No longer as optimistic as they were after the Iraqi elections in January, US officials are now in a grimmer mood. The elections appeared to vindicate President Bush’s Iraq policy and his push to bring democracy to the Middle East. There seemed to be a unique opportunity to turn the situation around in Iraq. Once a credible government was formed, it could begin to roll back the insurgency – and so enable the Americans to start withdrawing their forces sometime in 2006.
Things have turned out very differently. The new government emerged only with great difficulty, after three months of squabbling between Shi’ite, Kurdish and Sunni factions. No less troubling, some of the Shi’ites dominating the new government show signs of wanting to purge the security forces of Sunnis who had belonged to Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party – a move that would further alienate the Sunni minority and make it even harder to end the insurgency.
So concerned was the Bush administration that Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld flew to Baghdad and used characteristically blunt language to warn against this course of action. Mr Rumsfeld is already worried that the training of new Iraqi police and soldiers is proceeding too slowly – and with mixed results. The pragmatic argument is that former Baathist military men have a much-needed role to play in the security forces, provided they don’t have too much blood on their hands. But, for the moment, the question of whether to “de-Baathify” or “re-Baathify” the security forces is unresolved.
Mr Rumsfeld’s visit was followed by other high-level emissaries – Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, and a few days later her deputy Robert Zoellick. Under the pressure of events, the Bush administration has shifted from its earlier position – of letting Iraq’s new leaders get on with the job – to a more “hands-on” approach. The situation is so grave that they can no longer remain detached observers.
Meanwhile April and May witnessed an escalation of violence -- in particular a wave of car-bombings in Baghdad and elsewhere. US military officials speculate these may mark a shift of strategy on the part of the foreign “jihadi” fighters led by the Jordanian Islamist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A big US offensive in the west, near the Syrian border, was designed to eliminate some of Zarqawi’s networks – and to clear an area which has become a notorious haven for foreign fighters and smugglers. It was a purely US operation; no Iraqis took part.
Zarqawi may also be behind the targeted killing of Shi’ites – mainly in and around Baghdad – which seems to have triggered a cycle of tit-for-tat sectarian violence. Certainly Zarqawi is viscerally hostile to the Shia, whom he regards as renegades. Whoever is behind the killings, their persistence and brutality (many victims are shot in the head, and some are mutilated) has contributed to a worsening climate of sectarian tension.
All this makes the task of the new prime minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a moderate Shi’ite Islamist, even harder. Iraqis regard him as honest and well-intentioned, but some question whether he is tough enough for the job. Unlike his predecessor, Ayad Allawi, he has no experience of security matters. Only if his government acts quickly to ease Sunni-Shia tensions, draw representative Sunnis into the political process (including the task of drawing up a constitution), and build up efficient security forces can the Americans hope to begin planning a phased withdrawal of their forces. For now, a viable exit strategy remains elusive.
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