Trade Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (the IAEA).

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction involves both "hard power" and "soft power" interests. On the one hand, weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical or biological, are a major threat to the security of any state against whom they are directed. There is, however, a "soft power" dimension to nuclear weapons, insofar as legitimately possessing them in the eyes of the international community is the primary determinant of who is and who is not a "major world power." All five permanent members of United Nations Security Council, who were recognized as possessing and having tested nuclear weapons in their military arsenals by January 1, 1967, are accorded the status of "nuclear weapons states" by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). "Soft power" also determines the attitude of the major powers against other states that have developed nuclear weapons since 1968, when the NPT went into force. Three--India, Pakistan and Israel (whose nuclear weapon status is officially "ambiguous")--never signed the NPT, and are therefore regarded as being exempt from its dictates, while North Korea officially withdrew from the NPT and is no longer subject to its terms. Iran, which ratified the original NPT agreement in 1970 and agreed to be bound by additional safeguards in 1974, stands out as the sole focus of concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

All of these foreign policy concerns would point to a U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East that would, in the interest of energy security, foster strategic ties not only with the Arab sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf but with Iran, which is estimated to have the third or fourth largest oil reserves in the world. As the sole superpower after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, it would bring pressure to bear on all states who are not participants in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and attempt to bring them under the NPT regime.

The palpable incoherence in U.S. Middle East policy in the second decade of the twenty-first century has been difficult, if not impossible, to explain, in terms of the traditional understanding of foreign policy promoting national interests. Ends and means seem to have become blurred. Traditional conceptions of what constitutes "national power" are being challenged--and some might say undermined--by the increasingly prominent role of non-state actors in global politics. The excessive reliance on the use of force in the past decade--and its ineffectiveness in bringing the decade-long conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq to definitive, decisive and desirable conclusion has resulted in frustration, as well as the breakdown of any consensus about the best and worst outcomes that can be expected from intervention in the affairs of other states. The value of diplomacy--the exercise of the art of statecraft through the skillful crafting of mutually advantageous compromise--is continually called into question and disparaged. "Coercive diplomacy" such as the imposition of sanctions, has seized the middle ground as the sole alternative to war, although it too, more often than not, has failed to achieve its objectives.

These indicators of incoherence are among the aftershocks of the attacks on the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2011, which radically altered U.S. self-perception from superpower to victim. President George W. Bush, the nations of the world were given the choice of being "for us or against us." Israel's war against its restive Palestinian population was incorporated into the U.S. "war on terror," while Syria and Iran became part of an "axis of evil." When Obama took office in 2009, the U.S. had been at war for eight years in Afghanistan, and for nearly half a decade in Iraq. Sandwiched between them was Iran, against which Israel and its advocates were urging the U.S. to launch yet another war.

Although Obama has frequently expressed his intention to shift the focus US foreign policy toward Asia and the Pacific, in point of fact the Middle East occupies most of the time, effort and resources that the U.S. devotes to foreign affairs. Outgoing Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had to postpone her visit to Asia in November 2012 on account of Israel's "Operation Pillars of Defense," which retaliated against rocket strikes from Gaza. Incoming Secretary of State John Kerry was immediately confronted with civil war in Syria, and the decision as to whether or not to provide assistance to the Syrian opposition. During his nomination hearing for the post Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel was grilled incessantly--and almost exclusively--by members of the Senate about his views on Israel and Iran. By one count, Hagel mentioned Israel 136 times, and Iran 135 times, while Asia, including China, received no attention whatsoever. Hagel's first meeting with a foreign counterpart as Secretary of Defense was with Israel's Defense Minister Ehud Barak. [5]

3. Israel

It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand current U.S. Middle East policy without understanding Israel's central role in it. American presidents and politicians frequently refer to these ties with Israel as based upon "shared values," and Israel's unique status as a democracy. But there is also powerful fervent ideological dimension to these ties.

One of the primary goals of Israel's political leaders has been "to make the continuity of the ancient past with the contemporary context a taken-for-granted reality." [6] The assumption and assertion of the geographical, historical and ethnological continuity between the modern State of Israel and the idealized biblical Israel established in ancient Canaan more than three millennia ago--promised by God to the patriarch Abraham, ruled at the peak of its glory by King David, the ancestor of Jesus Christ. The image of ancient Israelites, returning after two thousand years of exile in anticipation of the Second Coming--plays a major role in the modern State of Israel's relationship with U.S. lawmakers with decisive roles in foreign policy decision-making. According to this narrative, the establishment of the State of Israel represents the return of the Jewish nation to its biblically promised ancient homeland, from which it had been twice exiled. The modern state of Israel's continuity with its ancient ancestor, stands in marked contrast to the surrounding "new" and "artificial" Middle Eastern states, whose boundaries were drawn by foreign powers, whose present-day populations have no real historical connection or attachment to their land, and therefore have only a tenuous and transient claim to legitimacy.

The American IsraeI Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) organizes trips to Israel for members of Congress which serve to create and reinforce the connection between their religious commitment and their support for the the modern State of Israel's policies. A congressman who participated in the first visit to Israel organized by the exclusively for newly elected evangelical Christians that the evangelical delegation's Israeli tour guide had told them, "You're our favorite group, because for you the history of Israel is the Bible, then silence, and then 1948 on." [7] Members of Congress speaking before AIPAC often share the religious experiences of their childhood, reading about "Israel" in the Bible on a parent or grandparent's knee. [8] Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter recounted in one of his books,

Although pro-Israel Jewish organizations occupy the limelight of pro-Israel lobbying, Christians United for Israel (CUFI) is a much more formidable organization in terms of influence, claiming to have over a million members. One nationally known Christian Zionist leader, the late Rev. Jerry Falwell, claimed that he could mobilize 70 million evangelical Christians "whenever we begin to detect our government becoming a little anti-Israel." [10] Adherents of apocalyptic Christianity, who believe that the world is rapidly approaching the end time, with the battle of Armageddon will destroying the earth, include prominent politicians and decision-makers in Congress and foreign policy circles. The Rev. John Hagee, claims on his website that the pro-Israel organization he founded, Christians United for Israel (CUFI), has a million members, and that 99 million homes are the audience for his religious messages. Hagee is not only unequivocal in his support of Israel's refusal to evacuate the settlements of the West Bank and Gaza, which were promised to it by God, but preaches that a nuclear war by Israel and the U.S. against Iran (but not the other way around) will fulfill God's plan for the apocalyptic battle that will bring about the end times.

Christian evangelicals have been--and are today--a much stronger determinant of U.S. support for Israel in Congress than are Jews. According to a recently published survey by the highly respected Pew Research Center, [11] organization, 82% of white evangelical Protestants believe that Israel was given to the Jewish people by God--more than twice the percentage of Jews (40%) who agreed. Over half the sampling of American Jews surveyed (54%) consider the level of American support for Israel to be "about right," with fewer than a third (31%) claiming that the U.S. is not sufficiently supportive. In contrast, only 31% of white evangelical Protestants surveyed agreed with the current level of American support for Israel, while 46% said the U.S. is not supportive enough. Furthermore, 61% of Jews polled said that an independent Palestinian state could peacefully coexist with Israel, while only a third said it could not. Half of white evangelical Protestants said peaceful Israeli-Palestinian coexistence would be impossible, while only 42% felt it would be possible.

4. Israel as a Nuclear State

The U.S.-Israel relationship deepened and evolved in a number of ways. During the 1960s and 1970s Israel became part of the U.S. Cold War strategy. The U.S. assumed responsibility for Israel's survival and security, and for guaranteeing Israel's military superiority over its Arab neighbors. For nearly half a century, every American president has argued that a well-armed Israel, confident of unequivocal American support, would be both willing and able to make the necessary territorial concessions to make peace with its neighbors. But the unique status of an increasingly assertive Israel as the only nuclear weaponized state in the Middle East has forced U.S. policy to accommodate what Israel "might do" as a factor in its own foreign policy decision-making.

The goal of Israel having a nuclear weapons research program originated during its War of Independence in 1948. Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, based his survival strategy for the new state on two major components: a formal military alliance with one or more Western powers, and nuclear weapons. Initially Ben Gurion considered the possibility that a defense pact with the U.S. would guarantee the 1949 cease-fire borders. By the mid 1950s, however, he was convinced that Israel's security needs would best be served by nuclear deterrence it provided for itself. Ben Gurion regarded nuclear weapons as "insurance" in an arms race with the Arab states, as a weapon of last resort, and even thought they might be a means of persuading Israel's Arab neighbors to reconcile themselves to Israel's existence. [12]

Israel's Ambassador to the U.S., Yitzhak Rabin (a future Prime Minister) insisted that Israel "would be not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons" into the Middle East. He also argued to U.S. officials that no weapon could be considered a deployable nuclear weapons-system unless it had been tested. By the late 1960s, U.S. officials realized that pressuring Israel would be futile since it was already a nuclear weapons state. Declassified documents from the Nixon administration reveal U.S. suspicions about Israel's nuclear program and American pressure on Israel to sign the include Israel's official notification that it would not sign the NPT. [13] The "nuclear understanding" reached in 1969 between Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and Richard Nixon ended a decade of American insistence that Israel terminate its nuclear program, and allowed Israel to keep its nuclear status "ambiguous," so as not to initiate a Middle East arms race. [14]

The fear of a Middle East nuclear arms race among the Arab states of the Middle East was the chief American concerns about any public acknowledgement that Israel possessed (and possesses) nuclear weapons. But the existence of a nuclear-armed Israel raised another, and even more serious challenge to U.S. foreign policy--namely, that Israel might actually employ its unacknowledged nuclear arsenal in warfare. To prevent this, as far back as the 1970s, the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East has been preventing Israel from deploying its nuclear weapons. The U.S. has done this by providing Israel with its most advanced aircraft and military hardware designed to give Israel a "qualitative military edge" (QME) over its Arab neighbors since the 1980s, paid for with U.S. military aid to Israel, originated as a means of keeping Israel from using its nuclear weapons if it felt militarily threatened. Furthermore, the U.S. has politically backed Israeli positions in the United Nations and other international organizations, and assuring Israel that the U.S. will guarantee Israel's security with its own military power.

Moreover, the U.S. has actively intervened to prevent the outbreak of war between Israel and its neighbors, most notably Egypt, and has attempted to facilitate a resolution of the Palestinian issue that might aggravate Middle East tensions. The U.S. maintains close military and intelligence cooperation with Israel, which serves to keep U.S. security and defense officials up to date about Israeli assessments of regional threats that might give rise to armed conflict. What began four decades ago as a variety of strategies intended to bolster Israeli security, as part of a sustained American effort to prevent Israel's deployment of its nuclear weapons in combat situations--have proven largely successful in preventing any regional war in which Israel has been directly involved. The U.S. insisted that Israel stay out of both Gulf Wars between the U.S. and Iraq, ostensibly out of concern for Arab sensibilities, but in reality to avoid any possibility that Israel might resort to use of its weapons of mass destruction--including its unacknowledged nuclear weapons--invoking its right to self--defense. The U.S. also benefits from Israeli technological innovations are incorporated into advanced U.S. military hardware that is ultimately provided to Israel.

5. Domestic Politics

The current US Congress, which has proven to be unsuccessful at passing legislation on a number of urgent domestic issues, nonetheless manages to come together on passing resolutions supportive of Israeli policies and concerns and increased levels of funding for Israel with majority support from both parties. This includes passing increasingly punitive anti-Iran sanctions that affect not only U.S. foreign policy, but significantly impact the economies, trade relations and energy security of other countries, including Japan.

Congressional candidates who receive campaign funding from defense contractors, and whose districts may be dependent largely upon producing military equipment included in such defense contracts, are generally among the most hawkish, and, regardless of whether they are Democrats or Republicans, they are unequivocally supportive on the subject of maintaining and increasing U.S. military aid to Israel. Regardless of complaints about the growing federal deficit or excessive government spending, military aid to Israel is considered to be untouchable.

In the past few years, members of the Israeli government--including Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, cabinet officials, military and intelligence officials, past and present, and members of Israel's Knesset (Parliament), have exploited the political polarization in the U.S. to their own advantage. With no qualms about voicing disagreements with the U.S. publicly, they look to members of Congress who are critical of the Obama administration for redress. Members of Congress use platforms provided to them abroad, particularly in Israel, to disparage their own government. On the eve of the shutdown of the U.S., members of both Houses of Congress, of both parties, attended a reception for the outgoing Israeli ambassador, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hosted Netanyahu for a special briefing.

Complicating matters still further for Middle East foreign policy, and what was once known as "public diplomacy," has been the emergence of 24 hour, 7 day a week media, hungry for headlines. Discussions of Middle East foreign policy take on particularly shrill and highly partisan overtones. With over 900 foreign correspondents based in Israel, and very few elsewhere in the Middle East, Israeli views of developments in the Middle East are given disproportionate coverage and importance.

Beyond domestic political that heavily favor Israeli interests, the close military and intelligence ties with Israel help to shape U.S. perceptions of the Middle East in numerous ways. There have been unintended consequences for the U.S. of seeing the Middle East through Israeli eyes. Among them has been the persistent challenge from Israeli leaders and pro-Israel advocates of drawing "red lines" that would commit a war-weary and financially stretched U.S. to military action.

6. Egypt

In 1977 U.S. President Jimmy Carter brokered a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt known as the Camp David Accords that became a cornerstone for Israeli security and a pillar of U.S. foreign policy. Having lost the Yom Kippur War of 1972, and realizing that the U.S. would never allow Israel to lose, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel. Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula, which it had captured in the Six Day War in 1967, and was guaranteed Israeli access through the Suez Canal. Egypt also became a client state of the U.S., receiving substantial U.S. military aid, second only to that received by Israel.

This turning point in U.S.-Egyptian relations resulted in the Egyptian military aligning itself with the U.S. Widespread human rights abuses in Egypt were ignored by the U.S. for more than four decades--under Anwar Sadat, and his successor, Hosni Mubarak, until the "Arab Spring" uprisings in 2011 brought them into to the headlines. U.S. pressure on Mubarak, it was feared, might jeopardize the peace treaty with Israel, and might even bring down Mubarak as Jimmy Carter's pressure to liberalize Iran had brought down the Shah in 1978. The primary focus of U.S. foreign policy toward Egypt became maintaining the peace treaty with Israel.

Egypt's first democratic election after Mubarak was removed from power that made Mohamed Morsi Egypt's first president posed a dilemma for Israel and for the U.S. Not only was Morsi a member of the Muslim Brotherhood party in Egypt, but he was not part of the military elite of Egypt with whom U.S. and Israeli defense officials had become friendly and comfortable. Although Morsi had said and done nothing to imply that he would abrogate the peace treaty with Israel, there was speculation in Israel and in pro-Israel circles about what the implications of an Islamist Egyptian might be. Ironically, Morsi had to counter accusations by Egyptians that he was "too pro-Israel" after Israeli Chief of Staff Benny Gantz implied in mid-April that security cooperation with Egypt in Sinai was actually better than they had been in the past. [15] But Gantz was also careful to warn that "the security situation on the border with Egypt was 'not good' and terror organizations were continuing to flourish there.

Ever since Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt over thirty years ago, there have been Israelis--particularly on the far right--who have vociferously argued that it had been a mistake. Discussions of Egypt in the Israeli media often allude to the opportunities that various scenarios for Egypt's future might offer for Israel seizing the Sinai. Such a move, it was argued, might be justified by either the breakdown of military authority in Egypt and the prospects for chaos on Israel's borders, or an Islamist Egypt run by the Muslim Brotherhood that could be portrayed as supportive of Hamas and terrorism. After Morsi was deposed, some Israeli pundits wondered whether it might have been more to Israel's advantage had Morsi remained Egypt's president.

If Morsi's election had been problematic, his ouster was even more so in some respects. U.S. law prohibits foreign and military aid to any state that ousts its democratically elected leadership in a coup d'etat. Israel lobbied against the U.S. considering Morsi's removal from office a coup. Pro-Israel media in the U.S., as well as some lawmakers and policy makers portray pro-Morsi demonstrators as being Islamic terrorists who are exclusively responsible for the violence and loss of life in Egypt, and assert that getting rid of Morsi was the "democratic" thing to do. Ironically, it was the members of the secular grass roots Tamarod movement who brought down Morsi, who have been calling for the peace treaty with Israel to be nullified.

The Egyptian coup (or non-coup) was followed by calls for a "return to democracy" the U.S. president, various State Dept. officials, and members of Congress, which were paradoxical, even impossible, since Egypt had no democracy to "return" to. Although in some respects Morsi could be regarded as the first and only democratically elected president of Egypt, his return to power is not considered either desirable or feasible not only by the U.S. and Israel, but by many Egyptians who accuse him of betraying the goals of Egypt's Arab spring. Congress and the Defense Dept. grappled with the question of whether or not Egypt would receive its normal appropriated funding, to which it would not be entitled if there had been a coup. Israel has been quietly urging the U.S. to continue Egypt's funding. A compromise agreed upon in October reduced, but did not eliminate U.S. military aid to Egypt, funding only those activities of Egypt's military that were most beneficial to Israel's security, such as counterterrorism in the Sinai.

7. Syria

Before leaving office, President Bill Clinton expected that Syria would sign a treaty with Israel similar to Egypt's, promising peace in exchange for the Golan Heights and American military aid. That did not happen, because peace talks stalled, each side blaming the other. Nevertheless, the Syrian border with Israel remained quiet, even as Israel made it abundantly clear that it would not return the entire Golan to Syrian control and has carried out strikes against what it claims were nuclear facilities under construction.

With the outbreak of anti-Assad protests in 2011, Israeli defense and intelligence strategists were divided on what the best possible outcome in Syria would be from an Israeli point of view. The ouster of Assad, who backed Hezballah in Lebanon and who has had the support from Iran, has viewed positively by most Israelis, but the uncertainty as to who or what would replace him has been problematic. A secular strongman friendly to Israel as well as to the U.S. would be ideal but it is also highly unlikely. On Sept. 17 of this year, Israeli Ambassador to the US Michael Oren publicly announced that even al-Qaeda would be preferable to Assad remaining in power from Israel's point of view. [16]

Having been pressured into declaring the use chemical weapons a "red line" that would trigger U.S. intervention in the Syrian civil war in which 100,000 Syrians were estimated to have been killed, President Obama asserted that he had the executive authority to order military strikes at any time in defense of U.S. national security. Nonetheless, he asked that Congress grant him an authorization for the use of force. Obama was simultaneously derided as weak for backing down from his "red line," and accused of getting the American people into yet another Middle East war that the American people did not want.

Asked whether there was any way that way a U.S. attack on Syria could be avoided Secretary of State John Kerry responded, "Sure, if the Syrians give up their chemical weapons." To worldwide astonishment, Assad agreed. While the details of precisely how and when Syria's chemical weapons would be destroyed were being worked out, Assad received a temporary reprieve, much to the chagrin of Israel and the Arab Gulf states supporting the Syrian opposition. Kerry met with representatives of the core group of countries making up the Friends of Syria to review progress towards convening a Geneva peace conference to discuss how to help the Syrian opposition. Plans for the Geneva meeting on Syria call for bringing together representatives of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad for peace talks that will lead to a political transition in Syria. Kerry has stated that "there is no military solution" to the Syrian conflict now in its third year, in which some 110,000 people have died, "only a continued rate of destruction and creation of a humanitarian catastrophe for everybody in the region if the fighting continues." [17] The foreign ministers of the Friends of Syria group on Monday, who decided Bashar al-Assad has no future in Syria's future. [18]

8. Iran

The U.S. view of Iran is refracted through an ideological prism shaped by Israeli perceptions and colored by the recollection of the Iran hostage crisis. It is an image of a rogue state ruled by mad mullahs, whose Islamist zeal make it the world's foremost and implacable sponsor of terrorism who cannot possibly be trusted with nuclear technology. Israel has been at the forefront of accusations that Iran is in the process of developing nuclear weapons. A front page headline from the Israeli newspaper Maariv, dated April 25, 1984, reads (in translation), "Iran in final stage of production of nuclear bomb." In June 1992, the Chief of Israel's Air Force, Gen. Herzl Budinger, told Israeli television that, if not stopped--by military action if necessary--Iran would become a nuclear power by the end of the decade. [19] In 1995, Benjamin Netanyahu (currently Israel's Prime Minister) said that "the best estimates at this time place Iran between three and five years away from possessing the prerequisites required for the independent production of nuclear weapons." [20]

Israeli insistence that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons became a driving force behind the Clinton administration's "dual containment" policy that regarded both Iran and Iraq as "rogue states." Beginning in the mid-1990s the pro-Israel lobby began to push for the enactment of strict sanctions against 'Iran, but against firms in other countries investing in Iran's energy sector. Israeli political leaders played a major role in President George W. Bush's designation of Iran as part of an "axis of evil" in his State of the Union address in January 2001. [21] Israel has continued to call for American "red lines" that will trigger a U.S. attack on Iran, and has repeatedly threatened to carry out unilateral military action on its own if necessary against Iranian nuclear production and research facilities.

Iran first had its compliance with additional safeguards called into question by the IAEA in 2002. Unable to determine whether or not any violation had actually occurred, the IAEA referred the matter to the UN Security Council in 2006. Despite Iran's claims that its nuclear program is in compliance with its treaty obligations, it has been subject to punitive sanctions for nearly two decades. Furthermore, firms based in countries other than the U.S. have been forced to comply with the increasingly stringent sanctions imposed upon Iran. These sanctions are, in some measure, intended to persuade Israel that Iran's nuclear research can be halted without the use of force. Although Israel does not agree that sanctions are sufficient, it insists they must be maintained and intensified.

There are frequent reports-in the media that Israel has been provided by the U.S. bunker-buster weapons and the delivery devices to be use them against Iran. Yet to this day, the western media carefully qualifies all references to Israel's own possession of nuclear weapons as "alleged" or similar terminology that implies that there some question about the extent of Israel's nuclear weapons capability. It is very rarely reported that Iranian nuclear negotiators have repeatedly brought up the subject of creating a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. With everything to lose (in terms of its own nuclear weaponry) and nothing to gain from giving up its unacknowledged nuclear status, Israel refuses to participate in such an endeavor.

Israelis also pointing out that Iran has consistently topped the US list of the most active "state sponsors of terror" since 1984. [22] Although few details beyond speculation have been brought forward as actual evidence of Iran's advancement in nuclear weapons capability have been brought forward since 2003. U.S. National Intelligence Estimates (with the one exception of the 2007 NIE that actually played down the threat posed by Iran) and IAEA reports have revealed little that was not known in the previous reports. Nevertheless, during the past two decades, the Israeli deadline for Iran going nuclear--and the "red line" that Iran is reportedly about to cross in its nuclear weapons--have continued to inch forward in Israeli estimations a year or two at a time. Such "within a year" estimates in the popular media, usually are fueled by off the record assurances of purportedly well-placed anonymous sources "not authorized to comment" that plans for an attack on Iran are underway, and an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities is imminent.

From the perspective of U.S. national interests, the election of Hassan Rouhani, a pragmatic moderate, as Iran's president, ought to be good news. Iran has expressed the willingness to resolve outstanding issues with the IAEA and to improve ties with the U.S. so that the sanctions--which have become global in their scope and ramifications--can be lifted. The telephone call between Obama and Rouhani that broke the diplomatic ice when Rouhani spoke at the United Nations was groundbreaking--the first contact between Iranian and American heads of state in over 30 years. Since then, U.S. officials involved with the negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran--and between the U.S. and Iran--have been taking. "I've been doing this now for about two years," one U.S. official was quoted as saying, "and I have never had such intense, detailed, straightforward, candid conversations with the Iranian delegation before." Rapid progress from hereon out is expected.

Israel has responded with fury to the prospect of improvement between Iran the U.S., demanding that all sanctions remain in place until no vestige of Iran's nuclear program remains--and there is regime change that brings down its current government. In a similar vein, some members of the Congress immediately greeted the positive interaction between Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and Secretary of State John Kerry with the threat of new and more crippling financial sanctions, and one member of the U.S. Congress announced he would introduce a resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iran. Although a growing number of voices are realizing that rapprochement with Iran is in the national interest of the U.S., and of Israel, the pressure to maintain and even ratchet up the sanctions remains strong. Iran may also have to contend with objections to its human rights policies and accusations that it supports terrorism, even if a satisfactory solution is reached on the nuclear issue.

Nevertheless, as of now, Obama's foreign policy vision, expressed in the blueprint he set down when he was still an unlikely candidate for the presidency, appears to be unfolding just as he had hoped. Time will tell...