Ever since the early days of Islam, the societal role of Shia Arabs has been obscured and relegated to marginality by the politically preponderant Sunni majority. The rise of the Shia-inspired Safavid dynasty in Persia in the beginning of the 16th century did very little to ameliorate the conditions of Shia in Arabic-speaking societies. Religious persecution and political exclusion persisted until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, and found their way into the state order that emerged in the Arab East shortly afterwards. Along with this development came what became known as the Shia Arab question, especially in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Lebanon.[1] Broad national issues pertaining to the Pan-Arab national movement during the 1950s and much of the 1960s, as well as the centrality of the Palestinian issue in Arab consciousness during the same period, served to slow down the articulation of exclusively Shia demands, not to mention the evolution of an explicit Shia ethos.
One of the enduring consequences of the
1967 Six Day War, during which
Arab Shia did not lag behind other
minorities. In Syria the Alawites, an extreme Shia sect, fully
controlled the
country’s political system by 1970. Shia activism in
The Shia question in the Arab East since the last decade of the twentieth century has been giving the impression of a compelling transnational political issue. Lebanon, which is often described as the weakest link in the Arab regional order, has found itself immersed in the regional Shia question to the extent that some scholars regard this tiny eastern Mediterranean country as its clearest manifestation.[2] This paper posits that the Shia issue in Lebanon is interactive with other Shia in the Arab East, as well as with Iran. The Shia in Lebanon both have been influenced by the status of their coreligionists in the region, and also presented themselves as a potent role model for change within their respective societies. This paper seeks to demonstrate, nevertheless, that the Shia movement in the Arab East, including the Hizbullah phenomenon in Lebanon, is primarily intrastate in character. Its seeming intertwinement and appearance as a monolith are only a function of intervention by the Islamic Republic of Iran who seeks to carve for itself an in indelible niche in Middle Eastern politics, especially in the Persian Gulf and Iraq.
This paper further claims that the Shia movement in the Arab East is integrationist, in the sense that Arab Shia aspire to become an integral part of the fiber of the society in which they live. They see themselves as the victims of gross historical injustice, sectarian persecution and political marginalization, and they aspire to reverse them into active societal involvement. Impressions. The appearance of the interconnectivity of the Shia movement in the Arab East is only transient and has an ephemeral nature. By implication, this paper asserts that the Shia trends in the Arab East have only marginal implications for Lebanon.
In order to understand the contemporary Shia movement, be it at the national or transnational level, one must tackle the constituent elements that underlie this Islamic sect. First, at the heart of the Shia doctrine lies the issue of succession to Prophet Muhammad upon his death in 632 C.E. The heated succession issue produced a permanent schism within the Muslim community, namely between the majority Sunnis and the minority Twelver Imami Shia.[3] In traditional Sunni religious parlance the Shia are often described as rafida, a pejorative word that literally means disavowers. In this venue, prominent Sunni author Muhammad Rashid Rida[4] uses Koranic verses antedating the great rift in Islam between Sunnis and Shia to condemn the latter group: “Surely they who divided their religion into parts and became Shia, you have no concern for them.”[5]
Second, a pervasive characteristic that has inflicted the great majority of Arab Shia is that of deprivation which, in this case, is the resultant of discrimination and marginalization at the political, social, economic and religious levels. Scholars writing on the Shia especially in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and pre-1989 Tai’f Agreement Lebanon[6] seem to invariably agree on Shia domestic subjugation.[7] Shia activism in pre-Saddam Hussein’s republican Iraq and confessional Lebanon planted the first seeds of dissension among their coreligionists in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but did not elicit a discernible response n the UAE and Kuwait, where Shia economic achievements there intervened to deflect manifest sectarian activism. The triumph of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979 only had a symbolic impact, albeit tremendous, on Arab Shia, although its actual political impact has remained negligible, except in Iraq and in Lebanon. The USA invasion of Iraq in 2003 has destroyed the Iraqi political ecology, empowered the Shia and inadvertently made Iran a major political actor there. Lebanese confessionalism made Iran’s role within the Shia community preponderant, mainly through Hizbullah who, as early as 1982, committed itself to espousing Ayatullah Khomeini’s wilayat al-faqih concept (guardianship of the jurisconsult).
Third, Shia reaction to the loss of the imamate and to prolonged deprivation by the Sunni ruling elite has wavered between quietism and activism, which, on occasion, took the form of rebellion. Meir Litvak traces the origins of Shia activism to the ascendancy of usulism at the expense of akhbarism as early as the 1770s. Since then “usulism has dominated orthodox Shi‘ism.”[8] Whereas in the akhbari school the clerics maintained a low profile, the usuli school empowered them to act on behalf of the Imam until his raj’a (return )from al-ghayba al-kubra (the greater occultation) to redeem the faithful.[9] Shia activism in Iran in the third quarter of the 19th century, a process that was pioneered by the clerical establishment, underscored the revival of the role of the ulama in the political sphere. This usuli movement culminated in the success of Ayatullah Khomeini’s Islamic revolution in 1979, and the introduction of the wilayat al-faqih concept as its guiding principle.
In Iraq and Lebanon, the Shia clerical establishments asserted themselves in society simultaneously but independently of their Iranian counterpart. As attested by subsequent developments, they played a decisive role in the political empowerment of the Shia community in the national politics of the two countries. The three issues central to the Shia political evolution, namely succession to the Prophet, the ensuing deprivation and the usuli activist response constitute the section on Shia Arab awakening, which this paper probes into after it places the faith in proper perspective.
The great division in Islam between Sunnis and Shia emerged immediately after the death of Prophet Muhammad, and was prompted by the controversial appointment of his close companion Abu Bakr to succeed him in leading the Islamic Ummah at al-Saqifa gathering. The Shia consider al-Saqifa a conspiracy plotted primarily by Umar ibn al-Khattab, another close companion of the Prophet, that violated the Divine inspired command to the Prophet to designate Ali ibn Abi Talib, his cousin and son-in- law, as his successor after his death.[10] A. Sachedina, a Shia scholar, finds no explicit direction by the Prophet as far as appointing Ali as his successor. The strongest statement by the Prophet in favor of Ali came at Ghadir Khum--half way between Mecca and Medina-- just before his death. The Prophet’s implicit statement says: “Whoever’s leader I am, Ali is his leader.”[11]
S. Husain M. Jafri presents a very interesting and plausible explanation of the issue of succession that caused the early divide in Islam. He sees it as a tribal clash between northern and southern Arabian tribes that had converted to Islam and formed the backbone of the Prophet’s state at Medina.[12] The Medinan Islamic community included diverse converts to Islam who were “homogeneous neither in cultural background and traditions nor in politico-social institutions.”[13] Northerners at Saqifa wanted to elect a successor on the basis of seniority, and not blood relation. They specifically did not want the new caliph to come from Banu Hashim, the Prophet’s line in the Quaysh tribe.[14] The southern representatives from the Aws and Khazraj tribe--who resided at Medina and welcomed the Prophet into their city after he emigrated from Mecca in 622 C.E.—pushed for Ali, who hailed from the Prophet’s household, to become the new leader of the Ummah. Jafri argues that
Arabs in the South were… accustomed to hereditary succession in leadership based on hereditary sanctity… The majority of the North Arabians understood Islam… as a sociopolitical discipline based on the religion taught by the Prophet, since they had been lukewarm to religious impetus.[15]
King Nader Shah, the founder of the short-lived
Afsharid dynasty, tried in 1743, rather unsuccessfully, to end heal
this
deep-seated split in Islam, by making the Shia faith the fifth school
of
thought in Islam.[16]
Less than half a century later, a major transformation occurred within
the Shia
faith that led to the empowerment of the clerical establishment. The
rise of
the Qajars in Persia (1796-1925) facilitated the resurgence of Usulism,
which
negated the literalism of Akhbarism among Shia clerics.[17]
Accordingly, the Shia marja al-Taqlid (source of emulation) won
sanctified
religious authorization as the deputies of the Imam, and assumed a
considerable
political role. The rise in the political fortunes of the Shia clerics
manifested itself first in Persia towards the last quarter of the 19th
century.[18]
Shah Naseriddine’s
Tobacco Concession to a British company created an uproar in
A controversial statement to the press in April 2006 by Egyptian president Husni Mubarak generated a wave of protests by many Shia Arabs. In that statement, Mubarak accused the Shia of lack of affinity and solidarity with their nation states. Mubarak broke a taboo on discussing divisive sectarian issues in public. In the debate the ensued, Sunni Arab journalists recognized the presence of a schism between the Shia and their Sunni brethren. They have flagrantly charged the Shia of loyalty to Iran.[19] He exhorted them to rid themselves of Iranian influence and immerse themselves in the national politics of their countries.[20] What the Egyptian president apparently missed in his statement was that the Shia movement in the Arab East is essentially integrationist. In fact, Sunni Arab disinclination to put their Shia compatriots on a par with the politically preponderant Sunnis is forcing them to seek alternative solutions to their historical predicament. It does not need much inquiry to claim that Shia Arab receptiveness to Iranian influence is mainly a function of a deliberate effort by the ruling elite in Arab states to keep them marginalized.
In Bahrain, for example, where the Shia movement has spanned much of the twentieth century, the power relationships have not appreciably between the dominant Sunni minority and alienated Shia majority. Unemployment is rampant within the Shia community. Even though the Bahraini Ministry of Labor has recently launched the National Employment Project, yet the Shia are grossly discriminated against in the bureaucracy, security and military apparatuses. Khalil Uthman, who asserts that the unemployment of the Shia emanates from a deliberate Sunni policy, considers it a time bomb threatening the fiber of Bahraini society.[21] To be sure, king Hamad bin Isa’s Comprehensive Reform Plan appears to have come to a complete halt more than six years after he launched it shortly after he assumed the throne of the small Persian Gulf kingdom island. The king has insisted of maintaining the gross imbalance in power sharing between the Sunnis and the Shia. Instead of building a representative system of power sharing between the two sects, he did very little to allay sectarian tensions and sought, instead, to consolidate his grip on the kingdom’s political resources.
Shia activism in Bahrain has had little impact on the governance of the Sunni ruling elite. Heavy taxation on the Shia led to the disturbances of 1934, and their submission of a memorandum of grievances to the sheikh. In a previously unheard of escalation of sectarian strife, sectarian conflict turned bloody in September 1953. Nevertheless, the Shia curtailed their protests and joined a combined Sunni-Shia popular committee to restore law and order. The mainly Shia Iranian community in Bahrain, which constitutes about seven percent of Bahrain’s population did not manifest any regard for the sociopolitical demands of its Arab coreligionists.[22] Lack of genuine Iranian affinity towards Arab Shia has not dispelled the worries of Sunnis about their loyalty to Iran, instead of their own countries. The Shia are usually treated as suspects. In the case of Bahrain, for example, this enduring impression has been exacerbated by Shia hopes that British presence there would lead to their inclusion in the country’s political process. Between 1820-1920 the British made no effort none whatsoever to ameliorate the social and economic, let alone political, conditions of the Shia. In subsequent years, they consistently advised the Shia not to expect to change the course of history overnight.[23]
In Saudi Arabia the Shia question came up as a pressing issue for the Saudi royals only after the USA and British forces overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein and occupied Iraq in April 2003. Sheikh Hasan al-Saffar, a reformist Shia religious celebrity, announced on satellite T.V. the utmost urgency for removing the onerous conditions his coreligionists have endured since the conquest of the Shia eastern province in 1915 by Ibn Saud and the ultra radical Ikhwan supporters. Al-Saffar demanded justice and equality for the Shia of Saudi Arabia. He raised the slogan that the Shia are partners in Saudi Arabian society. Al-Saffar requested the recognition of the Twelver Imami Shia as partners in developing their society.[24]
The primary challenge facing the
integration of the Shia in Saudi Arabia’s tribal political system is
that the
kingdom’s Wahhabi religious institution considers Twelve Imami Shia its
sworn
enemy. Wahhabi literature often refers to the Shia as
rafida (disavowers),
kuffar (infidels), or mushrikin
(dissemblers). Prominent Wahhabi sheikhs, such as Muhammad bin Salih
al-Uthaymin (d. 2001) consider the Shia rejection of the caliphate of
Abu Bakr,
Umar and Uthman as “more sinister than the treacheries of the Jews and
Christians.”[25]
The Shia in
The breakthrough with regard to the lots of the Shia in the Arab East is happening in Iraq, where the future balance of power between Sunnis and Shia in the Arab World and beyond, depends to a large measure on the outcome of Iraq’s current transformation. Sunni Arab ruling elite in the Gulf need to display greater appreciation for the demands of their Shia brethren and bridge the social, economic and political gap that continues to exist between them and the Sunnis.
The Arab East features prominently in Iranian foreign policy. Geographic contiguity, religious affinity/animosity, economic interests and the presence of strong Iranian communities on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf make the Arab East particularly appealing to Iranian policy makers. Naturally, the western shores of the Persian Gulf have been central to Iranian drive westward. In this respect, the policies of the Islamic republic of Iran do not appreciably differ from the periods of its predecessors. Shireen Hunter attributes Iranian interest in the Gulf region to the fact that, as “a semi-landlocked country whose only window to the world is through the Persian Gulf—hence its preoccupation with its position there.”[27]
It is not entirely clear whether Ayatollah
Khomeini seriously expected to export the Islamic revolution throughout
the
Islamic world. The fact that the only ideological penetration of the
Islamic
republic did not go beyond a fraction of the Shia community in Lebanon
attests
to the impracticality of Iran’s slogans in the aftermath of the
revolution.
Iran’s direct influence within the Lebanese Shia community remains
tenuous and
subject to the region’s politico-military balance.
Iranian interest in Lebanon needs to be
considered from the perspective of the Islamic republic’s attempt to
find
allies in the region, such as Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in the
Palestinian
Territories, in order to secure for itself an advantageous position in
the Gulf
and post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. One can advance that Iran’s interests in
the
Levant are tactical, whereas its interests in the Gulf and Iraq are
strategic.
Iran’s pan-Islamic policies are probably part of its al-Hala
al-Islamiyya
[Islamic state of affairs] discourse.
Vali Nasr affirms that Iran is, in fact, undergoing a process of religious revival. It is this type of revival, which distinguishes Iran from all other Islamic societies, that can best account for the current Shia revival in Iran. He argues that Iran is the only Islamic country that is witnessing “intellectual fervor and cultural experimentation at all levels of society… [T]he cultural dynamism of the country will also be a force that will define the Shia revival.”[28] He adds that even though the Shia revival has already begun in Iraq, which lately became the first Arab Shia state, Iran stands to benefit from its development, as well as influence it and shape its direction.[29]
Iran’s strategy primarily seeks to preserve the country’s Islamic regime, revitalize its stagnant economy, maintain the new status of Qom as the unrivalled center of Shia learning, win a permanent and eminent role in the Gulf, and ensure that Iraq never again threatens its security at home and interests in the region.
Even though the Shia of Lebanon represent
no more than 30% of the country’s total population, yet they are
crucial for
understanding the Shia movement, not only in the context of Lebanese
sectarian
politics, but probably more importantly in the larger picture of the
Arab East.
Unlike the Maronites and the Sunnis, the two other major sects in Lebanon, who had solid foreign connections—the first looked up to France as its role model and sought its protection, whereas the second thoroughly identified itself with the Arab hinterland, be it Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—Shia connections to the larger world of Shi’ism remained exclusively spiritual and with non-governmental agencies. Lack of a solid foreign sponsor contributed to rendering the Shia marginal to Lebanese politics. The Maronites enjoyed the bulk of political and economic spoils of the political system in their capacity as the major confessional player, and accorded their Sunni junior partner most of what remained, to the detriment of other sects, especially the Shia.
It was the arrival into Lebanon of Iranian-born and Najaf-educated Musa al-Sadr, ishortly after the end of the country’s brief 1958 civil war, that planted the seeds of Lebanese Shia transformation from political spectators into the country’s militarily and politically most dynamic sect. Al-Sadr’s came to Lebanon, at the prodding of his Iraqi mentor Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim (d. 1970)—the source of emulation for most Lebanese Shia—and invitation of the clerical establishment in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre.[32] Al-Sadr, who was more of a political activist than a cleric, exhibited unwavering determination to empower Lebanese Shia within the framework of the country’s confessional politics. The local and regional political environment was conducive to the fruition of al-Sadr’s endeavor. The destabilization of the Arab World proceeded at an alarming rate in the early 1960s as a result of the dissolution of the Egypt-Syria merger in 1961, the republication coup in the Yemen in 1962, the rise of the Ba’th Party to power in Syria in 1963, and the concomitant appearance of the Fateh Movement and the creation of the PLO in 1964.
In Lebanon, the Palestinian refugees rose in their camps and took full advantage of the trickling of Fateh guerilla men into their midst, as well as deep inside southern Lebanon, where they engaged the Israelis in minor sabotage activities and border skirmishes. In this volatile situation, the Alawites took over power in Syria in February 1966. The coup of Hafez Asad and Salah Jadid represented a revolutionary shift in the conduct of Arab politics at the national level. A maverick and heterodox sect that dates its origins to the Shia golden century, has risen to the top of the Syrian political system and end more than a millennium of Sunni political monopoly. In June 1967, Israel precipitated what became known as the Six Day War, in which it soundly defeated the combined Arab armies of Egypt, Syria and Egypt. The massive Arab defeat dealt a severe blow to Sunni Arab preeminence and gave a huge impetus to the region’s ethnic and sectarian minorities.[33] In 1969, Musa al-Sadr established the Higher Shia Islamic Council, and ended centuries of reliance on imposed Sunni jurisprudence. On May 26, 1970 al-Sadr called for a national strike to protest against Israeli retaliatory incursions into southern Lebanon that was forcing the Shia to seek shelter in the southern suburbs of Beirut, which they eventually transformed into a poverty belt. By then, the Shia, thanks to al-Sadr, became a voice in Lebanee politics, especially after they established themselves in strength in the suburbs of Beirut. On the eve of the 1975 civil war, al-Sadr created Amal Movement (an acronym for Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya, literally meaning the battalions of Lebanese resistance), as the military wing of Harakat al-Mahrumin (movement of the dispossessed). For the first time in the history of Lebanese Shia, they now had their own sectarian politico-military organization.
Unlike other Shia movements in the Arab East, the inception and progression of the Lebanese Shia mobilization into politics depended heavily on foreign incentive and support. This fits well within the make up of Lebanese society and politics, which are imbedded in regional and international cultural and political undercurrents. Grand Ayatollah al-Hakim may have planted the seed of Shia activism in Lebanon, and the Alawite regime in Syria may have made the rise of Shia Amal Movement, but it was the triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 that gave them the strategic geographical depth that they searched for in vain for since the emergence of independent Lebanon in 1943. The creation of Hizbullah in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the allegiance its founders had given to Ayatollah Khomeinin’s wilayat al-Faqih concept (rule by the jurisconsult) finally placed the Shia on a par with the Sunnis and Maronites. During his May 1993 visit to Lebanon, hundreds of thousands of Shia converged into Beirut’s main stadium to offer their respects to Iranian president Muhammad Khatemi. Explaining this unprecedented crowd of well-wishers, Zuhair Hawari interprets this event that
Equally attracted the partisans and sympathizers of Amal Movement and Hizbullah to come to greet and hear the speech of Khatemi. What we can infer from the huge audience is that Iran has become the main source of support on which the entire Lebanese Shia sect can rely. Now they can tell other Lebanese sects that they have their own source of political reference.[34]
The politics of Lebanon have become inseparably intertwined with the larger Middle East political scene since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Since then, regional sources of intertwinement have gripped Lebanon as one player has replaced another. Iraq, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the PLO competed in Lebanon, each enlisting the loyalty of a specific sect or political group. The 1975-89 civil war can, to a certain degree, be called a mini-Arab civil war because different Arab countries vied there for influence and to defeat the political objectives of its rival Arab states. Israel joined in the fray as soon as Fateh Movement, and later the various groups under the umbrella of the PLO. The cost for Lebanon in terms of human lives and material destruction has been phenomenal. The Tai’f Agreement of 1989--convened in Saudi Arabia at the behest of the USA and blessing of moderate Arab states--that formally ended the civil war aimed at sparing Lebanon any further implication in regional politics.
The two main drawbacks of the Ta’if Agreement include the absence of an implementation mechanism and failure to take note of the rise of Hizbullah, which largely remained outside the Lebanese political system. Hizbullah’s ideological commitment to the Islamic republic of Iran and answerability only to its Grand Ayatollah keep Lebanon on hold and prevent the integration of Hizbullah in the workings of the Lebanese political system.
For many years both the Maronites and Sunnis mainly identified themselves with non-Lebanese sources of patronage. Lebanon’s protracted civil war taught both sects to accept to collaborate with other sects and to forgo dependence on foreign powers. The Ta’if Agrement and the amended Lebanese constitution implied that the country’s sects have accepted that Lebanon is a final state and that their commitment to its integrity outweighs any other consideration. Hizbullah has chosen to continue to champion anti-Israeli and anti-American causes and refused to lay down its arms using different pretexts and excuses. Both the Maronites and Sunnis of Lebanon saw the defeat of their projects to run Lebanon by themselves before they concluded that it is best for them to accept the country’s diversity. It seems that Hizbullah is walking in the footsteps of these two sects and in the process, keeping the Lebanese Shia a hostage to its millennial vision.
[1] Iraq pursued, since its creation as a modern state in 1921, ostensibly national politics. The emergence of Shia political consciousness did not manifest itself before 1958, and could not completely extricate itself from the secular ideologies such as communism and Arab nationalism. Shia in Kuwait and the Trucial States that eventually grouped themselves in the United Arab Emirates as of 1971, never articulated an explicitly Shia agenda and largely remained dependant on the ruling elite for the preservation of their business achievements and social standing.
[2] See, for example, Khalil Rizq. Al-Imam al-Mahdi wa al-Yawm al-Maw’ud [Imam Mahdi and the day of Recokoning]. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Wala’, 2002.
[3] Evewn tough religious sects and cults proliferate in the Islamic religion, yet the essential divide is between Sunnis and Twelver Imami Shia [or Ja’fari, afther the Sixth Shia Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq who in the eighth century C.E. developed the basic religious tenets of the Shia faith. For a detailed account of this see the seminal work of Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 38-9].
[4] Rasid Rida, Al-Sunnah wa al-Shia or wahhabism or al-Rafida: Haqaiq Deeniyya Tarikhiyya Ijtimaiyya Islahiyya [Sunnis and Shia or Wahhabis or disavowers: religious, historical, social and reformatory truths]. (Cairo, Egypt: Dar al-Manar, 1947).
[5] The Koran, 6:15.
[6] The Tai’f Agreement, which ended 14 years of civil war in Lebanon, put the Shia, in terms of political representation and access to the material resources of the political system on, on par with the Sunnis and Maronites, in what became known as the Troika system. The 2006-07 constitutional crisis shows that the Shia in Lebanon have developed the political capacity of immobilizing the Lebanese political system until it heads its demands.
[7] See, for example, Nabil Khalifa, Al-Shia fi Lubnan: Thawrat al-Dimugrafia wa al-Hirman [The Shia in Lebanon: the revolution of demography and deprivation]. (Beirut, Lebanon: published privately, 1984); Muhammad Abdulqadir al-Jasim and Sawsan Ali al-Shair, Al-Bahrain-Qissat al-Sira’ al-Siyasi: 1904-1956 [Barhrain-the story of political struggle: 1904-1956]. (N.P.: published privately, 2000); and Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab Shi‘a: The Forgotten Muslims. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
[8] Meir Litvak, Shi‘i Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: The ‘Ulama of Najaf and Karbala’. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University press, 1998), p. 15.
[9] Twelver Imami Shia believe that the twelfth Imam Abu al-Qasim Muhammad bin Hasan, usually referred to as al-Mahdi (the guided), had gone into hiding in 940 C.E. The Divine measure ensured the safeguarding of the life of the Mahdi from the Abbasid state, who sought to eradicate the Shia faith. Despite his disappearance, the Mahdi has remained the supreme spiritual guide of the Shia community. In the Shia faith, the return of the Mahdi will usher in the ultimate triumph of good over evil.
[10] Ibrahim Muhammad Jawad, “Mu’amarat al-Saqifa,” [al-Saqifa conspiracy]. Available at http://www.14mason.com/hkaek-mn-tareek/08.htm
[11] A. Sachedina, “Appointment of ‘Ali: Explicit or Implicit?” Available at: http://www.al-islam.org/wilayat/5.htm
[12] S. Husain M. Jafri,, Origins and Early Development of Shi‘a Islam. (Qom, Iran: Ansariyan Publications, 1989), p. 1.
[13] Ibid,. p. 3.
[14] Traditionally, Banu Hashim were the custodians of the Ka‘ba at Mecca, the holiest site in Arabia, and a regular destination for worship by the tribes.
[15] Jafri, Origins and early Dvelopment of Shi‘a Islam, P. 11.
[16] Nadr Shah hoped to make Twelver Imami Shi‘a an addition to the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence (the Hanbali, Maliki, Hanafi, and Shafi‘i.
[17] Akhbaris did not involve themselves in ijtihad (religious research) and confined the Shia jurisprudence to available rulings by the Imams. The disappearance of the twelfth Imam cut off the Shia community from the source of religious legislation.
[18] For more on this, see, for example, Ali Mirsepassi, Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
[19] Salim Najm and Faris Ali, “Azmat al-Walaa’ lada al-Shia al-Araab: Iran am al-Awtan? [The crisis of loyalty for Shia Arabs]. Al-Hawadith Magazine, no. 2581, April 21-28, 2006.
[20] Al-Hayat Newspaper, April 12, 2006.
[21] Khalil Uthman, “Al-Batala Qunbula Mawquta Tuhaddid al-Mujtama’ fi al-Bahrain,” [Unemployment is a time bomb threatening Bahrain’s society], BBC Arabic, February 8, 2006.
[22] Muhammad Abdulqadir al-Jasim and Sawsan Ali al-Sha‘ir, Al-Bahrain—Qissat al-Siraa’ al-Siyasi: 1904-1956 [Bahrain: a story of political struggle: 1904-1956]. (No Place: No Publisher, 2000), PP. 154-206.
[23] Hamza al-Hasan, Al-Shia fi al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa’udiyya: 1913-1991 [The Shia in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia: 1913-1991], vol. 2. (NP: Mu’assasat al-Baqi’, 1993), pp. 174-5.
[24] Hasan Abu Talib, “Al-Mas’ala al-Shi‘iyya fi al-Mamlaka al-Saudia.” [The Shia question in Saudi Arabia]. Available at: http:www.ahram.org.eg/acpss/Ahram\2004\3111\COMMO.HTM
[25] Abu Talib, “Al-Mas’ala al-Shi‘iyya fi al-Mamlaka al-Saudia.”
[26] http://www.alriyadh.com/2005/04/12/article55974.html
[27] Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 6.
[28] Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), p. 213.
[29] Ibid., p. 212.
[30] Nicola Ziade, Ab‘aad al-Tarikh al-Lubnani al-Hadith [Dimensions of the modern history of Lebanon]. (Cairo, Egypt: Ma‘had al-Buhuth wa al-Dirasat al-‘Arabiyya, 1972), pp. 127-8.
[31] The Ottomans recognized the substantial Christian population of the Empire as dhimmis, or protected peoples. According to this categorization, Ottoman Christians received recognition as religious minorities and were entitled to freely observe their religious practices and apply their own religious code to civic matters. Labeled as mushrikin (dissemblers), the Ottomans imposed the Sunni religious code on its Shia subjects.
[32] Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 44.
[33] For more on this, see Hilal Khashan, “Minorities in the Arab East,” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, 1992, pp. 45-63.
[34] Zuhair Hawari, Al-Shia: Hala Siyasiyya am Ta‘ifiyya? [The Shia: a political or sectarian trend?]. (Beirut, Lebanon: Al-Markaz al-‘Arabi lil Ma‘lumat, al-Safir Files, no. 37, July 2003), p. 27.
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