The report of the Baker-Hamilton commission is a worthy attempt to solve a seemingly intractable problem, but it has a fatal flaw. The measures it proposes to strengthen a weak Baghdad government are unlikely to work; and if that proves to be the case, to pull out US combat troops by March 2008 (the implied target date) would be a dangerous gamble.
The report essentially calls for three things:
The Iraqis should “take control of their own destiny”.
The United States should lead and co-ordinate an “aggressive” diplomatic initiative to build up regional support for Iraq.
American troops should move from a combat role to a support role.
The approach is certainly logical. A weak Iraqi government is to be buttressed both internally and externally. The internal steps concern political measures -- reversing de-Baathification, offering an amnesty to insurgents, revising the constitution – designed to reassure the Sunni Arabs and bring them further into the political process. On the security front, the US priority should be to work faster and more effectively to train and reorganise the Iraqi security forces. In all these areas the Iraqi government must reach agreed targets, or “milestones”, or suffer a reduction of political, economic and military support.
On the external front, the proposed diplomatic initiative would reach out to Iraq’s immediate neighbours including Iran and Syria (and others such as Egypt). They would be offered carrots and sticks to be more helpful – or at least, less unhelpful – towards Iraq and its government and its security problems. There would also be a serious attempt to revive the moribund Middle East peace process.
But will it work? While in principle Baker and Hamilton are surely right that only Iraqis can solve Iraq’s problems, their prescription requires the country’s new political leaders to reinvent themselves. To do what the report calls for, they would have to abandon the pursuit of individual and communal self-interest and work selflessly in the interests of the Iraqi nation. In a series of concrete ways, they would have to bring about national reconciliation (rather than merely talking about it). Since the report itself presents a damning indictment of how corrupt and ineffectual the new political class has shown itself to be, it is hard to believe this magic transformation will occur – regardless of the threat inherent in those “milestones” (i.e. if you fail, we will leave you to your own devices).
If America were indeed to start walking away from Iraq in just over a year’s time, even if the Baghdad government had failed in its allotted tasks, the consequences for Iraq, the Middle East, and American credibility would be severe. Baker and Hamilton have, it is true, given themselves a let-out clause: the withdrawal of US combat troops would be “subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground”, and in any case non-combat troops would remain after that date. Nevertheless, the clear sense of the report as a whole is that the Iraqis have one last chance – with the help of others – to get it right; and that America can’t be held hostage to Iraqi failure. There can be no open-ended commitment.
Although it does not say so, the report has an American rather than an Iraqi purpose: to limit the damage of a dreadful mistake which has badly divided the American nation and is costing it $2 billion a week. But Baker and Hamilton are savvy enough to know there is no guarantee that their proposals – even if taken up by President Bush – will work. It may be too late.
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