Iran’s nuclear program has evolved into a major challenge to international order with the onset of the twenty-first century. Thus far, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s （IAEA） failure to produce a mutually acceptable solution, the ascendance of extremist Mahmud Ahmadinejad, and the progress of Iran's nuclear program, have all rendered the search for a resolution more acute. The ongoing quagmire in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian and Lebanese crises （in which Iran exercises significant influence）, and the nuclearization of North Korea and its recent missile launchings, further signal the urgency of the issue.
Seeking a strategy to confront this challenge, the U.S., Europe and China—with all of their differences aside—employed various strategies to calm tensions, ranging from waving sticks to offering carrots, yet all to no avail. Failing to dissuade Iran from continuing its nuclear program, the IAEA transfered the Iranian dossier to the United Nations Security Council （March 2006）. In what may be viewed as a major shift in American policy, President Bush gave the green light （31 May） to try a more accommodating policy towards Iran. On 6 June 2006, the EU foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, met Iran's chief nuclear negotiator and Supreme National Security Council Secretary, ‘Ali Larijani, in Tehran to present a package. This package, agreed upon by the five permanent members of the Security Council （U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France） and Germany, requested a clear Iranian response prior to the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg （15-17 July）. Iran did not show any readiness to meet such a deadline, maintaining that its response should not be expected before the end of the next Iranian month （22 August）. On 12 July Larijani failed to deliver an Iranian answer during his meeting with Solana in Paris, prompting the Iranian file's return to the UN. Another chapter has been closed, and the issue continues to occupy world attention.
This paper examines the Iranian nuclear policy on the eve of the St. Petersburg summit. It begins by outlining the legacy of the past, and follows with an investigation of the difficulties involved in reaching an understanding at this delicate juncture. With the escalating tension on the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Hizballah front, the paper concludes with an attempt to point out the inter-relationships between these two issues.
Iran's aspiration for nuclear capabilities （purported for peaceful uses only） is not new. Already in the 1970s, the Shah entertained such ambitions, which were then not opposed by the West. The Iran-Iraq War, （1980-1988） Iraq's nuclear program （destroyed by an Israeli air-attack in 1981）, and the region's other nuclear possessors （Pakistan, India, Israel）, highlighted the need to advance this goal. The ambition of becoming the leading Muslim state similarly necessitated—in their eyes—"membership" in the exclusive club of countries with nuclear capabilities. The complications encountered by U.S. troops in Iraq and the fact that no "smoking gun" was found served as additional incentives. As oil prices sharply increased and shored up Iranian self-confiednce, the rising population growth compounded by the need to modernize the economy also encouraged such a policy. The American attack on Iraq added to the urge to gain nuclear power, so as to make Iran, similarly to North Korea, less susceptible to American military action, and not as vulnerable to its fury as was Iraq. The absence of an opposing united front has added to their perceived maneuvering space. For a long time, Europe remained by and large undetermined. Russia and China, both veto-wielding members of the Security Council with vital economic interests in Iran, seemed reluctant to pressure Iran. Although there were growing signs of the international community’s impatience with Iran's maneuvering tactics and explicit U.S. determination to assume a firmer policy vis-à-vis Iran, Tehran believed it could continue playing with time.
With this perceived leniency in mind, Iran insisted that uranium enrichment is its legitimate right. This is nearly a unanimous consensus in Iran, and was utilized as a national rallying point. Not solely the policy of the regime or a specific faction. While Iranians generally share this ambition, the conservative factions have always spoken more forcefully. Their mounting influence （since the early 2000s） increased the harshness of their tone, reaching new peaks with the election of Ahmadinejad. Yet, as in other realms of policy, Iranians did not speak unequivocally. Their statements often reflected ambiguity, double-talk, and even, as its officials admitted, not being always faithful to the truth.
By early 2004 there were growing signs of European annoyance （mainly France, Germany, and the UK）, attributed to Iran's failure to adhere to its own commitments. The EU attitude seemingly converged with that of the U.S., and it expressed regret that Iran's implementation of its commitment to temporarily suspend enrichment fell "significantly short" of their expectations. In March 2005, Washington offered various incentives to Iran—a willingness to drop its veto of Iran's candidacy for the World Trade Organization and allowing it to purchase spare parts for civilian airplanes—in return for suspension of its nuclear program. Yet, Iran assessed that the offer fell far short of "confidence building" measures. Thus, even if some sign of change in the political atmosphere became evident, the gap between the two sides still remained wide.
For both Iran and the U.S., a demonstration of dramatic policy change remained complex. The advisability of conducting direct talks was raised occasionally in both Tehran and Washington, but failed to produce meaningful results. In fact, a colossal wall of mistrust persisted between the two governments, making such attempts extremely intricate. Given that the termination of Iranian-U.S. relations emerged as a central symbol of the revolution, engaging in dialogue could signify a retreat from a major dogmatic principle, representing an open admission of failure. For its part, the U.S. could not retreat from its opposition to Iran's nuclearization, nor could it ignore the links between the nuclear dossier, the Iraqi scene and Iran's involvement on the Israel-Arab front.
Since early 2006, the U.S. seemed determined to put an end to Iran's nuclear saga. While allowing the IAEA to exhaust its efforts, the U.S. endeavored to create a European front to support its stance and neutralize likely opposition from Russia and China. Simultaneously, Iran bought time in order to both prevent this opposing united front and to avoid its referral to the Security Council. Upon the realization that the EU was close to adopting an anti-Iranian stance, Iran vied to gain the support of other powers—namely Russia and China. As long as the issue was handled by the IAEA, Iran felt immune to actual sanctions. Yet, the IAEA decision to report the issue to the Security Council raised some concern in Iran, especially after the U.S. managed to make some headways with Russia and China. Finally, on 8 March, the IAEA governors decided to report the Iranian nuclear file to the Security Council. That China and Russia supported the resolution was an especially unpleasant surprise for Tehran. At this stage, support for milder policy was discernible among some Iranians; this included criticism of nuclear politics, the conduct of the negotiating team, and—even if implicitly only—the president’s conduct. Yet, enjoying Khamene'i's support, Ahmadinejad seemed to represent the Iranian policy. The name of their game was clear: to gain time.
While it was presumably not in Iran's best interest to attract the world's attention to its extremism when aiming to gain time, Ahmadinejad took every opportunity to voice extremist views against the West, the U.S., and Israel, as well as leading a confrontational line on the nuclear program. As his statements and the motivations behind them have been examined widely, the question arises: since Ahmadinejad is by no means the effectual head of the state, why is he permitted to continue making such statements?
The following arguments may join to explain this:
Still, whether just to demonstrate good intentions or for sincere wish for meaningful negotiations, a dialogue could serve American interests.
First, it is important for the U.S. to take the initiative, set the timeframe, and dictate the rules of the game. Second, given the domestic and foreign circumstances, no decisive action against Iran can be taken without first exhausting diplomacy and political channels. Russia, China, Europe, and even domestic public opinion would oppose firm action before a serious diplomatic effort. Yet, since Iran is expected to exploit any dialogue to gain more time, it is essential for Washington to give Iran "tests" that can be easily verified （whether or not they fulfill their pledges）, and to make sure that Iran's answers are clear, unequivocal, and on time. As it was expected, Iran denied Washington the satisfaction of receiving answers before the G-8 summit. When forced to respond, it may avoid giving a simple “yes” or “no” answer.
With all of the fanfare and self-confidence on both sides, both Iran and the U.S. entered this new phase from a position of weakness. For the U.S., the difficulties in Iraq, the Administration’s deteriorating popularity at home and abroad, and the fact that major foreign or domestic support for action against Iran is lacking, all aid in the difficulty situation. Iran is also confronted by formidable obstacles. There is certainly a growing worldwide concern about its nuclearization, and Ahmadinejad’s radical statements only fuel this. While some powers may appear more supportive of Iran, none of them, including Russia, really want to see a nuclear Iran. Additionally, Iranians are concerned that President Bush, either motivated by ideology, strategic calculations, or a personal commitment and distaste of Iranian politics, will take actions against Iran before he leaves the White House.
It was under these circumstances that, on 6 June 2006, European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana met 'Ali Larijani in Tehran to present Iran the aforementioned package.
Complete details of the package have not been disclosed, but from what has become public knowledge, the magnitude of the offer and its ramifications for Iran’s economy are far-reaching. It entails assistance in facilitating Iran’s nuclear energy industry, including one light water reactor and a guarantee to supply uranium fuel on a long term basis. It also includes various trade deals, technology transfers, and backing for Iranian membership in the WTO with the option to buy Airbus and Boeing airliners. Most significantly, the U.S. has offered bilateral talks, and agreed to omit any language that suggests or condones the possibility of military action in the face of Iran’s refusal to acquiesce. The “sticks” remained more obscure. Other than the threat of sanctions and issuing travel bans for Iranian diplomats, a coherent stance has not been vocalized. Solana has asserted that rejecting the offer would signal Iran’s search for a level of enrichment that might be called “a nuclear-weapon type of enrichment.” （RFE/RL, 2 & 6 June 2006）.
Although Larijani initially expressed optimism, so far, the main “dialogue” so far has been over the deadline for Iran’s response. Some indications calling for a softening of Iran’s hard-line stance were discernible. Ahmadinejad himself even anticipated that a deal may be possible （CSM, 5 June） and implied that his country was considering the proposal the “offering of this package as a step forward" （NYT, 17 June 2006）. Yet, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said （9 July） that Iran does not intend to give any response to the proposal prior to the G-8 summit, warning that any decisions made during the summit which may be immature or incomprehensive “can harm the positive trend of talks.” He urged against taking steps that may “disturb current positive atmosphere” （IRNA, 9 July）. Larijani added that there was no reason to be pessimistic, but setting time limits undermine mutual confidence （AP, 7 July）. Throughout this time, the Iranians have not signaled readiness to give up enrichment, insisting on conducting negotiations without pre-conditions and stressing their “legitimate rights” to a nuclear program. Khamene’i expressed the sternest rejection of the package. Iran, he pledged, “will not bend to these pressures” （The Telegraph, 16 June 2006）, adding that talks with the U.S. would be of no benefit to Iran （RFE/RL, 7 July 2006）. Finally, in his meeting with Solana （11 July）, Larijani avoided providing any “clear and definitive” response to the package prior to the G-8 summit （Kayhan, 15 July 2006）, urging Europe to show more patience. "We must be patient. We must build confidence. Negotiations can be a win-win situation" （IRNA, 12 July 2006）.
The world powers officially declared their loss of patience with Iran on 12 July with their decision to refer Iran’s nuclear dossier back to the Security Council for possible punishment or coercion. They maintain that the Iranians were awarded ample time to indicate a willingness to move forward with negotiations, yet they have not risen to the occasion. Debate on this issue in the Security Council could begin instantly. Still, Tehran may choose to resume negotiations and accept the package. The ‘carrots’ have thus far not proven to be enticing enough for Tehran, and the ‘sticks’ are still difficult to employ. Precious months have passed by and progress has not been made. This, in itself, is another victory for Iran.
As the deadline for the Iranian response approached, there was an escalation between Israel and both Hamas and Hizballah. A Hamas attack inside Israel on 25 June led to Israeli casualties and kidnapping of an Israeli soldier, provoking a severe escalation on the Palestinian front. On 12 July, the day the Iranian file was returned to the Security Council and in anticipation of the G-8 Summit, a Hizballah attack inside the Israeli northern border led to the killing of eight Israeli soldiers and the kidnapping of two. Since then, a major confrontation has ensued, which is still going on. Although it is premature to examine the exact inter-connection between the Iranian nuclear dossier and the escalation on Israeli borders, a few tentative points can be stated with some assertion, surpassing simple coincidence in timetables. The Iranian record in relations with the Hizballah, its motivations to escalating the conflict and evidence on the ground, suggest some links between the two “fronts”:
While Iran seems eager to pour oil onto the Israeli-Arab fire, it may also have its own reasons to play low profile, and even to prevent the escalation from getting out of control. In fact, During Friday sermons and in media coverage, Tehran sounded more guarded than could be expected. With its nuclear dispute unresolved, and the risk of confrontation with the U.S. still looming, Iran can ill afford to play an open and active role in the escalating crisis. Finally, being in the eye of the storm, deeply involved in Iraq, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon and—no less important—the nuclear program, Iran may have good reason for concern lest its involvement in Lebanon encourage the U.S. and its allies to take harsh steps against it. Therefore, similarly to their position in Iraq, the Iranians seem to be inciting tempers but preferring its involvement to not to be public and open.
Clearly, the Lebanese tension helped diverting opinion from the Iranian nuclear issue during the G-8 Summit. Typical to Iranian tactics, while refusing to meet the deadline on the nuclear front, Iran surprised the world by expressing optimism that the package may still be a good basis for agreement. Similarly, on the Lebanese front, having instigated the tension and supported the Hizballah all along, they some leading figures now call for reduction of violence. Faithful to their modus-operandi, while they close a door, they open a window; while advancing radical policy, they often use mild language. Until now, however, Iran’s determination to advance its nuclear program remains firm, and so is their support for the Hizballah.
JIME Center. All rights reserved.