The prospect of an International Atomic Energy Agency （IAEA） decision to report the Iranian nuclear file to the United Nation Security Council initially did not arouse much concern in Tehran. The intense diplomatic effort to shore up “Eastern support”—China and Russia—provided Iran with some sense of confidence. Tehran offered them significant incentives, which it viewed sufficient to secure their backing. Peaking oil prices and the American complications in Iraq gave Iran a further comfort. Its past experience with Europe has also convinced Iran that it had a leverage to gain more time. The IAEA decision to report the Iranian dossier to the United Nation's Security Council, therefore, came as a shock to the Iranian leadership, prompting angry recriminations and provoking soul-searching process. While the immediate response was mostly heated, milder statements have been also voiced—some of them even containing criticism of the Iranian policy. This paper will discuss the main lines in the Iranian official arguments. The next will explore the milder-critical views. Together they portray Iran’s multi-faceted attitude at this extremely sensitive juncture.
Few trends of thought have been recently formed in Iran regarding the suitable nuclear policy—an issue over which Iranians have so far spoken in an impressive unanimity. Conservatives fluctuate between belligerent tone vis-à-vis the West and advocating a more cautious approach at home. Reformists and figures outside the government usually expressed concern and called for a thoughtful way out of the crises. Yet, attitudes crossed this reformist-conservatives line. Often, leading reformists voiced resolute support for the government policy, or harsh criticism of the West, as did the conservatives, and, occasionally, the same officials spoke in divergent language on different occasions. Still, significant variations became clearly evident in their public announcements.
The immediate instinct was to play down the significance of the IAEA decision and, at the same time, to caution that if suffered, Iran, too, could inflict “harm and pain” on its adversaries. Iran found comfort in that, as they have often put it, there was no resolution in the IAEA, no referral to the UN and no consensus among its Board of Governors. ‘Ali Asghar Soltaniyeh （Iran's envoy to the IAEA） thus said, that Secretary General Al-Baradi‘i’s report to the Board will be sent to the Security Council, as “a purely administrative procedure” and that, in any way, the IAEA “continues to be responsible” over Iran’s nuclear file （Tehran TV, 8 March 2006）. Iranians usually viewed the decision as politically motivated and one that reflects anti-Iranian biases. Supreme Leader 'Ali Khamene’i （9 March 2006）, viewed the decision as another chapter in the US hostility, and vowed to resist all “pressure and threat." The nuclear issue, he believed, was only "an excuse" for the US to attack the Iranian regime, which reflects its fear of Iran's growing regional influence. Exploiting the emotion evoked by the religious procession of the ‘Ashura （10 February）, former president Khatami was assigned to present the united Iranian front. He endorsed the call for unity by his successor, President Ahmadinejad, maintaining that “the entire nation chants a single slogan in unison”—nuclear energy is our “absolute right.” He, too, accused the West of using the nuclear program as a pretext to “target Islam” （Radio Tehran, 10 February 2006）. Rafsanjani added （8 March）, that faced with western scheme to isolate it, Iran should “move along with solidarity,” and will stand firmly “against the plots of enemy” （Radio Free Europe, Iran Report）.
Attempting to reflect power and confidence, Iranian officials disputed the notion that Iran was vulnerable to sanctions or even to military action, and warned of the ramifications of such eventuality–i.e., possible rise in oil prices, destabilization of the Middle East and reprisals by Iran’s Iraqi allies. Some suggested that reporting Iran to the Security Council could even lead to Iranian withdrawal from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty （NPT）. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, warned that if the existing mechanisms would fail to secure its rights, Iran’s nuclear policies could be revised. He disclaimed, however, any intention to use oil “as a foreign policy instrument." Assefi, the ministry’s spokesman, seconded him, maintaining that withdrawal from the NPT "was not on Iran’s agenda yet" （New York Times, 13 March 2006）. Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh said, that even if economic sanctions were imposed, oil exports “will not be stopped" （New York Times, 9 March 2006）. Yet, others did not hide the threat and sounded more belligerent.
Regardless of occasional milder tone, there was little sign of wavering from those close to Ahmadinejad. His head of the Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator, ‘Ali Larijani, made it clear: “If they take action, the response will not be a very pleasant one for them” （1 March 2006, IranMania.com）. Rafsanjani threatened that without mutual trust, “the chain of internal security will snap.” Kazem Jalali, member of the Majlis Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy said, that if steps are taken against Iran, “everybody would be the looser … the region would become insecure” （roozonline.com）. The US may be able “to cause harm and pain," added nuclear negotiator Javad Va‘edi, but it is “susceptible to harm and pain” itself （NYT, 9 March 2006）. He warned that even a “simple report,” to the UN would lead to ending “our engagements” with Europe （Iran Press Service, 3 February 2006）. Ahmadinejad added, that while so far Iran has pursued its nuclear effort within the context of the IAEA and the NPT, if its rights are violated, it will revise its policies （Iranian TV, 11 February 2006.）. Iran, he vowed, will “never accepts humiliation." Once again, thus, duality and conflicting tendencies reflected Iran’s politics.
Iranians expressed deep disappointment from the European attitude and from Al-Baradi‘i's position. Soltaniyeh, termed Al-Baradi‘i's report as biased and misleading: Iran’s “purely technical nuclear issue,” he said, has been politicized （Fars News Agency, 7 March 2006）. The Europeans, he added, have allowed the US to “take their multilateral policy hostage” （Financial Times, 9 Mar 2006）.
Iranians were extremely disappointed with Russia, which Majles member Mohammad Reza Mirtajedini typically said “only follows its interests.” Legislator Javad Jahangirzadeh then recalled Iran’s bitter historical memory of its engagement with Russia. Its proposal of uranium enrichment on Russian soil, he said, is “more disgraceful than the Turkmenchai and Golestan” humiliating treaties （in which Iran had to cede Russia its Caucasus territories in the early 19th century）. Reformist Majlis member Nureddin Pirmoazen added that Russia has a “dual role” and “a thousand faces,” and in any case “cannot be trusted” （RFE/RL Iran Report, 8 March 2006）.
Iran, this conclusion run all along in official assertions, will not give up its nuclear program. Foreign Minister Mottaki typically said that developing nuclear expertise for peaceful purposes is Iran’s “inalienable right,” although the production of nuclear weapons is haram （forbidden） in Islam （Tehran Times, 22 February 2006）. Reflecting unity, some prominent figures （such as Hasan Rohani and Khatami）, asserted that Iran’s nuclear policy is decided by its top officials and, thus, does not vary with a change of governments. In fact such a policy goes back well before Ahmadinejad's election （RFE/RL Iran Report, 6 and 8 March 2006）.
Iranians maintained that they are still seeking to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue, but as Mottaki noted, Iran would neither tolerate “threats and unilateralism” nor “accept nuclear apartheid” （Tehran Times, 22 February 2006）. Ahmadinejad, maintaining that the West is fundamentally against Iran acquiring nuclear technology, and “basically opposed to Iran’s development,” instructed Atomic Energy Organization chief Gholamreza Aqazadeh to suspend the “voluntary implementation” of the Additional Protocol. （In fact, an earlier Majlis legislation calls for the resumption of enrichment-related activities if Iran is reported to the Security Council）. （RFE/RL Iran Report, 17 February 2006）.
Clearly, there was a sense that the entire world had turned against Iran. Conservative media was especially critical of this anti-Iranian move. Jomhuri-ye-Eslami （16 March） asserted Iran’s steadfast position: In dealing with the western evil plan, Iran would not withdraw even one step from its positions. The Security Council will try to issue a statement against Iran, it suggested, but it cannot change Iran’s persistence to achieve “peaceful nuclear technology." Kayhan warned that an “aggressive attack" was "targeting Iran’s culture,” aimed against its spirit of unity, self-confidence and dignity. Hinting to prevalence of dissident views, he added, that Iran’s enemies have “activated their domestic puppets in the media and politics to opine that nuclear technology is unnecessary for Iran because it would cause a military strike against the country” （MidEast Mirror, 16 March 2006）.
Although the official line remained harsh there were thus some milder attitudes—even among officials.
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