The new Administration and Regional and Persian Gulf Security

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    Key US interests converge in the Middle East: energy security, nuclear proliferation and the ‘war against international terrorism.’ At the same time the US confronts an unprecedented series of challenges and constraints which makes the pursuance of these interests more difficult. Many of the problems stem from policies of the past eight years, which can be corrected. But there are other global global trends ---including the diffusion of power and the rise of other states--- trends which reduce US power, which cannot.

    In this paper I will start with an introduction highlighting the legacy of the recent past, then move to the foreign policy problems facing the new administration before focussing on the changing geopolitics of the Middle East and the immediate regional issues they pose. Finally I discuss the factors in the Persian Gulf retarding or facilitating regional security as a solution to the region’s problems. I conclude by noting the fluid and transitional nature of the security environment, with reflects shifts in both regional and external powers’ postures.

The legacy of the past administration

    The US’ standing in the Middle East is at an all-time low.  The  US’ reputation been damaged by policies that have brought into question its judgement and credibility as an ally as well as its moral standing. All of these are encapsulated by its miscalculations and incompetence of execution in Iraq, but they extend also to policy toward Lebanon, Palestine and Iran. US policy has been unilateralist and   animated by ideology, and has lacked any  international legitimacy that might have insulated it from outright failure. The result is not just a loss for US diplomacy but also damage to the regional order.

    The US’ entanglement in Iraq has increased its vulnerability to local adversaries. Anger at this occupation and the neglect of the Palestinian issue, local sentiment has swung behind the rejectionists hostile to the US’ idea of regional order. Iraq together with Afghanistan have come to symbolize US’ over-extension militarily and economically, leaving it with little ‘spare capacity’ militarily or diplomatically to deal with other crises or commitments.

    Thus the US has fitfully addressed the question of Iranian nuclear ambitions with limited results. Fiery rhetoric and empty threats have succeeded neither in convincing Russia to entertain serious sanctions nor Iran to suspend its enrichment programme. US and European diplomacy has been one of shifting ‘red lines’, makeshift inducements and doubtful preconditions, none of which has induced Tehran to forego its nuclear ambitions. This ticking clock together with the uncertainty of Iraq’s future and the possibility that the two state-solution on Palestine may no longer be viable, is a difficult legacy for the incoming administration.

The administration, foreign policy and the Middle East

    Policy mistakes aside, the US is confronted by changes in  international politics that threaten its role as an unchallenged superpower. Power in the future will be more dispersed with the world witnessing not a unipolar but a non-polar (a-polar )world. [1] Over time this may become a ‘multipolar world without multilateralism’[2] The slow rise of Asian powers China and India (and possibly Russia)will dilute US power and make it more subject to the reaction of others. In the short term the US will need to strengthen its credibility and its legitimacy internationally. Both of these imply a more multilateral approach to issues.[3] . Economic constraints will shape how many and what issues become a priority, given domestic claims on resources.[4] President Obama may not be ideological but he will certainly believe  in American pre-eminence , although he will be sensitive to the need for domestic consensus on foreign policy. He will inherit a “world of pressing troubles” and despite inherited political capital “there is no shortage of problems demanding that he spends this capital.”[5] The immediate demands on the President will be first, the domestic economy and second the US’ reputation in the world. Concretely the Middle East will have to come very high on his list of priorities, if only because of the continuing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan which sandwich Iran and its distinct and time-urgent problems. Strategists might argue that relations with China, Russia and the EU should  take precedence, but this appears unlikely.

Changing Geopolitics of the Middle East

    The Middle East however, has changed considerably in the past decade with consequences for the regional balance as well as for foreign policy. In summary form we may note:

•  A shift in the geopolitical centre of gravity of the region from the Levant to the Persian Gulf.[6]
• The removal of Iraq as a regional (and especially a Persian Gulf) player.
• The phenomena of weak or failed or shattered states, notably Iraq but also Lebanon and Palestine.
• The corresponding growth in importance of transnational militia (and ideology) Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaida,
•  The increased saliency of sectarian issues and identities
• Iran’s nuclear ambitions and active regional diplomacy.
• The absence of Arab leadership, reflecting divisions in the Arab world and the increased differentiation between the Gulf and other Arabs, the rich and the poor.

     It is important to emphasize that  indigenous dynamics ( from demography to radicalisation) largely shape the regional environment and that the role of outside powers to affect these is at best marginal.

    The net result of these trends has been the strengthening of forces hostile to the US and its allies.

 1)US strategic interests in the Middle East since 1945 have remained fairly constant. They may be encapsulated by the phrases “access” and “denial”, that is access to region physically and to its resources, and denial of the region to a hostile power. Although the principal threats have changed, with the flow of oil less salient than its price, and the identity of the hostile power morphing from the USSR to Iraq and now Iran,  the fundamental strategic imperatives  remain the same. In the past eight years US occupation of Iraq and a general insensitivity to the interests of regional allies has left the US with less influence than in the past.

    The increased detachment of US polices from the concerns of the regional states, eg. the Freedom Agenda . The taking of initiatives by local states to fill the vacuum thus left (eg, Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia).The attempt by key states notably Saudi Arabia, the GCC  and Iran  to diversify their relations with other states such as China and India. The continuing---perhaps increasing, in light of Iran’s activities--- dependence of the GCC states on the US for security and hence the need for the US as a regional security guarantor. [7]The demand for a US role is clear and even growing but the need for restoring the US’ reputation and implementing policies that address the new regional realities is pressing. The new administration will be confronted by three sets of interlocking issues: Palestine, Iraq and Iran, (and by extension, Afghanistan). It will be difficult to avoid tackling these or doing so separately. Despite other demands on Washington (the economy, Russia, N.Korea etc)it is likely that this region will receive priority attention.

    Overall policy will be characterised---initially at least--by an emphasis on diplomacy and on multilateralism. On Palestine we can expect a  special representative to be designated. On Iraq, the drawdown of troops will be largely a defence department affair. On Iran the international approach with the EU-3 and now the United Nations Security Council members plus Germany (P5+1) will be the preferred approach.

2)Palestine Putting an end to the longstanding conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has become more important as it has become more difficult. Neglect of the issue has led to frustration, intifidah, increased distrust, more settlements and in practical terms the receding prospect of a two-state solution. [8] Even if this conflict is no longer the key geopolitical issue in the region, its festering prevents normalisation of the region and allows rejectionists like Iran to play the “Arab street” to undermine the more moderate Arab governments and their Western allies. Further the fragmentation of the Palestinians between Fatah and Hamas, between West Bank and Gaza, and the fragility of Israeli coalition governments, makes it imperative that outside powers assist in the formulation and implementation of a settlement. How much political capital President Obama is willing to expend to personally push a peace settlement, if necessary by pressuring both sides (and providing assurances) cannot be predicted. The US will need to start serious peace talks quickly, position itself as “even-handed” while retaining enough Israeli confidence to coax and reassure that state to make painful compromises. The Palestine-Iran  issues are linked, most concretely through the Iran  nuclear question.

     If Iraq looks as if it is ‘on the mend’ but it is no means certain that the end-game will not see an upsurge in violence among the communities in the struggle to achieve positions of strength (and wealth) for the future. Two key issues are the role of the Sunnis in the state and especially the armed forces, and second the role of the Kurds, the degree of autonomy and access to the country’s resources. Whether a US withdrawal timetable can be synchronised with matching progress politically, appears uncertain, at best. What is clear is that relative Iraqi stability after a US withdrawal is essential for regional stability.  Turmoil in Iraq will provide Iraq’s neighbours the conditions for further intervention and proxy warfare, leading in the extreme case to a polarisation between Sunni Arabs and Shi’i Iran. This is a recipe for prolonged instability in Iraq and the Gulf. US withdrawal in stages between 2009-11 may decrease US  influence over the course of future Iraqi politics. The Obama administration may want to reach out to Iraq’s neighbours to try to ensure the withdrawal is accompanied by a peaceful transition in independent Iraq. The association of the  neighbours and the coordination of their policies may not be within the US diplomatic capabilities. But it is inescapable that Washington will need to ensure an orderly withdrawal and devote effort toward it.

3) Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The third crisis immediately facing Obama will be Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The issue here is whether Iran can be dissuaded from continuing on its path of mastery of the fuel cycle, which will bring it very close to a “breakout “ capability to nuclear weapons. The larger issue is whether Iran can be persuaded to behave more like a “normal” state, pursuing national interests,  than a revolutionary power intent on acting as a cause, overturning the regional order?   Tehran has seen the US increased involvement in the region  as both a threat   encirclement) and an opportunity (entanglement in Iraq) to weaken its principal adversary. So far, Tehran has rejected the P5+1 “dual track” approach, which offers incentives for the suspension of its enrichment activities, as incompatible with its rights under the Non Proliferation Treaty(NPT). In reality Tehran has judged that the US position in the region is weak; that other issues like North Korea sap its will, and that it can divide the international community, counting on the carrot of trade to divide not only China/Russia, but also Germany, Italy and others from the US. Iran’s policy of stalling for time to achieve an enrichment capability, includes blowing ‘hot and cold’

    about diplomacy and ‘playing the victim’ of the US’ alleged bullying. The combination of US misjudgements, a regional environment that has appreciated Iran’s rejectionism and windfall oil revenues, has given Tehran greater regional influence.[9]

    Iran has deliberately played the nuclear issue ambiguously; hinting at unrevealed capabilities, and the value of enrichment for its power,(“joining the nuclear club”) while allowing IAEA inspectors enough access to its facilities to escape the charge of a cover-up. While accepting the weak UNSC sanctions that have been voted, Tehran is clearly more concerned by the ‘informal’ sanctions on its financial and banking sectors, a number of countries and institutions have adopted. The poorly written National Intelligence Estimate (NIE, December 2007)seemed to clear Iran of any active weapons programme, making the threat of force less credible. This US ‘own-goal’ has encouraged Iran to continue its programme without any suspension. With some 5000 centrifuges now operating, Tehran should be able to master enrichment within 24 months and to have enough fuel to make a weapon in the same time-frame.[10]

4) Alternative scenarios. The  importance attached to the nuclear  issue stems from three considerations apart from the time-urgency  itself. First, a nuclear capable Iran might be emboldened in its efforts to destabilize the region. Second, a nuclear Iran might well encourage others to follow suit, leading to an arms race in the region and beyond. Related to this is the fatal weakening of the NPT that would probably follow.

    Third, it will be difficult to create the kind of stable deterrent relationships that came to characterise the East/West cold war relationship ( due to technical considerations,short distances and  culture).

    Finally, whatever the rhetoric about the limited value(usability) of nuclear weapons, a nuclear Iran would end the US and Israel’s ‘free hand’ in the region; every intervention/strike would have to be  very carefully considered in light of the new environment, which would have an inhibiting effect.

    These considerations make the prevention of the emergence of a nuclear Iran a high priority for the Obama government. What are his options? Neither a military solution not an acceptance of a nuclear Iran appear feasible. The former is risky without promising success, and the latter is too dangerous in light of the above and the difficulties of containment/deterrence that would need to accompany it. Obama will have to consider precisely what he is willing to settle for as regards Iran’s nuclear programme. Is it to be no enrichment/ some enrichment,  or enrichment later after a confidence building freeze? The first will not be easy to achieve. Limited enrichment in exchange for intrusive inspections may be attainable but has risks. A freeze but not necessarily a permanent cessation may be possible. Iran’s receptivity will depend on its options and whether it feels it can ride out sanctions.

    This leaves Obama, who will opt for a policy of direct diplomatic engagement, while continuing the international ‘ dual track’ approach, with two options: more carrots and/or sticks. The carrots could be in the shape of assurances of no ‘regime change’ and non-intervention, and sticks could be in form of more sanctions, formal (if Russia agrees) and informal. Obama will have to try and sharpen the ‘stick’ of a military option if Iran proves unreceptive to a diplomatic formula. Also tighter sanctions especially on refined petroleum products , which Iran imports, will have to be considered.  Since the nuclear issue is only a symptom of the larger problem with Iran’s behaviour, noted earlier, ideally it will be settled in a “grand bargain”; an across-the-board agreement covering all outstanding issues, including Iran’s support for terrorists.[11]

  For Iran to accept such a bargain the regime must be persuaded that they have little choice. So far with the oil windfall and the accommodating region, the leadership has seen its interests in continuing its anti-western activities. Tehran has seen itself ‘on a roll’ and the US in retreat. The decline in oil prices and the arrival of a new, and not tarnished, President may change these calculations. However the Iranian leadership may misjudge its relative position and prefer its disruptive, activist regional policy to an accommodation with Washington. If this were to occur the US would need to sharpen the sticks and seek first stronger UNSC sanctions and simultaneously tighter informal sanctions. The GCC states and Arabs generally are suspicious of both the “military option” and a ‘grand bargain’, both of which they see as taking place at their expense. This will call for careful diplomacy. US attempts to unite the GCC states against Iran’s programme, may be stepped up and might be complemented by the extension of improved security guarantees, but they require also that the US increase its credibility and reputation as a dependable and prudent ally.

Towards Regional Security in the Persian Gulf?

    Since Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf in November 1971 there have been several attempts to organize the region to stand on its own, without the active involvement of outside powers. The first 1971-1979 encouraged by the US, envisioned cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia as “twin pillars” against Iraq and revolutionary activity. This foundered in 1979 in part due to the revolution in Iran.  The US kept its military presence largely  “over the horizon”  but with the addition of a new capability dubbed the rapid reaction force which became CENTCOM. Shortly thereafter the war between Iraq and Iran preoccupied the region., 1980-1988. In this period the Arab states saw revolutionary Iran as the greater threat and lent their support to Iraq. Saudi Arabia took advantage of the situation to create the Gulf Cooperation Council in May 1981, excluding Tehran and Baghdad and giving Riyadh a vehicle for regional leadership. With Iraq’ s attempted annexation of Kuwait and the assembly of an international coalition and 500,000men on the Arabian peninsula  to expel it in 1991, a new era was born. This saw the stationing  of US soldiers, ships and aircraft in the Gulf, and a US policy of “dual containment” of the Iran and Iraq. The US now created a Fifth fleet explicitly dedicated for this theatre of operations. This era was followed by the current one in which the US presence inflated by the attack and occupation of Iraq is being drawn down, while a presence remains notably in Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE with a small naval detachment in Bahrain. Since the creation of the GCC it has been US policy to sell arms and train the military and to encourage defence cooperation among the members. This has met with limited success, as the  whole remains less than the sum of its parts. In the absence of real defence cooperation, and in light of the treat posed by Iran and the unravelling of Iraq, the US role in the security of the region remains  indispensable and,  notwithstanding its defects and uncertainties,  is likely to grow.

Obstacles to security regional cooperation

    For the incoming administration, a functioning regional arrangement would be welcome, if it was dominated by pro-western, moderate, regimes. It would obviate the need for a US presence in the region, and reduce its ‘footprint’ regionally. In these circumstances the US role could be as a ‘backup’ (offshore) rather than as the manager of regional security. Especially given the multiple demands on US resources, a regional security mechanism could indeed reduce the burdens on US leadership as act as a building bloc toward “peace by pieces.”

    The attractions of a regional security arrangement are clear enough: as regional institutions they would be legitimate and effective in dealing with local problems without the intrusion of external powers and their agendas. Thus they can avoid un-necessary interventions, polarisation or escalation of disputes.  Precisely because regional approaches assume common approaches to security and a high degree of cooperation, however, they are difficult to achieve. Preconditions for such cooperation include:

• An aversion to war;
• An agreement on the distribution of power;
• A common vision of the future;
• Transparency;
• Inclusiveness (of membership).

    Even putting aside territorial disputes and differences on the name of the Gulf, none of these conditions exist in the Persian Gulf. Since the removal of Saddam Hussein, Iraq has been removed as a major player in the Gulf. As a result the former tripolar system has been replaced by a bipolar one, pitting Saudi Arabia against Iran.[12] . A stable balance between these two states is difficult given demographic/ geographic disparities as well as ideological differences. Iraq’s absence means that no security system can be ‘regional’ in any meaningful sense.  The  existing institution, the GCC in any case is not inclusive having been created to keep Iran and Iraq at bay.   Even so  Saudi Arabia cannot count on fellow GCC states to balance Iran. Some GCC states resent Saudi leadership pretensions (Kuwait, Qatar, Oman).While Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE distrust Iran, they prefer to follow their own path in dealing with it. On the other hand Qatar, Dubai and Oman are more disposed to deal with Iran than to confront it. None of the GCC states believe that it can afford to alienate Iran, a large neighbouring state that is bound to have considerable influence in the region. Divisions among the GCC together with ambivalence about how to deal with Iran, thus makes it difficult for the GCC to come to a common policy vis vis Iran or to adopt a common security policy.[13] Un- certainties about the future role of Iraq also complicate the establishment of a regional security system.

    Apart from the ‘structural’ obstacles there are political difficulties. Iran seeks a security system in the Gulf that is ‘regional’ , an indigenous system without  the presence of outside powers. This implies a system in which the smaller states forego defence relationships with the West and there is no military presence of these states in the Gulf.[14] Such a system would be a vehicle for ratifying Iranian hegemony. The ‘threat’ from Iran stems not just from its revolutionary ideology and the legacy of the export of the revolution.[15] It comes also from the current Shi’i awakening which makes Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait particularly sensitive to Iranian influence and manipulation. There is also the disparity in size involved: Iran looms larger( in population) than all of the GCC combined and inevitably the smaller states are concerned whatever the nature of the regime in Tehran. Iran’s regional activism, its leadership pretensions in the Muslim world, its support for the Shi’i as “oppressed”, together with its nuclear ambitions, its harsh anti-Western and incendiary anti-Israeli rhetoric, of course aggravate the problem today.

    Iran periodically proffers these states a ‘diplomacy of smiles’,  suggesting joint military exercises, and confidence-building measures, insisting that the regional states are able to manage their own security. Predictably there are few takers. The GCC states continue on their course of buying arms separately, without too much coordination ; to hosting Western  forces; and to making their own bilateral security arrangements with Washington, France and others.

What shape for future regional security?

     The constraints on US resources  (military, economic, and political) will determine their deployment. The Middle East/Gulf will remain a priority theatre of operations, even as operations in Iraq are reduced. The demands on the US as a security manager may increase in the absence of an accommodation with Tehran and with the development of its nuclear programme. The US will need to consider what kind of military  presence will be necessary. The choice will not be between an “offshore” presence (ie. ‘over the horizon’ of the 1970’s) and an in-region presence, but on the best mix. The balance between requirements for deterring Iran and reassuring the GCC states and the need for not exacerbating the political situations in these states, is the prime consideration, (apart from resource considerations.) If Iran moves toward an overt nuclear posture, the US will need to extend security assurances and accelerate anti-missile defences in the region. More difficult will be countering the shadow cast by Iran’s nuclear capability politically, especially over its immediate neighbours. Thus the US role as the principal balancer or ‘security manager’ in the region, will continue and may grow.

    This will not preclude and may encourage two other trends. One is regional cooperation. The littoral states may meet more often whether in the GCC , the Organisation of Islamic conference (OIC) or bilaterally. They may cooperate in areas of shared interests; dealing with maritime security, drug smuggling and protection of the environment. Joint energy cooperation is also possible. Iran’s trade with Dubai (12bn dollars/year, mainly from the emirate to Iran) and Iranian investments and businesses in Dubai testify to a  mutual interdependence. They also underscore the widening gap between the richer smaller gulf states and other less successful economies.

    A second trend is toward a diversification of trade and foreign relations with other, especially Asian  states. India has a long history of ties with the region and the presence of some 5mn nationals from the subcontinent are tangible expression of this today. India already engages in naval exercises with states on both shores of the Gulf and with a naval build-up may play a larger role in the security of the approaches to the Persian Gulf . [16]

    On the energy front some 2/3rds of Middle East oil goes to Asia and some 70% of Asian imports are from that region. It is difficult to dissent from the conclusion that the Asian states will play a larger  regional role  “reinforcing their growing economic links with stronger political ties.”[17]

    It is worth noting however that China and India have growing interests in all areas in the Gulf: Iran, Iraq and the GCC. They will be unwilling to take sides in regional disputes or to choose among contestants in a regional power struggle.

    Together with this diversification of ties is the suggestion that the security of the region should be “internationalized.”[18]   In practice this suggests that the security of the region is too sensitive to be left to one state, especially in light of the US recent record of error and incompetence. However there are no obvious alternatives to the US.  NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in 2004. It offered the GCC states assistance on energy security and pledged to “foster security and regional stability” but it is neither a treaty nor a security commitment. While it may assist individual countries in areas of common concern, (should they choose to cooperate) it is obviously only of limited significance for hard security concerns.[19]

    Another approach might be to try and imitate the 6-Party talks on the Korean nuclear issue by creating an ad hoc group of concerned states. Members might include China, India, Japan, as well as the US, UK, and France/Germany/Russia. This group could be institutionalised on a semi-permanent basis for consultation and observation.

    Periodically it is suggested that what the Gulf lacks is an OSCE-type forum for all regional states to discuss security. [20] This  proposal  is based on the lack of an inclusive region-wide institution in which all states are represented, and which can interact and consult multilaterally on a regular basis. This may  create habits of cooperation and at least will increase the sensitivity of states to each others’ concerns. Some proposals argue for the inclusion of Yemen and/or Turkey, which would increase the inclusiveness and dilute the otherwise preponderant weight of powers such as Iran. These proposals make sense if they are seen as confidence-building mechanisms rather than as substitutes for the security relationships that the smaller states feel they need. They would meet the need for multilateral fora , which address collective needs,  rather than the bilateral contacts which allow for states to build on divisions and differences among the GCC.

    In general though, such proposals fail to address the main concern: are they a precondition for improving security in the region or rather the product of improved relations? Building trust and confidence though actions and policies will go further than institutional tinkering, to strengthen regional security. In their absence strong links with dependable security partners will be necessary .In the  absence of  alternatives the US will be the preferred partner of the GCC states.

    The new administration, with all its competing commitments and resource constraints, will be there, in  the defence of its own interests. But it will be facing a more complicated environment, a more sceptical audience and more recalcitrant set of local actors. Even with limited ability to affect the basic factors affecting regional politics, the skilful and determined external power can shape the strategic environment to contain adverse dynamics and harness positive ones to constructive ends. It will take vision, effort and luck but it is not impossible if  you accept “change you can believe in.”

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