Iraq: missing pieces of the puzzle

　As the Bush administration pursues its new Iraq strategy more urgently – saying openly it wants tangible results by September – there are three missing pieces of the puzzle. The plan requires success:

• 　at the security level – with clear signs that the “surge” is reducing sectarian violence in Baghdad’s most troubled neighbourhoods, and that operations in the western province of Anbar are starting to make an impact on the Sunni insurgency;
• 　at the political level – with progress in meeting the targets, or benchmarks, supposedly agreed by the Americans and the Baghdad government (on sharing oil revenue, reversing de-Baathification, revising the constitution, and fixing a date for provincial elections);
• 　at the regional level – with agreement among Iraq’s neighbours to take a number of tangible steps (ranging from debt relief to the sealing of borders) to stabilise the country and bolster its government.

　As so often with strategy on Iraq, the logic of this three-dimensional approach to the country’s stabilisation is impeccable. While the Bush administration might prefer to present these ideas as its own, they are not dissimilar to the proposals of the Baker-Hamilton commission last year – with the obvious difference that Baker-Hamilton were ready to set an implicit date (the spring of 2008) for the withdrawal of US combat forces, something President Bush still opposes (at least publicly).

　The signs so far, however, are of limited progress on the three fronts. The “surge” in Baghdad has had some effect in reducing tit-for-tat sectarian killings. But the Iraqi capital can scarcely be considered calm. Sunni militant groups have continued their attacks, goading the Shi’a to respond (which at some point they may well do). There are also signs that militants forced out of Baghdad are simply launching attacks elsewhere.

　Reports from Anbar suggest some Sunni tribes have turned against Al-Qa’ida – a trend which, if sustained, would be significant. However, some of the Sunnis’ political grievances will have to be met if they are to be wooed away from violence and support for violence. This is why the benchmarks are important -- and so far they have not been met. Hasty actions – such as a proposal on de-Baathification pushed through by Zalmay Khalilzad before his departure as US ambassador in March – have produced confusion rather than clarity. Pressure for national reconciliation – i.e. reaching out to the disaffected Sunni Arab minority – still provokes resentment from many Shi’ites, who suspect the Americans are trying to deprive them of the dramatic political gains they’ve made over the last few years.

　There is suspicion, too, among Iraq’s Arab neighbours – suspicion of the capabilities (and trustworthiness) of Nuri al-Maliki’s Shi’ite-led government, suspicion of Iran and its regional ambitions, suspicion that the Americans, having created the Iraq mess, are trying to get others to clear it up. The danger remains that, without more or less simultaneous progress on all three fronts, efforts to stabilise Iraq from within and from without will fail. In that eventuality, the “Lebanonisation” of Iraq – its collapse into a civil war in which the neighbouring states become directly or indirectly implicated – will become the most likely scenario.