Summary: The US does not have one policy towards Iraq. Rather, it has increasingly diverse policies that range from the result of divisions in domestic politics to operational efforts inside Iraq. The one thing all of these polices have in common is that their future is uncertain, and increasingly depend on how successful the Iraqis themselves are in creating a new set of political compromises, a viable government, and effective security and police forces.
In terms of domestic politics, the 2006 Congressional election campaign is only the prelude to steadily greater divisions between those who support “staying the course” in Iraq, and those who see the war as lost or too costly to pursue. This is to some extent a partisan debate. Republicans tend to support President Bush in supporting the war and staying the course. Democrats tend to criticize the conduct of the war and increasingly shift from efforts to find alternative solutions to calls for withdrawal. President Bush’s increasing unpopularity, however, has led some Republicans to at least question the war and a number of them to distance themselves from the President. At the same time, a number of Democrats feel the war, Iraq, and the Gulf are too important to accept a defeat as long as there is any prospect of victory.
American policy within Iraq increasingly is focused on pressuring the Maliki government to find some viable compromise between Iraq’s three main factions: Sunni Arab, Shi’ite Arab, and Kurd. This focus is supported by an ongoing effort to create effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces to bring stability and security to Iraq, and to allow the US and its Coalition allies to withdraw most of their military forces.
At the same time, the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns have broadened to make a concerted effort to reduce ethnic and sectarian violence and the risk of civil war. The focus of this effort is to secure Baghdad, which has been the main site for both insurgent violence and civil strife. US policy recognizes, however, that the insurgency must be defeated throughout the country and that the risk of separatism and civil strife in Mosul, Basra, and Kirkuk—and the country as whole—must be addressed by both political and military means.
US policy recognizes the importance of the economic dimension and of Iraq’s oil exports and energy resources. The US has, however, largely deferred additional aid and economic reform efforts, concentrating on the political and security dimensions, hoping that the momentum of existing aid programs will buy time.
All sides at least privately recognize that Iraq’s future prospects are uncertain, and that there is a serious risk of a major civil conflict, partition, or divisive ethnic and sectarian federalism. The worst case is a forced withdrawal in the face of a major civil war. The best case is years of future effort and a major US presence through at least 2009-2011.
: The US does not have one policy towards Iraq. Rather, it has increasingly diverse policies that range from the result of divisions in domestic politics to operational efforts inside Iraq. The one thing all of these polices have in common is that their future is uncertain, and increasingly depend on how successful the Iraqis themselves are in creating a new set of political compromises, a viable government, and effective security and police forces.
In brief, this mix of different polices takes the following forms:
Since the fall of 2005, President Bush’s low popularity ratings, and increasing Congressional and popular doubts about the war, have forced the President and other key members of his administration to become steadily more defensive about the war and the future of Iraq. The Administration has not changed its view that the war is of critical American strategic interest, that it is directly tied to the war on terrorism, and that it must be won. It also has not changed the basic strategy for winning the war that it advanced in the fall of 2005.
It has, however, gradually limited its goals to creating a stable Iraq with some elements of democracy, rather than some more dramatic form of victory. It also has increasingly made it clear that a major US troop presence will be needed through 2009 and that an intensive US support effort will be needed beyond 2010.
In terms of domestic politics, the 2006 Congressional election campaign is only the prelude to steadily greater divisions between those who support “staying the course” in Iraq and those who see the war as lost or too costly to pursue. This is to some extent a partisan debate.
Republicans tend to support President Bush in supporting the war and staying the course. Democrats tend to criticize the conduct of the war, and increasingly shift from efforts to find alternative solutions to calls for withdrawal. President Bush’s increasing unpopularity, however, has led some Republicans to at least question the war and a number to distance themselves from the President. At the same time, a number of Democrats feel the war, Iraq, and the Gulf are too important to accept a defeat as long as there is any prospect of victory.
Much will depend on how well the Iraqi government and Iraqi forces do in the coming months, and on whether the Democrats take control of either the Senate or the House in the November 2006 election. This currently seems doubtful, and if the Democrats do not score a major victory in the election, and find opposing the war to bring political benefits, it is doubtful that the Congress will take any action to try to cut the US effort in Iraq as part of the debate over the FY2008 budget.
The situation will, however, be highly volatile, and much will depend on whether Iraqi politics and security continue to deteriorate or show a significant improvement in calendar 2007. Any major deterioration, or shift towards a serious civil war, would produce a far more demanding debate and make funding the war far more difficult when the FY2009 budget debate takes place in 2008—a Presidential election year.
The basic policy the US is now pursuing in Iraq has change strikingly since its original invasion of Iraq. The US had now clear plan for nation building and stability operations when it invaded Iraq, and expected to withdraw most of its forces within about three months. It then attempted to take over the process of reconstruction with a Coalition Provisional Authority acting under American control, a policy it effectively abandoned when it transferred sovereignty back to Iraq in June 2004.
is still the policy that President Bush formally announced on November 30, 20051. The US laid out its policy for addressing the political, security, and economic dimensions of its activity in Iraq as part of an integrated effort in the strategy in a white paper it issued following the President’s speech2:
Our Strategy for Victory is Clear
o Isolate enemy elements from those who can be won over to the political process by countering false propaganda and demonstrating to all Iraqis that they have a stake in a democratic Iraq;
o Engage those outside the political process and invite in those willing to turn away from violence through ever-expanding avenues of participation; and
o Build stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions that can protect the interests of all Iraqis, and facilitate Iraq's full integration into the international community.
o Clear areas of enemy control by remaining on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy fighters and denying them safe-haven;
o Hold areas freed from enemy influence by ensuring that they remain under the control of the Iraqi government with an adequate Iraqi security force presence; and
o Build Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society.
o Restore Iraq's infrastructure to meet increasing demand and the needs of a growing economy;
o Reform Iraq's economy, which in the past has been shaped by war, dictatorship, and sanctions, so that it can be self-sustaining in the future; and
o Build the capacity of Iraqi institutions to maintain infrastructure, rejoin the international economic community, and improve the general welfare of all Iraqis.
This Strategy is Integrated and its Elements are Mutually Reinforcing
Victory Will Take Time
o It is not realistic to expect a fully functioning democracy, able to defeat its enemies and peacefully reconcile generational grievances, to be in place less than three years after Saddam was finally removed from power.
Our Victory Strategy Is (and Must Be) Conditions Based
o No war has ever been won on a timetable and neither will this one.
o We expect, but cannot guarantee, that our force posture will change over the next year, as the political process advances and Iraqi security forces grow and gain experience.
o While our military presence may become less visible, it will remain lethal and decisive, able to confront the enemy wherever it may organize.
o Our mission in Iraq is to win the war. Our troops will return home when that mission is complete.
This was a very different and more balanced US policy than the “transformational” approach the US pursued in going to war, in creating the CPA, and during most of 2004 and 2005. It did depend, however, on the success of Iraqi politics, on the ability of the new Iraqi government to find a workable compromise between major factions, on its ability to revise the constitution to be acceptable to all such factions, and on the success of the Iraqi force development effort.
The US has continued to try to implement this policy for nearly a year with one major change. The growing ethnic and sectarian tensions in Iraq have led the US to focus more and more on ethnic and sectarian violence as the primary threat to stability and security in Iraq. This change in policy has not been addressed in detail in Presidential speeches, but it is clearly outlined in the Department of Defense quarterly report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 20063. This document stated US policy was still based on the same eight pillars in the President's original strategy:
It also made it clear, however, that US operations were focused more on political unity, governance, and eliminating civil violence than defeating the insurgency per se. The counter insurgency focus of "win, hold, build" had been altered to one of "isolate, engage, and build4:"
With the seating of its constitutional government in June 2006, Iraq had completed all the milestones required under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546. As a result, the focus of US policy was now to support the new Iraqi government. The political focus of US actions was5:
This strategy was designed to support rounds out the National Development Strategy (2005-2007) of the new Government of Iraq, whose national economic objectives were to strengthen the foundations of economic growth; revitalize the private sector, improve the quality of life, and strengthen good governance and security.
The security focus of US policy was to work with its Coalition partners, and the Government of Iraq to achieve objectives that include7:
There is no way to be certain how much better the present situation would be if the US had begun with such a strategy, or if it had begun its invasion of Iraq with the plans and resources to preserve as many existing Iraqi capabilities as possible and encourage Iraqis to take the lead in the areas where new capabilities were needed. US efforts to implement this strategy have come late in terms of organization, staffing, resources, and coherence. As a result, success virtually had to be uncertain at the ideological, political, security, and economic levels. Iraq may plunge into civil war, divide, or simply fail to emerge as a strong and viable state that meets its peoples’ needs.
It may well be that much of the tragedy that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein could have been avoided, although no one can ever be sure. The sheer scale of the task of reshaping a nation of some 27 million people in a divided state after decades of dictatorship, war, and economic mismanagement may well have been beyond US capability even if it had chosen such a strategy to begin with, committed the necessary resources, and chosen to work closely with every faction in Iraq.
What is clear is that time and experience have forced the US to focus on the development of local forces and capabilities, and that this is a serious warning about how the US should shape its strategy and military interventions in the future. The US found in practice that only a strategy that could allow it to remove most or all of its forces from Iraq within a few years, produce some kind of victory, and solve America’s immediate problem of “overstretch” on a timely basis, was to create a mix of Iraqi forces and Iraqi governance that could relieve the burden on the US, and support this effort with added economic aid.
Moreover, the US has found that it cannot not hope for any kind of victory until it is clear that the Iraqi government has created both a far more stable political structure for Iraq and a far more effective government. The US cannot hope for victory until Iraq has a suitable mix of military, police, and legal forces in the field. It cannot hope for victory without maintaining major military advisory and aid efforts, providing continuing support from US heavy and special forces, and eventually reshaping Iraqi military capabilities to deter and defend against Iraq’s neighbors. Even under the best conditions, the US has found that it does not face “tipping points” in Iraq. It faces “tipping years.”
This helps explain why American policy within Iraq has increasingly focused on pressuring the Maliki government to find some viable compromise between Iraq’s three main factions: Sunni Arab, Shi’ite Arab, and Kurd. This focus is supported by an ongoing effort to persuade the new government to make major improvements in its actual presence and quality of governance at the national, provincial, and local levels; by an effort to get the government to clarify the 50 some areas in the constitution left for action by the new government; and by an effort to create effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces to bring stability and security to Iraq, and to allow the US and its Coalition allies to withdraw most of their military forces.
US policy is to create a mix of Iraqi regular military, Ministry of the Interior Security forces, and police that can replace US and other Coalition forces in defeating the insurgency, and bring day-to-day security to ordinary Iraqis. US policy is to support these efforts with effective court and criminal justice systems with an effective presence by local government that provides political and economic support to the security effort.
The levels of Iraqi forces the US had helped create as of early September 2006 included nearly 300,000 men. These included 129,000 Iraqis in the military (127,200 army, 700 air force and 1,100 navy) and 165,100 in the Ministry of the Interior (115,500 police, 24,400 national police, and 25,200 in other MOI forces8).
Approximately 84% of the objective end-strength of MOD forces had been trained and equipped, while more than 92% of authorized Iraqi Army battalions had been generated. Remaining train-and-equip efforts now focused on building combat support and combat service support forces. Many Iraqi units were able to take the lead in combat operations against the insurgency and to assume security lead in their territory.
The number of counter-insurgency operations conducted independently by Iraqi forces as a percentage of total combat operations continued to increase steadily. Approximately one-third of the company-sized operations in Iraq were conducted independently by Iraqi forces. There were 85 Iraqi Army battalions (5 divisions, 25 brigades) that have assumed the lead for counter-insurgency operations, a 35% increase since May 20069.
All 27 National Police battalions were conducting counter-insurgency operations, and 2 National Police battalions had the security lead for their areas of responsibility. Transition. Iraq achieved a historic milestone on July 13, 2006, with the transfer of security responsibility in Muthanna Province from MNF-I to the Provincial Governor and the civilian-controlled Iraqi Police Service (IPS). Moreover, since May 2006, MNF-I has transferred an additional 10 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to the Government of Iraq. Forty-eight of 110 FOBs were under Iraqi control.
The Iraqi military force development effort had succeeded to the point where US plans call for the Iraqi government to officially take control of its major air, sea and land-based military commands beginning in early September by standing up the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. The Iraqi Ground Forces Command—the primary component for security operations—will stand up at the same time as the Iraqi Joint Headquarters and will gradually take control of the ten Iraqi Army (IA) divisions.
About a quarter of all security operations were conducted independently by Iraqi security forces (ISF) and over two-thirds were conducted by Coalition Forces (CF) in conjunction with Iraqi forces. Less than ten percent were conducted by CF alone.
It was clear, however, that Iraqi military forces would require extensive US military combat support for at least 12-18 more months and US air, transport, logistic, intelligence and advisory support for at least several years after that time. The Ministry of the Interior security forces still have elements that supported the Shi’ite militias and carried out “death squad” operations, as did some elements of the police.
The US advisory effort was just beginning to give the police the same attention as the military as part of the “year of the police.” The US was actively supporting an Iraqi “Quick Look” Plan as the first phase of a National Police Transformation Plan designed to help transition Iraq to civil security and self-reliance. This phase consisted of unit inspections and leader assessments conducted by Iraqi-led teams of Ministry of Interior and Coalition technical experts.
At the same time, the US had broadened the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns as part of a concerted effort to reduce ethnic and sectarian violence and the risk of civil war. As of September 2006, the key focus of this effort is to secure Baghdad, which has been the main site for both insurgent violence and civil strife. US policy recognized, however, that the insurgency had to be defeated throughout the country, and that the risk of separatism and civil strife in Mosul, Basra, and Kirkuk—and the country as whole—still had to be addressed by both political and military means.
US policy recognizes the importance of the economic dimension and of Iraq’s oil exports and energy resources. The US has, however, largely deferred additional aid and economic reform efforts, concentrating on the political and security dimensions and hoping that the momentum of existing aid programs will buy time.
The US has not advanced any new plan for either Iraqi reconstruction or economic reform, or for major US aid expenditures. It only provided a limited supplemental aid request for FY2007, and its declared policy seems to be that Iraq must increasingly assume responsibility for funding its own government and economic development efforts.
These policies partly result from a recognition that there is only so much that can be done while the nation is politically divided and at war, that the US Congress will not vote for massive new aid funds, and that the reports of the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) have revealed massive flaws in the existing aid effort10. The policies also, however, reflect the reality that unless the Iraqis and Iraqi government take far more responsibility for their fiscal affairs and Iraq’s economic development, outside efforts will be a wasteful failure.
At the same time, the US recognizes that high oil prices, the past flow of aid funds, and wartime expenditures have benefited only a small elite, and have led to massive and permeating corruption. US government agencies cannot even agree on a rough estimate of the current Iraqi GDP, and no one knows how many Iraqis are actually unemployed or underemployed.
The US claims that Iraq’s economy is improving and that per capita incomes are rising, in its quarterly reports to the Congress on Iraq. In reality, however, the CIA estimates that some 95% of Iraq’s export and foreign exchange earnings come from its oil exports, that its GDP ranges from $94.1 billion in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms to $46.5 billion at the official exchange rate, and that its economic growth continues to deteriorate at a rate of at least 3% a year (2005)11. The present Iraqi economy cannot support even the present government budget, and US experts feel that the initial World Bank estimates that Iraq would require some $100 billion in reconstruction funds represent significantly less than one-third of Iraq’s actual needs.
Equally critically, the CIA recognizes that national unemployment is at least 25%, and may well range from 30% to 60%, depending on the province involved12. This is a critical problem for a nation of some 27 million people, with a labor force of at least 7.4 million13. To put this in perspective, the US claims its current aid efforts have only created some 90,000 to 120,000 Iraqi jobs.
As for energy, the US really does not have a policy towards Iraq’s energy development. Its current efforts are patchwork efforts to maintain current exports and current export revenues, and the key planning studies necessary to determine even how much Iraq’s oil fields and infrastructure have suffered since the Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War of 1991, UN sanctions, and the 2003 invasion are still underway.
The lack of any clear energy development policy is critical for Iraq’s future. The Energy Information Agency (EIA) of the US Department of Energy reports that Iraq earned an estimated $23.4 billion in oil export revenues during 2005, more than twice the $9.8 billion that it earned in 2003, although without any increase in export capacity14. The EIA projects that Iraq's oil export earnings will increase only slightly in 2006, to around $25 billion, and then fall in 2007 (to $23.7 billion) on slightly lower oil prices15.
The EIA also notes, however, that Iraqi oil export revenue projections are complicated by high levels of uncertainty regarding future Iraqi oil exports, ongoing instability and violence that discourages contractors from making needed repairs, and continuing attacks on oil infrastructure. Iraq’s operating oilfields are being badly overproduced, and the EIA reports that Iraq is having major problems with water cuts, especially in the south, and with the use of short-term techniques that are not generally considered acceptable in the oil industry (i.e. the injection of refined oil products into crude reservoirs). UN oil experts have estimated that some reservoirs in southern Iraq have been so badly managed that their ultimate recovery rates might be only 15-25 percent, well below the 35-60 percent usually seen in the oil industry16.
Iraq’s export facilities have suffered major damage as a result of the insurgency. Between April 2003 and June 2006, there were an estimated 315 attacks on Iraq’s energy infrastructure, including the country's 4,350-mile-long pipeline system and 11,000-mile-long power grid. Iraq’s terminals in the Gulf are still under repair, and it no longer has access to Kuwaiti and Saudi pipelines17.
All sides in the US policy debate at least privately recognize that Iraq’s future prospects are uncertain, and that there is a serious risk of a major civil conflict, partition, or divisive ethnic and sectarian federalism. They also recognize that the US can influence the situation, but that the outcome will be determined by Iraqi politics and is not under US control.
US policy will increasingly depend on how well Iraqi political leaders and Iraqi forces do in meeting the challenges they face. If conditions improve, much of the political pressure on the Bush Administration and continued US efforts in Iraq will ease, and the partisan debate is likely to shift back to how best to support Iraq and not on whether to support it or withdraw. If the political and/or security situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the Bush Administration will steadily lose political support even in the Republican Party. Even President Bush has made it clear that US support is contingent on the success of Iraqi political leaders in forging a political compromise and establishing effective governance18. The worst case for US policy is a forced withdrawal in the face of a major civil war. The best case is years of future effort and a major US presence through at least 2009-2011.
1. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, White House, November 30, 2005. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html.
2. “Executive Summary,” National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, White House, November 30, 2005. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html.
3. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006, Report to Congress on measuring stability and security in Iraq submitted pursuant to Section 9010 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006, Public Law 109-148, p. 2.
4. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006, p. 4.
5. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006, p. 5.
6. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006, p. 14.
7. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006, p. 25
8. US State Department, Iraq Weekly Status Report, August 30, 2006, p. 10, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/2006/c18335.htm.
9. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006, p. 4.
10.For the reports involved, see the SIGIR home page on the web: http://www.sigir.mil/.
11. See CIA, World Factbook, 2006, “Iraq,” https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html.
12. The EIA estimates unemployment at (27-40 percent). http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iraq/Background.html. The figure is 60-70% in some high threat areas like western Iraq.
13. See CIA, World Factbook, 2006, “Iraq,” https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html.
14. These figures overstate Iraq’s net revenues since EIA does not take into account the amount of money – over $2 billion per year - spent on refined oil products the country is forced to import.)
15. Adapted from EIA Country Reports, “OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/OPEC_Revenues/OPEC.html, accessed September 2, 2006.
16. Adapted from EIA Country Reports, “Iraq,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iraq/Background.html, accessed September 2, 2006.
17. Adapted from EIA Country Reports, “Iraq,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iraq/Background.html, accessed September 2, 2006.
18. Speech to Veterans of Foreign Wars, August 28, 2006.
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