A hand shake? Even an olive branch? Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad and Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert are both due to attend a conference in Paris on 13 July, prompting speculation that they may meet and perhaps even advance the cause of peace. Although some of the speculation is fanciful, what’s fuelling it is the surprising fact that Israel is currently engaged in diplomatic activity on no less than three fronts. What’s more, it is talking, albeit indirectly, to three parties it routinely castigates as terrorists or sponsors of terrorism – Hamas (via the Egyptians), Hizbullah (via the Germans), and Syria (via the Turks).
So what’s going on? Why this flurry of diplomatic activity? And what, if anything, will it produce?
In each case, the parties are motivated more by short-term interests than the longer-term pursuit of peace. Israel puts a high value on the return of captured soldiers (dead or alive), even if that means dealing with mortal enemies such as Hamas and Hizbullah. A ceasefire with Hamas offers relief to Israeli towns that have been subjected to rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip. The alternative – a full-scale military intervention in Gaza – would be a far more costly and uncertain way to bring calm to Israel’s southern border.
For their part, Hamas and Hizbullah want the release of their militants held in Israeli jails – and, no less important, the degree of legitimacy which comes from being acknowledged as actors on the regional stage. Both hope the Europeans will eventually drop the “terrorist” label, even if the Americans do not. Hamas, alert to Palestinian opinion, is also anxious that the Israelis should ease the blockade of Gaza and give its people the chance to breathe.
The indirect Israeli-Syrian talks are more obviously designed to foster a peace process. But here too other motives are at work. Israeli commentators are asking whether their beleaguered prime minister needs the appearance of diplomatic movement to deflect attention from persistent allegations of corruption. And Syria’s more immediate goal is to ease its international isolation and, in particular, get America off its back. For President Assad, being invited to France (which until recently was openly hostile to his Lebanon policy) is itself a reward worth having.
A striking feature of all three regional initiatives is the absence of American involvement. Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, comes and goes, visiting the region more often in the last months of the Bush administration’s life than in the preceding eight years; but her efforts to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process have had little effect. Meanwhile regional powers clearly feel they cannot rely on American efforts but must conduct their own diplomacy – even with parties of whom Washington disapproves.
The Bush administration has actively discouraged negotiation with Syria, Hamas and Hizbullah on the grounds that talking to them legitimises them. But it has had to grudgingly accept that some of its closest allies see things differently. They tend to see talking to the enemy not as an ideological concession but as a practical necessity.
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