Iran: Elections at Home and Pressure from Abroad

　For Iran, the events of late 2006 were overshadowed by two major developments: the twin elections of the City and Village Councils and of the Council of Experts (15 December); and the United Nation’s Security Council decision to impose sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and missile program (23 December). Additionally, a series of statements and concrete steps recently taken by Washington signalled that regardless of the Iraq Study Group’s findings (disclosed on 6 December) the US Administration’s determination to pursue and intensify measures against both Iran’s nuclear policy and its engagement in Iraq is as obstinate as ever. Combined, these elements constitute significant political challenges for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, representing a growing discontent at home and increasing pressure from abroad.     

Elections: Growing Signs of Resentment at Home

　The results of the elections for the Council of Experts and the City and Village Councils (as well as by-elections for few vacant seat in the Majlis held on the same day), highlight a measure of stability in the revolutionary institutions and continuity in the clerical rule as it approaches its 28th anniversary.  However, the results of the elections were a setback to President Ahmadinejad and to the (radical) line that he pursued. His rivals—the more pragmatic traditionalist-conservatives on the one hand, and the pro-reform camp on the other hand—gained a meaningful advantage over Ahmadinejad’s neo-conservative cohorts. Although the elections still seem insufficient to determine the contest for power or to affect a serious policy-change, they indicate growing public disillusionment with the president’s failure to address the mounting socio-economic grievances and the restriction of freedoms, and his performance in the international scene.

　Three main groups competed in 2006. One, usually termed “traditional-conservatives” (or moderate-conservatives), includes individuals who hold major posts in the establishment and are formidable contenders for power in the national scene, such as former President ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (who suffered humiliating electoral defeats in the 2000 Majlis elections and was defeated by Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential run-off), and Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, Ahmadinejad’s successor in Tehran’s City Hall who ran against him in the presidential elections. (Qalibaf, one of the leading figures in the conservative camp, gradually distanced himself from the more radical-conservative camp and turned closer to the reform faction). The second group encompasses the radical or neo-conservative faction, of whom Ahmadinejad is the figure-head and Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi is considered to be their mentor. The third camp is comprised of reformists of varied postures, who under President Mohammad Khatami controlled the government (1977-2005) and Majlis (2000-2004). zzzzz

　The Council of Experts which meets only twice a year and rarely intervenes in actual politics, is an extremely important body. It is empowered, inter alia, to supervise the Supreme Leader, to appoint his successor (which may turn a relevant duty in case the Supreme Leader will not be able to function) and in extreme cases, even to dismiss him. As sufficient mastery of religious scholarship is a pre-requisite for nomination to the Council, ultimately the contest was limited to the first two groups, while the reformists supported candidates closest to their political line. Similar to previous elections, the Council of Guardians—charged with overseeing the nomination process—rejected two-thirds of the nearly 500 candidates, including almost all of those identified with the reformists and some neo-conservatives associated with Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. Thus, only 165 candidates competed for the Council’s 86 seats (the fourth since 1982).

　Since mastery in religious scholarship is a pre-requisite for candidacy, many reformist could not even compete. Therefore, in effect, the actual competition was limited to the clerical factions only, and the results demonstrate a clear tendency towards the traditional-conservatives.

　Most of the prominent incumbent candidates who ran managed to secure their re-election. The traditional-conservatives gained a decisive success. Given the nature of the elections (with no clear “party-lists” and reformist unqualified to compete), an exact analysis of the results is complicated. Clearly, however, the traditionalists now control the Council. Considering the aforementioned caveats, and the shifting affiliations that characterize Iranian politics, it seems that they gained over 60 of the 86 seats, while neo-conservatives gained less than ten; and the candidates overtly supported by the reformists attained around 15. Even more illuminating was the considerable support for Rafsanjani—who gained the highest votes in Tehran; almost twice the votes gained by Mesbah-Yazdi.

　This very trend was reinforced by results of the elections for the City Councils, where some 230,000 candidates competed for over 110,000 seats. While the first such municipal elections (1999), held at the peak of the reformists’ power earned them a decisive victory, in the second elections (2003), the conservatives gained extensive control throughout the country and advanced Ahmadinejad to the seat of Tehran’s mayorship.

　Unlike in 2003, the pro-reform camp was now ostensibly more organized and vigorous. While the conservatives struggled with internal factionalization, uncharacteristically, the reformists presented a more unified front. In Tehran, while most reformists competed under one list, some of Ahmadinejad’s hard-line cohorts broke off from the conservative ranks shortly before the elections, and nominated their own candidates under a list led by Ahmadinejad’s sister, Parvin. Tehran’s new mayor, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, headed the alternative faction. A third conservative group competed under the “Followers of the Imam’s line.”  Qalibaf attracted most of the attention, both due to his current position as Tehran's mayor, and as a contender with a score to settle with Ahmadinejad (who supplanted him as the conservatives’ candidate before the presidential election). In 2006, he appeared to be more closesly assosiated with the reformists than with the neo-conservatives. He became the symbol of hope for those who aspired to challenge the president, as he advocated an alternative, milder philosophy that won him the support of reformists for his mayoral bid.

　Ahmadinejad’s rivals came close to a landslide victory. The elections were a success for traditional conservatives who have expressed alarm resultant from Ahmadinejad’s confrontational stance in the international scene and failure to ease domestic hardships. On their part, the reformists appeared to make an impressive comeback, after they were driven out from the local councils (in 2003), the Majlis (2004), and the presidency (in 2005). In Tehran, Ahmadinejad’s allies grabbed only three of the 15 seats, while traditional-conservatives won at least seven, and reformists picked up four, with one seat going to an independent (a wrestling champion). Country-wide, the results indicated a serious defeat for Ahmadinejad’s supporters.

　The results thus exhibit a backlash against Ahmadinejad, casting a shadow over his popularity. Some observers viewed the elections as “harbingers of change,” due to the entrance of rising Iranian youth and women activists on the scene. Traditional ayatollahs and pragmatists took this to heart, hailing the results as a sign of the people’s ambivalence to Ahmadinejad, that stems from unmet economic promises and a confrontational foreign policy that has brought Iran to the brink of UN sanctions.[1] The results reflect Ahmadinejad’s diminishing popularity since his own election. According to Ahmad Zeidabadi, a prominent journalist, “a new generation of technocrat conservatives” led by Qalibaf, alongside the reformists, “won the election.”[2] The vote for Rafsanjani, said one of Iran’s leading intellectuals, Mohsen Kadivar, “means the school of thought of Ahmadinejad—in the form of Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi—has failed.”[3]

　The recent elections are yet another indication of the vitality of the Iranian political system. In its 28 years in power, Iran had general elections almost every year, with power shifting between competing factions. While signaling significant change within the ruling system, the regime and the revolutionary institutions seem stable. However, growing signs of discontent and disenchantment are evident, as demonstrated in the elections. Further substantiation of this notion can be seen, as the elections were held a week after students disrupted a speech by Ahmadinejad at the Amir Kabir University, setting fire to posters bearing his picture.

　The elections are quite telling of the changing political atmosphere, but their future significance depends on many variables: for example, how many reformists will be barred from the 2008 Majlis contest? “This election is only a way of measuring power; it’s not a real competition," thus maintained Kadivar. Much also depends on the government's ability to alleviate the socio-economic difficulties. In this regard, more people are growing impatient, and seem resentful of the president’s preoccupation with foreign relations, rather than fulfilling his election campaign promises. “In Tehran, people have already begun to nag” about the economic situation, added Nasser Hadian, a political science professor of Tehran University. As time passes, Hadian added, Ahmadinejad is going to find that “he’s got to deliver.”[4] Thus, although the elections do not directly affect Ahmadinejad’s administration and are not expected to bring immediate policy changes, they represent a significant blow to his popularity. Furthermore, the UN Security Council's decision to impose sanctions on Iran has presented another challenge for Ahmadinejad and his government, this time from abroad.  

　Sanctions by the Security Council: Growing Pressure from Abroad

　The findings of the Iraq Study Group initially brought some relief to Iran. Two of its foremost proposals directly impact Iran: troop withdrawal from Iraq and conducting direct negotiations with Iran and Syria. Although President Bush’s initial response to the report superficially gave the impression that he is carefully considering its recommendations, his preference for “staying the course” and aversion to admitting failure emerged soon thereafter. The Administration seemed determined to pursue its Iraq policy (as evident in the decision in early January to dispatch additional forces to Iraq), and to act resolutely against Iranian interference in Iraq (see below).

　The decision by the Security Council (23 December), approved unanimously by all its 15 members, to impose sanctions on Iran—shortly after the elections—is another setback for Ahmadinejad. It carries significant weight, even if the approved measures are seemingly mild and unlikely as such to prevent continued Iranian efforts in its nuclear program.

　Resolution 1737 states that Iran should, without delay, suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development work on heavy-water related projects. The Council additionally decided that all States should prevent the supply, sale or transfer, for the use by or benefit of Iran, of related equipment and technology, if such items could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing, or heavy-water related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. The council requested a progress report within 60 days from the Director General of IAEA regarding Iran’s compliance or non-compliance with the resolution.

　The Iranian response was swift and caustic. Ahmadinejad (24 December) dismissed the resolution as “a piece of torn paper” that would not deter Iran from its nuclear program, maintaining that the supporters of the resolution would soon regret their “superficial act.” He promised to “celebrate our atomic achievements in February" [referring presumably to the 28th anniversary of the revolution]. Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator ‘Ali Larijani responded with a declaration that Iran will start installing 3,000 centrifuges at its Natanz uranium enrichment plant.[5] On 27 December, the Majlis passed a bill which obliges the government to review its co-operation with the IAEA, instructing it to “accelerate” Iran’s nuclear drive.[6]  

　The difficulties involved in even such mild steps by the Security Council do not bode well for those advocating serious and immediate measures that will dissuade the regime from pursuing its nuclear plans. It is also not clear if and when the additional step noted in the resolution regarding Iran’s non-compliance, will be approved by the Security Council. If past experience is the yardstick, the world reaction so far seemed falling behind the path of the progress in Iran’s nuclear plans.

Still, the Security Council resolution sends a stern message to Iran’s leadership, and particularly to President Ahmadinejad. Transferring Iran’s nuclear file from the IAEA to the Security Council in early 2006 was the first step in intensifying the pressure on Tehran. In fact, approving sanctions has not been the frequent practice in the Security Council. Thus, the unanimous decision—regardless how mild the sanctions seem—and the support of Russia and China should not be marginalized. These developments maintain that there are still some red lines that the world will try to prevent Iran from crossing. Additionally, they will also have some—even if only partial and limited—consequences: to slow down Iranian nuclear plans and, no less significantly, they are liable to exacerbate discontent at home.

　Since then, Washington continued to send decisive signals. Most important in this regard is the decision to send additional troops to Iraq.  Although this maneuver is intended to advance American policy in Iraq, it simultaneously conveys a message to Iran as well. Recently, there have been numerous additional steps aimed directly against Iran: On 22 December—just a day before the Security Council resolution—a federal judge in Washington charged Iran with responsibility for the 25 June 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and ordered Tehran to pay more than $253m in damages to surviving family members of the American victims. On 11 January US troops launched two raids on Iranian targets in the Kurdish town Irbil (one of them on the Iranian Liaison Office), following through on President Bush’s vow to break up Iran’s networks in Iraq. A few Iranians were detained and vast amounts of documents were reportedly confiscated. Earlier, in late December the US forces arrested two Iranians in Iraq (two others with diplomatic immunity were released), as a “validation” of claims of “Iranian meddling” in Iraq. According to analysts, through these measures, Washington is stating, “Forget the Iraq Study Group, we’re going in a different direction.”[7]

　No one expected Iran to suspend enrichment following the Security Council resolutions. Clearly, the sanctions as such do not impose an immediate threat to Iran or to its nuclear program. The international community's consensus on tougher and more effective measures would be difficult to achieve. Yet, after growing tired of fruitless negotiation efforts, the West has seemingly taken the lead in dealing with Iran’s nuclear aspirations and has begun to applying pressure.  

　Ahmadinejad’s belligerent statements (against the West and Israel, and regarding the nuclear program) and the world’s resultant indignation have aroused resentment at home and charges—even if implicit—against Ahmadinejad. Some observers have even expressed concern that his belligerent statements contributed to the recent anti-Iranian campaign. Several reformist newspapers editorialized that the sanctions might have a greater economic effect than the government was willing to acknowledge. Some went as far as criticizing Ahmadinejad on the grounds that rather than promoting Iran’s national interests, he has caused growing tension with the international community and hostility towards Iran. This is exemplified by Sadegh Zibakalam, a professor of political science at Tehran University, who said that the Holocaust conference (11 December) damaged Iran’s national interests and its international image, as it was held at a time when “our nuclear case is at the UN and we have to do our best to gain the trust of the international community.” Describing the conference as a “gift to Iran’s opponents” he added: “Associating with neo-Nazis and anti-Semitic racists ruins the remains of Iran’s reputation with Europeans.”[8] Reformist Majlis members on 6 January blamed the government for failing to prevent the sanctions. “The only way to pass the crisis is to build confidence.” Yet, by “holding [a] Holocaust conference and financing the Hamas,” the government “creates mistrust and tension," said Nur al-Din Pur-Mo’azen, spokesman of the Majlis reformist faction.[9]

　Thus, if the developments at home and on the international scene do not signal an immediate threat to the stability of the regime, they undoubtedly send a clear warning message to Ahmadinejad and his government.

[2] http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/2614.cfm, December 26, 2006.