Twenty-six years after the Islamic Revolution the Iranian people continue to search for an appropriate way to achieve the aims which had led to the anti-Shah movement. At the same time, the fluctuation of Iranian politics continues to fascinate Iranians at home and to surprise observers worldwide. On 24 June 2005, the Iranian people elected a relatively unknown figure, Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad as their new president. More than any of the candidate he demonstrated adherence to the original revolutionary dogma. He was the choice of the people, a hope for brighter future.
With the president-elect not yet in office and before his government has been formed, only tentative assessments can be made. This survey is therefore a tentative appraisal of the elections, limiting itself solely to the domestic features of the elections and their impact on the home front only.
To begin with, continuity and stability, which characterized Iranian politics since the early 1980s, have been impressively preserved. It was maintained following Khomeini’s death (1989), and again with Khatami’s election—who was certainly not the conservatives’ favorite. Now, again, Iranians has surprised observers with the nature of their choice. The system of government, in fact the conservative elements within it, gained a new mandate to prove that their dogma carries the cure for societal malaise. .
Popular participation was similarly impressive. It fact, in the last generation Iranians have voted more frequently than any other nation. This and the high turnout rates have been interpreted by the regime as a sign of democratic practice, of public support and further legitimization for their rule. Also, within the severe constraints imposed by the regime, the conduct of elections resembled some features of more open societies. Although candidates were all loyal to basic revolutionary tenets, they presented different platforms, providing different alternatives. No less significant, notwithstanding the power of the conservatives, the winner could not be predicted in advance—a rather unusual feature of most Middle Eastern elections.
Yet, despite some signs of openness, the elections were far from being truly free. More than 1000 candidates were disqualified (including all 89 women) by the Council of Guardians; only eight were approved (ultimately seven ran)—all deemed acceptable by the conservative elite. Many others did not even bother to submit their candidacy, understanding that they would be disqualified any way. The elections were also typified with reports of voting irregularities.
Ahmadi-Nejad’s election closed the circle of the growing of the conservative trend, and they are now heading all significant institutions of power. Since the mid-1990s, the reformists had the upper hand in Iran's elections. They won the presidency (1997), local councils (1999), Majlis (2000) and Khatami won a second term (2001). Since then they started to lose ground, with the conservatives consolidating their control of local councils (2003) and Majlis (2004). They now were determined to win the presidency as well. In this sense, the results were not unexpected. Yet, it was still not clear that victory would go to the most conservative of the conservatives.
Ahmadi-Nejad and his opponent in the run-off, Hashemi Rafsanjani, symbolized different poles of a relatively narrow spectrum of Iran's politics. Rafsanjani (70), a clergyman and veteran politician with a wealthy family, has been one of the solid pillars of the revolution. While conducting a somewhat pragmatic policy in his presidency (1989-97) and paving the way for the reform camp in the mid-1990s, he distanced himself from the reformists. His devastating failure in the 2000 Majlis election and the harsh reformist campaign against him distanced him further from their camp. Yet, he did not have meaningful support in the conservative camp either.
Ahmadi-Nejad (49), son of a steelworker, comes from a modest origin and conducts a Spartan lifestyle. He focused in his campaign on promises for greater welfare, to combat corruption and voiced strong anti-Western tendencies. He is of the second generation of the revolutions. Thus, his worldview was not shaped by the anti-Shah movement but rather by the Iran-Iraq war. The war strengthened his strive for national security, care for the common people and distrust of foreign powers. Like Khatami, he provided a fresh hope for a brighter future. Yet, while Khatami upheld reform, freedom and openness to the outside world, Ahmadi-Nejad stressed economic development, social justice and loyalty to revolutionary values. Similarly, his hatred to the USA and the West contrasts the message embodied in Khatami’s creed. Thus, in many ways, the two offered distinct solutions to heal societal ills. Ahmadi-Nejad, who came to public notice only after his emergence as Mayor of Tehran (2003), ran as the representative of the downtrodden and scattered Robin Hood-style promises to take from the rich and give to the poor. He was supported in the run-offs by the conservatives, the religious establishment as well as the security organs. However, it was mainly his emphasis on Islamic morality and popular hope for better welfare—and distaste of Rafsanjani by both reformists and conservatives—that won him massive support. His main slogan was appealing: “it is possible and we can make it.”
Apart from Ahmadi-Nejad, another main victor is the revolutionary system and the conservative trend, personified by Supreme Leader Khamene’i. After the elections, conservatives once again head both the elected institutions (Majlis, Presidency, local councils) and the unelected echelons (Supreme Leader, Judiciary, Guardian Council, Council of Experts, religious and military establishments). After eight years of a reformist presidency (Khatami), during which the Supreme Leader had also to contend with the specter of his influential colleague and rival (Rafsanjani), Khamene’i enjoys unprecedented authority, at least for the time being. Rafsanjani suffered another severe blow and the reform camp suffered a serious setback. Some intellectuals, in a typical naiveté called to boycott the election, thus weakening their camp further. Those reformists who did participate failed to unite behind an agreed candidate.
Looking at the larger reformist-conservative contest, both main factions stressed justice as a major goal. Yet, here too, there was a basic divide in the revolutionary ranks since the early days of the revolution. For Khomeini, the accent was on the social aspects of justice. Kazem Shari‘atmadari, a leading cleric, then stressed the primacy of political justice—i.e., freedom. This same dichotomy was later evident in the controversy between Khatami (favoring political development) and Khamene’i and the conservatives (who stressed the primacy of economic development). Either out of conviction or as a tool to censure Khatami, the conservatives therefore focused on his economic failures. In fact, the basic economic difficulties have not been mitigated, even after the recent rise of oil prices. The economy will be his main challenge as president.
Still, the contest for power is not over. The conservatives enjoy disproportionately more power in the ruling institutions than in society. The recent developments—in the region and at home—further strengthened them. The results of the elections, in turn, add to their power. The American complications in Iraq (the fact that no WMD was found there and the growing unrest) lessened the pressure on Iran. The growth in oil income has made it easier for the conservatives to strengthen their hold on power. Yet, the reform camp has had significant achievements in recent years. Their movement has already transformed the nature of political participation and altered the political landscape significantly. Reformism still seems a grassroots movement. Therefore, powerful as the conservatives appear, they still seem in many ways to be driving on a one-way street “against the flow of traffic.”
Ironically, the conservatives’ control of the main levers of power may challenge their standing in the long run, because growing pressure for results from within the country or greater tension with the rest of the world. Also, while the elections exposed the weakness of reformists, the support for Ahmaji-Nejad also betrays a measure of disillusionment with the revolution and disenchantment with the clerical rule. With Ahmadi-Nejad's election the conservatives shifted the test of performance to their own camp. Given the important services that Khatami provided to the Islamic regime, it is not clear why the conservatives were so eager to have one of their men in this office. Additionally, having chosen a fairly unknown figure, the conservatives also risked that new details would be disseminated about his past activities. Also, while it is not clear what led to Rafsanjani’s determination to run, it is even less obvious what his role in future politics will be. The domestic contest has therefore not been settled. In fact, the next elections are around the corner—Council of Experts (2006), municipalities (2007), and Majlis (2008). Also, the rifts between various factions have widened and the elections sharpened the dichotomy within the society. No less importantly, the rift between Khamene’i and Rafsanjani has become more open and bitter. Finally, at a time of tension in Iraq and negotiations about Iran’s nuclear program, a conservative president may lead to harsher US policy as well as growing rifts with Europe. Finally, while the conservatives won in Iran, the neo-cons in Washington also strengthened their appeal following Ahmadi-Nejad’s elections.
All of these factors muddy the waters of Iranian politics, and the picture will not begin to clear up at least until Ahmadi-Nejad appoints his government and publishes his policy guidelines. Clearly, his statements in the election campaign and his policy as mayor of Tehran, position him as an extremist. Yet, by their very nature, movements and leaders often deviate from their professed doctrine once they have made the transition from opposition to power. Inevitably, thus, some dissonance will exist between Ahmadi-Nejad’s campaign declarations and his actual policies. Still, his starting point is far more radical than his predecessor. Finally, even if change is unavoidable, its pace, direction and price remain unpredictable.
The new President's major and immediate tests will be therefore two-fold: First, to unite the public behind his government and include representatives of different trends in society in it. Second, in the longer run, to "deliver the goods" he so generously promised during the campaign to the weaker sectors of the population. To a degree, the rise in the price of oil may help him do this. However, that alone, will probably not be enough. What is clear is that Iranian politics will continue to fascinate the world, and will have grave influences for Iranians, for the region and for the outside world at large.
JIME Center.All rights reserved.