In the UAE senior members of the elite are publicly discussing their fears over demographic trends that have reduced the number of Emirati nationals to 15.4% of the population, according to the latest semi-official data. The UAE was the last of the six members of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) to introduce an elected component to the legislative process, and Dubai leader Sheikh Mohammed bin-Rashid Al Maktoum recently said, “We don’t do politics”. In such a context the increasingly public expression of nationalistic concern about the number and influence of foreigners is quite striking.
At the ‘National Identity Conference’ in April 2008, remarks made by Lt General Dhahi Khalfan al-Tamim, the head of Dubai police , attracted much attention. Noting Dubai’s reliance on the mass importation of foreign labour and the right of foreign nationals to own and develop property, the police chief warned that building the biggest amaraat (towers) could be at the expense of the imiraat (United Arab Emirates). Although described privately by senior Emiratis as “playing to the gallery” and “letting off steam”, Dhahi Khalfan’s comments were firmly in line with what an increasing number of UAE nationals are saying in the majalis (discussion “councils” of senior Emiratis and invited compatriots). It is in these majalis where much of the real debate in the country takes place.
General Dhahi warned that unless something was done to cut the numbers of foreign nationals entering the country then the children of the crown princes of the seven emirates that make up the UAE will be lucky to take over the leadership from their fathers. He went further by saying that leaders in the future would have Hindu names. The latest population data, contained in an unpublished report by the official consultative assembly, the Federal National Council, says that at end 2006 Indian nationals were the largest national group in the UAE. At just over 2 million, they constituted 36.1% of the 5.6m total UAE population, compared to only 0.87m Emirati nationals.
The political threat from foreign nationals is increasingly viewed in the UAE as twofold: from the demands of international human rights groups for labour rights, and from foreigners owning property. Worker demonstrations are becoming more common. Foreign labourers are feeling under increasing financial pressure as domestic inflation is soaring and the Emirati dirham remains tied to the sliding US dollar.
In response to Emiratis’ perceived threat from foreigners, the UAE’s foreign minister and senior member of the ruling family in Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayyed al-Nahayan, argues that the UAE cannot become an island in order to preserve its national identity. However he acknowledged at the national identity conference that the country’s population imbalance is “dangerous”, but offered no practical ideas on how to address it.
The perception of demographic threats is most problematic in Dubai where the pace and form of economic development requires an ever increasing numbers of migrant workers. However minority status is the demographic reality for Emiratis in all seven of the emirates where a massive amount of public infrastructure and private building projects are taking place. The Dubai “model” of foreign ownership is now being aggressively pursued in Ajman and Ras al-Khaimah and to a lesser but notable extent in conservative Sharjah. Dubai’s granting of 99 year freeholds on private residential property since 2002 is often identified as the greatest political danger because of the demand of many long resident elite foreign nationals that Emirati nationality, or at least long term residency status, be given to them.
Pre-eminent local academic Dr Abdel-Halaq Abdullah commented to the author that the “talk” he hears among “certain elites” is that “we built this country”. This, he said, “touches a raw nerve, it rocks the boat unnecessarily”. Nationality in his opinion is not for “the Janes or the Jims” or the Hindus. The priority, Dr Abdel-Halaq argued, is for Arabs and Muslims, but even then a long term presence in the country of ten to 20 years may not be sufficient to justify being granted Emirati nationality. The UAE, he says, should not become a “salad platter” society where national culture lacks a dominant theme and is based on the various traditions of often very different national patrimonies. Property-based claims to political rights were recognised in many European countries in the 19th century. An increasing number of Emiratis today believe that ending foreign property ownership is vital to preserving their national identity. Furthermore, there is a growing Emirati fears of having to concede labour rights in terms of formal representation and collective bargaining. However this may be a misreading of what is required by the WTO. The WTO is divided over the issue. It ambiguously agrees to defer to International Labour Organisation standards but opposes the issue being used by member countries to prevent free trade.
The outspoken Emirati academic Dr Ebtisam al-Kitbi is from the same Emirati tribe, the Al-Qitab, as the favourite wife of the former ruler of Abu Dhabi and founding president of the UAE, Sheikh Zayyed al-Nahayyan . Being part of the historic mainstream gives Dr Ebtisam confidence in her public complaints. She rails against selling land to foreigners, describing such “individual decisions” as illegal because the land “belongs to the people”. Indirectly referring to Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashed, the UAE prime minister and ruler of Dubai, she asks rhetorically “Is it right for one individual to sell the whole country?” Like many Emiratis, Ebtisam al-Kitbi equates foreign ownership with a weakening of Emirati political identity. This emergent Emirati nationalism is as much concerned with the politics of ownership as it is with the demographics of economic development. Membership of the WTO is understood as requiring majority foreign-owned companies to have the right to set up in virtually all sectors, something that occurs in free zones in a number of emirates. However the unhindered right of ownership of land and property was not a stipulation of Saudi Arabia’s membership of the WTO in 2005, for example, nor is it seen as necessary in the UAE by an increasing number of outspoken Emiratis.
Those who are less nationalistic about property issues for example, are often more willing to extend nationality or at least a watered down version of it. A well-connected Dubai official told me that the government should open up the debate on national identity and seek consensus on the attributes of Emirati national identity. The present legal requirements for those seeking nationality are a minimum of 10 years residence in the country for foreign Arabs, or continuous residence since 1940 and an ability to speak Arabic fluently. “Noteworthy service to the state” is however also a consideration. A number of Emiratis have begun arguing that a new category of “long term residency” should be created that would not necessarily mean granting nationality to those who do not fit an agreed definition of Emirati culture, but that would reflect the fact that there are many non-Arabs born in the UAE who regard it as home and for whom all other countries and cultures are “foreign”. For this section of the population there should be a formal status that recognizes their national contribution. This idea has been expressed publicly by leading Abu Dhabian Dr Jamal-Suweidi, a senior member of the al-Sudan, part of the leading tribal confederacy, the Bani Yas. Others, however, either dismiss such ideas as impractical - the view of a member of the ruling Sharjan al-Qassimi family – or fear that the “halfway house” of long term residency is a short step to full nationality for those who are far from being Emirati and/or who would represent a potential security threat. Foreign Arab nationals have in the past been assimilated in Abu Dhabi, in particular Yemenis and some Palestinians who absorbed part of the emirate’s Sunni tribal and Bedouin symbolism. However the behavior of many of the Palestinians in Kuwait in 1990-91 underlined for many Emiratis their old fear of Mediterranean Arabs’ radicalism. Other Emiratis however see granting nationality to the foreign Arabs disbursed in different emirates, who today number between 10-15% of the overall population of the UAE, as the best way to expand the national population on a secure basis.
There is UAE agreement on the desire to sideline most Iranian nationals from any expansion of the national population. Today an estimated two million Dubai population contains around 500,000 Iranian nationals, or 25% of the total, many of whom could in theory qualify for nationality on the basis of commitment to the UAE. However, for some Emiratis this factor makes it important to stress Arabic as key to national culture, therefore disqualifying many Iranians living in Dubai from even long term residency, let alone nationality.
The UAE Iranian population’s preponderance in Dubai underlines a key facet of the growing debate on national identity and this is the much more muted but related debate on the differences and even divisions among the individual emirates. While the formal debate about the distribution of power within the UAE is unlikely to be revived, there is increasing talk among nationalists and those of a more liberal persuasion that relatively weak UAE leadership by President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayyed since the death of his revered father Sheikh Zayyed in 2004, has encouraged an already growing “Dubai First”, “Abu Dhabi First”, “Sharjah First” etc mentality. From the outset of the UAE’s inception in 1971 individual emirates have weakened the federal, and therefore central, powers of the country as exercised from the capital, Abu Dhabi, by refusing to concede significant local authority. However today the two leading UAE emirates are increasingly competing for international profile, tourist revenues, and adventurous property developments. Sheikh Khalifa’s background as a kind of Abu Dhabian prime minister underscores his local focus. Abu Dhabi essentially incorporated disparate local tribes with diverse inland economic interests under the ruling Bani Yas tribal confederation and still emphasises its bedouin identity. Coastally orientated Dubai on the other hand, takes a more inclusive approach even though it was and remains ruled by a branch of the same tribal confederation. Dubai has long been more inclined to incorporate foreign merchants, including the Sunni Arabs and ethnic Persians from Iran, and Indian sub-continentals. Inclusion however does not mean full acceptance. A Sharjan al-Qassimi member spoke to me of the “climate of doubt” throughout the UAE, even about Shia who are Emirati nationals, or the Baluch who often originated from Iran or Oman. In February 2008 the number of Emirati ministers from an ethnic Persian background increased from three to four, including the rare appointment of a Shia. The perception among these Emirati communities that they are outside of the national mainstream remains, however. The notion of “outsiders” can even extend to tribes who originated from one emirate but who ended up dwelling in another.
The top two emirates in political and economic terms are not liable to formally separate anytime soon. However their contrasting roots and population components are increasingly overlapping with different economic models, and therefore differing political outlooks, to create tensions central to the national identity debate. The demand for “leadership” heard in different parts of the UAE relates to whether Abu Dhabi is prepared to more fully exploit its economic weight and centralize decision-making. As long as it does not do so, the national identity debate will remain targeted against foreigners and will avoid addressing the differing components of the “nation”. These include the different histories and cultures of Emiratis themselves, the differing agendas and interests of the separate emirates, and the interests of those with nowhere else to call home. The Al-Qassimi family member told me that without the Abu Dhabi leadership “taking up its responsibilities” and exercising federal leadership, “In 20 years I do not think the UAE will exist”. For some other Emiratis, economic and political realities simply mean that the weaker northern emirates Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Um al-Quwain and Fujairah will become municipalities that will merge with more powerful emirates. However the increasing talk of a split between the top two emirates is a reflection of their increasing independence from each other. While the ruler of Dubai Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashed, who is the UAE prime minister, is keen to import his emirate’s administrative style into federal decision making, he is not keen to see any federal encroachment on Dubai’s affairs. It is arguable that federal political reform would go against the traditional structures of rule within the seven emirates. Reflecting their origin as tribally-led and consolidated bodies, these sheikhdoms, and the cultural values they uphold, are reinforced as UAE nationals become preoccupied with their minority status.
The greatest differences are not between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, however, but are between these two emirates and Sharjah. The al-Qassimi, who also rule over Ras al-Khaimah, have given Sharjah a more self consciously conservative identity since the 1980s. This is due to a change in the ruler Sheikh Dr Sultan bin Mohammed al-Qassimi’s political and religious outlook, the influence of Saudi finance, and political opportunism of a ruling family conscious of their pronounced Gulf history and keen to differentiate Sharjah from its higher profile Emirati brethren by marketing both Islam and contemporary art and culture. Some Emiratis simply refer to Sharjah as “wahhabi”, partly emphasizing Saudi connections that go back more than two centuries, but also underlining a political culture that relies far more heavily on Islamic political credibility than other emirates.
If this suggests an almost inevitable break-up of the UAE, some caution is needed. Nationalism perhaps comes cheap to the wealthy. Dr Mohammed Ghobash is a member of a senior Dubai family and secretary-general of the government-approved Emirates Human Rights Association. Dr Ghobash says those who are talking of the threat from foreign nationals are making a “grand drama” out of their fears when their financial affiliations, and to a lesser extent their Islamic affiliations, are stronger than their nationalism, and given that they are also powerless to challenge the will of their “political masters”. The UAE is unlikely to see a nationalist movement being built out of the 15% of the population who are nationals and who are often tied in to government patronage and/or to foreign business interests. However the national identity debate is raising issues about the future direction of the UAE as a federation, and therefore as a country, and emphasizes the divergent paths that distinct emirates are on, especially when there is not a coherent UAE federal leadership.
Set against the potential dangers of increasingly separate and distinct political and economic paths are the factors that formally and informally tie the emirates together. This includes the UAE’s supreme council of ministers and what is now a de facto convention of Dubai providing the federal prime minister. However underpinning this is the sheer economic strength of Abu Dhabi, which in 2006 produced 60% of the GDP of the UAE, set against 28.2% of national GDP generated in Dubai. Abu Dhabi holds 95% of the hydrocarbon reserves of the UAE, which itself sits on 8.1% of international oil reserves and 3.3% of international natural gas reserves. Dubai’s dwindling energy resources have been significantly compensated by the rise in services revenues, and the emirate claims to be a net contributor to the UAE federal budget. However the greatest proportion by far is contributed by Abu Dhabi – it is estimated at 90% in practice, while Dubai’s reported formal commitment to pay 20% seems rarely to have been met. Dubai benefits in terms of what are in effect highly subsidised federal services funded by Abu Dhabi. This, and large non-conditional payments to the five comparatively poor northern emirates by Abu Dhabi, stresses its informal patron role vis-a-vis the other parts of the UAE. Abu Dhabi is effectively a key investor in Dubai’s burgeoning service sector as senior Abu Dhabians deploy their surplus resources. More importantly, Dubai’s assumed credit worthiness, despite it having a growing and sizeable public debt, is assisted by the assumption that borrowing by public companies is underwritten by first the Dubai leadership but ultimately by the UAE, effectively the Abu Dhabi, government. Any move toward political separation would put this support in jeopardy.
In talking about the UAE’s national identity influential Emiratis also emphasise the importance of a Shakseeah Khaleeji (“Gulf personality”). However few of the elite have a deep confidence in the political, economic or security capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), nor do they see its formal economic commitments as liable to create a new federal national entity to either challenge or ease the complicated issue of Emirati nationality. The GCC does provide a regular platform for the UAE to present perhaps the only coherent and distinctly Emirati identity issue: the Gulf islands whose sovereignty is disputed with Iran. However these “rocks”, as one elite Dubaian disparagingly called them, are widely acknowledged to be an issue that the UAE leadership has periodically emphasized to serve its regional political interests. Their ownership no longer greatly animates Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, who formally claim them. However, raising the issue, not least given the Iranian naval presence on the island of Abu Musa, serves as a way of underlining the UAE’s Arab credibility.
Attitudes toward Iran vary greatly among the emirates, constituting what is effectively a significant foreign policy variation among its component parts. During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s this became pronounced. Dubai’s extensive trade with Iran took on a distinctly political meaning at a time when the UAE, essentially through Abu Dhabi, professed Arabism, funded Saddam Hussein, and pursued diplomacy with both sides. At the other end of the Emirati spectrum, Ras al-Khaimah publicly urged strong political as well as economic backing for Iraq to defeat Iran, given Baghdad’s proclaimed desire to return the islands to the UAE. The different trading and demographic profiles of Abu Dhabi and Dubai cause internal tensions over relations with Iran today, although a mutual desire to keep the UAE removed from possible US military plans to attack Iran enables the projection of a united front.
UAE national identity seems set to continue to be a contradictory official project to tie the country together against a perceived threat from foreign nationals, while the real tensions over its overall direction and the divergent paths of individual emirates remain unresolved. Economic patronage will help to offset these tensions, but different leadership styles and policies may not be able to maintain the appearance of unity over the longer term.
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