The Blood Triangle: USA and Israel, and Arabs

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I.   Introduction

　U.S. policy interests in the Middle East have remained constant since the 1940s, despite the changing and expanding nature of the region. These interests are: oil, the security of Israel, stability against radical forces (Communists, Marxists, Pan-Arabists, and now Islamic terrorists and others), prevention of nuclear proliferations and other weapons of mass destruction, and the newly added integrating the Middle East, particularly the Arab World, into a world order of capitalism and democracy. Yet, the United States has failed to conduct a balanced even handed policy towards the major players of the region Israel and the Arab States in order to achieve these interests. The findings of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have indicated that the U.S support to Israel has been the major centerpiece of the U.S policy in the region. Unchecked support to Israel wasn’t always a U.S national interest according to their findings. In some instances that don’t take place ever in the U.S political history, the U.S has jeopardized its own national security interests for the sake of Israel[1].

　The Baker- Hamilton commission has also emphasized the fact that the U.S policy in the region will not reach its objectives unless the U.S is directly involved in the Arab Israeli conflict. According to the commission, the U.S in that sense must sustain and renew its commitment to a comprehensive lasting peace for the Arab Israeli conflict. Peace that includes all parties of the conflict: Lebanon, Syria, and the two state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.[2] A balanced wider regional context for the U.S policy might guarantee to a certain extent the maximization of U.S interests in the region.

　One can describe this triangular relationship that attaches the U.S, Israel and the Arab states as extremely decisive not only for the future of the Middle East, but also for the future of world politics at large. It has a strategically outstanding importance for a number of hot issues such as oil, the Arab Israeli conflict, and security of the Middle East.  The dynamics of this triangle enjoys a high level of complexity, uncertainty and mistrust. Part of this complexity resembles the fact that the interstate relationship is not subject to the notion of national interest. On the contrary, the domestic variable has a very influential impact on the triangular relationship between the parties.[3]

　When the domestic variables intervene in the interstate relationship, perceptions become extremely influential. The U.S support to Israel is perceived in the Arab World as an extension to the colonial period that the Arabs lived and experienced. The U.S has been supporting Israel with no major interruptions since Israel's formation. The Arab world perceives Israel as being the hegemonic arm of the U.S in the region. Further, the repercussions of Arab perceptions are not limited to the image of the United States only, it transcends to the west in general, since the U.S leads the Western camp. In other words, a whole image is being built negatively due to the excessive U.S support to Israel.

　The purpose of this study is to examine one variable in the dynamics of the triangular relationship between the U.S, Israel and the Arab States. This variable is the U.S strategic support to the State of Israel. The Study will address how the U.S support helps in building a negative perception of the United States in the region. The implications of this perception are continuous distortions of U.S Arab strategic ties. These distortions distract the track of the U.S and the Arab states from reaching collective interests. Negative perceptions also create a political environment in the Arab World that tends to forget all past cooperation and joint efforts. The dynamics of this triangle has escalated from a regional to a much higher and wider global levels. 

II- The U.S Israel Connection

　Today the U.S support to Israel is extremely potent. After decades of constant aid since 1949, Israel has entered the world of developed and advanced states. Of course, the U.S aid to Israel was not the sole reason behind the modernized development that Israel had experienced. Yet the structure of the U.S support to Israel was with no doubt among the primary reasons for a powerful Israel.

　In May 2006, the world wide U.S investor Warren Buffet had declared that he was in the process of buying 80% of the major Israeli metalworks firm Iscar for the price of $4 billion. A year earlier 2005, the famous U.S microchip manufacturer Intel increased its investments in the Israeli branch of Intel with $4.6 billion. The Israeli government at time secured the deal with $525 million.[4]

　The two simple examples indicate beneath the high mutual partnership between the U.S and Israel in different fields of industry. This coherent interrelationship explains the rationale behind the U.S support to Israel. The support was a strategic commitment from the United States to help Israel build strong sophisticated hi-tech industrialized economy, and powerful military capabilities. As we proceed, it will be much clearer how the U.S support to Israel has led to Israeli breakthroughs in different military, technological and scientific sectors to the extent that Israel now exports 10% of the world’s defense exports reaching an annual sale of $3.5 billion. In addition, Israel is the second arms supplier to the republic of China.[5] Israel is the largest recipient of U.S aid, and it has also received the largest cumulative U.S assistance since World War II. The total amount of aid that Israel has received from 1949 till 2004 is $100 billion. This amount includes $64.4 billion of military assistance and $35.6 of economic assistance. Yet this number doesn’t represent the actual aid and support that Israel receives.[6] Israel receives more aid but in different patterns. 

　U.S Economic Assistance to Israel: Israel receives its annual Economic Support Funds (ESF) directly from the government of the United States as a grant cash transfer. The ESF is not allocated for specific development project or to a certain commodity purchase. This means that Israel is not conditioned in the fund it receives. The Israeli government has a free hand in using the ESF by either purchasing goods or services from the U.S or to pay back a debt owed to the American government. This free allocation of U.S aid which Israel enjoys, is different from the general procedures that other states recipients of aid have to comply with.[7] According to the foreign operation appropriation act, Israel has to receive its ESF as a lump sum during the first 30 days of the U.S fiscal year. Before, 1982, Israel used to receive its fund in quarterly installments. In the year 2006, Israel has received the total of $ 240 million of ESF.[8]

　Yet, that is not all because Israel enjoys the privilege of loan guarantees which is the ability to borrow from the United States commercial establishments like banks with a guarantee from the United States government that there will be no default. Israel can have an annual loan that reaches the amount of $3 billions.[9] The loan guarantees are now attached to the foreign operation act. Israel has loan guarantees for housing, economic recovery and Soviet immigration. However, it is important to acknowledge that Israel has agreed with the United States government to gradually decrease the level of ESF to zero in a period of 10 years to be completed by the year 2008, while increasing the U.S military aid to Israel to reach $2.4 billion at the same period. 

　Military Assistance to Israel: The U.S congress has committed itself to protect Israel’s security and at the same time preserve the Israeli qualitative military edge over its neighbors. The annual foreign military financing (FMF) that Israel gets from the U.S constitutes 23% of its defense budget. In the year 2004, Israel received $2.16 billion of a military grant. As the ESF, Israel by law has to receive its complete FMF as a lump sum during the first 30 days of the U.S fiscal year, however, different from the ESF, Israel transfers its aid to interest account at the U.S Federal Reserve Bank to use the interest to pay back some of its debts to the United States.[10]

　Different than any other recipient of military aid, Israel has the benefit of using approximately one quarter of its FMF fund to make an in-country purchase, which means the Israel can use the U.S military aid to purchase military equipments, arms from the Israeli defense industries. Israel is the only state that enjoys this benefit. This pattern of U.S support has helped Israel develop its military and arms industry to be among the leading ones in the world. In the year 2006, Israel used $595 million to purchase Israeli defense purchases.[11] Moreover, besides the military aid, there is a joint political military group (JPMG) that meets twice a year to establish a framework for ongoing consultations and cooperation on enhancing the national security of the two states.[12] 

　U.S Israeli Cooperative Programs: The congress provides annual funds for cooperative programs between the United States and Israel. These programs account for collective research and development for defense, agriculture, science and hi-tech industries. The Arrow anti-missile system that started in 1988, is a defense project between the two parties. Each party supplies half the fund for this project to develop this weapon that has a theater ballistic missile defense capability. The congress has provided $60.25 million for the production of the Arrow missile components  in the year 2006.

　There is also the Israel U.S Bi-national Research & Development Foundation (BIRD) which is responsible for connecting companies from both sides to cooperate in the private high tech industries.[13]Another form of cooperation is the United States Israel Energy Cooperation Act. According to this act, the congress would provide $20 million annual grant starting from the year 2006 till the year 2012 to fund joint research, commercialization, and development of alternative, renewable energy sources and improved energy efficiency.[14] 

　As we can see, the U.S support to Israel is a strategic commitment made not by only successive U.S administrations, but with also a very generous and committed support from the congress. This reflects the influential impact that the Jewish interest groups have on the U.S domestic politics, in addition to the impact of the evangelical right in the United States.[15]The factual and empirical evidence provided in this part explains why the Arabs are extremely critical of the U.S Israeli relations, because as it appears the U.S is determined to make the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel always in favor of Israel. These policies build up in the negative perceptions of the Arabs.   

III- Perceptions and Misperceptions

　The roots of the crisis in the triangular relations are located in the perceptional gap that has developed between Americans and Arabs due to the U.S unique support to Israel. Arabs perceive the U.S as a threatening superpower that is potentially hostile to Arab interests. The negative perception of U.S motives and policies has taken a sharp turn under the administration of President George W Bush, especially in the wake of September 11 and the war in Iraq.[16]

　Washington's special relationship with Israel complicates the picture, setting up an uneasy diplomatic and political triangle in which the Arab states seem to be at the disadvantage. Israel superiority in weapons technology and its status as undeclared nuclear power arouse real concern for the Arab States. The continuous U.S supply of advanced arms and military technology to Israel, which far outstrips comparable U.S aid to another large recipient of aid such as Egypt, is therefore troubling.

　More broadly, the lack of evenhandedness in U.S policies in the Arab Israeli peace process is unanimously criticized in Arab World. Washington's dual role as the sole guarantor of Israel's security as well as the principal mediator between Arabs and Israelis creates contradictions and often leads to partial American support to Israeli interests, irrespective of the their legitimacy. American timidity on the issue of Israeli settlements, Israel nuclear capabilities, and most recently on the separation wall is often cited as an example of double standards and moral weakness of U.S policy in the region. Meanwhile, Israel demonstrates its readiness to use heavy firepower and its missile attack capabilities against the Palestinians on a daily basis.[17] 

　The U.S unbalanced relationship to Israel helps in escalating any crisis in the triangular relationship into more severe levels due to the negative perceptions. Crisis management skills are inefficient when perceptions are part of the problem. Crisis by definition is a situation that uncovers hidden predispositions that play in the attitudes of individuals, states, and nations. The mix of the trilateral crises in US – Arab relations of September 11^th, Palestinian –Israeli conflict, and Iraq war are feeding up the negative perceptions that affect negatively the U.S relations with its moderate Arab allies.

　Nothing can demonstrate the growing negative feelings in both sides as much as certain stereotypes that seem to summaries the opinion of each side of the other. These stereotypes are prevailing in wide circles but they are not necessarily representing the opinion of the majority in the Arab World. There existence, however, should alert those who believe that good Arab – American relationship is important for the Strategic interests of both sides.

　The American behavior in the Middle East especially when it comes to Israel reflects a perception of intrigue, “Conspiracy” and in short evil. The Arab perceptional image of the United States is reinforced by other acts such as the historical role of CIA. The role in which it used to counter revolutionary activities, its animosity for the national liberation movements, and its hegemonic tendencies, all motivate a belief that U.S policies and its support to Israel is an integral part of a number of conspiracies to dominate and subjugate the Arab world. In that sense also the US can be pictured as a “Client” of Israel, which is capable through its Jewish lobby to manipulate American policies.

　Other stereotypes are also important. U.S support to Israel is not necessarily the sufficient variable in formulating the negative stereotypes of the U.S. yet it exists among other variables and it is connected to how a large segment of the Arab population perceives the United States. Stereotyping the Americans as “Cowboys” is the most prevailing one; in which, Americans appear as a group of lawless individuals firing all the time from their 'six-shooters' in all directions. The image, propagated widely in Arab mind set proves according to some Arabs how the U.S doesn’t necessarily abide by the law. The issue of justice also does not influence or guide the act of the foreign policy.

　The Crusader stereotype is a very common in the Arab World. It is believed that the U.S Israeli alliance is a pact against the Arabs and Moslem world that dates back to the Crusade wars in an early historical period. The effect of the stereotyping imaging of the United States creates obstacles, tensions that may essentially obstruct mutual benefits.

　The “colonialist” image of Americans reflects tales of American violence in the acquisition of wealth, the cold-bloodedness of slave traders and the "robber barons"; this has reinforced their image of ruthlessness. It also explains why the United States supports and protects Israel because as it seems to some Arabs, the United States and Israel are similar. The two states represent the same ideas and guiding principles. Their similarity comes from the same kind of the historical experience they both share. As Israel has built its state on the remains of the Arab Palestinians, the Americans too built their existence on land plundered from the native Indians and on the backs of slaves subjected to the utmost cruelty, all in the interests of accumulating vast wealth.

　The U.S acceptance of Israeli pressures, are an indication on the state of perceptional mistrust towards the United States. Israel Pressures the United States to reduce military aid to some Arab States such as Egypt and to limit its military modernization assistance. These acts provoke and emphasize a belief in the negative perceptional image of the U.S. in the Arab mind set. A clear example on how unquestioned U.S support to Israel has a credible impact on the negative perception that some Arabs share towards the United States, is the issue of the Harpoon missile sale to Egypt. In November 2001, the US State Department provided a preliminary notification to Congress for a proposed sale of 53 Harpoon Block 2 missiles to Egypt. Israeli security officials attempted to dissuade the Americans from following through the planned sale. They considered the satellite-guided missile as disastrous to Israel's national security and suggested that the sale be postponed until the situation in the region becomes more stable. [18]Under the Israeli pressure the US reached a compromise to restrict the Harpoon missile system ability to hit ground targets. [19]Israel not only tried to block the Harpoon sale to Egypt but tried to benefit from the situation and presented a plan in May 2002, to upgrade “jointly” the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile used by the Israeli Navy. [20]

　The negative perceptions of the United States are clearly reflected in the Public opinion of the Arab World. In a public opinion poll conducted in Egypt in July 2005 on four main categories: the general public, businessmen, students and Media community. 72.5% of the surveyed categories do not approve the way the U.S handles the Arab Israeli conflict. An average of 70% of the poll also believes that the U.S is not serious in implementing the road map. It is important to assert that the negative perception is not only limited to the issue of the Arab Israeli conflict. This perception becomes to a very large extent definite in overseeing the acts of the U.S in the region.67% of Egyptians do not think that the U.S policies in Iraq will result in building a democratic model in Iraq. On the contrary, between 93% and 96% think that the U.S occupation of Iraq and the current policies are only conducted to enhance Israel’s security in the region[21].

　The poll has also indicated that 59% of The Egyptian general public believes that the U.S doesn’t respect other nations. The majority of the four main categories in the poll distrust the forward democracy policy in the Arab world advocating that there is a hidden agenda behind it. The survey also shows that Egyptians with different variations think the United States violates human rights in the world. 90% of students, 89.5% of Businessmen and media community, and 86% of the general public share this belief.

　The Public opinion might be in a rejecting phase to the U.S, but in a manner that seems completely contrary to the objectives of the U.S policies, as Pew’s public opinion poll has highlighted in March 2004 when the popularity of Bin Laden increased to the extent that 55% of Jordanians and 54% of Egyptian supported the leader of Al Qaeda network. Polls prove the point that a negative perception has a great impact on how Arab societies perceive the U.S policies in the region. Part of it occurs due to the U.S unprecedented support to Israel. The negative perceptions and images are responsible for the failure of moderate Arab states to support or stand on the U.S side even if a clear mutual interest exists between the two parties. This perceptional image cannot observe any positive policy to the U.S in the Arab Israeli conflict, the War on terror or even the aid which some Arab states receives.

IV. from September 11th to the Clash of Civilization

　The issue of negative perceptions that the U.S inherited in the Arab world due to its support to Israel can be best described as a conceptual catalyst that intensifies crises to high escalating measures between the U.S, Israel and the Arab states. These negative perceptions have gained more solidification with the repercussions of September 11^th   towards a possible clash of civilization. The fact that the 19 terrorists who attacked the United States were Arabs has highlighted the deep antagonisms between Washington and the Arab and even the Islamic world. The revelation of a world wide networks of "Jihadists" has shown that they are predominantly Arabs who are full of shame because of defeats by Israel and the Christian- Jewish alliance. The United States was considered as an arch enemy that is determined to occupy Saudi Arabia, destroy Iraq, and "propping up Israel by incapacitating the Arab states…"[22] Abdullah Azzam who founded Al- Qaeda was a Palestinian.

　The US response to the September 11^th challenge has been massive and multifaceted. However, The harvest of U.S. policies since the horrific terrorist attacks have not been promising, neither in the context of the efforts to win the war on terror, nor as a means of advancing U.S. and Western interests in the Middle East. Different indicators and methods of assessment point to the continuous deterioration of conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as both countries have become increasingly infested with terrorism and radicalization. The gulf between the West, and the U.S. in particular, and the Arab and Islamic countries, is widening.

　A review of events in 2006 alone demonstrates that the early optimistic evaluation of the elections held in Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, and Kuwait, turned out to be premature and unwarranted.  In all four cases the actual electoral outcome has increased the strength of Islamic fundamentalist forces at the expense of liberal and secular parties.  On June 25, 2006, a mini-war had erupted in the Palestinian territories, as Israeli forces returned to Gaza, less than a year after it disengaged from the area.  And, in July 12, 2006, following a cross-border incursion by Hezbollah, Israel launched a major military operation against Lebanon – a war that lasted 34 days and threatened to escalate into an even broader confrontation with Syria and possibly Iran as well.  In a sense, the sixth Arab–Israeli war proved to be a much more than simply another Arab-Israeli confrontation. While from Hezbollah’s side it could have been seen as part of a much larger counter-offensive to the U.S. war on terror, from the Israeli side it could have been viewed as part of a broader confrontation with fundamentalist Islam.

　Indeed, the post-September 11 war on terror seems to have expanded from Afghanistan to the shores of the Philippines, and from Palestine, through Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, to Iran. This counter-offensive included the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the nuclearization of Iran, the fundamentalist resistance and terror in Iraq, the winning of elections by Hamas in Palestine and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the winning of the Sharia Courts' forces in Somalia before it was toppled by Ethiopian forces, and the resurgence of Al Qaeda terror types and groups in Egypt and Algeria. The war waged last summer by Hezbollah, and its perceived victory in the eyes of Arab and Islamic publics, was thus merely one dimension of much broader phenomena.

　When on September 20, 2006 Pope Benedict XVI quoted a "Persian philosopher" regarding the aggressive nature of Islam and its contradiction with reason, he opened the gate to a confrontation that continues to simmer with questions about the Crusaders and the Conquistadors who fought in the name of Christianity and Islam. Only nine days earlier, the fifth anniversary of the September 11 attacks was commemorated. The “war on terror” that followed, first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq, and then against Fundamentalist Islam at-large, has over-shadowed all other aspects of highly complicated issues. Thus, Islam – or at least Islamic Fundamentalism – has become the central focus of international relations, much as communism was at the heart of the Cold War.

　Slightly less than a year before the Pope’s statement, on September 30, 2005, the world had witnessed the Danish Cartoon affair – a development that seemed to validate the “clash of civilizations.” Why did a cartoon in an obscure newspaper of a small country result in such havoc, motivating demonstrations, violence and the burning of embassies in a number of Arab and Islamic countries?  During the months that followed, the U.S. and Europe were busy with attempts to address the political and strategic implications of the affair.

　In all these episodes, the United States was not confronting state actors but rather a mixture of states, political movements, terrorist organizations, and broad sentiments of rejection and hatred of the West in general, and of the U.S. in particular. The thread that ties these separate events was the involvement, in one form or another, of Islamic Fundamentalism that is fanned by a sense of injustice in a mode of political behavior that is antagonistic to U.S. interests and Western thought.  In some sense, Islamic Fundamentalism, in its different faces, questions the merits and justification of U.S. and Western hegemony over world affairs, with particular focus on the Middle East in which Israel is considered the super regional power.

V – From Conflict to Cooperation

　As the preceding discussion has shown the U.S Arab relations are at some level adversarial and conflict ridden at the perceptual and cognitive level. The durability of their relationship depends on the ability to sustain pressures from within and from outside. As has been demonstrated, support for the relationship is strongly declining on the Arab side due to a multiple of factors including misperceptions. More important, the ability of both sides to maintain agreement on the major strategic objectives of the relationship is deteriorating. Washington and key Arab capitals have been on different sides on the key issues of today. On issues of the Arab Israeli peace, Gulf security, regional stability, the war against terror, the transformation of Iraq and the reform in the Arab world. The views of both sides are moving further and further apart.

　The Middle East crises in Iraq, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Somalia may exacerbate the divisions between the U.S and the Arab States. Anguish resentment grows in the Arab streets over the U.S policies in the region. The ability of the Arab states to manage its relations with Washington inevitably diminishes. The Bush strategy has stir giant opposition with each attempt to implement it in the region. If both sides continue down that path, the perceptional gap will continue increasing.

　The following is an outline to how this strategic option might restore positive relations in the triangle. There is a need to lay basis for the relationship by agreeing upon common values to promote deeper understanding and cooperation between the U.S and the Arab states. At the same time, the two allies must agree on a broader program that encompasses three main objectives:

•  Resolving the core issues posed by the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and the War in Iraq.

•  Promoting change in the Arab States through home grown economic and political reform.

•  Building a new framework for regional cooperation.

　The overall objective would be to strengthen the U.S Arab relations as a foundation for stability and security in the region by building common values that will allow these objectives to be met and dismantle to a certain extent the influence of misperceptions. In fact, Arab States and the U.S belong to two different worlds, particularly in their culture and political values. Unless the two parties succeed in building a system of common values, the relationship will always be threatened with the loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the publics, bureaucracies and elites. Above all the two sides need to come to consensus on five principal values:

　Transparency: Although the Arab States and the U.S have intensified military and strategic cooperation, and have been involved in a complex network of political and economic relations, yet most of these interactions are not well known to the public in the Arab world. Washington role in the liberation of Arab territories, the aid it provides to some Arab states and the depth cooperation between the two sides. The elites in the Arab world as well as the publics need to be made aware of the accomplishments and the problems of the relationship. Transparency will have a positive impact on the relationship that far exceeds the current policy of low level openness. American ties to Israel causes embarrassment to the Arab states. However the lack of transparency undermines the foundation of the relationship in the eyes of the Arab public giving space to perceptions, misperceptions and negative images to doubt the value and importance of the Arab U.S relationship.

　Realism: The second value is for both sides to realize that it is policies that decide differences, not a deep seated image of the other side. Public opinion surveys clearly show that misperceptions and the decline in popularity among the public is not rooted in the U.S religious or ethnic characteristics, but rather because of specific policies, particularly those U.S policies related to the U.S definite support to Israel. It is time for both sides the Arabs and the U.S in principle accept as “givens” the historical as well as the moral ties the U.S has with Israel. In this way, the two sides will be capable of differentiating between situations in which both the U.S and the Arab states have a common policy and those situations in which they will basically differ. The value of honest differences, because of different historical and geopolitical positions, is the cement that binds alliances and allows them to continue to achieve common objectives. 

　Legitimacy: In many quarters of the Arab world, the imbalance of power between the Arab states, the U.S and Israel detracts from the legitimacy of the Arab U.S strategic ties. In many ways the U.S leadership of the world is not accepted on grounds similar to those widely accepted in the European Union. These doubts about legitimacy of the relationship add to the perception that it is only a transient alliance of convenience, lacking solid foundations. Yet, the achievements of this relationship may attest for its legitimacy as an effort to rebuild a stable Middle East. In this war torn and violence ridden region of the world, such a shared effort has a value that can give the relationship moral as well as political legitimacy.[23]

　The centrality of the Middle East peace as a strategic goal for the region: Arab states and the U.S should reach a consensus that the Arab Israeli conflict is a conflict of strategic magnitude. Time will not lessen its acuteness, reduce its agonies, heal its wounds, nor end its pain. Furthermore, the conflict takes place within a highly integrated strategic context in which issues such as Iraq, Palestinian Israeli problems, terrorism, reform, and the fundamentalism are all related and interdependent. The Arab Israeli conflict was one of the most important chapters of the Cold War and now it could be the most important chapter in the war against terrorism. One of the greatest achievements of the peace process in the last three decades has been the transformation of the conflict from an existential war into a question of how Arabs and Israeli can live with each other. The resolution of the conflict should therefore be at the top of the Arab U.S agenda.[24] 

　Concert of Powers: the final value is a belief in the necessity of building a wide ranging regional coalition for moderation and modernization. In alliance with the United States and the European Union, a concert of regional powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, the new Iraq and Turkey should work together for the reconstruction of the Middle East and its integration into the globalization process. 

Finally a cultural initiative between the Arab world and the U.S should promote a dialogue of religions, cultures and civilizations and the values of tolerance and mutual understanding. This initiative can significantly help combat the negative perceptions and increase each society’s knowledge and understanding of the other. 

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