Since coming to power in 1979, the Islamic regime in Iran has perceived
the United States as the "Great Satan." This animosity remained one of
the revolution's most forceful symbols, raised to almost an article of
faith. Washington is viewed as the symbol of arrogance, the prime cause
of all evils in the world and the main source of the misery of the
Muslim world in general and the Iranian people in particular. The US,
on its part, viewed the Islamic regime as the main source of
anti-Americanism, and a major pillar in its list of "axis of evil."
Still, the two countries seemed to have some shared interests, such as
in Afghanistan and, to a degree, also in Iraq. Oddly, Iran's stance in
the region has benefited significantly from American "services." In
1991, the US shattered the power of Iraq-Iran's enemy to the west; in
2002 it destroyed the Taliban regime-its enemy to the east; and in 2003
it removed Saddam Husayn-Iran's major foe.
The advisability of conducting direct talks to resolve their giant disparity has been raised occasionally in both countries. Some contacts were made as a matter of course (i.e., in The Hague international court; through interest section in foreign embassies), arms deals were also made (Iran-Contra) and understandings were reached (regarding Afghanistan and probably Iraq). A measure of change in bilateral atmosphere has been noticed after Khomeini's death in 1989, reaching peak following Khatami's election in 1997. Just prior to the fall of Baghdad, Rafsanjani went as far as to claim, that relation with the US is not a strategic or religious question, but a tactical and political one-and therefore can be reversed by the government. "Our ideology is flexible," he then reminded his fellow Iranians (Rahbord, 27, Spring 2003). Still, no significant change has been registered in their official "relations" since they were cut in 1980.
Previous initiatives to mitigate tension have failed to produce any meaningful result and animosity prevailed. In January 2002 President Bush explicitly included Iran in his "axis of evil." More recently, the Iranian nuclear program and Ahmadinejad's harsh tone, further heated the atmosphere. His statements about "world without America" and his harsh tone regarding the US prevailed, further heating the atmosphere. Some reformists wished for change, but lacked the power to lead their preferred policy. Conservatives, led by Ayatollah Khamene'i could make such a bold step, but did not approve such a move. The issue was imbued with ideological rejection and deep anti-American sentiment and was rooted in mistrust, rather than in logic and practical calculations.
Emotions and misconceptions have also characterized the American approach. Khomeini's zealous anti-American stance, the hostage crisis (1979-1981), the Iran-Contra affair (1985-1986) and Iran's regional politic, deeply hurt American feelings-much more than Iranians could have perceived.
The political and cultural differences between the two countries also made it difficult for Washington to comprehend Iran's revolutionary rhetoric and its blurred and inconsistent policies. On its part, the US also seemed to have sent mixed signals to Iran-from the hostility upon the fall of the Shah to the Iran-Contra arm deals (mid-1980s); from its "dual containment" policy to the concurrent expansion of economic ties (early 1990s); from harsh criticism following September 11, to mutual understanding regarding Afghanistan. In fact, the recent news about a possible dialogue came just after President Bush reiterated that Iran was part of an "Axis of Evil," Secretary of State Rice termed it the "central banker of terrorism," and its UN ambassador, John Bolton, warned of a threat from Iran akin to September 11th "with nuclear weapons." Interestingly, the American endorsement of dialogue came on the day that Iran was officially described in a new American national security document as the single most important obstacle to American goals (Times, 17 March 2006). Still, the two countries could not ignore each other-the US is a significant force now stationed on Iran's both east and west (with influence all over its borders), and Iran is an important and active player in the Middle East in general and in the Gulf in particular.
Thus, when on 16 March, 'Abd al-'Aziz Hakim (Leader of Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq; SCIRI), offered a dialogue between them regarding Iraq, Tehran and subsequently the US complied (even though Iran rejected previous such calls not long ago). Given their huge differences and the recent rhetoric between them, such talks-if and when they take place-could well amount to a dialogue of the deaf. The US would find it extremely difficult to give a green light for Iranian nuclear program, and Iran could not go too far in "assisting" the US in Iraq. Still, their acceptance to engage in dialogue is important in itself. After all, they seem to have some common interests in Iraq that could be better serve by mutual understandings. Finally, one can not avoid the feeling, that both sides responded positively to the call to negotiate directly because of their respective sense of weakness-the US, because of its growing difficulties in Iraq; Iran, because of the IAEA decision to report its nuclear file to the UN.
Both Iran and the US wish to prevent disorder in Iraq getting out of control. For both, al-Hakim, with his firm ties with Iran and the US, is an ideal mediator. With the American facing difficulties to stabilize the Iraqi government, and Iran facing growing pressure on the nuclear issue, direct talk may serve both countries. If taken place, they could expand to cover other areas of mutual interest.
Iraq is of intense importance for Iran and it could gain much from stabilization there. While Iran is pleased to see the US complicated there, it is not unaware of the liability of perpetual civil war there. United Iraq remains Iran's main goal. Civil war in Iraq could also lead to insurgents slipping over into its territory. Iran, thus, wishes to see the US forces withdraw from Iraq, but not at the expense of instability and chaos. On the other hand, it does not want a too strong Iraq that could pose a threat to Iran in the future.
Tehran may have believed that the situation in Iraq gave it certain leverage in dealing with the US also on the nuclear issue. Iran wants the US to cease pushing hard on its program, but no less than that-to regain the support of Russia and China and key European states. Thus, as its case comes before the Security Council, it has an incentive to portray itself as a responsible geopolitical actor. Entering direct negotiations with the US, and even the mere approval of such a move, can be instrumental in advancing such an aim. In fact, the indications of intent to negotiate with the US contained a significant signal to them-that Iran has other options. This could divert international pressure over its nuclear program, reduce the pressure on Iran and earn it more time-the most precious commodity for Iran at this stage.
Iranians also seem concerned about their continued isolation and the reaction of the world to their president's recent harsh statements. In fact, prominent figures like Khatami, Rafsanjani and Karrubi have recently criticized Ahmadinejad's foreign policies and the new team's modus operandi. Iran also felt pressured by the IAEA decision, and also by the recent allocation by Washington of $75 million for regime change in Iran.
On the other hand, entering such negotiations could transform Iran into the region's "greatest power, with a "certificate" sealed by the US. Having the US seek talks with Iran could also demonstrate to its people-and to the international community-that Iran is a regional power to be reckoned with. There is, thus, much that Iran can earn from entering talks, or even just declaring readiness to engage in a dialogue with the US.
Stable Iraq is also an important goal of the US, with implications way beyond Iraq. This would also remove a major burden for President Bush. The US has long been ready to engage in a formal, authoritative and open dialogue with Iran. The Bush administration had authorized some time ago its Baghdad ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, to seek talks with Iran about the situation in Iraq. Tehran retains much influence over the Shi'i parties that have emerged dominant from Iraq's elections. Its help is viewed indispensable in restraining the Shi'i and America wants Iran to help persuade Iraqi Shi'a parties to help the formation of a stable government.
Still, it is extremely difficult to produce a meaningful change in their bilateral relations. Khatami was certainly right in observing, that "a bulky wall of mistrust" existed between the two states, making such attempts extremely intricate. The reform paper Jame'e suggested (28 June 1998), that Iran was forced to stick to an extremist approach, of fear of losing its "last card." Even if the US were to accept all our conditions, it wrote, Iran would refuse to retreat from its approach, since animosity to the US has become an issue of prestige for us. In a way, for Iran engaging in dialogue with the US is almost an open admission of failure. They have made relations with the US such a gigantic symbol of the revolution, that engaging in direct, official and public negotiations (even admittedly over Iraq only) would signify an important retreat from a major dogmatic principle.
While both sides-with all their reservations-admitted the intention to hold such talks, it is still not clear if and when they will take place, and what would be their scope and format. The results, of course, are far from clear. But even the official acceptance to engage in a dialogue is not insignificant.
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