Egypt's first presidential election on 7 September , while a break with the previous single-candidate plebiscite, nevertheless returned incumbent Husni Mubarak with a little-different 88.6% of the vote. The election was designed to preserve the current semi-authoritarian system but nevertheless marked a incremental liberalization of the political system.
Several forces converged to push the regime into this election. The public has suffered from a growing cost of living due to the devaluation of Egypt's currency while a wave of strikes by workers protested pro-business policies such as privatization. The fragmented opposition came together around demands for constitutional reform (an end to emergency rule, free presidential elections). Mubarak's failure to stand up to the deeply unpopular US war on Iraq cost him legitimacy at home. Thereafter, Western discourse on democratization of the Arab world put the regime on the defensive internationally while emboldening opposition within. As the regime, in response, incrementally relaxed its political controls, a wave of unprecedented domestic criticism was unleashed, for the first time targeting the president. Petitions by a thousand public figures suggested a loss of confidence in the regime by the attentive public. A movement called kifaya ("enough!) calling for Mubarak to step down and allow free presidential elections, led a wave of demonstrations and the beating of its activists by pro-regime thugs only inflamed opposition. The arrest of opposition party critic Ayman Nur brought a scolding from the US secretary of state.
At the same time, a new generation of Western-educated neo-liberal oriented technocrats and businessmen, led by the president's son, Gamal, was coming to power within the regime at the expense of the old guard of more cautious reformers. It advocated attracting investment through privatization and reductions in taxes and tariffs, measures that, according to critics, would lead to increased job losses, inequality, and de-industrialization. Such an agenda was not compatible with democratization. For Gamal and his technocrats a market economy must precede democracy since the man in the street cannot be trusted to understand the need for economic reforms. The best way to disarm regime critics, Gamal's reformers argued, was to allow presidential elections but under rules which would prevent a credible challenge to the president. That the resulting constitutional amendment practically confines eligibility to candidates of the ruling National Democratic Party in the next 2011 elections suggests it is designed to legitimate a succession by the President's son, Gamal.
The election campaign did break a major taboo in Egypt, overt negative criticism of the president, while opposition candidates enjoyed unprecedented access to state-run television and were allowed to freely campaign. Yet, owing to a multitude of factors, President Mubarak won with ease. The ruling party ran a media-savvy campaign filled with promises of jobs. The fragmented opposition failed to unite behind an alternative to Mubarak. The left-wing Tagammu and Nasserite parties boycotted the election while the Muslim Brotherhood, the only party with a mass base, was excluded by the government. Those participating largely represented the educated upper and middle classes and promoted a pro-market message unlikely to win over the poor; the New Wafd party candidate, Numan Juma, backed by the private bourgeoisie, spent significant amounts on his campaign but still only got 2.8% of the vote while Ayman Nur's tiny Ghad (Tomorrow) party with its enthusiastic young campaigners managed to get 7% . There were significant electoral irregularities, although not enough to affect the outcome. In an election lacking independent supervision and credible opposition candidates--all of whom ran on the same neo-liberal program--nobody expected the president to lose. Hence, only 23% of registered voters (10% of the population) bothered to vote and those who did rationally opted to show their loyalty to the ruling party which alone can deliver material benefits to constituents. Egyptians, it must be added, are divided over whether democracy is likely to advance their needs, with only 63% embracing it in a recent poll and, as one Egyptian analyst remarked, even those who want democracy are not ready to fight for it. The election will undoubtedly be used to try to legitimize new neo-liberal reforms unwanted by most Egyptians.
The election achieved its main goal of heading off US pressure: Washington congratulated Mubarak on his re-election, in notable contrast to its negative reaction to the more competitive recent Iranian election. What distinguishes US behaviour, in the thinking of Egyptian analysts, is the different foreign policy stances of the two regimes: Egypt has appeased Washington by deepening diplomatic and economic ties with Israel.
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