A new American strategy is emerging to tackle the long-term challenges of the global “war on terror”. Critics of the Bush administration have frequently accused it of being narrowly focused on the short-term need to kill or capture the “bad guys”, arguing that the real challenge is to deal with the root causes of Muslim radicalisation as well as its short-term consequences.
The evolving strategy is not being openly discussed and it is not yet clear whether it will be published or simply circulated within US government departments – probably later this year. But a reading of the available literature, supplemented by recent conversations with experts at a number of Washington think-tanks, suggests the following.
There is now a widely-shared recognition that the United States must become engaged in the “battle of ideas” in the Muslim world, buttressing “moderates” and undermining “extremists” – and that this requires a broadly based strategy involving a number of interlocking objectives and a full range of US government departments (including the Pentagon and the CIA as well as the State Department). Among the methods which are being advocated are:
•vigorous promotion of American “values”, in particular democracy, human rights and economic empowerment;
•the promotion of local civil-society groups advocating press freedom, women’s rights, democratisation, etc.;
•educational initiatives to foster literacy, computer and IT skills, and a greater openness to the outside world;
•overt and covert initiatives to weaken and discredit trends within the Muslim world seen as negative or hostile (such as Wahhabism and Wahhabi-inspired radicalism) and encourage counter-trends (such as Sufism);
•a readiness to work with mainstream Islamists, including elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, even when such groups are outlawed (as in Egypt).
It is an ambitious and wide-ranging agenda, and not without risk. The Bush administration faces a chorus of criticism and advice from those who know the Muslim world pointing out, first, the inherent problem the American superpower faces in trying to win Muslim hearts and minds at a time when its standing in the Muslim world is so low. Anti-Americanism, while rooted in long-standing issues such as US support for Israel, is constantly fed by fresh allegations (whether true or false) about abuse of Muslim prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, disrespect for the Quran, the behaviour of US troops fighting the insurgency in Iraq, and so on.
A second inescapable difficulty is that American policy-makers are grappling with something they only dimly understand. Communism, the main enemy during the Cold War, was far more familiar to Americans than radical Islam is today. The beliefs of Muslims, the different traditions within Islam and the various currents within political Islam (“Islamism”) are not matters which the average policy-maker has much grasp of. The idea, for example, that it is easy to distinguish between “moderate” and “radical” Muslims, and hence to know who to work with and who to work against, is simplistic.
Third, by using American dollars to counter the influence of Arabian petrodollars, the United States is wittingly or unwittingly intervening in what is, in effect, a Muslim civil war – a complex and messy internal conflict within an important and volatile part of the world. Wise and sensitive intervention – for example, to promote social and economic development – could be beneficial. Clumsy and intrusive engagement could provoke a dangerous backlash.
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