The short time which has passed since the war in Lebanon does not allow for decisive conclusions of the range of influences the war has had on the region and on each of the sides in particular. It is clear, however, that the processes which led to the war, the events since then and the war's results yield profound impact on the region. On its part, Iran now seems as a major regional power and its leaders already express themselves as if it was a global superpower as well.
This review will address two inter-related questions:
Against its own interests, Lebanon over the past three decades has turned into a conflict arena of foreign countries, including the stronghold created there by Palestinians after the 1967 war, the entrance of Syria (1975) and the Israeli wars (mainly in 1982 and 2006). Iran holds special interests in Lebanon, and strives to maintain this strategic stronghold on the Israeli border. It maintained close ties with the Shi'is in Lebanon prior to the 1979 revolution and it supported the Hizbollah since its establishment, through moral, ideological, political and economic support, as well as through military training and devices. Iran takes pride in its support for the Hizbollah, while the Hizbollah, for its part, recognizes the spiritual authority of the Iran's Superior Leader (Ayatollah 'Ali Khamane'i)—as borne witness by the Hizbollah charter and pictures of the Ayatollah waved frequently by pro-Hizbollah protesters and hung on the walls of the organization’s leaders.
The war broke out at a time in which the radical camp in Iran was gaining fortitude. At the end of Khatami's presidency, during which he strived to advance reform, the conservatives seemed on the ascendance. They won the municipal (2003) and the Majlis (2004) elections and, finally, Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad was elected (2005). Even earlier, the Palestinian Intifada (2000), the event of September 11, 2001, the inclusion of Iran in President Bush "Axis of Evil" and the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq encouraged further Iranian radicalism. Since his election, Ahmadi-Najad has upgraded his status and became a leader with a global reputation and attempted to promote his stated objectives. Significant developments in Iran and the region promoted the trend. Domestically, they include the rise in oil prices, the weakening of the pragmatic camp, as well as Ahmadi-Nejad’s success in rallying the public around Iran’s nuclear program. His rise to power was the result of the fortification of radicalism and it fueled this trend further. What contributed to the fortification of Iran’s status from abroad was, for the most part, the fall of Saddam Hussein, the American complications in Iraq and the passivity of Arab nations on the Iraqi and Middle Eastern issue.
A series of developments have further strengthened the status of Iran in the region on the eve of the war and have fortified it even further since:
Already prior to the war, Iran has attained a superior status in Lebanon, and viewed the war as an opportunity to further fortify its status there. In objective terms, the war's results can be hardly viewed as a victory for Hizallah (even less so for Iran). The numerous casualties and the damage to the Hizballah military infrastructure, and the fact that their leader is in hiding since the "victory" and delivered his victory speech over the ruins of his Beirut headquarters, in addition to the heavy damage to Lebanon, do not attest to victory. However, the Hizballah's steadfastness, the atmosphere of victory that the Hizbollah and Iran arouse, in contrast to the deep soul-searching in Israel, nurture the sentiment that the Hizbollah’s path provides the means towards attaining their goals against the enemies of Islam and their domestic collaborators. Iran has strong interest in keeping this important stronghold among Shi'i population and on the borders of the Holy Land, as the means for exporting its revolutionary message, an example of successful Islamist movement and as a tool to strengthening its regional status. With the Palestinian issue being such a potent symbol in the world of Islam, Iran's active involvement on Israeli borders (from Hizballah, Hamas to the Islamic Jihad) is important ideologically and strategically. Having deviated from so many dogmatic principles and failing to demonstrate actual success at home, Iran can waive with the Hizballah's victory to prove its vitality—to public opinion at home and to the Muslim world. For Iran, the Hizballah has been, and continues to be, a flag ship of its notion of export of the revolution. In this regard, the war was a success story.
The growing Iranian centrality also benefited from the passivity of the Arab World. In fact, the “Arab World” has ceased to function as such, and following fateful events (such as occupation of Iraq and the war in Lebanon), it remained mostly inactive. The eradication of the Taliban in Afghanistan (2002), the defeat of Saddam Hussein (2003), and the withdrawal of Israel (2000) and Syria (2005) from Lebanon have strengthened Iran's position and extended its influence into the Fertile Crescent. In the balance of powers between Syria and Iran, the upper hand lies recently with the latter. The popularity of the Sheikh Nasrallah and Ahmadi-Nejad among peoples in the Arab states further highlights the gap between public opinion in various states and their leadership. While the moderate Arab states have been harmed by the war, the steadfast withstanding of the Hizbollah provided inspiration to radical movements, and strengthened Iran, which views itself as the “academy of the Islamic revolution.”
Moreover, the Lebanese terrain turned into a microcosm of a broader conflict—a clash of civilizations along two parallel spheres: Western culture vis-à-vis the Muslim world, which Iran seeks to lead; and within the Muslim world—the Sunni majority versus the awakening Shi'is, for whom Iran represents an important historical axis.
The strengthening of the Shi'is in the Islamic axis also tilts the inner-Islamic balance between the Sunni majority and the Shi'i minority in the favor of the latter. True, there are differences between the Iraqi and Iranian Shi'is. Thus, the top Iraqi religious leader, Ayatollah Sistani—of Iranian ancestry—denies basic principles of Khomeini's dogma. Even within Iranian Shi'is, there are significant variations between leading Ayatollahs. Thus, in the early days of the revolution Ayatollah Shari'atmadari was under house arrest until his death in 1986, and so is Ayatollah Montazeri restricted and Ayatollah Boroujerdi and his supporters were recently jailed. It is also clear that the Sunni Islam still rules the majority of the Muslim world, and that the Shi'is are a small minority (less than 15%). Yet, the uplift in the status of the Shi'is presents a substantial change. In addition to Iran, Iraq is the first Arab state in which Shi'is (some 60% of the population) have achieved political dominance, and in Lebanon the Shi'is represent the largest religious minority (above 40%). This Shi'i umbrella is a source of empowerment for Iran, and a cause for concern in Arab nations. Positioning itself at the core of such a Shi'i power is an ideological aim of Iran, which helps to upgrade its regional standing and global status. This is also a source of concern for Arab leaders. It was therefore not without concern that King Abdullah II of Jordon coined the term "the Shi'i Crescent" to portray the new situation. President Mubarak went as far as to complain that some Shi'is in Arab lands are more faithful to Iran than to their own countries.
Encouraged by such developments, Iran shows no intent to withdraw from its nuclear plans. The war in Iraq increased its motivation to pursue its plans, striving to attain status similar to North Korea and not exposing itself to conquest as in Iraq. The recent nuclear test by North Korean, and the lack of western response, could only be viewed from Iran as another sign of western impotence. The United States complications in Iraq and that no “smoking gun” was found there, and that the American aim of exporting democracies through war seem an empty promise further nurtures Iranian confidence. The increase in oil prices strengthened Iran’s sense of power, and it's strive towards Islamic leadership intensified Iran’s ambition towards inclusion in the prestigious club of the nuclear states. Moreover, the lack of unity in the position of the outside world further encouraged Tehran. China and Russia do not rush to support sanctions and the European states do not appear decisive. True, when actual sanctions seemed far, they gave it their blessing; but when more concrete measures were discussed, they seemed to withdraw. In Fact, even American public opinion does not necessarily support drastic measures against Iran.
To the above, one may add the artistry of Iranian diplomacy. Since the revolution, its leaders have demonstrated great sophistication, managing a dual policy through the use of a double tongue, and on occasions even utilizing intentional misinformation. They take full advantage of the interests of various states (such as China and Russia) to win more time. While they close a door, they make sure to open a window. Their response to western proposals is never unequivocal, leaving Washington and its allies to wonder what they really mean. In the meantime, the nuclear clock is ticking and works to Iran' benefit.
Yet, the war in Lebanon also carried some severe consequences for Iran, which overshadow to a large extent its accomplishments.
Domestically, public disgruntlement is growing (particularly due to economic difficulties and restriction of freedoms). There were also voices against supporting movements far away on account of reconstruction of Iran itself. Others view with distaste their country's identification with the world's radicalism. During the war some used a well known Persian proverb maintaining, that "a light which is essential to the household is forbidden to donate to a mosque." It means that even if support for the Hizballah is a holy cause, the needs of the Iranians should have preference. Following the war the magnitude of the destruction in Lebanon also became known and many Arabs blame Iran. Tehran was faced with a dilemma: Pouring fortunes to reconstruct Lebanon, would upset Iranians; failing to do so would upset Lebanese and Arabs. The rise in oil prices could yield a negative influence as well, if and when the public demands to know what has been done with the large amounts earned. History does not repeat itself, but it would be unwise to ignore its lessons. The 1979 revolution broke out a short time after the rise in oil prices in 1973.
Internationally, the world is becoming increasingly more aware of the dangers inherent in Islamism, and even Europe appears now more cognizant of the challenges that Iran and religious radicalism raise. Over time, the pressure on Iran may increase. True, such concerns had somewhat evaporated since July, but the growing of radicalism continue to be a concern for Europe. Tensions between Iran and its Muslim neighbors are also mounting, whether over policy in Iraq, Lebanon or the Palestinian question, or over Iran’s nuclear policy. Following the war, leading Arab cleric criticized Iran sharply on accounts of its Persian culture and Shi'i belief.
Iran presents the war in Lebanon as a significant victory for the Hizballah and Islamic revolutionary approach, and it might had had an interest in escalating the tension on the eve of the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg in mid-July. Yet, neither Iran nor the Hizballah wished or anticipated such a harsh Israeli reaction. Nasrallah even admitted that had he known the magnitude of the Israeli reaction he might have not initiated abducting the two Israeli soldiers. Iran on its part armed the Hizballah as a tool against Israel in time of its own interest, but the war came much earlier than Iran's interests would have dictated. In this sense, it lost a significant tool aimed to be used under better circumstances.
Thus, Iran’s balance of benefits and losses is therefore not unequivocal. In the ultimate balance, it appears that the negative by-products which may potentially arise from the war are no less potent than the short-term gain which Iran has won even before the war has started.
Still, regardless of the effort by outside powers, the Iranian nuclear program continues. So where is the hope for change?
The world's response: in the aftermath of the war in Lebanon, the outside world seems far from determined to confront Iran's nuclear program. In fact, even the US seems to send more accommodating signals (such as allowing Khatami's visit to the US and the well measured speech of President Bush in the UN General Assembly). European states are even less enthusiastic to approve harsh measures and China and Russia made their milder approach clear. Still, Iran can not be idle of possible measures against it. Most damaging from the Iranian perspective is the fact that President Bush is intent on fighting what he has labeled the “Axis of Evil." The US may proceed in two directions, seemly contradictory but may be complementing each other: initiative for dialogue to reach a mutually accepted agreement; or harsh measures against Iran, with or without the support of its allies. While a dialogue may not result in an understanding, without dialogue it would be extremely difficult for Washington to take active measures. It seems that not only China and Russia, nor Europe, but also public opinion in the US is not ripe to harsh actions prior to a serious attempt at dialogue.
The Arab-Israeli front: Another possible source to incite a change in Iran's policy is an Arab-Israeli dialogue aimed at resolving the conflict with Syria and mainly with the Palestinians. A peace initiative by the moderate Arab states may serve as a useful response to the growing of radicalism. Peace talk between Israel and Syrian—Iran's main ally—may face Iran with a serious challenge. In fact, a decade ago, Syria under Hafez Asad did engage in peace talks with Israel, much to Iran's resentment. The Palestinians have done so even more intensively then. True, today the Hamas is in government, and Arab negotiators have been so far despaired from the Palestinian lack of response. Moreover, the war further strengthened the extremists on both sides. Still, one way to diminish Iranian centrality is the resolution of the Palestinian problem.
Change in Iranian policy: Finally, is the possibility of a change in Iranian policy, either by the current regime or a change in government—both seem far from being likely today. Still, over their history, the people of Iran have demonstrated much political involvement. In the twentieth century there were two major popular revolutions in Iran (the 1906 constitutional revolution and the 1979 Islamic revolution), and between them there was a major popular movement led by Mohammad Mossadeq (1951-1953). Recently, the Iranian youth, women organizations, the press, cinema industry and the extensive use of internet continue to amaze foreign observers. The Islamic regime managed so far to suppress its opponents. If and when there will be a change, it is difficult to predict. It seems that two parallel trends are already in motion: growing popular disillusionment and a possible change of regime and an attempt to achieve nuclear power. As it seems now the "train" carrying the nuclear message drives faster than the one carrying hope for a regime change.
While the conservatives seem to have tightened their grips over power recently, the struggle for of the revolutionary path is not over. If and when the people would interfere to mark a change, their position will not depend that much on the measure of return to Islam or the degree of Iran's impact on the Hizballah or Hamas, but to the degree that the Islamic regime managed to meet the initial expectations of the 1979 revolution. Ahmadi-Nejad made Rubin-Hood style promises (to take from the rich and add to the poor) and gave new hope for Iranians that his revolutionary path is the highway to salvation. It is his challenge now to deliver. The main battle field is at home and the task is extremely heavy. The nuclear battle therefore is another important front for the government to prove success.
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