JIME News Report

OWLS AND EAGLES:
Why Did the US Get Iraq So Bad,So Far

Dr. Harlan Ullman (09/27/2005)

  Much of the world wonders why the United States and the Bush administration so far have managed to get Iraq so wrong in so many ways, from citing the wrong reasons for war to failing to plan for the peace.  Even a cursory inspection of why this has happened provides a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of America’s capacity as a global leader. America’s closest allies such as Australia have more than a passing interest in these matters especially as their futures cannot remain unaffected by what the world’s remaining superpower does rightly and wrongly.

  Consider the impact of culture, ideology and how both are affecting American politics today.  Fifteen years ago when the Soviet Union dissolved, a senior Moscow official challenged the United States as to what it would do now that the threat had been taken away from it.  The point was that the U.S. needed an enemy as a means to overcome the divisive effects of its political system—a system purposely based on divided power and authority to limit any branch of government from becoming too powerful.  That is part of the culture that dates back centuries.

  Hence, when September 11th struck down Manhattan’s Twin Towers, America needed an enemy and the attack was instantly compared to Pearl Harbor.    The automatic response was to declare war on the perpetrators and then on global terror.  Yet, there was no formal declaration of war and absent that, the president was ceded the authority to take charge and win, whatever that meant.  Congress remained supportive and passive expressing its outrage over the atrocities committed by al Qaeda.

  Regarding ideology, there is little new.  Vietnam was about “paying any price and bearing any burden” to preserve freedom. Today, the ideology of the so-called neo-conservatives prevails.  In this view, democracies did not make war on other democracies.  The greater Middle East is the largest source of instability and danger.  Democracy there would change the region. The argument went that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, the Gulf States and Iran would take note and would adjust their policies accordingly and more favorably towards the United States. But where to start?

  As we know, Iraq became the target.  Given this ideology, it made little difference whether or not Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or had any links to September 11th.  Depose Saddam Hussein, democratize Iraq and the world would be a better place. For President Bush, with no foreign policy experience at that stage, Iraq became a once in a lifetime strategic opportunity.

  These same neo-conservatives also believed that once Saddam was gone, Iraqis would be willing and able to grab the reins of power and establish a democratic regime in short order.  All that was needed was to lift the horrible yoke of oppression.  Thus, thorough post-war planning was deferred.  Winning the war was sufficient to win the peace. And there was no debate on these assumptions and aspirations.

  This combination of culture and ideology, magnified by the reluctance of any administration to admit error or to change course, has played out over the last two and half years in Iraq to the extreme detriment to both the region and the coalition forces now occupying Iraq.  U.S. democracy is not Iraqi democracy and the profound if not irreconcilable clashes between the needs and aspirations of the various sects and ethnic groups—Shia, Kurd and Sunni— such as over the role of religion, division of resources and the power of a central versus provincial governments--- suggest the magnitude of the problems.

  Some point to America’s successful occupation of Japan that began sixty years ago and wonder that cannot be duplicated. Unfortunately, Iraq is as far removed from Japan in the Fall of 1945 as the earth is from the moon.  Japan was and is a largely homogeneous nation.  The Emperor then was a divine figure with total moral authority over the nation.  Japan had been devastated by war and the Emperor precluded any will to resist.  And, there was one person in charge—General Douglas McArthur who had a superb understanding and appreciation of Japanese society and culture.  None of these applies to Iraq.

  Finally, politics in America have been distorted by ideology and culture.  Reason and fact have been displaced by assertion.  Just look at how abortion, religion, gun control are beyond rational discussion.  And that a well-known US theologian—Pat Robertson could call for the assassination of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is a further indication of the demise of reason in politics.  Imagine if a foreign cleric called for the elimination of President Bush.

  Too often, American policy is based less on fact or reason than on other factors.  If American foreign policies are to succeed, the flaws in our assumptions must be fixed.   Whether or not the Bush administration is the crucial and sadly unanswerable question. But it is one that cannot be ignored.


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