The Israel-Palestinian conflict has experienced not one earthquake but two. The massive stroke suffered by Ariel Sharon, and his departure from the political scene, have transformed the Israeli political landscape. Now Hamas’s surprise election victory has brought about a revolution in Palestinian politics. Its ascent to power will influence the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – and, more broadly, the evolution of political Islam.
Had Hamas managed to form a government of national unity, as it had wished, this might have softened the impact of its victory. But Fatah and the other factions rejected that option, leaving Hamas no choice but to go it alone.
Its startling election victory has had two immediate consequences. It has caused disarray within the “quartet” of diplomatic powers – the US, the UN, Russia and the EU – among whom there is no common position on whether to talk to Hamas or ostracise it. This became all too apparent when Russia broke ranks and invited Hamas leaders for talks in Moscow. Of pressing practical concern is the future of economic aid to Gaza and the West Bank. While no one wants to put money into Hamas’s coffers, there is equally no desire to see the Palestinian population starve. Squaring this particular circle is proving troublesome.
Pragmatism or Confrontation?
The second consequence has been to strengthen the unilateralist tendency among the Israelis. Ariel Sharon had tacitly torn up the old concept of “land for peace”, arguing that Israel had no credible interlocutor and therefore had no choice but to unilaterally re-draw the map in order to separate itself from the Palestinians as completely as possible. Now, with Hamas in power, Israelis will need little persuading of the merits of separation. If Ehud Olmert becomes the next prime minister, as opinion polls suggest, he will seek to complete in the West Bank the unilateralist task which Ariel Sharon began in Gaza.
But while Israel and the international community face new and difficult challenges, so too does Hamas – and how it responds will be watched closely by other Islamist movements round the world. Since the late 1970s Islamists have come to power in Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan and more recently Turkey – and have come close to winning power in Algeria. All of these countries have served as case studies for Islamist movements elsewhere. They have raised important questions about how power should be gained -- through popular revolution （Iran）, through conquest （the Taliban in Afghanistan）, through an army coup （Sudan） or through the ballot box （Turkey and now the Palestinian territories）.
Since, in the first three cases, regimes gained power which quickly became repressive and unpopular, they offer a very different model from the second two. Moreover Hamas has a prestige in the Muslim world which the Turkish Islamists lack – they remain loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood tradition （from which most modern Islamist movements spring）, and they are fighting for the holy city of Jerusalem.
This is not to suggest Hamas will have an easy ride. On the contrary, the challenges it faces are severe. Will it abandon its founding charter and accept Israel’s right to exist? Will it prolong the year-long truce it has （largely） observed, thereby tacitly abandoning the armed struggle? How will it keep the Palestinian Authority financially afloat? Can it really raise significant （and sustained） funding from the Arab states and Iran, if it loses aid from the EU and the US?
There are certainly pragmatists within Hamas who have for some time favoured making the big leap from armed struggle to political struggle. They are well aware that this is their moment of opportunity. But the ideological tussle within the movement may take some time to resolve. Men like the foreign minister-designate, Mahmoud Zahar, cling to the old hard line. Moreover if the Bush administration and the next Israeli government set out, methodically, to strangle the new Palestinian administration at birth, a period of bitter confrontation will lie ahead.
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