The August 31 UNSC deadline for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program has passed with Tehran, not unexpectedly, refusing to acquiesce to this demand. Since then, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a number of other officials have reiterated their country's position that it would refuse enrichment suspension before serious negotiations.
Today, even as a resolution is being drafted to call for punitive sanctions against Iran, the Islamic republic remains defiant, and insists on its position. Of course, even if the sanctions resolution is adopted by the UNSC, it is expected to be rather mild and insignificant to start with.
The door will be left open for Tehran to change its mind and to come back to the negotiation table to discuss potential incentives, provided that it ceases uranium enrichment activity first.
However, it is very unlikely that the Iran accepts such a demand at this time.
This paper will argue that the Islamic Republic is convinced that the US government's intention is to seriously undermine, or preferably change the regime in Tehran. The Bush Administration's words and actions give enough credence to make this a rational concern. The Iranians realize that their difference with the Americans is not limited to nuclear activity or whether or not they enrich uranium. Rather, Tehran is aware that Washington would like to contain its role as a regional power. Consequently, incentives the European negotiators offer, with the unenthusiastic consent of the Bush administration, do not satisfy the Iranians who insist on open negotiations without preconditions. It is clear enough that what Tehran is really after is direct talks with the Americans, over a grand bargain that would eliminate the threat of regime change.
Given the region's strategic situation and events such as unsuccessful Israeli war against Lebanon, the desperate situation in Iraq, the victory of the Democrats in the November Congressional elections, the state of the global economy, and the persistence of high oil prices, Iran is confident about its position. Nonetheless, Tehran’s confidence can be dangerous if the regime overplays its hand. In particular, the state of domestic politics in the US is so volatile that there is the real danger of a desperate Bush administration to undertake radical unilateral action against Iran, in spite of strong warnings and hesitation from a significant segment of the American political, economic, and military elite, and even public opinion.
To better explain the above argument, this paper will go through a number of points.
Whenever Iran’s nuclear program is discussed, inevitably the same recurring question comes up: “with all the oil and gas riches of Iran, why is it pursuing a nuclear power program, unless the real objective is to hide a military program?”
To be fair, many energy economists believe that it makes perfect financial sense for Iran to use nuclear energy, especially at the current oil prices. We should also recall that huge and growing domestic demand on Iranian oil – encouraged by a misguided government policy on subsidies – means crude exports are always under pressure and threat. One solution is to diversify the country’s energy basket by using more natural gas and nuclear power for internal consumption to free up crude oil for export. Of course, besides its monetary value, crude oil exports provide strategic importance to a country. It is also worth noting that that idea that Iran needs nuclear energy came from the US back in the early 1970s; so it can be argued that now – with almost twice the population and 2 million barrels a day less oil production capacity – Iran needs nuclear energy much more than it did then.
Despite the above, energy considerations are not the key issue for the Islamic Republic when it comes to the pursuit of nuclear technology and capability. Far more important is what nuclear technology represents in the eye of the Iranian decision-makers. In short, it is a legitimacy card with a domestic, regional and international dimension to it, as follows:
Next, we need to ask ourselves why Iran needs to go so far as possessing the capability to enrich its own nuclear fuel? After all, even President Bush has publicly announced that the Americans recognize Iran’s rights to nuclear technology, with enrichment being the “unacceptable” red line. Is it really worth it for Iran to face international sanctions and to even chance potential military strikes at some point, just to produce nuclear fuel? Especially when we consider that the Iranians don’t even have a nuclear power plant yet, and will not need their own fuel for the next 10 years?
The perspective presented in the Western media is that Iran is rejecting a generous package of rewards offered by the 5+1 – that is, the permanent 5 members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and Germany. Once again, it is implied that there must be a military angle here, or else Iran should rationally accept such an offer.
Well, that is not exactly an impartial picture.
There are many debates in Iran regarding the importance of maintaining uranium enrichment. At the heart of the matter, the issue goes back to mistrust of the American intention.
Take for example the response of a senior Iranian nuclear negotiator to the question “why doesn’t Iran take advantage of the incentives package that it is being offered to it and declare victory?2” His exact response was: “With the present ambiguities in the American policy and their desire to contain us and try to overthrow us, we simply cannot give away its enrichment card. But what we can do is signal that under the right circumstances it would be willing to do so.”
But why not put the Bush Administration to the test? Secretary of State Rice has publicly offered to sit across from the Iranian representative in person and engage in negotiations, if Tehran first suspends its enrichment activities. President Bush has reasserted that stance regularly in the past months. Why not try it out and see what happens? What does Iran have to lose by trying?
The reply to this set of questions was instructive about the Iranian psyche. Instead of the expected, drawn out response about the technical problems that stopping the centrifuges would bring about, the reply was as follows:
“We tried that one during the Khatami days. We suspended to enter into negotiations with the EU-3. What did that get us? I will tell you! Time became a factor for the West and against Iran. We had to beg to get the Europeans to meet with us. They were in no rush to negotiate. When the offers would come, they were demeaning. Plus, we were told not to forget that there was an invisible main player – namely the US – to consider as well.”
Then came the cross examination and the questions from the other side of the table.
“If the Americans are serious, why don’t they drop this requirement? We have offered to cease enrichment, after negotiations start, so long as we get to a proper timetable clearly outlining what incentives would be delivered when. Why do you think the Americans start with a precondition that they absolutely know that we will not, and cannot accept? We should not overestimate the steps that we can take. If the US makes its decision to get serious, the problem will be solved. For us, right now, the situation is vague. We don’t know what the Americans really want. Where do they want to take us? We have every reason to believe that they are after regime change.”
In summary, enrichment is a key card for the Iranians. Tehran feels that the attention it is getting, and the incentives packages that are being presented, are all owed mainly to their ability to enrich. Enrichment is their main bargaining card, and they will not give it up easily or for cheap.
However, the optimistic extension of this argument is that enrichment card is up for bargaining. Perhaps the Iranians are seeking a Grand Bargain with the United States to resolve the issue.
Yet, now that the Islamic Republic is not getting the price it is asking for, it is likely to be tempted to enhance its enrichment capabilities – specifically by gaining the capability of putting a few more cascades together -- and try to bargain at that time.
For any outsider who has the opportunity to discuss the current state of affairs with Iranian strategists, it will quickly, perhaps surprisingly, become obvious that there is a general lack of alarm at the situation that they face. That is because there is an emerging consensual view in Iran’s foreign policy community according to which, given the region's strategic situation, Israeli’s failed war against Lebanon, the desperate and deteriorating situation in Iraq, outcome of the US Congressional elections this past November, the state of the global economy, and the persistence of high oil prices, that the Islamic Republic is in a relatively strong position.
Despite the fact that the Iranian file is back in the UNSC and the prospects of some sort of limited sanctions are fairly high at this point, most decision-makers in Iran discount the possibility of an American air strike against their country. For that matter, they see little chance of serious, biting sanctions for at least another year, by which time many things can change in the regional power dynamics.
No doubt, there is a risk that Tehran could become overconfident and overplay its hand. American and Israeli politics are very volatile at this time and it is unwise to completely ignore the danger of either actor taking radical action out of desperation, despite the folly of doing so.
The Americans are rather open about their desire to curtail Iranian influence in the region and the world. In a recent talk before the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), Undersecretary of State Nick Burns – the man in charge of the Iranian file at the US State Department – spells out that the American problem with Iran is not limited to ideological issues, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, or even the Islamic Republic’s alleged support for groups the Americans consider terrorist and its objection to the Peace Process.
Washington’s so-called War on Terror has had the unintended consequence of strengthening Iran’s regional hand, a prospect the Americans are far from being comfortable with. Certainly, with Iran’s main rivals – Saddam and the Taliban – out of the regional picture, the Islamic Republic’s relative strength has increased. The Americans attribute Iran’s renewed confidence to the rise of President Ahmadinejad, however, which is not a perfectly accurate picture.
In Burns’ words, “there has been a dramatic change in Iranian policy in the Middle East. There has been a sense of Iran flexing its muscles in the region.” He continues: “We look at Iran as a considerable threat to the multiplicity of American interested in the Middle East … We see the combination of Iranian actions – support for terrorism, specifically for Hezbollah and Hamas, their nuclear actions and their wider polity to the Arab world – amounting to Iran bursting into the region over the past 13 months in an attempt in essence to destabilize order and to rearrange the power relationships in the region.”
Notwithstanding Burn’s description of events, it can be said that the US is beginning to experience the limits of the utility of force. Not everything can be resolved using military strength alone; diplomacy cannot be ignored. The Bush Administration unilateral resort to the use of force has weakened international support for the US, while the removal of Iran’s chief regional foes has strengthened the Islamic Republic.
Yet, the Americans are profoundly uncomfortable with this new balance of power in the Middle East. Knowing that so are the key Arab players in the regions – namely Saudi, Egypt and Jordan – are also not at ease with the rise of the so-called “Shi’ite Crescent”, Washington is playing on their fears to expand the coalition of those trying to contain the Islamic Republic.
Ironically, as the US is doing all that it can to contain Tehran, it is also demanding its help to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan. While the Iranians have much reason of their own to seek a stable neighborhood, there is a serious disincentive to helping free the hands of the Americans in those countries so that it has more resources to place increasing pressure on it. Somehow, this critical conflict of interest does not occur to the Bush Administration, or if it does, the White House tends to ignore it. For now, the clerics in Tehran are convinced that the US is out to overthrow them and that at least the present Administration refuses to so much as imagine a strong, powerful Islamic Republic in the region.
There is a reverse relationship between internal and external relations in Iran; heightened external threats result in the regime reducing its internal conflicts and putting them aside for the greater good of the system.
At the moment there is a lot of disagreement among the ruling elite in Iran, not only in regards to the nuclear case, but also in terms of how the country is being managed as a whole. The course of President Ahmadinejad’s economic policy is a particularly contentious source of dispute. Other key points of upset include Mr. Ahmadinejad’s tendency to put aside the more experienced players in civil service in favor of trusted, younger officials.
This are several important lessons here for the US, which hopes to lend its support to the more reformist and democratic voices in Tehran. First, there is a dire need to “de-securitize” Iranian politics. It is no secret that some ultra-hardliners in Tehran see limited confrontation with the Americans on the nuclear issue as their saving grace. Such a scenario would take attention away from mismanagement and help shift the blame on unjust sanctions or military strikes. Further more, this group may conclude that it could rely on drumming up nationalistic sentiments in the face of outside force. The more pressure Iran is put under, the more excuse the militant groups would have for pushing for a state of emergency, which in turn would afford them the opportunity to take the upper hand in the political scene and suppress the other ruling factions. Meanwhile, with the nuclear issue so hot, even the reform-minded elite of the country is devoting its energy to this topic and away from matters such as the human rights problems of the country, among other things.
Moscow is a very important player in the Iranian nuclear game, particularly as its file heads to the UNSC to consider potential sanctions. In essence, Russia is the “X factor” in this entire equation.
Consider the following:
For the time being, Washington appears to have failed to charm Moscow to follow its lead on the Iranian file. Just recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that his country opposes any attempt to use the UN Security Council to punish Iran for its disputed nuclear program. He also said Moscow is against using the nuclear issue as a pretext to discuss regime change in Tehran. Lavrov explained that the Kremlin is ready to discuss ways to persuade Iran into accepting broader international oversight.
Incidentally, the Islamic Republic is well aware of its strategic loneliness and the fact that it has no true friends among the international powers. As former defence minister Shamkhani explained at a recent conference in Tehran, China and Russia have their own agendas and would not support Iran for the sake of the regime or the Iranian nation. However, there is a general consensus on convergence of interests for the time being.
An important question recently added to the Iranian nuclear puzzle is how the new dynamics as a result of the North Korean nuclear test will complicate the Iranian file.
This case has the potential of cutting both ways. On the one hand, it will occupy the minds and time of the key world powers and could serve as a distraction to the Iranian case, slowing things down. In the short-run, this scenario is rather likely given the gravity and urgency of the North Korean situation. On the other hand, it could also increase the sense of urgency of the Iranian file in the minds of some of the 5+1, especially the United States. As Nick Burns put it, the “unintended consequence” of the test was bringing countries like Russia, China and Japan together on the North Korean issue.” Burns hopes that this could, in turn, help also on the Iranian file.
All in all, it may be too early to make a final call on whether the North Korean nuclear test works in Iran’s favor or detriment. After all, there is also the discourse that Iran’s file is no where near as dramatic as the North Korean one, and the punishment doled out for each has to be proportional to the breach in question. In other words, it would not be fair to penalize Iran at the same level as the North Koreans. Karim Sadjadpour of the ICG put it best, “the Iranians can legitimately point to the fact that in comparison to North Korea their behavior has been upstanding. Whereas Pyongyang pulled out of the NPT, Tehran’s behavior has been less blatant. Whereas North Korea pulled out of the NPT and actually detonated a bomb....Iran's behavior has been much less provocative 3.”
Conclusions
Despite the complicated picture painted above, a diplomatic breakthrough is not at all impossible. The stakes are too high and the consequences too disastrous if Iran and the United States fail to get past their differences. Moreover, despite all the problems in Iran-US relations, these two nations have far too many matters of mutual interest in the region for either side to be able to permanently ignore. Both sides must come to learn to respect the rights and concerns of the other.
But things are likely to get worse before they get better.
Although the possibility of clash cannot be ruled out, there is time for giving creative diplomacy more of a chance. US Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte had estimated Iran would not have a nuclear weapon before 2010-2015. So there is ample time to negotiate further.
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