President Ahmadinejad created an international outcry when on 26 October he said that Israel should be wiped off the face of earth and describing Zionism as the vanguard of western arrogance. Basing his arguments on Ayatollah Khomeini’s creed, he insisted that Muslims must not compromise on Palestine. The Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, he went on, is one stage in the historical war between the forces of arrogance (West) and Islam. According to Ahmadinejad, some wonder if it is feasible “to foresee a world without America and Zionism?” His answer is clear: It is possible and attainable.
Ahmadinejad’s initial statements since his electoral victory (such as regarding nuclear energy, Israel, Iraq, U.S.) remain harsh. Clearly, he has tried to put forth the image of a nationalistic Iranian and devoted Muslim, determined to pursue his campaign pledges. His statements, therefore, have been directed mainly at the domestic audience. Yet, such statements and the initial policy lines (including nomination of ministers that even Iran's conservative parliament could not approve), reflected attitudes of a novice politician, lacking sufficient experience, adequate understanding of world politics, and even good advisors. His sharp anti-Israeli remarks that veteran politicians (like Rafsanjani) and diplomats (in the foreign ministry) had to reverse, are only one example of his paucity experience in the political realm.
While the notable domestic and regional changes resulted, over time, in greater realism in Iranian policy and emphasis on Iran's national interests, its inherent hostility towards Israel remained excessively uncompromising. For Tehran, Israel remained the enemy of Iran and Islam, and a threat to mankind. The declared revolutionary goal was similarly uncompromising: “Israel should be eliminated and destroyed.” “Death to Israel” turned into a central theme in Iran revolutionary politics.
Over time there were some signs of diversified tone in the approach of several Iranians even on this delicate issue. Milder expressions were infrequent, usually voiced by people with no official standing, and commonly coupled with considerable reservations. Yet, they revealed some cracks in the hitherto unified front against Israel and the peace process. Milder views, made public mainly after the 1993 Oslo Accord, and expressed more frequently following Khatami’s election in 1997, reached a new peak in 1999, when the reform movement reached its zenith. Iran, some said, using a well-known Persian phrase, should not be “a bowl warmer than the soup”—more Palestinian than the Palestinians.
The offensive against the reform camp and the Palestinian Intifada in 2000 suppressed whatever signs of softening could be discerned in Iranian attitudes. The radical voices then increased. The developments following September 11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, produced even harsher attitude to Israel. Iranians believe that Israel was behind the American inclusion of Iran in its list of “axis of evil” (January 2002) and that the war in Iraq was fought to serve Israel’s interests. Israel was also seen as the driving force behind the campaign against Iranian nuclear program. That animosity to Israel had become the main tenet in Iran’s revolutionary creed, made discarding it even more difficult. The more moderate voices may have had greater support within society than what was reflected in the official policy, but such circles lacked the power to force a change in policy. The conservatives, who control key decision-making mechanisms, may have been able to produce a change but seemed unwilling to take such a bold step—as the recent statements by Ahmadinejad have shown.
Clearly, Ahmadinejad’s declaration on 26 October in the conference on “World without Zionism” was a deliberate move. The fact that it was stated two days before the Qod’s [Jerusalem] Day, when anti-Israeli sentiments usually reach peak in Iran, was also meant to prepare the stage for expressing anti-Israeli attitudes. His attempt to adhere to Khomeini’s position was another reason for such an extremist statement. In fact, upon coming to power Khomeini called on Muslims everywhere to proclaim the last Friday of the month of Ramadan “Qods [Jerusalem] Day,” in order to demonstrate solidarity with the “rights of the Muslim people of Palestine.” Calling for a campaign to liberate Jerusalem, Khomeini said: “If every Muslim was to pour a single bucketful of water on Israel, it would be drowned by an uncontrollable flood.” On a similar occasion in 2001, Rafsanjani elaborated on the possible effect of a single Islamic nuclear bomb against Israel. He warned that “the use of even one nuclear bomb in Israel will destroy everything, whereas it will only harm the Islamic world.”
It is not entirely clear why Ahmadinejad made such a harsh proclamation. Obviously, his statement, about a “world without America and Zionism” and hundreds years of conflict did not target Israel alone, but the West at large and was also motivated by American policy in Iraq. Possibly, by voicing such an extremist position, he wished to advance one or more of the following aims: To assure Iranians that he intends to advance his policy and thus strengthen his hold over power; to signal Iran’s strive for centrality and leadership in the Muslim world; and to demonstrate to the U.S. and the West his determination to pursue his declared policy. Whatever the reason, this statement also reflected his deep personal belief—that Israel should be eliminated. While the statement reflects Ahmadinejad’s sincere distaste for Israel, it may also represent “on-the-job training” for a man without political experience, or foreign policy background, or exposure to the global spotlight. Some Iranian observers apparently believe that he needed a tutorial period.
Ahmadinejad’s view, which may have been popular among Iranians, dose not seems to serve any of Iranian’s vital interest. In fact, after initial applause for the president, key veteran politicians (including Khamene’i, Rafsanjani, and figures in the foreign ministry) tried to distance themselves from the president's remarks. By 30 October, Ahmadinejad tried to modify his statement, maintaining that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be only solved by political steps. He then raised again the idea of referendum to decide the future of Palestine. Yet, for Israelis, such a solution (in which Palestinians inside and outside the occupied territories would decide), is not much better. In fact, Khamene’i himself mentioned such a solution shortly after the outbreak of the Intifada. Depicting Israel as a “racist regime,” established to “prevent the Islamic world from enjoying any unity, honor and integrity,” Khamene’i said that only “simple-minded” people could consider negotiating with it. The only “remedy” for the malaise spread by Israel, he believed, was “to destroy the root and cause of the crisis”—the Zionist regime. Palestinian refugees should return to their homeland, then the “original people of Palestine”—Muslims (who enjoy an “absolute majority”) and the few Jews and Christians who lived there before 1948—should “stage a referendum” to decide their preference. For Israel, the Iranian version of referendum is nothing short of destruction of the Jewish State. But this is stated in a nicer, more positive term, not in the black and white picture we get from Ahmadinejad. This difference in tact is the distinction between a veteran and novice politician.
Why was the West’s reaction so severe? While “Death to Israel” is chanted often in Iran, its public adoption by the new president worried the West, as it signaled Iran’s return to the politics of the early days of the revolution. Also, while harsher statements were tolerated at the peak of the Intifada, or when they were voiced by common people, the western world did not expect such radical statements after the Israeli disengagement and by the president himself. Iranian support for the radical Palestinian camp, as Israel and the Palestinians attempt to calm tension was another cause for concern. The militant Iranian rhetoric seems similarly problematic in light of the continued crisis in Iraq. Finally, Washington and Jerusalem have used this statement to lead a fierce campaign against the Islamic regime. The analogy between Ahmadinejad’s statements and those of Adolf Hitler was used to remind the Europeans of the mistakes of the past: open threats and expressions of intent that Europe did not take seriously in the 1930s. Interestingly, Ahmadinejad gave his speech when the UN General Assembly was discussing a resolution to establish an annual day to commemorate victims of Holocaust (which was approved by consensus on 1 November). Finally, the expression of such an extremist idea while simultaneously striving to acquire weapons of mass destruction could not leave even Europe indifferent.
We must, then, view Ahmadinejad’s remarks as symptomatic of his lack of experience in the political arena. He also seems to believe that even if more than 26 years have passed, he can take Iran back to the initial days of the revolution. In the final account, his statements have done more harm than good to Iran’s national interest. It proves again that a smiling and pragmatic president with a soft language (like Khatami) could have served the Islamic regime far better than an extremist president with rough and direct language (Ahmadinejad).
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