Ever since Barack Obama was elected, it has been clear that Iran would be a crucial issue for his administration. But now that issue has become distinctly more complicated, and the prospect of meaningful dialogue between Tehran and Washington is looking even more remote. Last month’s Iranian presidential elections – and the mass protests that followed – have plunged Iran into one of the most serious crises since the revolution of 1979 and are significantly complicating President Obama’s task of reaching out to the Islamic Republic in an effort to end the 30-year estrangement between the two countries.
Even now, it is hard to fathom just why Iran’s most senior clerical leaders have managed to give themselves such a grievous self-inflicted wound. By intervening prematurely in the election process to announce that Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad was the winner – by a startling two-to-one majority – the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei undermined his own neutrality, split the clerical elite, and triggered a political crisis which goes to the heart of the legitimacy of the regime.
So why did he do it? Two very different reasons suggest themselves:
The importance of the Obama effect should not be underestimated. There are signs that the ruling mullahs are disoriented by the American president’s charm offensive towards them, and uncertain how to respond to it. They have not ruled out talking to the Americans but want to do so from a position of strength. In their eyes, conservatism （in the form of Mr Ahmadi-Nejad） equals strength, whereas reformism （in the shape of Mr Mousavi） equals weakness.
Whatever the reasons for hastily declaring Mr Ahmadi-Nejad the winner, it was a monumental miscalculation which seriously weakened both the credibility and the coherence of the regime. Hard-liners are left with two crude weapons – repression on the streets, and desperate efforts to blame the unrest on foreigners （especially the British）. The reformists, meanwhile, are able to argue that they – rather than their opponents – are upholding the will of the people and the democratic legitimacy of the regime; they, in short, are the true custodians of the Khomeini revolution.
A man to watch is the pragmatic former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, who lent his weight to Mir Hossein Mousavi during the election and is clearly dismayed by the outcome. His past record, however, would suggest that he prefers to have it both ways, remaining part of the senior ruling elite while at the same time warning the conservatives of the grave risks of continuing with their current course.
For the time being, there is little the Obama administration can do to influence events. Wisely, the president has resisted the temptation to issue forceful denunciations, understanding that this would merely provide ammunition to the Iranian hard-liners. When the dust settles, however, the Iran problem will still be there – as intractable as ever – and, since the US president’s offer of talks is still on the table, it is not impossible that an attempt will be made to enter into a dialogue.
The regime of the ayatollahs is likely to survive, at least in the short run. But it will survive as a wounded and weakened regime, more than ever dependent on the loyalty of main paramilitary forces – the 120,000-strong Revolutionary Guard and the much larger nationwide volunteer militia, the Basij. Moreover the regime will be even more prickly towards the West and towards any hint of Western interference. Preoccupied with its own internal problems, it will be even less likely than in calmer times to consider any significant concession on the nuclear or other issues.
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