Over the last few months attitudes in Washington towards Iran continued to drift from course to course in constant search of an appropriate way to thwart the Iranian challenge. Two crucial issues were of main concern: the deteriorating situation in Iraq and the Iranian nuclear program. While the Iraq Study Group recommended direct negotiations with Iran (and Syria), the Administration seemed to adopt harsher stance and has shown more belligerent attitude towards Iran since late 2006 (see below). More recently, faced with a dilemma between the advisability of dialogue and the adoption of harsher steps against Iran, Washington seems attempting to combine the two—signaling readiness to talk, but also determination to preserve its vital interests. Thus, parallel to assertive steps (such as Security Council’s sanctions, economic pressure, dispatching more troops to Iraq and action against pro-Iran elements there), it agreed to participate in a conference with Iran, a country it had classified as a member of the vilified “Axis of Evil.”
For its part, Iran continued to use every
possible opportunity to advance its interests in Iraq and seemed
similarly determined
to pursue its nuclear program. Yet, while viewing the U.S. as “The
Great
Satan,” it agreed to participate in an official meeting with its
representatives
in Baghdad.
The Baghdad summit (10 March 2007), held to discuss Iraqi security, included Iraq’s neighbors and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany. It was perceived as a first-step toward a follow-up conference in April that is supposed to include minister-level talks, including Iranian and U.S. officials.
Is this a strategic change in their respective attitudes to each other, or are these merely tactical maneuverings?
The Baghdad summit came in the wake of the “new” U.S. strategy announced by President Bush on 10 January, to secure Iraq. It followed assertive American steps against pro-Iranians groups in Iraq and further harsh anti-Iranian steps continued following the summit.
In fact, since December 2006 the U.S. had taken several assertive steps against Iran’s presence in Iraq and presented new schemes that were designed to impede Iran’s nuclear program. On 10 January 2007, President Bush announced his new strategy for Iraq, which included plans to send an additional 21,500 American troops to Iraq to strengthen its hold over the country. The following day, U.S. troops raided Iranian targets in the Kurdish town Irbil, detaining a few Iranians and confiscating a large amount of documents. One of the raids was conducted on the Iranian Liaison Office, which conducted diplomatic and consular services, but was also believed to be a local headquarters for pro-Iranian groups. Already in December, U.S. forces arrested two Iranians in Iraq (two others with diplomatic immunity were released), as a validation of claims of “Iranian meddling” in Iraq. In early January, President Bush nominated Admiral William J. Fallon, to serve as the new commander of CENTCOM, the military command structure assigned responsibility for the Middle East. Under the circumstances, such a selection was viewed to be aimed at overseeing operations in the Middle East, in anticipation of a possible military confrontation with Iran. On 16 January, the U.S. announced the moving of a second aircraft carrier into the Persian Gulf for the first time since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Over the last year, the U.S. has also taken a series of actions against Iranian banks due to their alleged transfer of money to terrorist groups and transactions linked to weapons proliferation. Difficulties also emerged for Iran on the Russian front, as a result of the Security Council sanction and problems with Iran’s assumed delay in payment to Moscow. Also, while both Russia and China seemed reluctant to approve harsh sanctions against Iran, they still approved the sanctions in December 2006 and those in planning in March 2007—adding thus to the pressure on Tehran.
The harsher U.S. steps appear consistent with the President’s new plan for securing Iraq. More importantly, they appear directed toward Iran’s non-compliance and with the UN nuclear policy. Just prior to the March 2007 conference, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice claimed its assertive steps have strengthened the U.S. position vis-à-vis Iran, and allowed Washington to potentially negotiate with Iran from a stronger position.[1]
Iran, on its part, continued with its harsh tone and pursued its attempts to strengthen its positions and support pro-Iranian groups in Iraq. With the approach of the UN 60-days deadline for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment (21 February 2007) Iran did not show any sign of compliance. On 25 February, President Ahmadinejad made clear the Iranian determination to pursue enrichment bluntly stating: “The train of the Iranian nation is without brakes and a rear gear. We dismantled the rear gear and brakes of the train and threw them away some time ago.”[2] On the eve of the Baghdad summit, ‘Ali Akbar Rafsanjani stated that “Iran once suspended its nuclear program in order to build trust,” but Western countries did not reciprocate with any constructive step. Therefore, “Iran resumed its uranium enrichment at the end of the agreed suspension period.”[3] Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mohammad ‘Ali Hosseini stated, that the U.S. has asked for talks on the nuclear case, but stressed the precondition of uranium enrichment. “If the preconditions are removed, Iran will be ready to hold serious talks on its nuclear case with all members of the 5+1 group in a way that the outcome of the talks satisfies both sides.”[4]
By March 2007, both sides seemed willing to give the Baghdad summit a chance—a refreshing change in their long mutual animosity. Since September 2001, U.S.-Iran “talks” have occurred mainly on the periphery of international events and have been confined to limited topics: Afghanistan, in 2001, Iraq, in 2004, and now Iraq again. Given their huge differences, and their determination to stick to their positions, it would be extremely difficult to come to significant breakthrough. Still, their acceptance to engage in some kind of meeting is nevertheless important and, if continued in good will, may lead to some results in future. After all, with all the wide gulf in their positions and their mutual-mistrust, the U.S. and Iran seem to have some common interests in Iraq that could be better served by mutual understandings.
Yet, one can not avoid the feeling that both sides accepted such a meeting because of their respective weakness: the U.S., because of its growing difficulties in Iraq; Iran, because of the UN sanctions and American—direct and indirect—pressure. Washington, too, was under pressure. It had difficulties to gain support for its policy in Iraq (such as in China, Russia, the EU and even at home). Democrats in Congress added their pressure on the White House. Finally, for Washington, dialogue could have been a prerequisite for any serious action. If dialogue will not result in understanding, the U.S. could at least convince its allies and public opinion at home, that it tried all peaceful means to dissuade Iran from pursuing its policy.
Tehran indicated readiness to negotiate with the U.S. on its nuclear issue, provided there are no preconditions. ‘Ali Larijani, the chair of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council confirmed, that Iran had no problems in negotiating on nuclear and other issues, which might bring calm to the region, “provided that they are honest” and that President Bush “does not harangue us.” For Tehran, he said, negotiations “are not the end”—they are acceptable if they lead to results. Yet, he had his own concerns and some serious doubts about the U.S. intentions: While the French philosopher Descartes declared, “I think, therefore I am,” America’s slogan, he said, seems to be “I make trouble, therefore I am.”[5] Moreover, Iran’s stated goal for Baghdad conference appeared to be the removal of foreign troops from Iraq. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki stated, “We hope Iraq’s security conference will help put an end to the presence of foreign troops in the country.”[6] Yet, so far, Washington has shown no intention to withdraw.
Iran did not have great expectations from the summit. It believed that the U.S. only wished to make a show of strength in order to build-up leverage to extract Iranian concessions. According to Iranian journalist Mehdi Mohammadi, “America feels its condition in the region is very bad and Iran’s condition is very good.” They have realized “that the only way to solve the problem of Iran is with negotiation.” [7]
Some Iranian speakers, while determined to pursue the nuclear program, toned down the customary threatening melody. The head of Iran’s delegation and deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs, ‘Abbas ‘Araqchi, viewed the conference as an opportunity to assess U.S. policies. It “will clarify whether America is really seeking to end the crisis in Iraq or whether it is still pursuing adventurism.”[8] Mas‘ud Sepehr, a political scientist at Shiraz University, sounded even more forthcoming. He stated that the way “to resolve our issues with the Americans” was to offer them assistance in the region “in return for resolving the nuclear case, lifting sanctions, and unblocking our frozen assets.” It was in Iran’s national interests, he said, that “the conference serves as a starting point for an agreement between Iran and the U.S. on bilateral issues, and we manage to gain concessions in return for assisting the Americans.”[9] Rafsanjani added that preserving the Gulf security requires the cooperation of all regional states. Iran, he said, “is ready to cooperate” and to “play its own role in securing regional security.”[10]
Yet, while engaged in the Baghdad summit, Washington did not abandon its efforts to build further pressure on Iran. On 16 March 2007, the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, agreed on a draft resolution with further steps against Iran. The additional sanctions, it was said, are intended to convince Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing. The U.S. had hoped for tougher sanctions, but the draft was nevertheless another negative signal for Iran.
For his part, Ahmadinejad vowed to pursue Iran’s nuclear program despite future sanctions. Iran, he vowed again and again, will not give up its program under pressure. The Security Council, he added, “has no legitimacy among world nations” and even if “all of you gather and also invite your ancestors from hell, you will not be able to stop the Iranian nation.”[11] In response to reports on the UN sanctions, Foreign Minister Mottaki made it clear again, that uranium enrichment is very important for Iran. While Iran was “ready to take new steps forward,” he said, it “will not give up the Iranian nation's fundamental right."[12] Former Foreign Minister and advisor to the Supreme Leader ‘Ali Akbar Velayati termed the “interference of the Security Council” in Iran’s nuclear case as “illegal.” He added that any such resolution “will not be left unanswered.”[13]
At this stage, it seems that for both sides the Baghdad meeting was primarily a tactical maneuvering, rather than a strategic breakthrough. It also seems that for both Iran and the U.S. the move was motivated by a sense of weakness.
In the past, the Iranians have shown some flexibility when they felt pressured. Thus was the Iranian decision in the mid-1980s to engage in what became known as the “Iran-Contra” deals, or in the decision to accept cease-fire with Iraq (1988). They have shown similar attitude during the 1991 Gulf war, during the American war against the Taliban (2002) and on the eve of the fall of Baghdad (2003). As has been widely disclosed, concerned with the possible ramifications of the fall of Baghdad, as it then feared, Iran offered a comprehensive plan to resolve the mutual differences—which was coldly dismissed by Washington. Interestingly, in a remarkable interview, Rafsanjani at that time related to the theoretical possibility of restoring ties with the U.S. Intricate issues, he said, should be brought to the Expediency Council (chaired by him) to pass judgment. Pending approval of the Supreme Leader, such a policy can be approved. Relations with the U.S., he said, are not general-strategic questions, but a specific-tactical one—over which officials could, and should decide. In fact, Rafsanjani added, the assumption that relations with the U.S. contradict our interests does not constitute a religious verdict, rather a mere political decision. To put the country in jeopardy, while maintaining that we act on an Islamic reasoning is in itself “not Islamic.” Rafsanjani did not hide his inherent distrust of the U.S. and its intentions. Yet, Iran’s “sense for revenge,” should not lead us to drive the region from a frying pan into the fire. Rafsanjani advocated fast, decisive and timely decisions, but also recommended that officials should “act in a zigzag manner.”[14]
The U.S. agreement to meet and coordinate Iraqi security with Iranian officials in the summit may have bestowed legitimacy on Iran’s role in Iraqi affairs. Yet, at the same time, Iran, too, seemed to legitimize the “Great Satan.”
Taken all in all, its seems that, on the one hand the U.S. is attempting to diplomatically engage Iran in order to steer its involvement in Iraq in a positive direction and demonstrate its good will to its allies and public opinion at home, and on the other hand it is pursuing a wide range of other tactics—both unilaterally and in coordination with the UN and the other world powers—to prevent Iran from producing nuclear weapons. Clearly, it takes more than a few words or a one-day conference to prove of a genuine change. The gap between the two states remains wide, the sentiments are still sour and the atmosphere filled with mistrust. Washington continues to insist on genuine action rather than mere statements as a signal of change in Iranian policy. On its part, Iran seems determined to advance its goals in neighboring Iraq and, no less importantly, to pursue its nuclear program. Still, the recent conference in Baghdad was significant, for bringing the two sides together even if for a limited meeting. It is remained to be seen if this initiative will be continued and if so, in what directions.
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