The changing nature of the conflict in Iraq, discussed in a previous article, has frustrated the Bush administration’s efforts to stabilize the country and disentangle the United States from an increasingly unpopular and burdensome conflict. The search for a new approach, however, remains elusive, with domestic political considerations and international realities making it very difficult for the administration to change its policy in a decisive fashion. While alternative options are being debated in policy circles and there is an ongoing debate within the administration about what to do, the official policy remains unchanged.
Confronted with a deteriorating situation, President Bush has emphasized his determination to stay the course. Yet, the setbacks are likely to force a change, de facto if not officially. The death toll is Baghdad remains at a record high, despite a major campaign to reassert control over the capital launched in early August. One of the most respected Marine intelligence analysts has issued a report stating that the US military has lost control over Anbar province. Some Shia parties, above all SCIRI （Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq）, are trying to enact legislation that will make it possible to set up an autonomous Shia region, a move strongly opposed by the United States because it would lead to the de facto partitioning of Iraq. Such major setbacks make Bush’s determination to stay the course a meaningless policy. Changes are bound to be implemented sooner rather than later.
The choices made by American voters in the November mid-term elections may put more pressure on the administration to modify its Iraq policy. If the Democratic Party regains control of both chambers of Congress, the pressure on President George W. Bush to modify his policy will increase. Growing concern about the war may well lead to that outcome. For months now, U.S. citizens have turned against the war. The majority is now convinced that the intervention in Iraq was not worth the cost in human lives seen thus far. The public’s perception of President Bush has also turned negative, with a majority judging his performance to be unsatisfactory. However, polls taken after the fifth anniversary of the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York suggest that the occasion has allowed the president to regain some approval by linking the war in Iraq to the war on terrorism. In the numerous speeches he delivered on or around September 11, Bush argued that the war in Iraq is integral part of the war on terrorism, and that the United States must persevere in Iraq because if it does not fight terrorists there it will have to fight them in the United States.
Although numerous reports by American governmental agencies have now admitted that there were no links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations, the president has apparently succeeded in convincing at least some Americans that Iraq is part of the broader war on terrorism. Polls taken in mid-September show the president’s approval ratings increasing from 34 percent in mid-August to 39 percent in mid-September. The percentage of Americans who believe that the war in Iraq is worth the loss of lives also increased from 42 percent to 48 percent in the same period. It is impossible to know whether the impact of the speeches linking the war in Iraq to the war on terrorism will fade in the coming weeks. It is clear, however, that an embattled president, struggling to shore up the Republican Party in mid-term elections in which the Democratic Party might regain the majority in Congress, has now option but continuing to show the determination to stay the course in Iraq: having declared that the war in Iraq is part of an existential struggle against terrorism, he cannot be seen as backing down from that confrontation.
The official policy was outlined in the national strategy for victory in Iraq of November 30, 2005, entitled Victory in Iraq. The highly optimistic document restated U.S. commitment to rebuilding Iraq as a democratic state. According to the strategy, that goal is attainable despite the present difficulties, as long as the United States maintains its commitment and is clear about its short, medium and long term goals. Even in the most difficult short term phase, Victory in Iraq proclaims, the United States has made steady progress in reaching political milestones such as the holding of elections and the adoption of a new constitution. In the long term, success in Iraq depends on progress on three tracks. The political track requires the formation of a broad-based government that can isolate the enemy from those willing to participate in the process, keep the door open for those willing to abandon violence, and build strong pluralistic institutions. The security track involves a joint Iraqi-American effort to clear areas of insurgents; hold the cleared areas free of insurgent activity; and finally build Iraqi security forces so they can keep the country secure on their own. The security track also involves the strengthening of local institutions and civil society groups so they can deliver essential services, restoring normal lives. Finally, the economic track involves restoring infrastructure, reforming the economy, and building the capacity of Iraqi economic institutions. All elements of the strategy, the document states, are mutually reinforcing.
Such a comprehensive strategy has proven to be beyond the capacity of the Iraqi and U.S. governments and security forces to implement. In practice, the policies are far from comprehensive. The economic reconstruction program has practically ground to a halt. The money originally allocated for reconstruction has now been either spent or obligated to specific projects and the administration has not asked Congress for more. The $18 billion originally allocated for reconstruction, furthermore, has had limited impact. This was due in part to mismanagement and poor choice of projects, as reported by a July 2005 study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, and in part to the extraordinary expense of maintaining security on work sites and installations. Lack of security and an ineffective reconstruction program have left Iraq in difficult economic conditions, with extremely high unemployment rates, unimproved infrastructure, intermittent electricity supplies, and continuing poor access to clean water and sanitation. Without entering into details that go beyond the scope of this paper, it will suffice to say that the economic situation in Iraq does nothing to underpin the Victory in Iraq strategy.
On the security front, the strategy also exceeds the capacity of U.S. and Iraqi forces. Insufficient numbers of U.S. troops; insufficient numbers, poor training and equipment of the members of the new Iraqi army; and the unreliability of a police force, which has been infiltrated by political movements and transformed into a conglomeration of sectarian militias, have combined to defeat the strategy. U.S. troops, with the help of the Iraqis, have demonstrated repeatedly their capacity to clear a town or an area of insurgents. They are then faced with the dilemma whether to continue holding the area or going on to uproot insurgents elsewhere—there are not enough troops to do both. They usually do the latter, knowing that insurgents will return after they move on. The insufficiency of troops has become even more evident since the launching of the operation to re-establish some security in militia-ridden Baghdad. A few neighborhoods have been stabilized, but others remain as unsafe as ever. Furthermore, the greater concentration of troops in Baghdad has left some parts of the country even more vulnerable to insurgent attacks.
On the political front, since the elections of December 2005, the United States has tried to implement all the components of the strategy, but does not have much to show for it. It has tried to isolate Sunni extremists by putting pressure on Shia and Kurdish leaders to include Sunnis in the cabinet, and it has convinced many Sunni politicians to participate in the process. As a result, there are more Sunnis in the government, but this has not brought about reconciliation among Iraq’s sectarian parties nor has it isolated the insurgents from popular support.
The goal of coaxing Sunnis who had remained outside the political process into joining has also had little success. While Prime Minister Maliki has offered amnesty to groups that renounce violence and return to politics, only some insignificant groups have responded. Finally, the goal of building strong, pluralistic institutions is being stymied by instability and sectarian divisions that tend to transform any government agency or office into either a battleground or the stronghold of a particular group.
While officially still committed to the Victory in Iraq strategy, the Bush administration has quietly been refocusing on only a part of the agenda. Furthermore, there are indications that a discussion is taking place within the administration about what to do, since few now believe that the strategy outlined in late 2005 can work.
Three goals have absorbed the attention of U.S. military commanders and of the U.S. ambassador in Iraq. The first is to continue training the Iraqi army. The second is to restore a modicum of stability in Baghdad. The third is to prevent the splitting of Iraq into regions. A distant fourth, more discussed than acted upon, is the disarming of at least some of the militias and the parallel build-up of a national, non-partisan police force.
The training of the Iraqi military continues to have the highest priority for the United States because as Iraqi forces grow in number and capacity the United States should be able to withdraw its troops. The training has been plagued by technical and above all political difficulties. Training was originally plagued by poor implementation coupled with high desertion rates of newly trained troops. Some of the initial training problems have been overcome, but the process is slow and most Iraqi units still only perform well when American officers and men are embedded with the units. Even the most optimistic estimates foresee that it will take years for the Iraqi forces to gain the capacity to perform on their own, relying on their own logistics. The political problems are more intractable, however. The first is that the Iraqi army is still not truly national, but overwhelmingly Kurdish and Shia. Furthermore, it cannot operate all over the territory. The Kurdish regional government has enacted a law that forbids the deployment of anything but Kurdish troops in Kurdistan. And a fundamental question remains unanswered, namely whether a cohesive Iraqi army that gives its allegiance to Iraqi state really exists or whether the army would split into sectarian segments in a confrontation—for example, if an attempt was made to use it to disarm militias.
The security of Baghdad is also now a priority. This is quite understandable. First, Baghdad is home to one-fourth the country’s population. Second, control of the capital city is essential for any government that wants to establish its claim to legitimacy and effectiveness. Third, because of its mixed population, Baghdad has been at the very center of the incipient civil war in the country. Killings in Baghdad have an unmistakable sectarian character, with both Shia and Sunni militias deliberately slaughtering en masse members of the opposite confessional group and destroying their mosques. The focus on restoring Baghdad’s security, even at the cost of pulling troops from areas that are at the center of insurgent activity, demonstrates to what extent the United States has come to see civil war as a greater threat to Iraq than the Sunni insurgency.
The third goal prioritized by the administration is the preservation of the unity of Iraq. This puts the U.S. directly at odds with the vision of Iraq embodied in the constitution—an extremely weak federation where the central government has minimum power, existing provinces have the right to join together into larger regions whose laws override the constitution, and revenue from new oil fields would go directly to the regions. But Washington wants a strong central government instead—one able to keep the country together, disarm militias and keep Iraq firmly in the U.S. orbit. Washington has been encouraging Iraqi politicians to amend the constitution or, at the very least, to postpone the enactment of the legislation needed to set up a formal process by which the regions would be set up and formalized. Furthermore, it is Washington’s firm conviction that all oil revenue, from old and new fields alike, should go to the central government first, to be distributed in an equitable way among the regions. The U.S. position reflects two concerns: first, that the formation of regions enjoying as much autonomy as Kurdistan would facilitate interference by Iraq’s neighbors and, in particular, magnify the influence of Iran in the Shia areas; and second, that regional control of oil revenue would starve out the oil-poor Sunni areas, fueling the insurgency. The latter problem may be ameliorated in the future by the exploitation of the large gas deposits known to exist in those regions—but that does not solve the immediate problem.
So far, the steps taken by the United States to prevent the implementation of the extreme form of federalism called for by the constitution have fallen within the boundaries of what is constitutionally permissible. In particular, before the referendum of October 2005, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad convinced Shia and Kurdish lawmakers to write into the constitution provisions that would allow a quick amendment process for a few months after the election of the new parliament. These provisions aim at increasing Sunni support for the constitution, but also give the United States a second chance at influencing the constitution-making process and increasing the powers of the central government. The process of amending the constitution, however, has not even started nine months after the elections of the new parliament, and perhaps will never take place. This will leave the United States in the difficult position of opposing the vision of Iraq embodied in the constitution.
The question being raised with increased frequency—and a topic of persistent rumors in Baghdad—is how far the U.S. government may go in order to keep the country together and the central government strong. Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki has come under criticism by members of the Bush administration for not being assertive and for not moving forcefully to disband militias, especially the Mahdi Army led by radical Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr. Maliki still has some defenders in Washington, who recognize that it is difficult for the head of a fragile coalition of confessional and ethnic political parties to move forcefully against organizations that are part of the coalition. Nevertheless, the signs of unease in the Bush administration with Maliki’s performance have raised speculation whether Washington might try to engineer a leadership change. In Baghdad, the speculation centers on the possibility of the formation of a new “national salvation” government. This is only a rumor, but its persistence shows both doubts about the present government’s effectiveness and the desire for alternatives.
While the Bush administration does not admit to searching for a new policy, other groups are openly discussing alternative policies, because they have come to believe that the Victory in Iraq strategy has already failed. Proposed policies fall into three broad categories, each with several variants. The first category consists of various proposals for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The second category includes solutions based on the de facto partition of Iraq. The third category includes proposals to limit the efforts in Iraq to the promotion of stability, abandoning the broader program of democratization and economic transformation. A fourth theoretically conceivable option, namely to increase the number of U.S. troops and stabilize Iraq by military means, is not seriously suggested by any well-informed political analysts: the U.S. military is already overstretched, and posting a larger number of troops in Iraq for an indefinite period of time would require a rapid increase in the size of the U.S. army and possibly the reintroduction of the draft—a possibility nobody is willing to consider at present.
Withdrawal strategies are based on the assumption that the U.S. cannot stop the deterioration of the situation in Iraq and that it risks becoming entangled in a civil war by remaining in the country. Since the number of troops cannot be increased, it is better to start withdrawing now than to wait until more lives have been lost. The idea is highly controversial. Opponents call it a cut-and-run option that would decrease U.S. prestige, leave a dangerous power vacuum in the region, and embolden the enemies of the United States, increasing the likelihood of terrorist attacks on American soil. Proponents of the policy argue that at some point withdrawal will be inevitable and that delay will only cost more lives. Furthermore, some argue, an early, phased withdrawal might even have a positive impact on Iraq by forcing squabbling politicians to set aside their differences and agree on a common policy, since they could no longer count on U.S. support and protection.
In the United States, the idea of withdrawal is highly divisive. It is anathema to the Bush administration, most of the Republican Party and the minority of the American public that still believes the Iraq war was and is worth the cost. It is defended by many members of the Democratic Party, some retired generals, and would be accepted by the majority of the American public, which is increasingly disenchanted with the war. Iraqis are equally divided on the issue. Withdrawal is a central demand of both Sunni and Shia radicals, so it would be welcome in those circles. It is not welcome by politicians who owe their political career to opportunities created by the formal democratic process set in motion by the United States and are afraid of losing their jobs, their influence and possibly their lives if the US umbrella is removed. Sunni politicians who have entered the formal political process at U.S. insistence feel particularly vulnerable because their grassroot support is limited. Shia politicians, who tend to be better rooted in their communities, are more ambivalent toward U.S. withdrawal. Kurdish parties do not oppose a U.S. withdrawal from the rest of Iraq, as long as they keep a presence in Kurdistan; such presence, they argue, would be beneficial to the United States because it would allow its military to maintain a presence in Iraq without becoming embroiled in combat or, worse, civil war; and it would be beneficial to Kurdistan because U.S. presence would be a deterrent against intervention in Kurdistan by other Iraqi groups as well as by Iran and Turkey.
Proposals to partition Iraq, or at least to accept the inevitability that it will divide into regions on the basis of ethnicity and religion, are also anathema to the Bush administration, as indicated earlier. Partitioning Iraq into independent countries has no supporters, but the division of Iraq into regions with a large degree of autonomy has some ardent advocates and is seen by others as an inevitable outcome. Kurds support regionalization virtually unanimously and will certainly not surrender the autonomy they have already achieved. Some Shia organizations, particularly SCIRI, have also come to embrace the point of view of the Kurds on regional autonomy. In general, however, Shias are much divided on this issue. Sunnis, including moderate Sunni politicians, have so far completely rejected regionalization and insist on unity, a somewhat paradoxical position since Sunnis are a minority in Iraq and, after the defeat of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’th Party, are unlikely to ever rule the country again. Foreign analysts who see regionalization as inevitable are divided on whether this would help stabilize Iraq or worsen the situation by encouraging civil war and ethnic cleansing in the various regions. The real problem with all regionalization proposals is that they are vague about crucial issues: if Iraq divides, where will the boundaries of the regions be? What will happen to the minorities in each region? And, above all, what will happen to Baghdad, which has a highly heterogeneous population and is all too likely to turn into even more of a battle ground than it is now if the country divides?
The most problematic proposals are those that suggest the United States should remain in Iraq, but reduce its goals to promoting stability. Such an idea is gaining traction in Washington among those who believe victory is impossible but are not ready to call for a pull-out. The problem with the idea of giving precedence to stability is that it is not clear what it means in practice. At one extreme, a “stability first” option could be little more than a watered-down version of the Victory in Iraq strategy: stabilization would still require not only military measures, but also political pacts and economic revival. A political process aiming only at stability, rather than at democracy as well, however, would be more flexible. For example, it could increase the power of some non-elected leaders, or make it easier to conclude pacts with tribal leaders and even former Ba’th party members without asking questions about their democratic credentials. At the other extreme, stability first could mean a drastic departure from what the United States has done so far. Focusing on stability at all costs could mean the search for a new “man-on-horseback” to rescue the country—a new Saddam Hussein friendlier to the US but hard on terrorists. In this context, the Bush administration’s concern about Maliki’s lack of firmness takes on a different meaning. Suggestions set forth by some European analysts that the “golden bridge” to stability in Iraq passes through the rehabilitation of the Ba’th party also fall at the radical end of a stability-first approach.
None of the suggested alternatives to the present policy has gained overwhelming support so far, especially not in the administration. But in the next few months, after the mid-term elections are over, the Bush administration will be forced to re-examine its Iraq policy. The alternative approaches outlined here, which cover the spectrum of what is being discussed unofficially, shows how limited, and ultimately unsatisfactory, the options are.
* Marina Ottaway is the Director of the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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