The concept of ‘maritime security’ cannot be separated or isolated from the larger concept of 'comprehensive security' as effective maritime security cannot be established in unstable or unsecured environments. The link between the general regional security situation, which is reflected in the existing level of inter-state political and security cooperation, and cooperation on specific 'maritime security issues' needs to be recognized. The general rule is that when relations among the regional states are characterized by lack of trust, absence of confidence-building measures, and suspicions of hegemonic and expansionist ambitions, the concept of 'security' gets reduced to a single dimension, i.e. the 'national security of each state.' This normally works in contradiction to the wider concept of 'regional' security, as each state works to protect its security and national interest in isolation or in disregard to regional security interests.
This scenario is highly relevant in the context of the Arabian/Persian Gulf region. The noticeable absence of agreement among the regional states on the need for, the nature, and objectives of a comprehensive security regime in the region has hindered any serious thinking on establishing a maritime security system or setting up collective arrangements in this region; a regional security system would necessarily require a high degree of cooperation and coordination among all parties.
Further, a close link exists between maritime security and energy security as maritime security is one of the most important elements needed to ensure stable and sustainable energy supplies. Internal stability and security of the energy producing states or region is important but not sufficient, as maritime security represents the second layer or component of security required to ensure safe delivery of oil/gas to the consumer states mostly by seaborne transportation. Secure oil production will be meaningless without a secure seaborne transportation to enable the producers to export their oil and the consumers to receive their energy imports.
Thus, Asian energy security and the security of energy supply from the Middle East in general depend on two major factors:
First: The region’s overall stability and security (to help ensure continuous oil production)
Second: The maintenance of maritime security within the Gulf and beyond (to secure oil supply to the Asian consumers).
The paper has identified three main sources of actual and potential threats to the production and/or supply of energy from the Middle East region to the Asian states:
* The threat from terrorist activities
* The threat from organized criminal activities (piracy)
* The threat emanating from states' conduct
The objectives of the threats posed by states' conduct and terrorist activities differ from those of the second form of threat, namely piracy activities. The main objective of states' conduct and terrorist activities aimed at maritime targets is to disrupt oil/gas production and export capability in a bid to achieve political/economic gains. The experience during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) showed that states' conduct could be regarded as the main, and most serious, source of threat to energy supplies from the region.
On the other hand, organized criminal activities, such as piracy, aim to secure financial gain but could also have a negative impact on oil/gas supplies to the international market.
The paper identifies other factors that contribute to the difficulties facing energy security and maritime security in the Middle East: Failed, or failing states (like Somalia and, to some extent, Iraq), weak states (like Yemen), and ambitious states (Iran); external military and political presence and influence, which comes with a number of advantages and disadvantages; the lack of maritime capacity among the majority of the regional states which limits the prospect of self-reliant arrangements.
According to al-Qaeda and its associates' school of thought, targeting oil interests is part of legitimate Jihad (or justifiable war, according to Islamic Shariah law) and part and parcel of what they term as the concept of "Economic Jihad. " Economic Jihad, it is claimed, is an effective means to fight the enemy. In The Declaration of Jihad against the US Occupation of the Arabian Peninsula issued in August 1996, the leader of al-Qaeda Osama bin Laden identified the United States’ alleged 'control' of Muslims’ oil wealth as the main source of the weakness of the Islamic nation (or Ummah). In December 2004, the organization released an audio tape showing Bin Laden calling on his followers to attack Iraqi and Gulf oil facilities. At the end of 2004, or in the early part of the following year, one of al-Qaeda’s top theorists Shaikh Abdullah bin Nasser Al-Rashid produced an in-depth study offering an insight into al-Qaeda’s policy on operations against oil infrastructure. In this publication Al Rashid specified the targets and provided the legitimization for attacks on oil infrastructure. The publication titled Judgment on Targeting Petroleum Interests underlined the necessity to target oil interests by describing it as a crucial part of the economic Jihad strategy and asserted that attacking oil interests is “one of the most powerful ways in which we can take revenge on the infidels during this present stage.” [1]
Since 2002, terrorists have targeted onshore and offshore energy installations in a number of Middle Eastern states. On October 2002, terrorists attacked MV Limburg, the French supertanker off the shore of Yemen. In April 2004, in the first terrorist attack on an offshore oil export terminal, three boats launched a coordinated suicide attack on Iraq's vital oil export terminal off the Umm Qasr port. Iraq was almost completely dependent on the terminal to export around 1.9 million barrels per day. The first major attack on Saudi oil installations occurred in February 2006 at the Abqaiq oil facility. This facility was chosen because of its immense strategic value: the single largest oil processing facility in the world, it processes around 7 million barrels of oil per day which represents almost two-thirds of Saudi daily production. In September 2006, four suicide attackers, driving four explosive-laden cars, targeted Yemeni oil and gas installations in Ma'arib and Hadramaut.
Attacks on Iraqi oil infrastructure between 2003 and 2008 clearly showed the extent of damage that could be inflicted on the oil industry. Operations by terrorists/insurgent groups against the state's oil infrastructure were very effective in rendering many oil sectors partially or totally non operational. Attacks on the Iraq-Turkey pipeline rendered it non operational for a long period. For every day that this pipeline was not operational, Iraq's economy lost approximately $7 million. In 2004, three suicide boats attacked the Basra offshore oil export terminal, and the resulting damage cost the country some $40 million in lost revenue and repair expenses. Attacks on Iraqi oil infrastructure were designed to effectively prevent Iraq from exporting its oil, and resulted in denying the international oil market for a period of two years the supply of nearly two millions barrels a day, while at the same time affecting Iraqi oil revenue, which represents the main source of state income.
Naval ships and oil tankers are considered “politically justified targets” by terrorists. However, in general, it is harder to attack a maritime target than a land based one. Modern ships and tankers are well designed to withstand a suicide attack by speedboats or an attack by machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Besides, terrorists understand that an isolated attack on oil tankers or other maritime energy installations can inflict only limited physical damage and short-lived political or economic damage. In order to cause a psychological impact on the oil market, attacks need to be frequent, sustainable, and must inflict considerable physical damage on the targets. So far there is no evidence that the terrorists have been able to achieve such an objective.
Going by the experience of the first Gulf war, oil tankers have proved to be resilient against external attacks. Of the 411 ships attacked during the Iran-Iraq war, 239 were petroleum tankers. Yet tankers are difficult to damage, and only 23 percent of the tankers attacked during the eight years of the war were actually sunk or damaged beyond repair (or what may be termed Constructive Total Loss ? CTL). Most of these tankers were of old design or small in size. [2]
Attacks on LNG tankers carry more risk than an attack on oil tankers. LNG has different characteristics from oil as it is more flammable placing the safety of the tanker and the port where it is berthed at greater risk as the new generation of LNG tankers have an average capacity of three billion cubic feet. However, huge investment has gone into establishing a very high security and safety standard for LNG tankers.
Despite the fact that terrorist groups have already carried out a number of attacks against oil installations in different places in the Middle East, and that they were able to provide the required Islamic 'justifications’ as they see it to attack the oil industry, the oil industry in general has successfully stood up to the challenges and adapted itself to the unpleasant new realities.
Failed states are always associated with the absence of strong and centralized authority. They are also severely affected by political, economic and social crises. A failed state environment provides the right conditions for the growth of organized criminal activities such as piracy.
In Somalia, for example, the lack of a strong and centralized authority is identified as the major factor behind the escalation of piracy attacks. Historical records show that there were very few, if any, piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden before the collapse of the Somali state. Indeed, almost a full decade passed between the collapse of the Somali government in 1991 and the first recorded piracy attack in 2001. [3] The 10 years of continuous civil war between the different tribal and religious factions worsened the crisis situation in the country and Somali emerged as a good example of a failed state. Naturally this failed state environment encouraged a number of illegal activities both at the individual level and on an organized level. Piracy was one such illegal activity which thrived in the lawless environment in the failed state of Somalia.
Organized piracy activities always originated on land, while the actual attacks were carried out in the waters, close to the shore or on the high sea, within or outside territorial waters. The actual crime was planned, managed and controlled by a 'criminal infrastructure' based on land and linked to a wide network of facilitators who were responsible for taking care of logistical needs. Such a criminal infrastructure could not exist or operate in a normal state.
Somali officials have stated that originally piracy started as a response to illegal fishing. The country's tuna-rich waters were plundered by commercial fishing fleets soon after its government collapsed in 1991. Following this, Somali fishermen turned into armed vigilantes, confronting fishing boats and demanding that they pay a tax. From this point, pirates discovered that piracy could be a source of huge cash. Piracy in Somalia is now a multi-million industry and pirates reinvest some of the ransom money into improving their capabilities. The piracy phenomenon has transformed into organized criminal activity.
Terrorists would have taken note of the Somali pirates’ successful seizure of the Saudi supertanker, the 330-metre long Sirius Star (classified as VLCC - very large crude carrier), in November 2008. The daring nature of the attack on Sirius Star, which took place 500 miles off the coast of Kenya, could be a wake-up call for terrorists: what pirates were able to do, terrorists must consider doing too.
The Sirius Star episode showed that hijacking a supertanker was much easier than it was thought previously; it was even easier than attacking the ship with weapons or explosives as well as more rewarding politically, financially and publicity-wise. Until now, most - if not all - major attacks carried out by terrorists against maritime targets have been conducted while the targeted vessels were berthed in port or stationed near the shore. However, piracy activities showed that the hijacking of a ship could take place anywhere near the coastline or on the high seas, at a time chosen by the attackers, and even when the vessel was cruising at high speed. [4]
Supertankers are defenseless against a well planned hijacking operation. Due to their bulk, tankers cannot change course quickly to take evasive action; they move slowly and sit very low in the water when filled with oil making it easy for attackers to intercept and board them.
The real threat emanating from the success of the Somali pirate attacks on ships is that, sooner or later, terrorist groups will try to employ the pirate tactics and techniques to serve their political objectives. If a nexus develops between pirates and terrorists, it could be extremely dangerous for energy markets as oil tankers will be one of the prime targets of this new alliance or of terrorist groups which adopt piracy tactics for financial and strategic gains. In fact, such a nexus could potentially be dangerous for maritime security in general.
However, at this stage there is no evidence of links between pirates and terrorists. Further, the assumption that today's pirates are nothing but 'maritime terrorists' is not accurate either. Unlike their terrorist counterparts, criminal pirates have no ideological or political cause. They select their targets according to practical considerations, which are always motivated by the size of the potential financial gains, and tactical considerations, mainly looking for an easy target that will guarantee a successful seizure.
In considering the attitude of Islamic extremist groups toward the question of piracy, certain issues need to be closely examined.
In principle, a Muslim individual - or Islamic groups - should not be involved in or encourage criminal and illegal activities. According to Islamic shariah law, piracy is considered a crime of hirabah. In many Islamic countries which follow the shariah law ( for example, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen), piracy activities are placed on the same level as terrorist activities, which have also been classified as a crime of hirabah under shariah law. Hirabah is defined according to shariah law as 'highway robbery' in its narrow interpretation and is included in the category of most serious crimes. The wider concept of the term refers to the unlawful use of all kinds of violence by an individual or a group of people against the society, thereby terrorizing and spreading a sense of insecurity among people and instilling a fear among them for their life and property. Further, hirabah is seen as an act of disrupting civil order and spreading mayhem thus threatening the peace and security of individual Muslims and the society as a whole. [5]
In the case of Somali piracy, during the second part of 2006 when the Islamic Courts Movement (the extremist al-Shabab al-Mujahid group was part of the Islamic Courts Movement until September 2007) expanded its control over most of the southern parts of Somalia, a remarkable reduction in criminal activities, including piracy attacks, was noticeable.
In fact, Ambassador Samir Hussny who was responsible for the Somali file in the Arab League reminded the League Council that "when the Islamic Courts movement was in control of a certain part of Somalia, piracy activities had almost disappeared from that part of the country." [6]
In April 2009, the Somali Transitional Parliament, under the control of the relatively moderate Islamic Courts Movement voted unanimously to implement shariah law in Somalia. [7]
It seems that Islamic groups in Somalia are putting the pirates under pressure. For example, one of the pirate leaders in Garoowe, the capital of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland which came under the control of al-Shabab al-Mujahd movement in early 2009, told a New York Times reporter that “these Islamic guys want to cut my hands off ” referring to the shariah law which considers pirates as thieves. [8] “The sheiks seemed to have rattled him (the pirates’ leader) more than the armada of foreign warships patrolling offshore, ” the New York Times report said. The reporter noticed that, “Islamic leaders have embarked on a campaign to excommunicate the pirates, telling them to get out of town, and preaching at mosques for women not to marry these un-Islamic men… in Garoowe, the pirates are increasingly viewed as stains on the devoutly Muslim, nomadic culture. ” [9]
As part of their drive to implement shariah law to control criminal activities inside Somalia, the al-Shabab movement staged during September 2009 a number of public trials of people accused of theft and robbery. The movement punished them by cutting their hands in public. [10] Earlier, in June 2009, the al-Shabab movement had publicly executed four Somali youth under shariah law (and the Hirabah rule) accusing them of armed robbery. [11]
Theoretically at least, Islamic groups in Somalia, which have declared their intention to implement the shariah law, could play a major role in eliminating Somali piracy from the country’s territories. Islamic groups could prevent the pirates from using the Somali coast and coastal villages as a safe haven to plan and conduct attacks on international shipping.
The remarkable ease with which pirates have been able to get huge funds by way of ransom is likely to attract the attention of terrorist groups which have been struggling hard since 2001 to secure the financial support required to continue operations.
Further, the strategic impact of piracy activities on international maritime security in general and on energy security in particular is also likely to catch the attention of terrorist groups.
The main possible link between the pirates and the extremist or terrorist groups could emerge from the tribal ties and clan loyalties which remain very strong in the Somali society of today. Members of the clan or the tribe involved in piracy activities usually "donate money" to their relatives who could be part of one Islamic movement or another. Further, potential cooperation between the pirate and terrorist groups could extend to the exchange of intelligence and information related to ship movements and navigation routes which the pirates are knowledgeable about.
Neither the al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan-Pakistan nor the organization’s branches in Saudi Arabia or Yemen have expressed their view or declared any policy on the problem of Somali piracy. So far, al-Qaeda has not established a special branch for its activities in Somalia, nor does it have a declared 'African' or 'sub-Saharan' branch. Because of geographical factors, the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda are the two organizations likely to be concerned with the issue of piracy activities. The geographical proximity of Saudi Arabia and Yemen to the Somali mainland, and the shared waters in the Red Sea and in the Gulf of Aden, theoretically make it likely that the two al-Qaeda branches (unified into one organization since 2007 under the name ‘al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’) will be the 'regional command' qualified to deal with this issue.
However, despite the growing interest shown by al-Qaeda’s top leadership in the developments in Somalia, no opinion has been expressed by them on piracy activities. The leadership seems to have deliberately decided to ignore the issue.
In late April 2008, one Islamist website, which is thought to reflect al-Qaeda opinion, published an unattributed article under the title "Maritime Terrorism as Strategic Necessity." In this article, the author strongly argued for the need to extend 'mujahedin' activities to the maritime sector. The article pointed out that control of the seas could be achieved by controlling the chokepoints and the starting point for implementing this strategy could be around the Arabian Peninsula (Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandab). Yemen was identified as the best place, from the strategic point of view, to implement this policy. The author further stated that the 'mujahedin' had been successful on land, and they could achieve similar success on the sea. [12]
Almost a year later, indications emerged that one of the pro-al Qaeda Somali groups could be looking at the issue of piracy. One source within the al-Shabab al-Mujahid movement indicated that “attacks on foreign ships entering the Somali territorial waters without permission is acceptable.” The statement emphasized that such foreign vessels were breaking the Somali and international law and committing aggression against the state and the people. This kind of justification appeared for the first time in April 2009 when Muktar Rugo, the al-Shabab al-Mujahid spokesperson, stated in a press conference held in the city of Bedawa that his movement does not support piracy activities; however, "Somali pirates have the right to attack the foreign ships as these ships have no right to be in Somali waters." [13]
The statement thus legitimized piracy against foreign ships if the attack was carried out in the country's territorial waters (and possibly the country’s economic zone).
In the past few years, al-Qaeda headquarters has shown increasing interest in the developments in Somalia. This interest manifested itself in the support pledged to the fundamentalist Islamist groups involved in the Somali conflict. In July 2006, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden issued a recording encouraging the Islamic Courts Movement to control Somalia and calling on Muslims all over the world to support the movement’s objectives. Then in March 2009, the leader of al-Qaeda intervened in the struggle between the two Islamic movements (the Islamic Courts Movement and the al-Shabab al-Mujahid movement) battling for control of the country by calling for support for the extremist al-Shabab al-Mujahid group. A few more statements on similar lines were issued regarding developments in Somalia by the second-in-command of al-Qaeda, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri. Further, in mid 2008, a lengthy video tape was released by the al-Qaeda media arm 'al-Suhab foundation' featuring one of the organization's top leaders, Sheikh Abu Yahya al-Liby, asserting the view of al-Qaeda that 'No peace could be established in Somalia without establishing an Islamic regime first' and emphasizing that 'a true Islamic system is the only solution to the Somali problems.' [14]
In early September 2009, the al-Shabab produced a videotape titled "Osama: We Are at Your Call" affirming the movement's loyalty and support to the al-Qaeda leader. The movement's video message was a response to the al-Qaeda leader’s audio tape message released in March 2009 exhorting the al-Shabab movement to Jihad to establish an Islamic state in Somalia. [15]
It is well known that as part of its deterrence strategy, Iran places emphasis on 'retaliation capability' and 'the day-after strategy'. It aims to deter an outside military attack (a US or Israel air attack) directed against the state, or specifically against selective targets within the state (the state's nuclear installations). As for the objective of disrupting the flow of oil from the region to the international market, Iran will use all its capacity to achieve its objective. We can assume that if Iran decides to implement its retaliation or punishment strategy against oil and gas-related targets in the Gulf region, it could:
Try to attack oil installations on land by employing the state's military or intelligence capability. The likely targets are production, transportation, storage and, export facilities, besides refineries.
Extend attacks to oil and gas targets at sea like offshore oil/gas production facilities, oil/gas export terminals, oil/gas tankers.
Interfere with the freedom of navigation by preventing access to the main oil/gas seaports and access to the Strait of Hormuz.
Implement a general strategy aimed at the destabilization of oil-producing Gulf States by terrorist or intelligence operations inside the targeted Gulf state(s).
The statements of Gen. Mohamed Ali Ja'fairy, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Forces (RGF), in June and then in August 2008, serve as a good example to illustrate the repeated Iranian threats and to reemphasize Iran's intention and potential ability to prevent the export of oil from the Gulf region to the international market.
According to the statements of the RGF commander, Iranian forces are developing new weapons and upgrading their capability to achieve this objective 'if the need arises.’ The development program includes the expansion of the RGF naval bases in the Gulf region and the organization of a number of military maneuvers in the Strait of Hormuz area. In these military maneuvers, RGF naval, air, and missile units will practice and test their ability to interfere with the ships’ movement in and out of the strait. The weapons upgrading program focuses on local development of a new weapon system and new military equipment that will assist the Iranian forces in their objective of preventing movement through the strait. In mid 2008, the RGF tested a new Iranian made anti-ship missile with a range of 300 km as part of an ambitious national arms development program, which has notably focused on the development of Iranian naval capability including the introduction of a new generation of small ships, missiles, torpedoes, mini-submarines and other equipment.
In his August 2008 statement, the RGF commander stated that because of Iran’s strategic geographic location, and its long coastline on the Gulf and Arabian Sea, and due to the state's superior military capability "closing the Strait of Hormuz for an unlimited period of time became an easy objective." [16]
As part of Iran’s preparation for a possible military confrontation in the Gulf region over its nuclear program, in September 2008 the Supreme Leader decided to transfer the entire defense responsibilities of the Gulf region to the RGF and specifically the naval operation to the RGF naval command. Since then, the RGF is exclusively responsible for the strategic planning and the defense of the Gulf waters. Iran’s navy remains responsible for operations and the defense of other Iranian sea outlets (Sea of Oman and the Caspian sea).[17]
During the Iran-Iraq war, as a first reaction to the two belligerent states' policy of attacking oil tankers, oil prices initially rose sharply reflecting the nervousness of the market. The attacks on shipping at the start led to a 25 percent drop in commercial shipping through the Gulf waters. However, this drop lasted only for a very short time. Despite the ferocity of the Tanker War during the years 1984-1988, the Iran-Iraq war disrupted less than two percent of ships passing through the Gulf. One recent study on this subject has concluded that it will be very difficult for Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz for navigation and it could be even more difficult to cause a “significant” disruption of oil flow from the region. [18]
To generate a real impact in the global oil market, it would be necessary to prevent the transportation of around 50 per cent of the approximately 17 million barrels that transit through the Strait of Hormuz in tankers each day and the same percentage of the approximately 3.5 billion cubic feet of natural gas that passes through the Strait daily. This blockade would need to be sustained for a number of weeks to create enough of a supply shortage to overwhelm inventories and spare capacity in the global oil production and distribution system. [19]
Reflecting a genuine fear that Tehran would carry out its threats to close the Strait of Hormuz in case of an escalation of the confrontation between the US and Iran over the Iranian nuclear program, an old visionary idea was revived. The idea, which was originally suggested by the late Shaikh Rashid bin Saeed Al-Maktoum of Dubai during the height of the Iran-Iraq war, recommended the digging of a navigation canal, similar to the Suez Canal, from the UAE coast on the Arabian Sea (the coast of the Emirate of Fujairah) to the center of the UAE (Abu Dhabi) in order to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. [20] No action has been taken to further this idea.
The ideal arrangement which the GCC states wish to see for a future maritime security regime for the Gulf/and Arabian Sea area is based on a triangular partnership between:
A) The eight littoral states of the Gulf ? (6 + 2) the six GCC states, Iran, and Iraq.
B) Main beneficiaries/User states (Asian energy importing countries)
C) Major maritime powers present in the region (mainly the US, and potentially France).
Indeed, the inclusiveness of the arrangement is considered a prerequisite for the effectiveness, workability, and sustainability of any maritime security regime. However, two facts must be considered in any attempt to establish a maritime security regime in the Middle East:
- No effective and sustainable maritime security regime can be established in the Gulf region and the Arabian Sea area without the participation (or agreement) of Iran
- No effective and sustainable maritime security regime can be established in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden area without the participation (or agreement) of Israel
Thus, any plan to establish an exclusive Arab regional maritime security regime may have limited success.[21] Such a plan in fact faces a number of major obstacles.
The GCC states, possibly without exception, are content with US maritime protection and US naval domination in the region. Despite GCC states’ disagreement with many aspects of US Middle East policy, especially the US policy on the Palestine problem and the US conduct in Iraq, most of these states believe that, at this stage, no effective alternative or replacement exists for the US military role in the Gulf region.
Small states of the GCC, in particular, believe that US naval domination of the region and the US military presence on land has worked effectively to protect small regional states from possible intimidation by regional and outside powers. The US military role, which has rapidly expanded since the Iran-Iraq war, has created a degree of security for the vulnerable states. In fact, the US military presence is mostly concentrated in the smaller GCC states like Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait. In the last few decades, the UAE has moved closer to US in terms of military cooperation and, with the agreement of the US, has allowed the establishment of a French military base on its territory.
No doubt the GCC states understand that this protection comes for a price, as the GCC states have to maintain good terms with the US and take note of its strategic objectives. Such considerations surely place some restrictions and limitations on the freedom of the GCC leaderships and their policy making, especially on many sensitive issues relating to domestic or Arab affairs. However, at this stage the general feeling among the GCC leaderships is that the benefits deriving from the US role as the protector outweigh the disadvantages.
In conclusion, the belief among many small regional states that the presence of outside military powers as a security guarantor is a good substitute for regional security has the effect of hindering the drive to push for the establishment of a regional security regime which could require the end of such outside presence.
Since the Islamic revolution in Iran, the regime in Tehran has placed one unchanged condition as a prerequisite for the establishment of a regional security regime: all the foreign forces present in the Gulf region must leave the region, and all local arrangements with the US forces need to be terminated. It is a well established fact that the Iranians will not accept or be part of a regional security regime in a region dominated by US military forces with the approval and agreement of some regional states. As the largest state in the Gulf region and as the most powerful in military and intelligence terms, Iran wishes to play the leading role in any regional security regime that might established in the Gulf region. Therefore, what will serve Iran’s national security interest is a regional security regime or arrangement based exclusively on the membership of all littoral states of the Gulf and established on the basis of 6+2 (GCC states + Iran & Iraq) or even 6+3 (with Yemen as a member).
The US is not keen on encouraging the development of a regional security regime in the Gulf region which could replace its domination of this vital strategic area. Indeed, the US has little interest in promoting such a permanent regional strategic arrangement, which, if successfully developed, could eventually result in reducing its military and security role in the region and undermine its political influence in the long term. However, the US might see benefits in some sort of non-strategic maritime 'understanding' between the US Navy and GCC states’ navies on the one hand and the Iranian Navy on the other. The main objective of such an understanding would be to reduce tension and avoid incidents and misunderstanding among the navies operating in the Gulf waters.
User states, mainly the Asian energy consumer states, cannot dispense with the US role as the protector of the main source of energy supplies. Indeed most of the Asian states think it necessary to maintain the US military role in the Gulf to guarantee security and stability in the region. User states cannot depend on, or trust, a regional security arrangement as a replacement for the US role. However, most user states encourage the development of a regional security regime as an "additional measure" to help in the stabilization of the region; however, they do not share the Iranian view that such a regional security regime could be established only as a replacement for the foreign forces.
The lack of naval capacity constitutes a major obstacle in the establishment and implementation of an effective maritime security regime in the Gulf region. Regional states have no spare naval capacity, and there is very limited "blue water navy" capacity existing within the region. Indeed, most of the regional states, including the large states like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Oman have a relatively modest size navy, which might not even be adequate to protect the states’ territorial waters. Small states, in particular, have no navy and depend solely on a small Coast Guard unit.
However, while the present circumstances do not allow or encourage the establishment of an effective and comprehensive maritime security regime in the Gulf region, regional and international effort should be invested in encouraging cooperation in non-sensitive or non-strategic areas like:
Maritime safety (maritime traffic control, search and rescue)
Environmental protection
Control and monitoring of maritime economic activities (offshore oil and gas production, fishing, etc.)
Countering maritime criminal activities (drugs and arms smuggling, human trafficking)
Countering criminal piracy
Hydrological surveys and mapping
In November 2008, India and Qatar signed a landmark 'Defense and Security Cooperation Pact,'
described by one Indian official as an agreement "just short of stationing troops."
The defense and security agreement designed to address the security concerns of Qatar and safeguard India's interests deals with key areas like maritime security,
intelligence sharing on terrorism, countering money laundering and fighting transnational crimes.
In its maritime component the defense pact lays out a structure for joint maritime security policy and joint training programs as well as exchange of visits between the two navies.
The pact also has a strong energy security dimension. India buys 7.5 million tons of liquefied natural gas from Qatar every year as part of a 25-year contract. Recently, India has asked Qatar for an additional 2.5 million tons of LNG, with the prospect of further expanding energy relations with Qatar in future.
In May 2009, just 18 months after the signing of a new defense cooperation agreement between France and the UAE, France opened its first permanent military base in the Gulf region and in the Middle East region. This is also the first foreign military base on UAE soil.
The French military base in Abu Dhabi named 'Peace Camp' comprises an air force facility at the Emiratefs Al Dhafra air base, which can accommodate large number of French jets; a naval base of eight hectares (about 20 acres) at the port of Mina Zayed, which can handle any French naval vessels except aircraft carriers; and an army base at Zayed camp, specializing in urban combat training. Further, there is also an intelligence-gathering facilities center.
According to officials from the two states, the French presence in the UAE has a strong maritime dimension. Its 500 troops permanently stationed in the base and major naval and air operations "will safeguard shipping lanes and reinforce the fight against piracy off the Somalian coast." On the occasion of the opening of the base, the French President asserted that the French military presence in the UAE has two objectives. The first is to enhance the UAE defense capability, and the second to play a role in the regional security of the Gulf region. The President told the official Emirates news agency Wam that, "France was on the Emirates' side if its security was ever threatened." He said, "Through this base, the first in the Middle East, France is ready to shoulder its responsibilities to ensure stability in this strategic region."[22]
However, the US, with its CENTCOM HQ, remains the major foreign military presence in the Gulf with key air bases, logistics operations and the naval headquarters of the US 5th Fleet in Bahrain. [23]
In June 2009, just before the final withdrawal of the British forces from Iraq, the British and Iraqi governments reached an agreement on cooperation in maritime security. The agreement allowed a small force from the British Navy to remain in Iraq to provide protection for the offshore Iraqi oil export platforms (90 km from the port of Umm Qasr, which handles around 80 per cent of the total Iraqi oil export capacity). This special arrangement required the British Navy to keep a force of around 100 Royal Marines and their civilian supporting staff, in addition to five navy ships and its crew (400 in total), to help protect Iraqfs offshore oil export facilities until the Iraqi navy become operational in an estimated period of two years.
In June 2009, more than six months after the pirates attacked and hijacked the Saudi oil supertanker the Sirius Star in November 2008, the government of Saudi Arabia took the initiative to call for a regional maritime arrangement to fight the growing threats of piracy and terrorism. Saudi Arabia, like Yemen and other regional Arab states, was deeply concerned about the long term strategic impact of piracy on regional security, and anxious about the emerging tendency to 'internationalize the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area' under the pretext of 'protecting the region from the menace of piracy.' The Saudi view, similar to that of other Arab states of the Red Sea, was that the task of protecting the security of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden must rest with regional littoral states, mostly members of the Arab League. Unlike the Yemeni proposal (see below), the Saudi project widened the membership of the proposed security and anti-piracy structure to include all the GCC states besides the Red Sea states. Thus, on June 29, 2009, after two days of meetings in the Saudi capital Riyadh, the delegations from 11 regional states headed by the commanders of the navies signed what became known as the "Riyadh Declaration."
The Riyadh Declaration is an anti-piracy pact that seeks to establish a regional naval force called "Arab Maritime Task Force" consisting of 11 littoral Arab states of the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. The newly formed naval structure is based on the principle of 6 + 5 (six GCC states + five Arab states of the Red Sea).[24] The agreement to establish the naval force would initially run for one year and could be renewed annually after review and assessment of its role. Further, it was agreed that each state would allocate forces (naval units), according to its ability.
It was agreed that the new force would have its command center in Saudi Arabia and be under a unified command (Saudi command in the first year). It would be designed to act as a 'regional mechanism' to fight piracy activities in full cooperation and close coordination with the international forces already operating in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean waters. [25]
In fact it is very difficult to consider the naval structure laid out by the 'Riyadh Declaration' as an effective arrangement or as a long term arrangement. The 11 member states lack the naval capacity required to fulfill the task and are divided by different political and strategic interests. What unites them, however, is the concern about the impact of piracy on their security and stability and on their national economy. But it is hard to judge how far these states are ready to adhere to and promote the declaration in practical terms.
All the states that were party to the declaration, however, recognized the necessity to resolve the Somali political problem in order to find a long term solution to the challenge presented by piracy activities. But the dominating regional argument is that dealing with the threat posed by Somali piracy activities should take top priority ahead of resolving the Somali political problems. [26]
In June 2004, the NATO leadership invited the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to participate in a strategic cooperation initiative with the NATO countries. To date, four of the six GCC states (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates) have joined the initiative. The other two states, Saudi Arabia and Oman, have also shown an interest in the initiative but have refrained from official membership.
The content of the initiative and its priority areas have a clear maritime component. The main text of the document, adopted at the Summit meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul on June 28, 2004, stated that the initiative’s aim would be essentially achieved through practical cooperation and assistance in certain priority areas, and illustrative menu of specific activities. Article (C) referred to the members’ obligation to cooperate in maritime activities stating that,
"fighting against terrorism including through information sharing and maritime cooperation: The ICI document invites interested countries, in accordance with the procedures set out by the Council for contributory support from non-NATO nations, to join Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) in order to enhance the ability to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorism through maritime operations in the OAE Area of Operations." [27]
In June 2006, a Yemeni study published by the country's Coast Guard Command revealed that since the first maritime attack in the region which targeted the USS Cole in Yemeni waters in October 2000, the country had lost around $1.8bn in revenue as a result of the escalation of the maritime terrorism activities. [28]
In the summer of 2008, forced by the threat posed by maritime terrorism and the impact of piracy activities, the Yemeni government proposed an agreement which would lead to the establishment of a "Regional Maritime Security Center" for all the Arab states of the Red Sea to be based in Yemen. Yemen’s Foreign Minister stated that the objective of the proposed agreement would be to establish an Arab forum to take charge of the task of formulating and implementing “an Arab strategy” to maintain the security of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden areas without relying on foreign powers. [29] In the autumn of 2008, the President of Yemen Ali Abdallah Saleh visited Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to get support for the idea.
[1]
For further information, see Nicole Stracke, “Economic Jihad: A Security Challenge for Global Energy Supply,”
in GRC Security & Terrorism Research Bulletin, Issue no. 6, August 2007.
[2]
For more details on the Tanker Wars, see Martin S. Navias and E.R.Hooton,
Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping during the Iran-Iraq Crisis 1980-1988 (Tauris Academic Studies:, London, 1996)
[3] See "Piracy at Sea," New York Times,
[4] Terrorist attacks on the US Navy destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) in October 2000,
and French supertanker MV Limburg in October 2002 off the Yemeni coast, were carried out when the ships were moored and refueling or were very close to shore.
The August 2005 terrorist attack was aimed at the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) and USS Ashland (LSD-48) while they were berthed in the port of Aqaba, Jordan.
[5] See Mustafa Alani’s contribution in Lifting the Fog of Law: Legal Regimes to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Threats in the Near East and South Asia: The Case of Saudi Arabia (forthcoming publication), NESA Center, National Defense University, Washington D.C.
[6] Al-Hayat, December 8, 2007.
[7] See al-Ashraq al-Awsat, April 19, 2009.
[8] See Jeffrey Gettleman,
"For Somali Pirates, Worst Enemy May Be on Shore," New York Times,
May 9, 2009.
[9] Ibid.
[10] See report in Al-Hayat,
September 10, 2009.
[11] See http://www.as-ansar.com/. One study listed no less than 13 Islamic groups
(both currently operating and non-operational) in Somalia. See the map of Islamic movements and groups in Somalia (in Arabic),
July 13, 2009, at www.almethaq.info/news/article2122.htm
[12] See www.al-ekhlaas.net. For further debates on this issue,
see http://www.newsyemen.net/printn.asp?sub_no=14_2008_04_29_19173
[13] For the spokesperson’s statement,
see Al-Hayat, April 12, 2009.
[14] See also "Help your Brothers in Somalia!" video message by Ayman Al-Zawahiri,
January 5, 2007, and his second video message on Somalia released on February 23, 2009.
See also http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=1102;
http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/archive/index.php/t-518.htm
[15] Elaph, September 22, 2009, http://www.elaph.com/
[16] See Ja'fairy's statement in Al-Hayat newspaper on June 29,
2008, and his statement in al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper on August 5, 2008.
Also see the statement given by the ex-commander of the RGF and the current military adviser of the Supreme Leader Gen.
Yehya Rahim Safawy in September 2008 to Reuters, published in al-Arabia.net on September 18, 2008.
[17] See al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 17, 2008.
[18] See "Threats to Oil Flows through the Strait of Hormuz,"
Eugene Gholz and the LBJ School Hormuz Working Group, University of Texas at Austin, April 2008 (working draft).
[19] Ibid.
[20] Gen. Dhahi Khalfan, the Commander of Dubai Police Force,
news conference, al-arabiya.net on September 24, 2008.
[21] For a general view on security arrangements for the Gulf region, see Abdul Jalil al-Marhon,
"Gulf Security after the Iraq War," Center for Strategic Studies, The Diplomatic Institute, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
2005 (in Arabic).
[22] Wam, Emirates News Agency, May 26, 2009.
[23] On the regional level, the UAE is showing increasing interest in the topic of maritime security and maritime safety.
In July 2008, the UAE Naval Command organized the first "Gulf Naval Commanders Conference" (GNCC)
in Abu Dhabi which was attended by the Naval Chiefs of all the GCC states.
The objective of the meeting was to discuss cooperation between the naval forces in the Gulf region.
[24] The member states of the Riyadh Declaration are: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait,
UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Yemen, and Djibouti. All are members of the Arab League.
[25] Al-Riyadh June 30, 2009 and al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 30, 2009.
[26] See for this line of argument see
http://www.scc.gov.eg/legan-elom%20egtmaeya/legan-elom%20egtmaeya-gyograpgic/somalia.htm
[27] For the full text of the ICI document,
see: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-cooperation.htm;
For more information about Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), see http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/Endeavour.htm