The spark was often small and local.
But these sparks set off a conflagration which swept across North Africa and the Middle East, beginning in December 2010 and continuing throughout 2011, in the process toppling three dictators and pushing all the region's rulers, without exception, onto the defensive. The Arab Spring, as it came to be known, caught analysts and policy-makers by surprise, called into question many long-held assumptions about the region, and set in motion a period of political turbulence without precedent in the region's modern history.
This report will argue that these events present both challenges and opportunities for the region itself and for outside powers.
The role of outsiders, both politically and economically, may in fact be rather limited - because of the volatility of events on the ground, because of local sensitivities about the (real or perceived) agendas behind external assistance, and because of constraints imposed by the current global economic and financial crisis.
But external players who are anxious to play a constructive role - whether governments, NGOs, the United Nations, the European Union, or international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF-need a clearer understanding, first, of what has happened and, second, of the limits and possibilities of what they can do. This report seeks to address both of these challenges. It is designed to assist the process of understanding the extraordinary events of the last twelve months-and of formulating realistic strategies to help the region move towards a more democratic, equitable and, in the long run, more stable future.
In only one case during the last twelve months - that of Libya - has the West intervened militarily to help a local opposition movement overthrow an autocratic ruler. This report will argue that Libya was not a precedent for future 'humanitarian interventions' but, on the contrary, a bruising experience for the outside powers involved and one which is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere in the region.
Broader questions addressed in the report include:
The 'Arab Spring' is a catchy phrase but it is arguably an inadequate label for a diverse set of phenomena that are likely to produce a range of very different outcomes. The analogy with the fall of communism in Eastern Europe is inappropriate. Viewed with the advantage of hindsight, the old regimes in Moscow, Prague, and elsewhere fell like dominoes - and their transitions to democracy, however difficult at the time, were child's play compared with those now under way in parts of the Arab world. In particular, the citizens of the former Eastern bloc had a role model near at hand in the form of the European Union, which they were eager to join and which saw its role as that of a big brother helping them build democratic systems.
The countries of North Africa and the Middle East are in a very different situation, where a domino effect is less likely and role models are more problematic.
So how should we characterise the events of the past tumultuous year in the Arab world? There have certainly been striking similarities among the region's protest movements. These include:
Arabs throughout the region share a common frustration with an old order now widely seen as discredited. They have suffered decades of corrupt autocratic rule in political systems which are either out-and-out police states, or pseudo-democracies with rigged elections and rubber-stamp parliaments, or paternalistic monarchies where abundant petrodollars buy silent acquiescence. But many are no longer ready to remain passive. One of the most striking things to have changed over the last year is the popular mood. Arabs have had an intoxicating taste of 'people power'. They have been able to take to the streets to voice their dissent - often for the first time in their lives. In this sense, it will be hard to put the genie back in the bottle.
But if there are similarities, there are also important differences - and it is these which will help determine, in any particular country, whether democracy movements succeed or fail.
The Arab states can be grouped into five categories:
a. The trailblazers
Opposition forces in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have achieved regime change - the first two with dizzying speed through non-violent protest, the third after eight months of Western-backed armed rebellion - and they are therefore well ahead of other democracy movements in the region (even if the challenges they face remain severe). A process of political reconstruction is under way in these three states which, whether successful or unsuccessful, will offer lessons for opposition activists elsewhere. Of the three, Egypt is the most important because of its size and regional weight - and hence is the subject of separate analysis (see Section 3, below).
b. The violent republics
At the other end of the spectrum are Syria and Yemen, whose regimes have resorted to sustained and brutal violence to suppress opposition. The regime has clung on in Syria - despite the loss of an estimated 3,000 lives - for three main reasons:
With Western sanctions crippling the economy, the loyalty of the urban middle class to the regime is being sorely tested. However, a significant part of the population - especially in the capital Damascus - still seems willing to support President Bashar al-Assad and the ruling elite. Unless this changes, the situation will remain deadlocked.
In Yemen, too, there is deadlock - but the dynamics are different. What began as a popular uprising against the corrupt, authoritarian regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh has been largely taken over by powerful military and tribal factions. Hence what is now under way is less a grass-roots insurrection than an intra-élite power struggle - watched anxiously by Yemen's next-door neighbor Saudi Arabia.
At the time of writing (November 2011) there appears to be no end in sight to the violence and instability in Syria and Yemen - and a distinct possibility of prolonged and bloody stalemate, with troubling implications for the region as a whole.
c. The autocratic monarchies
Broadly speaking, during a year of protest and upheaval across the region, the monarchies have fared better than the republics. This does not mean they have been untouched by the regional storm - but they appear to be weathering it, so far at least, more successfully than their republican neighbours. Why is this so? There is some force to the argument (though it should not be pushed too far) that the monarchies have a higher degree of legitimacy, and hence of popular acquiescence, than the republics. Moreover the wealthy monarchies (Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab neighbours) are better placed to buy off dissent and hence gain time to bolster their position both domestically and regionally. In contrast, the poorer monarchies (Morocco and Jordan) have felt obliged to appease popular anger with the promise of far-reaching political reform.
The most significant of the monarchies, in this and other respects, is Saudi Arabia, which now finds itself uncomfortably isolated as the leading status-quo power in a region where the status quo is under sustained challenge. Saudi rulers regard the Arab Spring as a serious threat to themselves and their regional allies. They have responded in a variety of ways which reveal a sense of panic bordering on paranoia:
The death in October of Prince Sultan, the Saudi Crown Prince and long-serving defence minister, has raised questions about the kingdom's ability to navigate through these exceptionally choppy waters in the months ahead. The next in line to succeed the ailing King Abdullah is the widely feared and disliked interior minister, Prince Nayef. Nayef, too, is reported to be in poor health, but if he becomes king this could exacerbate Saudi-Iranian tensions, since he is known to take a hawkish stance towards Tehran - and it could jeopardise social reforms (such as giving women the right to vote) which Abdullah has cautiously advocated.
d. The reforming monarchies
In contrast to the Saudi rulers' outright opposition to the Arab Spring, the kings of Morocco and Jordan - lacking the substantial oil wealth of their Gulf brethren and feeling more vulnerable to public anger - have announced that they intend to embark on far-reaching reforms designed to transform their political systems into constitutional monarchies. They are clearly using the promise of political reform to defuse tension, and some of their citizens are accordingly sceptical about their true intentions. Even though in the longer run the reforming monarchies offer a more hopeful model than the authoritarian regimes, their success is not assured. They have already felt the force of popular protest, and are likely to do so again if their citizens feel the promise of real change is not being fulfilled. Moreover, should they get into difficulties, there are distinct limits to what their wealthier Gulf allies could do to help them. The Saudi intervention in Bahrain is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere in the region.
e. The dogs that didn't bark
Finally, there are states which, for a variety of reasons, have experienced little or no sustained unrest. To take three examples:
The most important event of 2011 - more important than the flight of the Tunisian leader Ben Ali, the suppression of the uprising in Bahrain, or the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime in Libya - was the downfall of Husni Mubarak in Egypt. Because of its large population and its regional role - in seeking an eventual peace with Israel, in confronting the power and influence of Iran, in upholding a regional order underwritten by both Saudi Arabia and the United States - Egypt is unique. The success or failure of what many Egyptians regard as their revolution will have immense implications not only for the Arab world's most populous country but for the region and the region's interaction with outside powers.
The interplay of forces in Egypt is being watched closely by would-be revolutionaries elsewhere. Those forces are, principally
An early mistake made by outside observers was to exaggerate the extent to which the young activists of Tahrir Square were representative of their societies. In fact, their secular middle-class lifestyles set them apart from most Egyptians (even those who supported the aim of toppling the dictator). The energy of these young activists, and their skill in using the internet and social media to organise and channel dissent, enabled them to trigger - but not control - a movement of change. Even if they seek to call their followers back to demonstrate in the heart of Cairo, they will find it hard to regain the kind of momentum they enjoyed in January/February 2011. Other actors are likely to exploit, with varying degrees of success, the dynamic which the activists set in motion.
The signs are that the interim rulers of the country - the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces - will only relinquish power after a gradual and controlled transition which ensures both their own role in guiding the country and the perks and privileges which come with that role. It must not be forgotten that the army controls, directly or indirectly, large parts of the Egyptian economy - as well as enjoying generous military aid from the United States (amounting to some $40 billion since 1979). The generals have been clumsy in the exercise of power since the demise of Mubarak: their decision-making processes have been opaque and their communication skills poor, and they have attracted growing criticism for extending the timetable for the transition to an elected civilian government. But regardless of how long the transition turns out to be, their ultimate goal seems clear: to maintain the role traditionally played by their counterparts in Turkey, as the power behind the scenes and the ultimate guardian against instability or an Islamist takeover.
Whether an Islamist takeover is likely is another matter. This report argues that it is not (either in Egypt or, for that matter, in Tunisia). The Egyptian Islamists have certainly opened a new and, from their point of view, promising chapter in their history. After decades of oppression and clandestine or semi-clandestine existence, the main Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, has now emerged into the light of day and is able, for the first time, to compete in the political arena on an equal footing with others - and with a good chance of winning a share of political power and decision-making. For the Islamists, this is an opportunity not to be squandered. However, to capitalise on it they must overcome a number of handicaps:
The contrast between the transition in Egypt and that in Tunisia is notable in several respects.
The transition in Egypt has already been marred by violence between protesters and security forces, sectarian tension between Muslims and Christians, and a widespread fear that various groups (the army, the Islamists, the Salafis, or shadowy foreign forces) are out to hijack the revolution and divert its course away from a democratic outcome.
It has not been easy to read the intentions of the Egyptian military. But knowledgeable observers believe the generals, uncomfortable at being thrust into the political limelight, genuinely want to hand power to an elected civilian government - provided their own interests and privileges are safeguarded. Reconciling civilian and military interests will not be easy. To give one sensitive example, the military budget has traditionally been secret - and is not subject to scrutiny by civilian officials - and the generals have made it clear they want to keep it that way.
It is nevertheless possible to envisage an outcome that is at least semi-democratic, with an elected civilian government trying to carve out autonomous powers for itself while at the same time trying to satisfy two very different groups of actors - ordinary Egyptians, impatient to see tangible benefits from Mubarak's overthrow, and the military, anxious to preserve its influence, even if from the wings.
Three important lessons can be drawn from the Egyptian experience:
It is not easy to identify clear winners and losers among the states of the region, in a situation of such flux and uncertainty. However, some regional trends are discernible.
Israel feels threatened and further isolated by the Arab Spring, seeing it as bringing to power regimes that are more hostile and less likely to honour existing peace treaties. In fact, the likelihood that either Egypt or Jordan would tear up its peace treaty with Israel is remote. But the attack by an angry Egyptian crowd on the Israeli embassy in Cairo, in September, showed that anti-Israeli sentiment remains strong (and is not confined to Islamists). This, in turn, will make Israelis even less likely to take risks for peace - even if conditions were more favourable for the revival of the peace process.
Iran was quick to welcome the Arab Spring, but it too is in some ways threatened by it, since there are obvious parallels between the large street demonstrations in Iran in June 2009 (following the disputed presidential elections there) and the mass protests of 2011 by young Arab pro-democracy activists. Moreover Iran is nervously watching events in Syria, where its closest regional ally - the beleaguered regime of Bashar al-Assad - is being challenged by sustained opposition.
Iran may, in one respect, benefit from the new regional mood. Most Arabs outside the ruling élites do not share Western alarm over its nuclear programme, and the newly emerging Arab regimes will accordingly be less inclined to join Western efforts to contain the Islamic Republic. Egypt may well set the pace: it has already signalled that it wants to normalise relations with Tehran.
Saudi-Iranian rivalry, meanwhile, looks set to continue and may well intensify, as an isolated Saudi kingdom seeks to blame its troubles on an Iranian threat it has amplified to monstrous proportions. This is something more deadly than traditional rivalry between states over power and influence, since it contains within it the poison of sectarian (Sunni-Shi'a) tension - something Saudi leaders and the Saudi media have not hesitated to inflame.
One place where Saudi-Iranian rivalries are likely to be played out is Iraq. Once American forces complete their withdrawal by the end of 2011, each of these two regional powers will try to prevent Iraq falling into the sphere of the other. In this contest, Iran, with its extensive political, economic, cultural, and religious ties with its western neighbour, has a distinct advantage. More broadly, a pattern of constant interference by its neighbours will reduce Iraq's ability to emerge as a sovereign state which can credibly control its own destiny.
Two countries that have clearly benefited from the Arab Spring are Turkey and Qatar. There is widespread discussion of a 'Turkish model', and there can be little doubt that Turkey's ruling AK Party, under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, provides an example many Arabs find attractive - a blend of Islam and modernity that is a good deal more appealing than the discredited Iranian model. Qatar, for its part, has recently become hyper-active in regional affairs - playing, for example, a significant role in arming and funding the anti-Qaddafi forces in Libya. It has attracted some suspicion, however, in Libya, Egypt, and elsewhere, since it is widely believed to be (like Saudi Arabia) funding Salafi groups notable for their intolerant Sunni puritanism.
Finally, the Arab Spring is occurring at a time when the position of the United States in the Middle East is weaker than for several years. As it struggles to become more relevant, it finds its leverage limited and its credibility low. Although President Obama enjoyed a brief honeymoon - because of widespread relief at the departure of George W. Bush and the feeling that Obama's Cairo speech in June 2009 heralded a fresh start - he has, since then, disappointed many in the region because of the growing gap between his words and his actions and, in particular, his failure to curb Israeli settlement-building or foster a meaningful peace process.
President Obama's response to the Arab Spring has often been hesitant and reactive. He has found it hard to explain why he actively supports democracy and human rights in Egypt and Tunisia but not in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, or why he favoured military intervention in Libya but does not do so in Syria. In any case, the new Middle East will, in general, be less amenable to American - and, more broadly, Western - interests and preferences. It is not only local rulers who will have to take greater account of Arab public opinion. Outsiders will have to do so, too.
(i) Political options
Since the start of the Arab Spring, countries outside the region have essentially been bystanders - captivated (and in some cases appalled) by the drama, but largely powerless to influence its outcome. Only in Libya has the West intervened directly - and Libya is the exception that proves the rule. Leaving military intervention aside, the outside world's political options have been limited. They have included:
The case of the North African states is distinct, since the West has encouraged regime change there and, rightly, feels an obligation to give material assistance in the challenging task of political reconstruction. That task will be distinctly harder in Libya than in either Tunisia or Egypt.
The Council, aware that its forces could not have overthrown the Qaddafi regime without NATO support, feels a sense of obligation to the West. The challenge for Western powers is to offer help when asked, without appearing to impose their will or to be solely motivated by a desire for access to the country's oil wealth.
Egypt and Tunisia, on the other hand, may lack Libya's oil wealth, but have a better chance of experiencing some sort of democratic or semi-democratic transition - given their greater level of social and educational development, and the less violent nature of regime change there. Outside support is needed in a range of areas, including:
There are, however, local sensitivities to be taken into account. For example, Egypt's interim rulers have been reluctant to give the United States a blank cheque when it comes to democracy promotion. They have demanded the right - just as, ironically, the Mubarak government did - to approve which groups should receive US aid for this purpose. This reflects a desire to retain 'ownership' of the Egyptian revolution and to resist anything that might detract from its home-grown character.
(ii) Economic options
This report has argued that the main motor of the Arab Spring is political: it is, first and foremost, about freedom and dignity. However, this does not mean economic issues are unimportant. Indeed part of the challenge for states in the throes of upheaval is that, while political reconstruction will inevitably take time, in the short term they badly need economic assistance. The most urgent priorities are:
The United States and the European Union - together with the World Bank, the IMF, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - have already pledged billions of dollars' worth of assistance. Talk, however, of a Marshall Plan for the region is unrealistic, given global economic conditions. What's more, the Arab mood is ambivalent: there is a great deal of economic pain and a recognition that international help is urgently needed - yet at the same time, as we have seen, a strong sense of national pride and a deep-rooted suspicion of Western models and Western intentions.
A telling moment came in June 2011, when Egyptian officials announced that, in response to public criticism, they were cancelling loans already agreed with the World Bank and the IMF. This reflected the intensely nationalist mood that has characterised the Arab Spring, the suspicion of outsiders' motives, and the rejection by many Egyptians of an economic-liberalisation model associated with the 'crony capitalism' of the Mubarak regime. In time, such suspicions may soften, especially if economic conditions fail to improve, but the spirit of national pride and sensitivity will endure.
Another difficulty is that, while Arabs want to throw off the political legacy of the strong-man state, they have nevertheless grown dependent on the state to provide jobs, houses, and services, and to act as the main engine of the economy. As Elham Fakhro and Emile Hokayem observe, 'Today, many Arabs are not demanding a smaller state but a bigger, more effective one.' (See the sources listed on page 22.) This will make post-autocratic governments extremely wary of lifting expensive subsidies on food and fuel, or embarking on privatisation measures that would, in the short term, significantly add to unemployment.
Outsiders will have to deal sensitively with these issues - but, if they do so, there are plenty of areas where they can help.
The European Union, because of its geographical proximity and its traditionally close trade and business ties with North Africa, has a specially important role to play - and has, by common consent, been slow to play it. The Europeans have, it is true, an obvious liability. For decades, their political leaders allied themselves uncritically to the region's autocrats (Ben Ali, Qaddafi, Mubarak). The 'privileged partnership' the EU offered these regimes under its European Neighbourhood Policy - promising them favourable trade and aid in return for progress on human rights and good governance - was sham. The regimes knew that, in reality, their autocratic behaviour would be tolerated in the name of 'business as usual'.
But in the changed circumstances of today, North Africans are pragmatic. They need help of various kinds and look to their neighbours across the Mediterranean as being best placed to provide it. It is now up to the Europeans to reciprocate.
The Arab Spring is far from over. But its outcomes will vary from country to country and from short-term to long-term. There will be gains and losses for the international community as events unfold. The likelihood of short-term turbulence is offset by the prospect of more open, equitable, and democratic systems emerging in the longer run - at least in some parts of the region. There are likely to be
Most Arabs want the world's support as they embark on difficult transitions - but, as we have seen, they are highly sensitive to any hint of external interference. That means, in political terms, that a local role model (such as Turkey) may be more attractive than any Western model. In economic terms, liberalisation of the kind advocated by the World Bank/IMF is tainted by its association with the anciens regimes in the region.
Western military intervention - as the Libyan experience showed - is costly and controversial, and unlikely to be repeated. Western powers will watch with embarrassment the suppression of legitimate protest in a number of countries (currently Syria and Yemen), but will find that apart from verbal condemnation (and, in the case of Syria, economic sanctions) they have little means of influencing the course of events.
Likewise in dealing with close allies, such as Saudi Arabia, who are hostile to the Arab Spring, there will be little outsiders can do, other than quietly but persistently advocating the virtues of reform. The need to work with the Saudis on a range of regional issues (such as opposition to Al-Qaeda and joint efforts to contain Iran) will necessitate the maintenance of working relationships. The Saudis, for their part, have a continuing interest in co-operation, especially on economic and security issues, despite their undisguised anger over Washington's support for the Arab Spring and its failure to activate a meaningful peace process.
World leaders should temper rhetorical support for democracy with a sober assessment of the difficulties each country faces on the road to reform - and of the limits of what outsiders can do. It will take many months for the dust to settle. Strategic patience should be the order of the day.
Useful sources
Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, 'The Arab Counterrevolution', New York Review of Books, 29 September 2011
The Arab Spring: Implications for British Policy, London: Conservative Middle East Council, October 2011 (available at www.cmec.org.uk)
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, 'Gulf States: Studious Silence Falls on Arab Spring', 25 April 2011, www.opendemocracy.net
Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, Nicu Popescu, and Nick Witney, 'After the Revolution: Europe and the Transition in Tunisia', March 2011, London: European Council on Foreign Relations (www.ecfr.eu)
Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Korski, and Nick Witney, 'Egypt's Hybrid Revolution: A Bolder EU Approach', May 2011, London: European Council on Foreign Relations (www.ecfr.eu)
Elham Fakhro and Emile Hokayem, 'Waking the Arabs', Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2, April-May 2011 (and other articles in the same issue)
Jean-Pierre Filiu, The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising, London: Hurst, 2011
Lloyd C. Gardner, The Road to Tahrir Square: Egypt and the United States from the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak, New York: The New Press, 2011
James V. Grimaldi and Robert O'Harrow Jnr, 'In Egypt, Corruption Cases Had an American Root', Washington Post, 20 October 2011
Michael Wahid Hanna, 'The Mind of Egypt's Military', 23 August 2011 (http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/23/the_mind_of-egypts_military)
Roula Khalaf, 'Eight Lessons of the Arab Spring', Financial Times, 28 July 2011
Roula Khalaf, Heba Saleh, and Abeer Allam, 'The Economics of the Arab Spring', Financial Times, 9 October 2011
David Kirkpatrick, 'Egyptians Say Military Discourages an Open Economy', New York Times, 17 February 2011
Marina Ottaway, 'Egypt's Democracy: Between the Military, Islamists, and Illiberal Democrats', 3 November 2011, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (www.carnegieendowment.org)
Revolution and Political Transformation in the Middle East, Volume I, Agents of Change, Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, August 2011
Revolution and Political Transformation in the Middle East, Volume II, Government Action and Response, Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, September 2011 (both volumes available at www.mideasti.org)
Aram Roston and David Rohde, 'Business Side of Egypt's Army Blurs Lines of Aid from US', New York Times, 5 March 2011
Johnny West, Karama! Journeys through the Arab Spring, London: Heron Books, 2011
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