Ahmadinejad’s New Administration: Tentative Appraisal

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 With Ahmadinejad’s swearing in as Iran’s new president (3 August) and the approval of most of his ministers (24 August), the new team started its efforts to advance the country. The short time elapsed since then does not allow definitive conclusions about the government’s future policy. The statements by Ahmadinejad since his election, the composition of the government and the initial policy lines that have been outlined only allow for some tentative conclusions at this stage.

 The following observations seem important in weighing the government policy:

• The Islamic regime seems stable, the clerical rule more solid than before and the conservatives have tightened their grips over the institutions of power. The holding of the elections on schedule, their results, the smooth transfer of authority from one administration (pro-reform) to another (conservative) and the identity of the new ministers, are only some signs of such continuity coalesced with a significant change.
• On the whole, the situation Iran (the economy, stability of the institutions, foreign ties) seems more promising than previously. Ahmadinejad inherited a better situation than his predecessors did—Khameneh’i in 1981 (following internal upheaval and during war), Rafsanjani in 1989 (after eight years of war) and Khatami in 1997 (with his strive for reform). Also, while Rafsanjani had to initiate new policies for reconstruction and Khatami wished to lead Iran to political development, openness to the world and reform, Ahmadinejad wishes to return to the old formula of social justice and economic betterment for the masses. This may be difficult to accomplish for the long run but sufficient to secure continued popular support in the short run.
• The mounting oil price is another asset for Ahmadinejad. Any additional dollar for barrel\day adds some billion dollars to the government income. With prices way above $60 per barrel, the government has better tools to answer expectations, advance reform and buy loyalty—at least for some time.
• On their part, Ahmadinejad’s opponents remain disenchanted, frustrated and inactive. His campaign rivals (Rafsanjani, Karubi), disenchanted segments of society (youth, students, women organization) are still caught in surprise, failing to regroup and form an effective opposition. The political movements are busy electing their leaders and deciding their path. They have not given up the struggle, but so far remain generally quiet—allowing some grace period for the new government.

  Still, the composition of the team and the initial policy guidelines join to face the new government with significant challenges, at least for the longer run:

• There seems to be a clash between the new administration and the Iranian elites (intellectual, social and economic elites). There are also growing number of frustrated people and groups (reformists, minorities, intellectuals, Rafsanjani) whose revolutionary goals have not been yet materialized. This was, after all, one of the reasons for the support for him in the elections. Some of the leading clerics (Grand Ayatollahs) or conservative (yet quietist) clerics do not approve the policy lines taken by the new president. While the above are quiet, with no visible sign of activity, they will undoubtedly continue to struggle for their views.
• Ahmadinejad, himself inexperienced politician, brought with him a team which lacks sufficient expertise, to an extremely strenuous task and in a critical moment in Iran's history. Only one of his ministers served in the outgoing cabinet (Mohammati Rahmati, transportation); another was deputy minister (Mustafa Pur-Mohammadi, now minister of interior). Four of his nominees failed to win sufficient votes in the Majlis: ‘Alireza ‘Ali-Ahmadi (Cooperatives), ‘Ali Akbar Ash‘ari (Education), Mehdi Hashemi (Welfare), and ‘Ali Sa‘idlu (Oil). Their rejection was a clear message by the Majlis, that although the legislative and executive represent a similar (conservative) trend, the Majlis does not wish to serve as a rubber stamp. In fact, some of the candidates were severely criticized. Another major source of real power is Supreme Leader Khameneh’i.
• Five ministers served or worked in or for the Revolutionary Guards, and three from the security apparatus. This may be partly due to their age. The average age of the ministers is less than 49. Thus, during the war with Iraq (1980-1988) they were in their twenties, and many of the people in their age-group indeed served in the army. The inclusion of three ministers with security background (including Interior and Information) represents the will for strong governmental control. Yet, their inclusion also signal a clear rightward drift in Iran’s politics.
• Interestingly, four major posts that had been occupied by clerics are now led by people with no religious education—the President, Majlis Speaker, Minister of Justice and Secretary of National Security Council (‘Ali Larijani who replaced Hasan Ruhani). Apologists for the regime use this to maintain that the government is not totally clerical and radical. Still, such lay-politicians don’t accept the separation of religion and state and Larijani is even more radical than Ruhani.
• More importantly, Ahmadinejad must prove that his policy contains the remedy to the many problems facing the society. Meeting the rising expectation is not easy. Oil income may help for the short run, but may also inspire expectations that would be hard to fulfill. (This, after all, happened in Iran following the rise of oil income in the 1970s).
• It would be difficult for the new administration to moderate its policy in the short run. While ideological movements are often forced to reconcile their idealistic convictions while faced with harsh realities, they don’t withdraw dogma voluntarily. Possibly, Ahmadinejad would have to modify some of his preferred policies, but such a process usually takes time (mainly with so many new ministers). It is even more difficult for him to modify his policy at the time that the goal of his foreign rivals is the dismantling of the regime. Although a significant change is unavoidable, this process will take more time than observers may expect. In fact, the society has matured and demands change, some of the changes under Khatami can not be reversed and Ahmadinejad may have the power to retreat from his own doctrine. But this can not be expected instantly. 
• There is growing criticism of the realities in Iran. Thus, for example, the government speaks about the need to confront corruption. Yet, some Iranians claim openly, this corruption continued to expand under the new regime. Another challenge is the growing unrest in the regions of the ethnic minorities.

  Some prevalent patterns in Iranian Politics:

• Ahmadinejad’s initial statements (such as regarding nuclear energy, Israel, Iraq, United States) remain harsh. The composition of the cabinet also attests to the president’s wish to pursue policies in line with his (radical) campaign statements.
• There is a clear trend from political openness under Khatami, to economic development, with a major stress promoting social justice.
• Yet, in many ways, regardless of the clerical rule over the last 26 years, Iran now has a somewhat secular society.  Over the last decades, the public sphere has gone through a significant process of secularization.
• European countries are aware that they have major responsibility to pressure Iran to modify its policy. Yet, they don’t know what exactly the USA expects them to do in this regard: what Iranian concessions would satisfy Washington? Part of the problem may be that the USA, itself deeply involved in Iraq, did not form yet a clear policy towards Iran.
• The USA, whose forces are located so close to Iranian borders, continues to censure Iranian policy in the harshest possible words. In the eyes of President Bush, Iran and Syria are the main supporters of terrorism, and Iran is also blamed for seeking nuclear energy.
• Ahmadinejad’s statements so far have been directed mainly to the domestic audience. He tried to portray the image of a nationalistic-Iranian and devoted-Muslim, which is determined to pursue his campaign slogans. After a short honeymoon, he will be expected to prove results, his domestic rivals would return to the scene and the USA may insert further pressure, adding thus to the challenges which Ahmadinejad currently faces.