The nuclear program was one of the few issues in which the different trends within the establishment—conservatives and reformist—spoke so far harmoniously. They viewed developing nuclear capabilities for peaceful use as Iran’s undeniable right, a program which Iran should pursue, regardless of western opposition. However, with the growing pressure on Tehran, and the March 2006 decision by the International Atomic Energy Agency （IAEA） to report the Iranian nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council, some milder approaches could be also discerned. They have grown in tone and intensity, and were prevalent even among adamant revolutionaries. That the growing western criticism on Iran’s nuclear policy （and the IAEA decision） coincided with President Ahmadinejad’s harsh statements against the West, and the coming to office of his new and more radical team, added some weight to such dissident voices. Some even questioned the advisability of Iran’s nuclear policy, often criticizing the government’s modus operandi and the new officials’ lack of experience. With this, another taboo is beginning to crack in Iranian public debate.
Criticism of the conduct of Iran’s nuclear policy prevailed mainly among the reform camp, but difference in tone could also be discerned in the conservative trend. While some revolutionaries urged strategic consideration to finagle Iran’s way out of the crisis, others called for maintaining the ideological principles and Iran’s firm and uncompromising position, and even withdrawal from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.
Top officials acknowledged the diversity of views, often blaming the West for encouraging them, or blaming those holding such views as serving Iran’s adversaries. Khatami thus complained, that while foreign countries “hatch mischievous plots” against Iran, some people inside the country “are trying to promote despondency” or “humiliating surrender” （Radio Tehran, 10 February 2006）. In a Friday sermon （14 March） he referred to the critics of Iran’s quest for a nuclear fuel cycle as “idiots,” who have “joined the enemy and helped it in the most sensitive time.” When time comes, he added, the nation will "give a harsh response to the insiders who move in the same direction as the enemies” （RFE/RL, Iran Report, 23 March 2006）. The main mouthpiece of conservatism, Kayhan （8 March）, complained, that some [reformists] have turned “very frightened and very intimidated,” as though “a great calamity would immediately descend upon the country” （The Times, 10 March 2006）. This makes clear that dissident views did exist and that they were disturbing for the government. Moreover, such new thoughts were not suggested only by those outside the government but also by key revolutionary figures.
While the leadership wished to rally solidarity, significant disparities were in fact evident. In fact, some criticism could be discerned previously, but they were rarely related directly to Iran-IAEA deliberations. Subsequently, and more directly aimed on the nuclear issue, reformist legislator Mohammad Reza Tabesh grieved （10 October 2005） that the government of Ahmadinejad had failed to handle Europe well and even urged the return of Iran’s former negotiating team. Legislator Hosein Afarideh also censored the “mistaken measure” and the “hasty” reshuffle of the nuclear negotiating team. Reformist paper Sharq even termed Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy ineffective, and recommended forming a “crisis diplomacy team” to lead Iran out of the calamity （The Times, 10 March 2006）. These are not minor complaints, when voiced on such a sensitive issue, so shortly after the new team entered office.
Some stressed the negative implications of the recent developments on the nuclear front. Rafsanjani warned that “even the slightest possibility” of being taken to the Security Council is “a very serious matter” for Iran. Resisting Americans and Europeans challenge, he said, entails “a high price.” He had no qualm that the IAEA Council’s decision to report Iran to the UN “is to our harm” （Iran Press Service, 3 February 2006）. Hasan Rohani, the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, has been extremely critical of Ahmadinejad’s foreign-policy team and its conduct. More specifically, Kazem Jalali, member of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, admitted that his country’s “Eastern policy” （i.e., relying on the support of China and Russia to back Iran） was superficial and erroneous （22 February, r0ozonline.com）. Mohsen Armin, spokesman for the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, maintained that it was obvious from the start that Russia and China “would advertise support for Iran” so as to gain “concessions from America and Europe” and “ultimately make deals” with them to secure their own interests. But sadly, he added, Iran failed to analyze this correctly. To take the country out of its crisis, he said, Iranian officials “must turn to the past and adopt the strategy of the government of reforms.” Iran, he added, should suspend nuclear activities voluntarily and “resume talks in order to build confidence” （Sharq, 1 February in BBC, 6 February 2006）.
Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy team was criticized for alienating foreign countries and undermining the world’s confidence in Iran’s intentions. The replacement of ambassadors and top officials in the foreign ministry, and the appointment of younger individuals who are ideologically compatible but lacking experience, has also earned criticism. ‘Abdul-Vahed Musavi-Lari, Khatami’s interior minister, illustrated the harmful results of the change in the negotiating team. He said: some officials, while urging national solidarity, in practice “take a pair of scissors in their hands" and "try to eliminate" the forces that are loyal to the system, or experts "who are supportive of the system," and "deprive them" of participating in the decision-making process （E‘temad, 11 March 2006）. The extent of displeasure with Ahmadinejad foreign policy team became clear on 12 March, when reformist in the Majlis summoned the president to explain his nuclear policy （Mehr News Agency; RFE/RL, Iran Report, 23 March 2006）.
The criticism of the “negotiating team” was indicative of the domestic disagreements. Hassan Rohani （9 February） complained that “shouting alone will not help” to solve Iran’s problems. To stand up to our enemies, he said, Iran needs “multidimensional, proactive and dynamic strategy.” He recommended widening Iran's “circle of consultants”—bringing in people with better experience and proven skills. The National Trust Party’s spokesman Isma‘il Gerami-Moqaddam said, that Iran can resolve its diplomatic difficulties by turning to elder statesmen like Rafsanjani, Karubi or Khatami. The National Trust also called for a switch from the policies initiated by ‘Ali Larijani （now secretary of Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator）, to the previous policy of “active diplomacy” （E‘temad-e Melli, 7 February; RFE/RL, Iran Report, 17 February 2006）. When an opportunity to reach some agreements was starting to take shape, Mohammad Reza Tabesh complained, “the process was disrupted” and “previous strategies were disregarded.” Conservative legislator Mohammad Khoshchehreh, suggested reviewing Iran’s diplomacy and crisis management and called for amending the “optimistic perspective that believes nothing will happen” and that speak “in simplistic terms of world affairs” （RFE/RL, Iran Report, 17 February 2006）.
Reformist politicians on the sidelines of power agree that Iran has nuclear rights, but maintain that these are better served with wit and diligence, not with provocations. Former legislator Mohammad Kianush-Rad observed （15 February）, that Iran’s radical stances are fuelling “tensions and spreading distrust” toward it （RFE/RL, Iran Report）. E'temad （2 March 2006） was concerned about the probable referral of Iran's nuclear file to the Security Council: If this happens, “we will enter a one-way street wherein we have to end all our nuclear activities inside the country,” otherwise “we will have to face" not only the IAEA but also the Security Council “whose slightest adverse decision can deal a blow to the entire economy of the country.”
In an interview with RoozOnline （19 March 2006）, Ayatollah Musavi Tabrizi （head of the Association of Qom’s Theological School Teachers） added significant weight to such criticism. Referring to the nuclear issue as Iran's “biggest problem,” he has reportedly expressed the hope, that Iran’s officials "will be able to resolve this crisis" with the least risks and minimal difficulties for Iran. The way out he seemed to suggest were "negotiations, dialogue and friendship" with the international community. The government, he reportedly said, "could have dealt with this [issue] in wiser ways,” leading to reducing tensions rather than "creating severe tensions.” Yet, unlike under Khatami, the new government’s policy has united the "international community against Iran.” His country, he said, “should not assume that the entire world is our enemy,” but engage in logical negotiations, aimed at building trust. Khatami's diplomacy should have been pursued even today. Negotiations should be based on Iran's national interest and today's needs.
The critical expressions regarding Iran's nuclear politics and with regard to the negotiating team, also include some implicit or even explicit criticism of the conduct of the new president. It seems that, regardless of public statements, the recent western moves have put severe pressure, at least on some Iranians.
The new proposals for direct Iran-US talks over Iraq—as were approved by both countries—are not unrelated to the new circumstances facing Iran and the US on the two vital fronts: the American engagement in Iraq and Iran's difficulties with the IAEA. Talks over Iraq if in fact pursued by Iran—either out of sincere intentions or as a tool for tactical maneuvering—may have a bearing on the nuclear crisis as well. It is too soon to resolve if Iran intends to reconsider its nuclear policy. Yet, clearly, there are new attitudes among some Iranians over issues that so far have been considered taboo.
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