The Second Baghdad Pact

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             The December 2003 conclusion of a pact regularizing the US presence in Iraq recalls earlier efforts by the UK to make Iraq a bastion of pro-western power in the Middle East. The first Baghdad Pact signed in 1954 replaced the 1930 British-Iraqi treaty and was as hated as the latter. British tutelage and military bases were never accepted by the Iraqi people and the first Baghdad Pact was ended by the Iraqi revolution of 1958. Will the second Baghdad Pact of 2003 fare any better?

             Britain entrenched itself in Iraq through a policy of coercion and cooptation similar to the US conquest of Iraq.[i] Britain faced massive rebellion in 1920 that it was only able to repress with 90,000 troops and at the cost of 10,000 Iraqi lives and 2000 British casualties. Aerial bombardment against villages and tribes, massive arrests and detention camps were part of its strategy. Also, in classic imperial fashion, Britain tried to divide and rule by exploiting communal differences, but the rebellion cut across all Iraqi communities, the Shia, the Kurds and the Sunnis. Only the Christian Assyrians became loyal clients, recruited into militias used against their countrymen; for their collaboration, they would, in time, pay dearly. Churchill, despite the tide of opinion at home against the rising costs of subduing the rebellion, was determined to stay in Iraq, for otherwise the French or Americans would get Iraq’s oil. But concessions had to be made if Iraq was to be ruled economically and London imported and installed a Hejazi Hashemite as King Feisal I with the aim of ruling the country indirectly, through him; the Shia leader, Sayyid al-Talib of Basra, a native with stronger claims, raised the banner of Iraq for the Iraqis and was deported. The British allowed an elected parliament through which they co-opted the big landed class, in particular tribal chiefs whose opposition was pacified by according them private ownership over tribal lands, turning their tribesmen into tenants on what had hitherto been collective tribal property. Almost immediately, however, King Feisal began to agitate for more independence and to court nationalists. In a concession to nationalist agitation, London agreed to grant Iraq “independence” on condition it accept a treaty giving Britain control over foreign policy and allowing British bases. It took threats to get a bare majority in parliament but the treaty could never be legitimized among the public and the regime associated with it suffered a permanent legitimacy loss.[ii] Also, Britain imposed an unpopular and unequal oil concession before parliament could be elected. A main additional grievance that made British overlordship intolerable to nationalist opinion was that simultaneously London was sponsoring an influx of Jewish settlers into Palestine where they threatened the integrity of the pre-existing Arab community. Exploiting popular resentment became a major tool of Iraq politicians. When popular nationalist politician, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani attempted to restrict British privileges in 1941, he was deposed by British forces stationed in Iraqi bases. “Independence” was a mere illusion. The hated British clients thus restored by force at the expense of the nationalist government, the regent Abdulillah and veteran politician Nuri al-Said, signed the first Baghdad pact but succumbed to the revolution of 1958.

             The parallels with America’s 2003 occupation of Iraq are uncanny. Washington also used massive and indiscriminate force, even more than Britain, to entrench itself in Iraq. Even before its invasion it had been guilty of imposing, in the words of the chief UN humanitarian aid official, “near genocidal sanctions” on the people in the expectation that if they suffered enough pain they would revolt against Saddam; in fact, the resulting deprivations only made people more dependent on the regime for daily survival.

             The US invasion was followed by the halving of Iraq’s GNP/capita compared to 2001, the imposition of a puppet government of mostly exiles without popular bases in Iraq, the flooding of the country with foreign mercenaries and contractors, the open avowal of the US intention to acquire permanent basing rights, and the attempt, in violation of the Geneva convention, to privatize and sell off Iraq's oil assets to Western buyers. This recalled the experience of British imperialism and ensured that Iraqis would view the US as an occupier, not a liberator.

             Like Britain, the US responded with violence to the growing resistance its occupation encountered, with 100,000 people, mostly civilians, being killed in the first year of war and occupation.[iii] It used tactics pioneered by Israel in occupied Palestine such as bombing and firing on densely populated urban areas; demolishing homes, collective punishment of villages, herding of thousands into detention camps,[iv] food blockades of suspected insurgent areas and security walls and checkpoints that fragmented the cities into sectarian cantons. A US commander infamously declared: 'With a heavy dose of fear and violence and a lot of money for projects, I think we can convince these people that we are here to help them.'[v] 

             Also recalling the earlier British occupation was the establishment of some 50 military bases in the country and the creation of an enormous fortified embassy--comparable to the former British High Commission--from which the occupier hoped to pull the strings of any future Iraqi government from behind the scenes. The American occupation also resembles Britain’s in its exploitation and exacerbation of Iraq's built-in communal cleavages, notably in its reliance on the Kurds against the Arabs and then the Shia against the Sunni; the near-imposition under US pressure of a constitution that locks in provisions guaranteeing US privileges in the country and institutionalizes the sectarian divisions among Iraqis;[vi] the holding of elections, at least partly manipulated, in which the main issues, above all the occupation and the measures it imposes by fiat, were off the agenda; the use of such elections to co-opt a compliant leadership which has some legitimacy but, which, being caught between the occupier and the populace, becomes increasingly dependent on the former against the latter; and the reconstruction of an security force prepared to back the occupier and its clients against the populace. In fact, the US has gone much further than Britain ever did in mutilating the country; while Britain’s clients, at least, were allowed to try to legitimize their rule through Arab nationalism, however hopeless the effort may have been, the US aims to replace Arab with communal identities, hence to deprive Iraq of collective purpose and ensure that it cannot be resurrected as a champion of Arab nationalism.        

             Iraqis did not respond positively to the destruction of their country. Western polls in the year after the invasion showed that 82 percent of Iraqis opposed the occupation and 57 percent wanted foreign troops to leave immediately; US troops were widely seen as 'lacking in respect for the country's people, religion and traditions' and 'indiscriminate in their use of force when civilians are nearby.' Five percent or less of Iraqis believed the U.S. invaded 'to assist the Iraqi people,' destroy WMDs or establish democracy, while 43% said the aim was 'to rob Iraq's oil.' More than 50 percent said attacks on US troops were 'justified' or 'sometimes justified.'[vii] These views have remained largely unchanged.

             Nevertheless, after years of civil war and insurgency, the US managed to contain, though not eradicate, the armed opposition to its presence through a combination of repression, cooptation of Sunni tribal leaders, and the intimidation of the nationalist Sadrist movement.  However, legitimating its presence was another matter. As the expiration of the UN resolution that gave international authorization to the US presence in Iraq loomed, Washington sought a pact that would regularize its hegemony over the country. The first American draft treaty gave it the right to keep 50 bases for at least ten years, tutelage over the defence and interior ministries, exclusive right to train Iraqi forces, immunity from Iraqi law for US forces, and the right to intervene against any coup or revolution and arrest any opponent. It specified no withdrawal date.

             This set off a big struggle in Iraq. On one side, Iran campaigned against the treaty among its Shia Iraqi constituents and got Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, a main party in the governing Shia coalition, to oppose the draft despite its good relations with the US. The Shia Sadrist movement was implacably opposed, without Iranian urging, on nationalist grounds. The most influential Shia religious leaders, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and Ayatollah Kazem al-Hairi also opposed it. Iraqis called it "the treaty of dishonour." Opposition from his own power base forced Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to reconsider his position on the US. After a visit to Iran, he stated that the US draft violated Iraq’s sovereignty and commented that Iraq had the option of asking the UN to terminate the US presence. As the security situation had improved in Iraq, Maliki had become more confident and believed the Americans had no real alternative but to reach a deal with him. For its part, the US made various threats regarding the consequences for Iraq of a failure to agree on a treaty; in particular, it threatened to deduct supposed debts from the hard currency it held on behalf of Iraq and to allow lawsuits to make claims on it.

             Deadlock between the Iraqi and US governments focused on a timetable for withdrawal and immunity for US troops who had been treated leniently for offenses against Iraqis. In mid-October, agreement was reached between negotiators on a second draft that specified US troops had to obtain Iraqi government permission for operations. US troops would remain immune from Iraqi law except for premeditated gross felonies committed outside of their bases when off-duty, although private US security contractors would lose this immunity. US forces would no longer be able to arrest and hold Iraqis indefinitely and would have to handover the 18, 000 Iraqis held without charge. Iraqi negotiators extracted a timetable for US withdrawal from Iraqi cities into its bases by mid-2009 and from the country by the end of 2011, but the parties could agree to renew the US presence.

            This satisfied al-Maliki but strong opposition remained in Iraq even within his cabinet where amendments were demanded. Outside Iraq, too, there was opposition. Arab League secretary-general Amr Moussa feared the treaty would be interpreted to allow US attacks on neighbouring countries. Syria, which had just been attacked by US forces based in Iraq, particularly objected. The influential Iranian parliament speaker Ali Larijani urged the Iraqi parliament to resist the pact, which he said, strengthened "US hegemony in Iraq." Senior Lebanese Shi'ite Ayatollah Hussein Fadhlallah insisted there should be no provision for the pact’s extension by Iraqi or US leaders on the grounds of insecurity in Iraq.

            The Iraqi cabinet reached agreement on the treaty in late November after omission of the clause allowing the pact’s renewal at the end of 2011 and the addition of one forbidding the US from attacking neighbouring countries from Iraq. The government began campaigning for parliamentary approval, warning that without the agreement Iraq would be vulnerable to financial losses at the hands of the US and to security threats from neighbouring countries.

              Opposition was led by Muqtada Al-Sadr, who warned parliament against approving the pact: "If you have been told that it will put an end to the occupier's presence in our land, [know that] the occupier will leave his bases [here]. And if someone has told you that [the pact] will grant you sovereignty, [know that this person] is a liar...” The Sunni bloc in parliament was won over to the treaty on condition that it be put to a national referendum in 2009; should it fail, the Iraqi government could cancel the pact by giving Washington one year's notice. The pact was approved by a bare majority of 144 members of the 198 who attended the session of the 275-member assembly, with many staying away to avoid voting.

             There is considerable uncertainty over who “won” the battle over Iraq’s sovereignty. The English version of the agreement was not published and US officials indicated they contested the Iraqi government’s interpretations of it. What seems certain is that the US will do everything possible to hold onto the prize it seized in 2003 and it still has plenty of leverage over any Iraqi government. Those who put their hopes in US President-elect Obama to remove US forces were disappointed to learn that he intended to keep around 50,000 troops in Iraq to continue “training” of the Iraqi army, protect the American presence and continue the campaign against “terrorism.” Ayatollah al-Sistani lamented that the treaty would become a source of instability since it had been imposed without a national consensus. Indeed, an Iraqi journalist who hurled his shoe at President Bush during the signing agreement in Baghdad became an instant hero in Iraq and the Arab world. Even the official press of the US-aligned Egyptian government judged that the treaty compromised Iraqi sovereignty, while Syria denounced it and Iran’s leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned Iraq’s Shia leaders not to allow the pact to perpetuate the US effort to use Iraq as a base from which to dominate the Middle East.

             The actual longer term outcome will be the object of a continuing three-sided struggle between the US, the al-Maliki regime, and opponents of the treaty within and without Iraq. But it is highly unlikely that in the long run an alliance with the US, a power that has inflicted unimaginable damage and suffering on Iraq and is widely seen as an enemy of Arabs and Muslims, can possibly be legitimized. Iraqi elites associated with it are certain to suffer, if not immediately over the longer term, the fatal de-legitimation that afflicted their predecessors under British hegemony. The first Baghdad Pact failed and the odds are that the second one will also fail.

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