JIME News Report 

Iran: what sanctions can (and can’t) do



Roger Hardy
Middle East and Islamic Affairs Analyst
(07/22/2010)

Sanctions hurt, and the new UN and US sanctions against Iran are no exception. They will hurt in practical ways by making it harder for Iranian banks, businesses and officials to operate – and they will hurt psychologically by intensifying Iran’s feeling of being isolated and in the dock. This helps explain why Iranian officials tried so hard to stave off the UN Security Council’s latest sanctions resolution by cobbling together a counter-proposal with the help of Brazil and Turkey.

The initiative failed, and the UN vote went ahead. The sanctions resolution – the fourth since 2006 – authorises new measures against Iranian banks and against Iran’s Revolutionary Guards; it adds more names to a blacklist of companies suspected of helping the nuclear programme; and it calls for the inspection of Iranian vessels at sea if there are “reasonable grounds” to suspect their cargo includes weapons or other banned materials. Thanks to the efforts of Russia and China, the resolution lacks teeth. But, whatever its weaknesses, it sends a political signal that is extremely unwelcome to the Islamic Republic: that the world is unhappy about its nuclear programme and the lack of transparency that cloaks it. From Washington’s point of view, diluting the resolution was a price worth paying in order to bring the Russians and the Chinese on board and send a message of international resolve.

In any case, the United States’ own, unilateral, sanctions do have teeth. They set out to deter companies in other countries from doing business with Iran – and set stiff penalties for non-compliance. Extra-territorial sanctions are problematic, since they can be regarded as infringing the sovereignty of the countries concerned, and it remains to be seen how the Obama administration chooses to enforce them. Sustained pressure on its European and Asian allies has certainly had an effect: many companies with global interests are reluctant to earn the Americans’ displeasure. But a constant complaint is that whenever they withdraw from business in Iran, the Chinese move in to take their place.

What if …?

So sanctions will hurt and annoy and inconvenience Iran, and may help slow down a nuclear programme that already has a number of technical hurdles to overcome. The new sanctions may encourage Iran to return to the negotiating table for yet another (probably futile) attempt to find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear problem. But what they will not do is make Iran abandon the quest for a nuclear capability which it regards as a strategic necessity. And it is this which has prompted one of the most senior and seasoned figures in the Obama administration, Defence Secretary Robert Gates, to ask the awkward question: what do we do if sanctions fail to do the trick? The White House was distinctly unhappy when the New York Times summarised a memo on the subject which Mr Gates had written in January, in which he called for an urgent review of the options.

As Mr Gates well knows, those options are unpalatable. The hope that the regime in Iran is so weak it will collapse ? a hope prompted by the surge of public protest after the disputed presidential elections last year – has now dissipated. The current ruling group, although more deeply discredited than ever, still clings to power and has shown it will use the most brutal means to ensure its own survival. The option of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities – whether by the United States or by the Israelis ? holds considerable risks. Although Mr Gates will want to have contingency plans available, it is clear he has little appetite for an option whose costs would probably outweigh its benefits.

The most likely course, therefore, is that while continuing to put diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran, the Americans (with the quiet help of a few allies) will use covert means to sabotage Iran’s nuclear programme. Even if this buys time, however, there is a danger that Iran’s beleaguered regime, feeling the screws being progressively tightened upon it, will become more paranoid and more inclined to lash out at its enemies. It may be tempted to make trouble in the Gulf – at the very moment when the Americans are drawing down their forces in Iraq.


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