The spotlight in the Middle East has shifted, with bewildering speed, from Tunisia to Egypt and now Libya. In the Gulf, the focus is on tiny Bahrain, whose fate is causing heartburn in neighbouring Saudi Arabia. Other countries - Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, Jordan - are experiencing serious discontent, but their situation seems on the whole less precarious. There is no sign that the regional storm will abate any time soon. Each country is wracked by similar grievances, yet each has its own dynamics and its own peculiarities. One of the main factors that will determine the outcome in any particular country is the presence - or absence - of a strong and unified military capable of playing the role of arbiter.
In Egypt, the military have taken charge, which has at least stabilised the situation for the time being. But the longer-term political consequences are uncertain. The generals have promised a four-stage political transition: rapid amendment of the constitution to be followed by a referendum, parliamentary elections, and, finally, presidential elections - all this supposedly by September. What we do not know is whether this 'transition' - a magic word these days - will lead to a genuinely democratic outcome or what Nathan Brown, a leading American expert on Egypt, warns could be 'liberalised authoritarianism'. As Brown points out, Egyptians are united in calling for far-reaching change, but there can be no guarantee that the military will in the end agree to wholesale reform of a system that has served them well. The generals have so far done little to reveal their hand.
Libya is very different. Muammar Qaddafi has kept the military divided, and is now relying on militias and mercenaries who owe their loyalty to himself or his sons. There is no one who can play the role of arbiter in the struggle - which helps explain its brutal, anarchic, and confusing character. If Qaddafi goes down in a bloodbath, it is far from clear whether there is any force that could fill the vacuum. Scarcely much better for Libya - or for the watching world - would be the country's de facto partition between a pro-Qaddafi Tripoli and an anti-Qaddafi Benghazi.
The case of Bahrain is different for other reasons. Having initially resorted to brutal force, the country's ruling Khalifa family seems to have backed off and is now talking of 'national dialogue'. What distinguishes Bahrain from other Arab states is that a predominantly Shi'ite opposition movement is confronting a Sunni ruling family. Since the Shi'a comprise more than two-thirds of the population, demography dictates that most of the protestors are Shia - even if their grievances are undoubtedly shared by many (non-royal) Sunnis. Whether meaningful concessions are possible, therefore, on the part of a beleaguered ruling family, fearful for its own survival, is far from clear. Majority rule would spell the demise of the family's monopoly of power. The Shi'a are not without enlightened leaders who favour power-sharing rather than the overthrow of the system. But, given current tensions, a mutually acceptable power-sharing formula may prove elusive.
The other complicating factor in the Bahrain crisis is the influence of neighbouring Saudi Arabia. Most analysts think it unlikely there will be a revival of significant unrest in Saudi Arabia. The violence of 2003-2006, when Al-Qaeda's Arabian wing sought to subvert the regime, is a thing of the past. Most Saudis, whatever their private criticisms of the House of Saud, do not seek its overthrow. But the ruling princes feel themselves nevertheless to be seriously threatened by regional developments. Put starkly, they have seen close Arab allies - first Ben Ali, then, far more significantly, Husni Mubarak - toppled by popular protest, and, in their eyes, the United States failed to lift a finger to save them. They fret that the end of Khalifa rule in Bahrain would (a) provoke Shi'ite unrest in the neighbouring oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, and (b) benefit Iran. Both fears may be exaggerated, but such concerns are impelling the Saudi rulers to do everything they can to try to keep the Khalifa family in power. Direct Saudi intervention would exacerbate sectarian tensions and be immensely counter-productive.
One of the biggest and most painful lessons of this whole regional crisis is how little other powers can do - whether Arab or Western - to rescue a close ally when the chips are down. More 'days of rage' lie ahead.
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