Iraq and the perils of disengagement 

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 The Iraqi elections in December have not produced the outcome desired by Sunni Arabs, secularists – or George Bush.

 Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, having boycotted the previous elections in January 2005, sought to re-enter the political game and thereby protect the interests of their – once dominant and now marginalised -- community.

 Secularists – fighting under the slogan of national unity, and with the quiet support of the Americans – sought to create a countervailing force to the religious parties representing the country’s newly-empowered Shi’ite majority.

 Both groups failed to win the support they’d hoped for. Hence, not surprisingly, both were in the forefront of those claiming the elections had been marred by serious irregularities. It is clear there were indeed some cases of fraud and intimidation; but the general verdict, endorsed by the United Nations, is that overall the elections were fair.

Who will rule?

 The balance of power is essentially unchanged. The next parliament, like the last one, will be dominated by the Shi’ite religious parties (with probably a bit less than half the seats) and the alliance of the main Kurdish parties. Still to be seen is how far these two blocs are willing to produce a broadly-based government incorporating Sunni Arabs, secular nationalists (belonging to the alliance led by the former prime minister Ayad Allawi) and other minority groups. Early signs suggest the dominant players are ready to bring into government one of the main Sunni groups – the Islamic Party of Iraq – but this is quite likely to stir up resentment among other, more militant Sunni groups who will feel excluded.

 But if Iraq’s political landscape has not been dramatically transformed, what has changed significantly is the mood in Washington. In 2005 President Bush – under the pressure of events in Iraq and a shifting public opinion at home – took the strategic decision to disengage from Iraq. Of course this decision has not been stated publicly in such stark terms. The matter is very delicate. The administration is sensitive to the charge that it is about to “cut and run”. Accordingly it insists it will withdraw its forces from Iraq only when victory is won, while quietly redefining what victory actually means. “Victory” will no longer mean that Iraq has attained democracy, stability and economic recovery – merely that it is making progress towards democracy, stability and economic recovery.

 There can be little doubt that 2006 will be a crucial year for Iraq and for the Bush presidency. For Mr Bush’s strategy to succeed, several pieces of a rather complex puzzle will have to fall into place:

• the creation, without undue delay, of a government which commands broad support;
• a conscious decision by the Shi’ite religious parties not to alienate the Sunni Arabs (by pressing hard for federalism, which many Sunnis oppose) or to alienate the secular middle class (by pressing for a bigger role for Islam in sensitive areas such as women’s rights);
• a decision by the new government to negotiate with those parts of the Sunni-led insurgency which are ready, under certain conditions, to lay down their guns;
• greater progress than hitherto in building up credible new Iraqi security forces;
• and, most crucial of all, a sufficient diminution in the daily violence to justify the reduction of the American force to perhaps half its current number.

 It requires an act of faith to believe that the situation will magically transform itself. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to underestimate the US administration’s determination to begin scaling down, and eventually ending, its presence.

 To withdraw large numbers of US troops even if many of the necessary conditions have not been met would be to risk precipitating Iraq’s collapse into anarchy and fragmentation, with awesome consequences for the Middle East and for American standing in the world.