The Iraqi referendum of 15 October showed that drafting a new constitution was not the consensus-building exercise many had hoped for. In keeping with the volatile and uncertain manner in which post-Saddam politics in Iraq have evolved, the drafting proved drawn-out, messy and divisive. Only if the Sunni Arabs are increasingly drawn into the political process (rather than into violent opposition) can that process hope to acquire much-needed legitimacy.
The roots of Sunni grievance are not hard to see; nor are they without foundation. The Sunnis have had little reason to invest much confidence in the Shi’iite-and-Kurdish-led government of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari. The dominant Shi’ite and Kurdish parties essentially drafted a constitution to suit their interests – with the Shi’ite religious partiers gaining a commitment to a bigger role for Islam, and the Kurds securing a commitment to a federal Iraq in which power and resources would devolve to the regions.
What particularly upset the Sunnis in the course of the constitutional debate was that one of the main Shi’ite parties – the Iranian-backed Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI – suddenly came out in favour of a Shi’ite “super-region” in the south. Sunnis reacted with paranoia to the prospect of the Kurds eventually controlling the oil wealth of the north, and the Shi’ites controlling the (much bigger) oil wealth of the south, with a small, impoverished Sunni region sandwiched between the two.
Sunnis were belatedly brought into the business of drafting the new constitution, but on the crucial issue of federalism they failed to make any headway. There was, however, a last-minute deal (reached with the active intervention of the US ambassador in Baghdad) designed to blunt the edge of Sunni objections. Under the deal, the next parliament will set up a committee to consider amending the current draft constitution. This had the effect of splitting the Sunni vote in the referendum, with some Sunnis deciding to vote yes but others still adamantly opposed to a draft which they viewed as inimical both to their own community and to the unity of the country.
The fact that the Americans were closely involved in securing this last-minute concession was an index of how worried they were about Sunni disaffection. A no-vote would have sent the whole political process back to square one – with fresh elections for another interim government, and the drafting of yet another constitution. No less troubling – and much more likely – was the danger that the draft constitution would be approved by the nation as a whole, but in the teeth of substantial Sunni opposition. And, in the event, that was what happened. Many Sunnis did vote no, even if some may have changed their minds as a result of the last-minute deal.
Greater Sunni involvement in the political process, if it is sustained, would open up what a leading British expert on Iraq, Toby Dodge, has called a “window of opportunity” – in other words, a chance to draw the Sunni Arabs away from supporting the insurgency and to stabilise the country. But this will require time and effort. The Sunnis do now have a strong incentive to take part in the mid-December parliamentary elections, rather than boycotting them as they did the elections in January. With a much bigger representation in parliament they will have a better chance of influencing the final shape of the constitution. Some Sunnis are likely to seize that opportunity; others, however, will need a lot of persuading that the end-result of engagement will be tangible gains for their community.
Much will depend on whether the Shi’ite and Kurdish politicians who dominate the next parliament – as demography makes virtually certain they will – are far-sighted enough to see that accommodation with the Sunnis is in the national interest.
The window of opportunity exists but it is small.
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