The victory of the Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections over the ruling Fatah party (25 January 2006) was seized by Iran as an opportunity to uphold the basic tenets of political Islam and to point to the significance and worldwide impact of its own revolutionary creed. Not surprisingly, representatives of the regime have translated the victory in terms of its implications for the overall Islamic resistance to the West and the spread of its own ideals. With Iran’s impact firmly in ground in Israel’s north (Hizballah), the Hamas victory was another step to encircle Israel by Islamists movements. That the victory came at the time of President Ahmadinejad’s hate speeches against Israel and the West was seen to carry an added value for Tehran. Yet, even Iran was not unaware of the challenge attached to such a smashing success. The Iranian statements were, therefore, milder than could have been expected.
Since 1979, the main impact of the Iranian revolution abroad has been found not in the main Muslim states, but in tightly knit, numerically small movements, mostly within Shi‘i populations. Even there the real measure of the Iranian role in their emergence is far from clear. Even in the cases for which Tehran claims greater success (Hizballah and Amal of Lebanon, Da‘wa and ‘Amal in Iraq, or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas), the exact connections between these movements and the Iranian revolution remained mostly obscure.
The Hizballah has been the flagship of the Iranian notion of "exporting" the revolution. It maintains a similar philosophy to that of the Islamic regime, it upholds the struggle for the suppressed, presents a successful example of the influence of the Iranian creed, it struggles against Israel and loyal to Iran. Their leaders visit Iran regularly, and Iranian officials visit them occasionally. Iran has also maintained a militant militia in Lebanon and has not denied providing support for the movement.
It was only after initial hesitation, that Iran and Hamas developed close ties. Historically, rather than supporting the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, which constitutes Hamas’ hard core, Iran cultivated the Islamic Jihad, a staunchly pro-Iranian organization. Hamas for its part initially rejected the Iranian model. Since the 1991 Gulf war, however, a significant change could be discerned. Following the Israeli-Palestinian peace process Tehran’s motivation and actual patronage for the Palestinian issue became still more manifest.
Viewed from Iran, Hamas had simiar advantages like Hizballah, with certain added values. It offered another front to demonstrate Iran’s Islamic leadership, an arena for involvement in the Arab-Israeli scene and another ally bordering on the holy lands. Moreover, Hamas seemed determined to struggle against Israel; had better potential than the Hizballah to strike inside Israel; and it attracts a great public interest in the world and Muslim public opinion. Tehran, according to most sources, has undertaken to provide it with military training and some financial support, in addition to political and ideological backing. The Palestinians, for their part, expected more meaningful-actual support from Tehran-way beyond what Iran seemed willing to provide. For Iran, as some Iranians maintained, support for Hamas was almost "cost-free," with significant dividends.
Tehran’s reaction to the election reflects thus its long-standing relationship with Hamas. Former Foreign Minister Velayati stated in 1999, that "all our friends and enemies know perfectly well," that "Iran is the [main] supporter of the Hamas and the Hizballah in their struggle against Israel" (Jomhuri-ye Islami, 4 April 1999). Tehran Radio reported in 1998, just after a visit by Sheikh Yassin, that Iran supports a Palestinian state "even more than the Palestinians themselves." Yassin added (July 1998): "I found that the Iranians have an intense desire to liberate Palestine." Allegations that Iran funds Hamas were usually disclaimed. Thus Hassan Rohani, then Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council said (31 May 1995), that Hamas and Islamic Jihad do not need our money: "They need our guidance, our ideas, our path, and our line." Funding aside, a strong formal relationship exists. Hamas has its representative in Tehran (Abu-Osama ‘Abd al-Moti), and Hamas and Iranian leaders interact quite openly (RFE/RL Iran Report Vol. 9, No. 3, 31 January 2006). Interestingly, there was also criticism among Iranian reformists, that Tehran has turned "more Palestinians than the Palestinians."
Meeting leaders of radical Palestinian movements in Damascus, few days before the elections, Ahmadinejad stated (20 January 2006) that, "victory in Palestine has become a matter of life and death for the Islamic world and for Global Arrogance [the West]." In his words, the Middle East conflict has become "the locus of the final war" between Muslims and the West. He stressed that "Iran strongly stands behind the Palestinian people and their just struggle" (www.arabnews.com).
Following election, Iran’s Foreign Ministry embraced Hamas’ victory and equated the voter turnout to utter support for resistance. Ahmadinejad attributed the results to "God's grace" and the Palestinians’ "resistance and struggles." He told Mashaal that, "What leads to the victory of the Islamic Ummah [community] is its attention to the injunctions of genuine Islam and lofty Islamic aspirations. Hard line newspapers also reflected this attitude and praised the victory as part of the trend of new Islamist regimes in the Middle East. According to Kayhan: "Everyone realizes that the Middle East is shaping around the Islamists."
In contrast, various reformist newspapers ascribed rampant economic and political corruption within the Palestinian Authority [PA] as the catalyst for the victory. They nudged Hamas to act wisely. Sharq noted with skepticism that Hamas now "must redefine its military activities within a legitimate and lawful police and military framework." According to E‘etemad: The victory was a protest vote, against the policies of the PA and corruption. The victory can prove costly to Hamas, it added, should it fail to act wisely.
In the aftermath of international shock, when Western countries and Israel have displayed hesitance to continue administering financial aid to a Hamas’ ruled regime, Ahmadinejad has not publicly risen to the occasion. The international pressure on the PA and severe financial ramifications that Hamas is faced with has turned a reason for concern. While Ahmadinejad may come up with some quiet financial promises, he usually stops short of publicly providing more than "moral support." This is quite a departure from his diplomatic audacity.
This is not surmising. In fact, the Hamas itself behaved as though the electoral win-or its magnitude-came as a surprise even for itself. It seems weird, almost unprecedented, that a movement that wins majority would seek to form a coalition (as Hamas leaders initially alluded). They also spoke of nominating technocrats, rather than key ideologues and prominent revolutionaries to the government. Three weeks after the victory their candidates for Speaker and Prime Minister are from the more pragmatic faction of the Hamas. Clearly, the Hamas has good reason for concern: The harsh statements from Jerusalem and Washington clarified to the Hamas that authority goes hand in hand with responsibility. Hamas need financial support; and heading the government makes it accountable for possible terrorist activities. Israel made it clear that from now on, any missile attack on it carries a "return address"-Hamas will be accountable.
Iran was not unaware of that. This may explain that even given the signs of joy in Iran, the statements were still mild. In fact, going over the conservative press, I was surprised of the relatively mild attitude and the limited attention to such important development.
Also, experience has shown that when Arabs wish to negotiate for peace with Israel-be it the Palestinians or even Syria (in the mid-1990s)-they do not necessarily follow the Iranian advice. There is, therefore, no reason to believe, that the Hamas would follow the Iranian line, against the interests of the PA. In many ways, as far as Iran is concerned, militant Hamas in opposition was in some ways preferable to milder Hamas in government. Iran will continue to encourage the PA to oppose Israel. But, as in the past, it may have greater hope in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad than in the Hamas. If, however, the Hamas chooses to continue its militant policy, it will find Iran willing to extend support.
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