In recent years, the Iranian nuclear program has remained in the core of public attention. The US failure to substantiate the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and its complications there, played into Iranians’ hands. Europe, on its part, remained by and large undetermined. Russia and China— both veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council with vital economic interests in Iran—seemed reluctant to press too hard on Iran. The rise of oil price also added to Iranian confidence. At the same time, however, there were growing signs that the outside world has become growingly inpatient to Iran’s maneuvering tactics and the US was determined to adopt firmer position vis-à-vis Iran. The result was the decision of the International Atomic Energy Agency （IAEA） to report the Iranian nuclear file to the UN Security Council. But the meaning of such “reporting,” the means to be taken and their timing are not clear yet.
Since early 2006, the United States seemed determined to put an end to Iranian nuclear saga. Its immediate target was to refer the Iranian dossier to the Security Council. To achieve such a goal it focused on the following steps: To allow the IAEA to exhaust its efforts to dissuade Iran from continuing its program; to create a European front to support its stance; and to neutralize, as much as possible, the opposition by Russia and China to such a move. Although it has not been fully successful, the IAEA decision （8 March） to report the Iranian nuclear issue to the Security Council was a significant breakthrough.
On its part, Iran’s policy continued to be based on gaining time; preventing a united front against it; and avoiding their referral to the Security Council. To achieve its goals, it focused on the following tactics: It insisted that its nuclear program was for peaceful use and, therefore, it’s inevitable right. It demonstrated a united domestic front and an impressive degree of self-confidence. Tehran also tried to find cracks in the front that the US was forming against it. When it realized that the EU was close to adopting anti-Iranian stance, it wished to gain at least the support of other powers—mainly Russia and China.
As long as the issue was handled by the IAEA, Iran felt immune from actual sanctions. Recent developments, culminating in the IAEA decision to report the issue to the Security Council—something Iran tried to avoid all along—raised some concern in Iran. Europe, on its part, also seemed tired of Iranian maneuverings and came closer to the US position. By early 2006, the US managed to gain some support also in Russia and China. The US thus scored significant points, but this is still short of putting an end to Iran’s nuclear endeavor.
The five permanent members of the Security Council met in London on 30 January in an attempt to bridge their differences. The United States and three major European powers （Britain, France and Germany） pushed for a Security Council meeting, which could lead to sanctions against Iran. Russia and China have been reluctant to back immediate UN action, but had to accept to turn the issue to the Council. Subsequently, on 4 February, the 35-member board of governors of the IAEA voted by an overwhelming majority to report Iran's case for judgment to the Security Council, allowing Iran a grace period of one month to take remedial steps before the Council takes action. The resolution requests Iran to take confidence-building steps: i.e., establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activities; and to ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol.
Iran continued to hold firm to its position that it had the sovereign right to continue to make small amounts of nuclear fuel for research purposes. It hoped to gain at least the support of China and Russia and to craft a deal with Moscow, which would allow it to also pursue some enrichments program in Iran. China and Russia, favored a diplomatic approach. Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed （7 February） that the decision to report Iran to the Security Council was "balanced.” He added, however, that the IAEA has not yet actually referred Iran to the UN, which still “offers an opportunity to keep looking for ways of settling this issue.” Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov maintaining that the Security Council is simply being notified, argued, nonetheless, that it would be "a very bad sign" if international inspectors were expelled from Iran. In his words, "Iran is our neighbor, and we are not interested in aggravating the situation,” which “is already explosive.” Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing also hoped for a diplomatic solution. His ministry spokesman Kong Quan reiterated that Beijing hoped to resolve the crisis through negotiations within the IAEA framework, and called for restraint, patience and flexibility. Kong explained China's position: the IAEA resolution requires Iran “to fulfill its obligations and commitments,” but does not mean “transferring the IAEA's responsibility” to the UN （see RFE/RL Iran Report, Vol. 9, No. 5, 17 February 2006）.
A major step was taken after talks on 3 March failed to make a breakthrough. The EU3—Britain, France and Germany—then rejected the “compromise” Tehran offered, although it signaled that it would further explore with Russia whether any deal might still be done. At the end of three-days meeting in Vienna on 8 March, the IAEA governors approved the earlier decision to report Iran to the Security Council. Russia still offered Iran the way out, proposing to do nuclear work on its territory. But Iran insisted on holding on to “experimental” work in Iran— a condition unacceptable to the EU3. IAEA Board, thus, sent a report to the Security Council to enlist its support in persuading Iran to cooperate with IAEA efforts to monitor its nuclear program.
Still, pressure on Iran from the Security Council is likely to build only slowly. First the council’s president is expected to issue a statement, taking Iran to task for its defiance. Then it may take long weeks before a formal resolution could be adopted, setting Iran a deadline to comply with the IAEA requests. Subsequent resolutions could involve graduated sanctions, ones carefully targeted at the Iranian regime, not at its people. But this may take time, and certain disagreements may involve with the permanent members of the Security Council.
The US and the Europe would want to make suspension of enrichment and co-operation with inspections compulsory. Russia and China may be reluctant to fully co-operate. Meanwhile, all sides insist that the door to negotiations remains ajar, though Iran has so far shown no sign of willing to walk through it. Iran is likely to continue playing “the Russian card”—enrichment on Russian soil—either sincerely or as another tactic to gain time. For Iran this seems to be the main way out of the crisis and Russia has its on interest to promote such a solution.
In the process, the US escalated its rhetoric. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, said at a congressional hearing （9 March）: "We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran." US envoy to the nuclear agency, Gregory Schulte, kept up the fierce tone, maintaining that Tehran has thus far “chosen a course of flagrant threats and phony negotiations." Nicholas Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs, said that if Iran fails to "accede to the wishes of the international community,” then “we would have to look at possible targeted sanctions.” Israel, again, jumped in, to wave with its own stick. Former chief-of Staff Bugi Yaalon said that Israel has more than one option to attack the Iranian nuclear sites.
But for the time, diplomacy still has its chance. In mid-March, the Security Council will launch its deliberations. China and Russia are likely to push for a milder response, and the Council may face difficulties to form a decisive and widely acceptable policy. The Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, said （8 March）: "I don't think sanctions as a means to solve a crisis has ever achieved a goal in the recent history." Russian diplomat also suggested that the United States was too eager to take the issue out of the hands of the IAEA. "This move is detrimental, and not one real problem can be decided with such a move," he said. ElBaradei, who has just received the Noble Prize, is still hoping that, behind the scenes and beyond the escalating rhetoric, a compromise could be found. "Everybody is looking forward to a political settlement," he said （8 March）, recommending "cool-headed approaches." He called on Iran to restore the world's confidence "to get out of the hole that we’re in today." For him, the Security Council involvement was “a new phase of diplomacy,” lending its weight to the IAEA’s efforts, “so as to make sure Iran will work as closely as possible with us.” ElBaradei, one source suggested, behaves as if he is even more frightened of the Security Council than Iran （Washington Post, 8 March 2006）.
Such divisions within the world community are likely to confuse the message to Tehran, as much as Iran’s own message spread a smoke screen on its own intensions. Once again, Iran will try to rely on the rifts within its rivals. It continues to make contradictory statements （mainly regarding the Russian proposal） and makes veiled threats. Its officials declared that it could cause “harm and pain” to the West. Some even suggested the use of the “oil weapon” to pressure the West further; others denied—forming a smoke screen through which real policy remains unclear.
Clearly, Iran felt threatened and more isolated than before. The US was demanding immediate and actual steps and the EU seemed upset with Iranian manouverings. That China supported the IAEA resolution was another unpleasant surprise. Russia seemed particularly unhappy with the Iranian policy, mainly by its rejecting the offer to enrich uranium for Iran on Russian soil. Lavrov termed Iranian policy “not useful” and expressed disappointment. But, not surprisingly, still left the door open to further negotiations （Haaretz, 14 March 2006）.
Still, the decision to report Iran’s nuclear program to the Security Council has not put an end to illusory rhetoric about that country’s ultimate intentions. Iran’s apologists continue to defend their "inalienable right" to a comprehensive nuclear program and to insist that "more time is needed for negotiations." All indications also suggest unless something dramatic happens, actual steps by the Security Council will take time. In this sense, Iran continues to play with time and walk on the edge. Even after being reported to the Security Council, Iran believes it still has the time to craft a better deal.
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