The words “Saudi Arabia” and “democracy” do not fit together easily. But the kingdom is at the centre of the U.S. policy discussion about the need for increased democracy in the Middle East – and the discussion is watched intently in many other countries as well. The discussion continues despite the uneven advances of the last two years and, indeed, the setbacks – the best example of which was the January 2006 parliamentary victory by the Palestinian fundamentalists of Hamas. At the heart of the debate is the risk represented by mainly Middle Eastern states that have little or no system of public discussion and only aging systems of political change.
The debate has existed for some time but was given a major impetus by the terrorist attacks on the United Sates of the September 11, 2001. How could ordinary Arabs, most if not all, from middle class backgrounds, be so politically frustrated that they resort to terror? The simple answer, of course, is that they were imbibed with a radical belief in Islam. But any attempt at a more considered answer quickly produced the realization that there were few possibilities for popular participation or even peaceful political change in their countries – the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and in the cases of 15 of the 19 hijackers, Saudi Arabia. Small wonder, that at least in the United States, people reached the conclusion that part of the problem was the local political system, and that part of the answer lay in the term “reform”.
“Reform” as a word has a variety of meanings, depending on where it is used. In English, it implies improvement, or a move forward. In the Arab and Islamic world, the implication is to revert to what the system should be. In other words, as it existed in the past. This is certainly not a move forward. But, in Saudi Arabia, with its natural conservatism enhanced by a strict interpretation of Islam, this means that “reform” has a particular meaning. For the Saudi leadership, they can discuss reform and mean change. The House of Saud can persuade the Saudi people that this is in keeping with Islamic norms. And the House of Saud can tell the rest of the world, and particularly the United States, that this is also a move forward.
An example of the Saudi meaning of the word was the address King Abdullah gave to the weekly meeting of the Saudi council of ministers, held in Riyadh on January 22, 2007. The new Islamic year had started on January 20, and he took the opportunity to say: “We hope peace and security will prevail all over the Islamic world…we also hope that Islamic countries will continue their efforts in reform, development and constructive dialogue in order to achieve progress and prosperity for their peoples and to prevent their deviation from the noble teaching of Islam.” (“Abdullah calls for Reforms, Development”, Arab News, January 23, 2007)
He did not mention democracy. “Democracy” as a word might be foreign to Saudi Arabia but some of the notions implied in it are not. Of course, Saudi Arabia is not a democracy, but nor is it a dictatorship. There are restrictions on citizens but for most of them, the kingdom is far from being a police state in the style of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or the Syria of Hafez Assad. Rather it is a tribal monarchy where great emphasis is laid on consensus. There might be inequality of wealth and opportunity but in Saudi society there is great importance attached to a general will of the people at various levels. Hence, the king is confirmed in his position on the death of his predecessor by an oath of allegiance from the senior princes. But this would not be achievable without a consensus in the House of Saud that this particular prince is the best and most appropriate person for the role.
Westerners have described this Saudi system as a “beducracy”, a democracy of Bedouins, the wandering tribespeople which the princes of the House of Saud essentially were until two generations ago. Bedouins travel vast distances looking for fresh pasture for their flocks of camels, sheep and goats. In the past, they also raided other tribes, stealing their animals and their women. But decisions were made collectively, with emphasis on the views and judgments of the older members of the tribe. If there was a tough question on which consensus could not be achieved, then the decision was delayed until agreement could be reached.
Saudi movement to growing political participation has not been linear. In the 1920s, in Jeddah, recently conquered by Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia also known as Ibn Saud, a council of local notables was allowed to operate. This was probably a gesture of expediency towards the important businessmen of the city (even then the commercial centre of Arabia), who were resentful of the new domination by the House of Saud. The Jeddah merchants regarded the Al-Saud as less sophisticated. But as Ibn Saud steadily deepened his control of the whole Arabian peninsula (the kingdom of Saudi Arabia was formally established in 1932), the official standing of the council lapsed.
Again in the 1960s, the activities of the liberal princes, also known as the “free princes”, sought to bring political change, influenced by the Arab nationalism of President Nasser of Egypt. But the princes, led by Talal bin Abdul-Aziz, were forced into exile. Some concessions to modernism were introduced by King Faisal, such as the abolition of slavery, but essentially the 1970s and 1980s were a period of the “authoritarian consolidation”. (“The Saudi Labyrinth: evaluating the current political opening.” By Amr Hamzawy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2006.)
During this time, high oil revenues enabled the House of Saud to both establish the control of a modern state as well as generously expand the system of tribal allegiances across the kingdom. The security forces were established along modern lines and the Wahhabi religious establishment was extravagantly subsidized so that they would accept the moves towards modernity. Hamzawy comments: “A degree of pluralism rooted in the tribal structures of the Saudi society and in the benevolent rule of the first kings was replaced by an emerging repressive state and an aggressive, fundamentalist Wahhabi ideology.” He goes on: [T]he government abolished municipal elections that had been held regularly up to the 1960s. Dissenting views on political, social, and moral issues were no longer tolerated. Minorities, in particular the Shiite community in the Eastern province, suffered from systematic discrimination and hate campaigns. Saudi politics became the monopoly of royal princes, Wahhabi clerics, and their allies in the state bureaucracy.”
This model of the working mechanisms of the Saudi statement has been accepted by the closest observers – the foreign diplomatic community. One ambassador told me in the early 1990s to imagine Saudi society as a triangular pyramid with the royal family at the top and one of the bottom corners representing the Wahhabi clerics, while the other represented the technocratic/commercial middle class. The ambassador described it as a triangle in perpetual tension with the royal family needing the support of both the clerics and the middle class while each group tried to obtain a more advantageous position than the other.
(A senior Saudi commented confidentially to me on this analysis, saying it reflected the correct power groupings but the positioning of them should be represented by the sides of the triangle rather than the corners. In this analysis, the House of Saud was the base of the triangle, while the clerics and middle class were the opposing sides. The Saudi said that the size of the base of the triangle was not large.)
In his study, Hamzawy explained why there were only weak popular demands for reform, saying most Saudis seemed either to consent to a state where there was neither taxation nor representation or actually approved of the emerging system because of a natural conservatism and caution.
Of course, few openings for politics does not mean there are no politics. In 1979, the Grand Mosque in Mecca was seized by a fundamentalist group but the revolt was put down ruthlessly and, assisted by tightly controlled information, the kingdom recovered and stabilized. Intertwined with religious justification, it was very much a political action, striking directly at a core aspect of the very legitimacy of the House of Saud – its claim that the king is the custodian of the two holy places (Mecca and Medina). It was not until 1986 though that King Fahd formally declared that his title had changed to “Custodian of the Two Holy Places”. It was probably not coincidental that, at the time, the price of oil had fallen disastrously and the kingdom, and especially its citizens, was facing dire economic prospects.
(I have been told by Saudis that there are three core areas about which the House of Saud does not allow direct public discussion. These are the House of Saud itself, its custodian role over the holy places, and Saudi oil policy. For a Saudi to discuss, without approval, any of these topics or a combination of them is to risk at best isolation and, at worst, some formal punishment.)
The 1991 Gulf War, following the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, provoked both religious scholars and more secular individuals to demand, from their own points of view, substantial political and economic reforms. (And, of course, Osama bin Laden called on the royal family to task him with raising an army of Muslims to defend the kingdom rather than seek military assistance from the United States. The offer was promptly declined, raising the level of antagonism between the House of Saud and bin Laden and prompting the two key demands of the eventual al-Qaeda ideology: the overthrow of the Saudi royal family and the expulsion of non-believers from the Arabian peninsula.)
Famously, a Memorandum of Advice was addressed to then King Fahd in 1991 by nearly 50 religious scholars, calling on him to create a legislative council, clamp down on corruption and promote a more equal distribution of the kingdom’s wealth. Secular intellectuals responded, demanding notionally the same changes but clearly with a very different sense of the image of the kingdom in mind.
Given the many years of limited international concentration on the internal events of Saudi Arabia, for many, foreign coverage of Saudi political developments regarding democracy and reform began with the municipal elections held in February, March and April 2005. For what was reported as the first time, male Saudi citizens were allowed to cast votes for half the member of the kingdom’s 178 municipal councils. The process was held in three stages apparently both for administrative reasons and also so as not to give the impression of fully nationwide elections. The candidates were only allowed to stand as individuals, political parties still being banned. And no women were allowed to stand or to vote. Reports afterwards indicated that in most cases, candidates endorsed by Sunni Islamic religious leaders were the most successful. The imagery of a modern political method selecting the less-than-modern secular candidates also standing was doubly ironic. The conservative candidates were reportedly approved by religious leaders using text-messaging on cell phones.
In all three rounds there was a similar pattern of fairly low registration of voters but a high turnout subsequently of those registered. In the Eastern Province, where there is a local Shia Muslim majority, voting was along sectarian lines with some suggestion of gerrymandering to ensure that Shias did not take all the seats.
The results were confusing also in that commentators found it hard to agree on whether the successful candidates “represented a moderate religious trend or a more militant strain.” (“Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations”, updated August 2, 2006, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, USA.) In a joint press conference on April 25, 2005, President Bush and then Crown Prince Abdullah noted that “the United States applauds the recently held elections in the Kingdom…and looks for even wider participation in accordance with the Kingdom’s reform program.” The use of the word “reform” and the absence of the word “democracy” are noteworthy.
The “wider participation” referred to was almost certainly a reference to women. Two months earlier Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal had predicted that women will vote the next time municipal elections are held. (“Changes in the Kingdom – on our timetable”, Washington Post, Feb 27, 2005.) Indeed, Saudi women were allowed to vote and run for 12 elected seats in the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry in November 2005. Two women won seats. This was not only a reflection of pressure on the kingdom to make concessions to U.S. pressure but also domestic pressure from the more sophisticated Saudi middle classes – the port city of Jeddah on the Red Sea coast is more liberal than Riyadh, and often daughters of the successful local business elite are well-educated and encouraged to pursue business careers, albeit often limited ones.
From the Saudi point of view, a key aspect of the process of reform was the establishment of the appointed Majlis a-Shura (consultative council) in 1993. This was the result of the political upheaval the Gulf war when the decision to invite U.S. troops to defend the kingdom after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait had caused turmoil in the political psyche of the kingdom. The religious conservatives had considered it endangered the Islamic character of the country. The more secular modernists had seen it as an opportunity to push for political openings. Under pressure, the House of Saud compromised, simultaneously tightening up on any perceived lapses in appropriate Islamic behaviour by giving the religious police more freedom to operate, but also announcing a Basic Law, which was essentially the outline of a written constitution for the kingdom. Since then the Majlis has developed its role. It increased its member from the original 60 to 90 in 1997 and then again to 120 in 2001. Also, in 2001 specialised committees were established to discuss policy details; even though their work was hidden by the usual Saudi secrecy, the development was seen as being a grasp for additional power by the kingdom’s non-royal elite. In 2005, the Majlis was expanded to 150 and several senior figures were reported to have hinted that was to be allowed to scrutinize the budget and might eventually become partially or wholly elected.
Parallel to these developments, which seemed to mimic the political institutions of democratic countries, was the establishment of a series of “National Dialogues.” (They are sometimes referred to as the National Intellectual Dialogues.) These are much more Saudi in their form and content. The sixth such meeting took place in Riyadh in December 2006 and discussed the role of women, who participated in the Dialogue. Later the male and female participants separately met King Abdullah. Addressing the reception for women, he said: “Saudi women are playing a great role. They make fruitful contributions towards the country’s comprehensive progress in various sectors.”
After the first National Dialogue, a Centre for National Dialogues was set up in Riyadh by royal decree: “In pursuance of Shariah principles based on safeguarding people’s interest and concern with the public good, carrying out the responsibility borne by the country’s clergy and intellectuals”. The second such meeting was held in Mecca in December 2003, when the memory of the May 2003 terrorist attacks on housing compounds in Riyadh was still very strong. Among other recommendations, the meeting called for religious academic institutions to come up with a suitable definition for “terrorism”. Other National Dialogues have been education, youth and religious extremism.
The non-Saudi judgment of the National Dialogues has been circumspect. One academic wrote: “However constrained in its remit and however limited the feed-through to society at large and to actual policy, the Dialogue was nevertheless an indication of a changing context and an awareness of a need for a different regime response (whether substantial or tactical). The very fact that a number of issues that were previously taboo could now at least be discussed, and that in the process previously “illegitimate” voices such as those of Shia religious figures were given formally equal standing as discussion partners in a form established publicly by the [King] Abdullah, was without question an important departure.” (“Political Reform in Gulf Monarchies” by Dr Gerd Nonneman, Durham Middle East Papers.)
Any bridging of the Sunni/Shia divide achieved by the National Dialogues looks like having been short-lived. The worsening clashes between Sunni and Shia armed groups in neighbouring Iraq has had a considerable impact on Saudi Sunni attitudes, where the Wahhabi clerical leadership has always been prejudiced against Shia Muslims. The level of anti-Shia indoctrination among Saudi Sunnis can only be guessed at but is probably high. In January 2007, a senior Saudi Sunni cleric declared Shias around the world to be heretics and urged Sunnis to expel them from [Muslim] land. Sheikh Abdullah bin Jabrain said in a statement posted on several Islamic websites that: “Some people say that the rejectionists [Shias] are Muslims because they believe in God and his prophet [Muhammed], and they pray and they fast. But I say they are heretics.” Bin Jabrain’s remarks were described as “join[ing] a chorus of other senior figures from the kingdom’s hardline Wahhabi school of Sunni Islam who have deemed [Shias] as infidels, the latest sign of increasing sectarianism in the Middle East.” (“A top Saudi cleric declares Shiites to be infidels, calls on Sunnis to drive them out.” Associated Press, January 22, 2007.)
Bin Jabrain is a member of the Senior Clerics Association, a grouping of Saudi Arabia’s top clerics that is closely linked to the government. In December 2006, Abdul Rahman al-Barak, another top Saudi cleric and considered close to the kingdom’s royal family, urged Sunnis worldwide to oppose reconciliation with Shias. He said Shias should be considered worse than Jews or Christians. In a fatwa (religious judgment) posted on his website, he wrote: “By and large, rejectionists [Shias] are the most evil sect of the nation and they have all the ingredients of the infidels.”
(Hardline Sunnis like al-Barak and bin Jabrain use the word “rejectionists” as a derogatory term to describe Shias because they opted out of the Sunni school of Islamic theology.)
Also in December 2006, about 30 prominent Saudi Wahhabi clerics called on Sunni Muslims around the Middle East to support their brethren in Iraq against Shias and praised the anti-American insurgency. Such remarks ran counter to the Saudi policy, stated by King Abdullah, of wanting all the communities of Iraq – Sunnis, Shias and Kurds – to work together, but there was no official condemnation of the views. The Saudi policy was the product of a meeting of 50 Iraqi religious leaders held in the Saudi holy city of Mecca in October 2006 under the auspices of the Saudi-dominated Organization of the Islamic Conference. A 10-point Mecca Charter drew on Koranic verses and sayings by the Prophet Muhammed, calling for an end to sectarian violence and attacks on places of worship. It also called for safeguarding the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, releasing all innocent detainees, and allowing displaced persons to return to their homes. It also urged Iraqis to “work together to end foreign occupation and rebuild the country’s economic, political and military capabilities.” But the charter was considered to be undermined from the start because of the absence of either the revered Iraqi Shia leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani or the radical Moqtada al-Sadr. Neither of them sent representatives either. Another Iraqi Shia politician, Jamal al-Din, said afterwards that “those who murder, blow up, and deem spilling of Iraqi blood permissible, do not believe in religion nor do they follow a religious scholar and will therefore continue on their path” – and apparent criticism of Iraqi Sunnis and Saudi support for them. (Iraq: Mecca Charter unlikely to stem sectarian violence.” RFE/RL News Analysis, October 25, 2006.)
(A National Reconciliation Conference held in Baghdad in December 2006 apparently attempted to build on the October meeting in Mecca but “infighting, dueling political agendas, and notable absences…thwarted the …attempt”. (“Iraq: Reconciliation Conference fails to deliver.” RFE/RL News Analysis, December 20, 2006.) The same month, Nawaf Obaid, an adviser to the Saudi embassy in Washington DC, had written in the Washington Post of the possibility of “massive Saudi intervention to stop Iranian-backed Shiite militias from butchering Iraqi Sunnis.” It is hard to tell whether the Saudi government is more upset by Iranian ascendancy or Shia ascendancy, and whether in fact, it makes any distinction between the two.)
Saudi politics have been a factor of domestic tensions for many decades. A major theme has been the position of the Wahhabi clerical leadership in the kingdom. This looks like a continuing trend with the added prospect that domestic tensions will become intertwined with regional tensions. The increased prominence and confidence of Iran is being matched by the emergence of the Shia-dominated government of Iraq, and the challenge in Lebanon posed by the Shia Hezbollah party.
Previous developments in political reform and concessions to participation, which might approximate to democratization, have come as a consequence of local circumstances, when it has been necessary to make concessions to the most active, non-clerical component in the population, the technocratic middle-class. Since then King Fahd had the first of a series of strokes in 1995, a major driving force has been Crown Prince Abdullah’s determination to broaden the basis of his support. With his successful accession to the throne in 2005, King Abdullah perhaps no longer feels the necessity to build up this constituency. There has also been less pressure on him to do so from Washington because of the setbacks in its policy of encouraging democracy in the Middle East as well as the added distraction of more difficult circumstances for U.S. forces in Iraq.
The factors to consider in judging the prospects for democratization are:
Sunni/Shias: the sectarian battles being fought in Iraq are having consequences throughout the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has security concerns as well as religious questions. At the very least, this means that the House of Saud is unlikely to want to make any political concessions towards Saudi Shias. This could cause considerable resentment in the Eastern province, where they live – and where most Saudi oil fields are also located.
Saudi Arabia/Iran: the United States is trying to convince the Arab world that Iran is the danger to the status quo rather than Shi’ism. It is far from clear how well this difference is recognized by Arab regimes and the general population of Arab states. At times of external danger, it is unlikely that the kingdom will want to make any domestic concession on popular political participation. Indeed, the Wahhabi clerical leadership is likely to press for more orthodoxy, in part because younger challengers to the clerical leadership tend to be more radical than even their elders.
Saudi leadership: King Abdullah has gained the throne after nearly 10 years of having the role without the title. He does not need to seek extra domestic political support. But, at 84 this year he already equals the age at which King Fahd died – and Fahd was the longest surviving son of Ibn Saud. Crown Prince Sultan is the designated successor but is only one year younger. Although he overcame stomach cancer two years ago, he is vulnerable to a relapse. After Sultan, the next crown prince and therefore eventual king will be chosen by a so far untested Allegiance Council, set up in 2006. Prospective contenders will need to have broad social support from both the Wahhabi clerical leadership and the technocratic middle-class. Having to balance both groups will limit any growth in political participation because of the innate conservatism of Saudi Arabia and the aversion to risk-taking.
Middle-class pressure: the Saudi middle-class looks like losing out over the next few years. It is unlikely to make further gains in terms of its role in politics – chambers of commerce, municipal councils, the majlis a-shura – because of royal family caution and opposition from the clerical establishment. The middle-class will perhaps instead hope that a prince supportive of them will emerge from the succession process after the passing of Abdullah and Sultan.
Wahhabi pressure: the Saudi clerical leadership may well judge that it will win because of both external and internal pressures over the next few years. The challenge of Iran is the centre of their attention. The clerics are a crucial component of the House of Saud’s defensive stance over the perceived combined Iran/Shia threat. Internally, the clerics also know that they will be called on to legitimize any succession in the royal family. A problem here could well be Crown Prince Sultan, who is popularly regarded as being corrupt. He will therefore be very conscious of the need to secure firm clerical backing to him becoming king. The ulema, as the senior clerics are known, have to declare that the next king is an “imam”, a religious leader. Sultan will have to favour the ulema in order for this judgment to be made.
The al-Qaeda factor: al-Qaeda is now more than just Osama bin Laden, although his leadership and influence from the presumed remoteness of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area should not be underestimated. The local franchise in the kingdom, al-Qaeda in Arabia, has been decimated by police arrests and shoot-outs, but Saudi youth remain a huge pool of potential recruitment. The instinct of the House of Saud is to try to de-legitimize al-Qaeda by faulting its religious credentials. To this the House of Saud must work closely with the Wahhabi clerical leadership, which is a vital component in this process. This means concessions to the technocratic middle-class in terms of greater political participation are pointless and perhaps even counter-productive.
So the prospects for Saudi democratization appear to be limited. Although this is likely to be interpreted as being a lack of Saudi confidence in the Middle East regional role of the United States, the main factors are indigenous to Saudi Arabia. Increased popular participation may well occur in neighbouring conservative Gulf states but this will be for different reasons. Some of the challenges facing all these countries are the same but there are significant differences in the case of Saudi Arabia.
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